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ENDURING SATISFACTION

ENDURING SATISFACTION

A Philosophy of
SPIRITUAL GROWTH

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To
Edgar Sheffield Brightman

PREFACE

MANY SINCERE and enlightened persons have found that traditional beliefs about human destiny are no longer emotionally satisfying or intellectually adequate. Among other observers of human nature, Jung portrayed this situation in the early thirties when he wrote his *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*. The disillusionment resulting from the recent war has even more intensified the spiritual frustration which robs man of any enduring satisfaction that might make his life meaningful. Some rational purpose for life must be discovered, if a spiritual reconstruction is to be achieved.

The writing of this book was motivated by the conviction that "modern man in search of a soul" might find an enduring satisfaction by working out for himself a "way of spiritual growth." This requires that each reflective person should explore the possibility that he can "save" himself from the inner sterility of a meaningless life by organizing and directing his thought, conduct, and imagination in accordance with an ideal purpose, i. e., by cultivating and satisfying such spiritual appetites as intellectual curiosity, an enlightened good will, aesthetic appreciation, and a consecration to some transcendent cause. It should be noted that throughout this study the term "spiritual" refers to any mental activity involved in the purposive self-realization of ideal values. Although religious consecration is not excluded, it is only one among other forms of spiritual processes as we conceive them.

It is the aim of this book to investigate the meaning, truth, and significance of an *hypothesis of spiritual growth* as a design for living. Our inquiry will proceed upon the assumption that a reflective thinker cannot permanently separate his

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concern for truth from his concern for ideal values. Is not the most disinterested passion for understanding reality in itself an ideal value experience? Furthermore, the "things that matter most" will lose their significance for a reflective person unless they are justified by reason. We believe, therefore, that if "modern man in search of a soul" is to find an objective meaning for his life, his intellectual curiosity will not be satisfied with mere isolated bits of information. He needs some comprehensive concept of the total universe in which his knowledge about the natural order, the human order, and the divine order, if such there be, are coherently integrated into an organic whole. Without such a speculative interpretation, natural facts are unrelated and human purposes have no meaningful connection with whatever objective process characterizes ultimate reality. One's personal experiences of fact and value have objective meaning, we believe, only when they are explained in terms of a coherent system of highly probable hypotheses which constitute the structure of the all-inclusive framework of one's metaphysical world-view.

The need for this type of inquiry is made evident in the cooperative volume, *Philosophy in American Education*, which reports to the American Philosophical Association the results of "an examination of the present state of philosophy and of the role philosophy might play in the postwar world." Careful study of this entire survey should be made by all who are concerned about educational problems. We shall cite here only those passages that pertain directly to the appropriateness of our discussions of the hypothesis of spiritual growth.

Questions regarding the basic issue of the function of philosophy in the spiritual reconstruction of a war-torn world brought out four specific demands:

Our graduates have a fair stock of information;
granted; but it lies about in their minds in fragments

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which need to be welded together to make a usable instrument. Secondly, they have been so busy boring educational holes, acquiring specialized knowledge and skills, that they now have little in common in the way of ideas, standards, or principles. Thirdly, they should understand better the nature and demands of the democracy in which they are to play their part. Fourthly, there is a want of clarity about the great ends of living, attachment to which gives direction and unity to life. And there is an impatient and general conviction that for each of these deficiencies philosophy has something of the first importance to offer, if only it could gather itself together and seize the opportunity boldly.¹

Professional philosophers have been indicted for their "ivory tower" detachment from the "faiths by which men sustain and give meaning to their major human interests." Although Murphy wisely emphasizes that it is necessary to integrate "a philosophy of life with philosophy as an intellectual discipline," he recognizes the need for a correlation of philosophy "as a process of inquiry" with "philosophy as product—the garnered wisdom of the ages put to current use as faith for living."² A composite picture of the current discontent with philosophy reveals how philosophers might become more effective in both academic and non-academic circles:

* The business of philosophy is to clarify, enlighten, and enrich these faiths by confronting them with the clearest thinking and widest knowledge humanly available on the matters with which they are concerned. It ought to eventuate in a philosophy of life in which these attitudes and affirmations — purged of ignorance, prejudice, and inconsistency — have been raised to the level of comprehensive wisdom. Not detach-

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ment but a profounder attachment to life is thus its goal, an attachment justified by knowledge but consummated in commitments to the realities that reflective criticism has shown to be best and most rewarding for actual living. Such wisdom, once more, is every man's business, in so far as he is to live his own life well, and its fruits should be available to all in terms they can understand and appreciate. In the great ages of faith and philosophy something approaching this sort of wisdom had actually been achieved. We do not have it today.³

If philosophers are to contribute significantly to the spiritual reconstruction of troubled minds, they must address two audiences, namely, the general public, and the academic student.

Otto points out that while philosophers have thus far done very little in furnishing philosophical guidance to the public, "an immense opportunity for enlarged usefulness lies open to teachers of philosophy who are not too hardened in their ways." Technical philosophy should assist laymen to attain a moral wisdom:

Is it possible for philosophy to meet these human specifications and yet measure up to scholarly standards? The answer depends upon whom you ask. My answer is a confident affirmative.

And what will professional philosophy so conceived do for the nonprofessional who makes its acquaintance? My answer is that it will do more for him than any other discipline can.

For one thing, it will work upon him in the same manner that intimate contact with mature philosophy of any kind does. It will break down the walls set up by habitual notions and feelings; will free him from the dominion of immediate appeals, from provincial-

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ism of ideas and narrowness of spirit, and thus aid in the emancipation of his mind. Superstitious credulity, dormant in almost all of us and active in the vast majority, will, so far as he is concerned, be recognized for what it is. Occult explanations, which still exercise enormous and harmful power over mankind, will lose the intellectual standing still so widely accorded to them wherever rational insight is weak. He will experience new interest in the value side of experience even as the whole process of evaluation is brought under critical scrutiny. Above all, he will gain in centrality of vision, in striking contrast with the mixture of confused and contradictory attitudes induced by the conflicting demands of present-day society.⁴

In writing *Enduring Satisfaction* we have attempted to reach those intelligent persons with little or no philosophical training, who, nevertheless, are interested in what philosophy may have to contribute to an understanding and solution of perplexing personal and social problems. We believe that if such laymen are sufficiently concerned about the spiritual crises of modern man, they can by diligent application find assistance from such a study in their efforts to formulate a satisfactory design for living.

The opportunity for philosophy to contribute to the spiritual reconstruction of our culture is probably the greatest in the college class room. Blanshard finds many educators demanding that philosophy should integrate college studies:

One of the most insistent of these, as we saw in the opening chapter, is that philosophy play a more distinctive and important role in the college curriculum. The demand and its grounds may be put in three propositions: (1) that the mass of knowledge we are asking students to master is growing more and more unwieldy, (2) that our present system does not give

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them the means of ordering and assimilating this knowledge, and (3) that philosophy can and should supply the means.⁵

Some educators believe that such a philosophical unification should come early in the student's program. Others claim that it should conclude the undergraduate's studies. Blanshard finds "wide support for the view that some study of philosophy should come at both ends." Ducasse reports the conviction that "philosophical reflection begets a special sort of perspective, more important perhaps than any other for the strategy of one's life; and to provide this particular kind of perspective is philosophy's distinctive role in a liberal education."⁶ An important step toward meeting this need, according to Ducasse, would be offering a general course in philosophy which might be entitled "Philosophy and Types of Human Experience," which would consider such subjects as education, religion, science, art, personal morality, morality and social policy, mind and matter.⁷

We hope that teachers will find *Enduring Satisfaction* a suitable text for such courses. We have used the material contained in it for an orientation course in the principles and applications of reflective thinking, which attempts to present a philosophical map for guiding beginning students in their exploration of the sources of valuable insights that are available throughout their entire college curriculum. In its present form this exposition has been used as the text for an advanced seminar which aims to integrate the student's knowledge into a systematic world-view. By means of supplementary references we have sought to make this book adaptable as a text for courses with beginning as well as advanced students. If our chief aim had been to present our arguments to professional philosophers, this study could have been much briefer. Historical analyses, extensive quotations, and detailed footnotes, except for documentation, could have been omitted. We believe that the additional space is justi-

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fied, however, since we thereby can meet the requirements of beginning students and the untrained laymen.

Professional philosophers will discern that the epistemological and metaphysical discussions pertain chiefly to the issue of whether or not the self-realization of ideal values has any objective meaning that can be verified in accordance with a synoptic method and a criterion of coherence which are also applicable in judgments about natural events.

Although we concentrate mostly on the personal problems involved in the discovery of a rational meaning for life, the social implications of our hypothesis of spiritual growth are suggested in Chapter 10. In this connection we call attention to a significant statement by Hendel in his excellent discussion of the role of philosophy in civilization:

It is characteristic of philosophy, too, to weigh deliberately the values of different possible courses of action. Our true work is really done when we are clear about these things, clear in our intelligence and in our conscience. After that philosophical function is performed there is a most important further step which is not the peculiar responsibility of philosophy. The men and women concerned, even whole nations, have to make their own decisions, according to their own free choice and character.⁸

In a democratic society men possess a common faith: "The freedom of the mind to inquire and to learn from other's experiments is a basic value." Philosophy must conserve and increase that attitude of mind:

There is, for example, an implicit sense of the good of the community in the creative work of the artist, scientist, or philosopher, and in the spiritual messages of religion. When such thought of the general welfare is a reality, however, there is some philosophy active in the minds of men. For philosophy inspires men to look

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to the whole and to seek for the unity of life amid all the differences. Philosophy also directs attention to the ends which all those various forms of culture must serve if they are doing their right work in the education of man. But in all this philosophy never acts as an authority, only as a guide.⁹

We assume the responsibility for justifying the claims of our hypothesis of spiritual growth as a principle of interpretation for theoretically explaining the meaning of human destiny and as a practical "way of salvation" from mental frustration. Two points, however, should be clear to the reader.

In the first place, our point of view is presented as an hypothesis that should be tested in the thought and experience of reflective persons. It is offered neither as a dogmatic doctrine, nor as a panacea for all of man's personal and social ills. Not only do we readily admit our own limitations, but we believe that definitive answers to persistent questions of objective inquiry, as well as perfect solutions to the problems of human life, are beyond the grasp of the human mind engaged in its fruitful but unending quest for genuine wisdom.

In the second place, this study should be viewed as only a contribution to the cooperative enterprise that is philosophy. We have drawn heavily from the well springs of wisdom offered by past and present prophets, artists, scientists, and philosophers. Although we are opposed to a slavish eclecticism and we have been critical at times even of those from whom we have learned much, we have attempted to glean from them whatever light they might shed on our inquiry. Hendel's warning is timely in this regard:

A review of past experience shows us, then, that philosophy is significant when it works in a generous partnership. It can, indeed, often take the lead in the search for wisdom. But the greatest mistake an indi-

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vidual philosopher can ever make is to 'go it all alone' and assume that he has the key to the problems of civilization in some idea from which he can draw out a whole set of systematic conclusions, assuming them to be forthwith applicable to the actual society of men. What the philosopher can offer is too valuable in its right place to be lost by such individualistic recklessness.¹⁰

My attempt throughout this study to maintain an objective attitude toward the doctrines of particular religions, including my own, might be interpreted as a lack of appreciation of the values of the Christian tradition. This would be an erroneous impression. For whatever it is worth, my religious outlook is expressed in Chapter IX, B. The Function of Religious Consecration in Spiritual Growth. Perhaps the best way to indicate my religious point of view in a preliminary way is to declare my whole hearted acceptance of the conviction of that "unrepentant liberal," Dr. Julius Seelye Bixler, to whom I owe so much: "Religion is devoted and loyal commitment to the best that reason and insight can discover. The liberal understands what loyalty to the best means as the authoritarian never can."¹¹ Not only were my discussions of the "spiritual crisis of modern man" and "the historical quest for salvation" worked out originally while studying with Dr. Bixler at the Harvard Divinity School, but his breadth of vision and depth of insight have greatly influenced all of my conceptions of the function of religion in a rational life.

My indebtedness to Alfred North Whitehead will be so obvious in the discussions of method and the conception of the natural order that I need not take space to elaborate it here. My study under that great man has been one of the rare privileges of my life.

Although I make frequent references to the ideas of Dr. Edgar S. Brightman in various parts of this study, they are

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very inadequate as an indication of the extensive influence he has exerted on my intellectual development. From him, more than from anyone else, I have received inspiration, instruction, guidance, encouragement, and concrete assistance both in my graduate studies and in the formulation of this inquiry. For the errors and shortcomings I alone am responsible. As a small token of my appreciation I dedicate this book to him, my teacher and friend.

To my wife, Marjorie, Dr. Raymond W. Short, and Mr. Richard M. Millard I wish to express my thanks for their painstaking labor in correcting the manuscript and making fruitful suggestions for its improvement.

The footnotes appear at the end of each chapter.

¹ Blanshard, PAE, 10 Cf. PAE, 9, 13

² Murphy, PAE, 70

³ Murphy, PAE, 71.

⁴ Otto, PAE, 156-157 Immediately preceeding quotation, PAE, 280.

⁵ PAE, 88

⁶ PAE, 139.

⁷ See PAE, 207-210.

⁸ PAE, 169.

⁹ Hendel, PAE, 173.

¹⁰ PAE, 187-188 Anyone who becomes impatient with our extended references to historical developments or detailed analyses of particular difficulties should note Murphy's conclusion "There is no proposed short cut to philosophical wisdom that has not proved to be a blind alley" (PAE, 65)

¹¹ Bixler, *Conversations with an Unrepentant Liberal*, 45.

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CHAPTER I

THE SPIRITUAL CRISIS OF MODERN MAN

*Ye heavenly strains, most mighty and most mild,
Why seek ye me, whereas in dust I grovel?
Peal where are men more apt to be beguiled!*

WHEN GOETHE expressed Faust's unresponsiveness to the ringing of the Easter bells in these lines, he anticipated the spiritual crisis through which many sincere and enlightened persons are struggling today. Traditional beliefs about the meaning of human destiny which constituted the "faith of our fathers" do not seem adequate to elicit a genuine response that is emotionally enduring or intellectually satisfying. Thus Jung declares that modern man is in search of a soul:

It is no reckless adventure, but an effort inspired by deep spiritual distress to bring meaning once more into life on the basis of fresh and unprejudiced experience. Caution has its place, no doubt, but we cannot refuse our support to a serious venture which calls the whole of the personality into the field of action. If we oppose it, we are trying to suppress what is best in man—his daring and his aspiration. And should we succeed, we should only have stood in the way of that invaluable experience which might have given a meaning to life. What would have happened if Paul had allowed himself to be talked out of his journey to Damascus?¹

Throughout this study we shall refer to a person who feels this spiritual distress and is seeking some meaning for his

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life as modern man. This does not mean that one who believes that he has found a way of salvation satisfactory to himself is deluded or unsophisticated. Perhaps he has discovered the true way of salvation, if such there be. It will facilitate the subsequent discussions, however, if he will allow us to designate his more unfortunate brother as "modern man in search of a soul." If the reader has not already experienced this tormented state of mind, we have no intention of creating it; and it would be strange if the present undertaking had more than academic appeal to one who has not already felt this need for some meaning in his life.

At the root of the spiritual frustration that possesses modern man is the lack of an intrinsically sacred enterprise to which he might consecrate his whole thought and conduct. In the bondage of selfish passions and petty aims he feels that he is condemned to inner conflict and stagnation. Whereas his forefathers found release from this mental distress through a specific mystical experience of conversion and appropriation of a redemptive process that was clearly defined by theological doctrines, he cannot find a way of salvation which satisfies both his feeling and his reason. What he most direly needs is a cause greater than himself through the participation in which all his experiences might progressively increase the meaning of his life.

In the troubled minds of many young men and women today there has welled up a "war-caused" disillusionment which requires a spiritual reconstruction of the ideal values which Mars has destroyed. Spiritual anguish over the apparent meaninglessness of their lives plagued some sincere and enlightened persons before all "civilized" society was plunged and engulfed in the late world war. Now, Mars has not only intensified this sense of frustration, but he has sown and reaped a bountiful and diabolical harvest in the sensitive minds of the youth whose education has been based upon the Platonic principle of the "victory of rational persuasion over brute force."

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The Government of the United States has exhibited justice and appreciation in furnishing therapeutic rehabilitation and financial compensation to those veterans who have suffered "war-caused" physical injuries, as well as educational and economic opportunities for all veterans under the "G. I. Bill of Rights." No government, regardless how just it may be, can spiritually rehabilitate the disillusioned minds that have been robbed by Mars of their cherished convictions and ideals.

We are not referring merely to the popular conception of "helping the returning veteran to readjust himself to civilian life." Good intentions in this regard can be overdone and even when necessary and successful, they do not touch the deeper problem with which we are concerned. In most cases time and patience are the only effective remedies.

Long after the veteran becomes accustomed to civilian clothes again, however, he often is still haunted by such thoughts as these: "I no longer possess any ideals of goodness, truth, justice, and a respect for the dignity and worth of personality." "Is there any purpose for my life beyond mere survival that may give my life some meaning and significance?" When students have confronted us with these problems during the past three years, we recall a conversation between two soldiers overseas. We report it since it throws light on the source of much spiritual despair:

Joe: "This killing is really getting me down."

Fred: "What do you mean? I know you're not yellow. Anyway you won't get it unless your number is up and your name is on the bullet."

Joe: "No, I am not afraid to die myself. And that is bunk about a guy's number being up. But that is not the point anyway. I have always been taught that human life was something sacred, and last week I shot an old man and a boy. I have not been able to sleep since. Sure they were Jerrys; but they were just as human as I am."

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- Fred: "But they would have killed you, if you hadn't plugged them. You should thank God that you're alive and they are dead."
- Joe: "Yeah, they are dead, but so am I—inside. Instead of thanking God because I am still breathing, I curse him for allowing a mess like this."
- Fred: "Joe, you shouldn't say that about God. Maybe He allowed this war to bring out heroism, courage—you know, to bring out our best qualities which we would not have otherwise known we had."
- Joe: "That's just so much stuff! And it sounded just as corny when the Chaplain said it last Sunday. What do you mean by the best qualities? I never stole a thing in my life before I was in the army; but where did I get this helmet, when I lost the one that was issued to me?"
- Fred: "Why, you just appropriated it from the next tent."
- Joe: "I stole it, and calling it 'appropriation' doesn't make it any better."
- Fred: "But you had to have a helmet, and you did not get caught. I am the only one who knows about it, and I wouldn't tell on a buddy."
- Joe: "That still doesn't make it okay for me to steal."
- Fred: "But we just got to stick by our buddies, no matter what. Remember how we got Jim Blake out of that bar in Cairo."
- Joe: "That, I suppose, was another case of bringing out our best qualities."
- Fred: "Of course it was. We stuck by our buddy. Didn't we tear up that joint and beat up those 'wogs' who were ganging up on Jim. Those Arabs deserved what they got. It was justice."
- Joe: "It was not justice! Jim was so drunk that he didn't know that he was polluted. So when the Arab bartender refused to sell Jim another drink for Jim's

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sake, Jim cut up the Arab's face with his broken glass, tore his clothes off, and smashed all the show cases. No wonder the bartender's friends were trying to get Jim under control."

Fred: "But we sure got them under control. Boy, but you sure smacked those birds, and I got some good cracks in myself. Those 'wogs' will never try to jump another American G. I."

Joe: "That's right, Fred, we paid them back for jumping Jim. But what sort of justice is that. Jim deserved a beating; but we beat the Arabs up simply because Jim was in our outfit."

Fred: "But Joe, we have to stick up for our own boys, no matter what. Maybe it wasn't fair to the Arabs, I hadn't thought of it that way; but when we occupy a town we don't bother about justice. The only thing we've got to go by is 'military necessity.' Without it the Army couldn't operate"

Joe: "Military necessity! Military necessity! Yes, Fred, I guess you're right. Military necessity covers every injustice, every murder, every lie, every act of cheating, and stealing. No, Fred, I don't blame the army. It's only doing the messy job that our whole society has foisted upon it. Yes, the society in whose churches and schools I was taught that everything I am doing now is wrong. I'm still no better off than the boys we buried over here. I'm just as dead inside. If there is a God, why hasn't He saved us from all this? Why?"²

Both ministers and educators must counter this disillusionment with a sound philosophy of personal counseling. If they fail, the civilizing tradition — derived from Socrates' insights into spiritual growth and from Jesus' appeal for love of God and man — may be considered by American youth to have only historical significance as a museum relic from a bygone unsophisticated era before man truly understood his nature and

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destiny. Lacking adequate guidance for their thought and conduct reflective minds will turn to a philosophy similar to that which developed after the first world war and became crystallized in Krutch's *Modern Temper*:

Formerly, man believed even in his darkest moments that the universe was rational, if he could only grasp its rationality, but gradually he has come to suspect that rationality is an attribute of himself alone and there is no reason to suppose that his own life has any more meaning than that of the humblest insect that crawls from one annihilation to another. Nature in her blind thirst for life, has filled every possible cranny of this rotting earth with some sort of fantastic creature, and among them man is but one — perhaps the most miserable of all, because he is the only one in whom the instinct of life falters long enough to enable it to ask the question, "Why?"³

Deliverance from mental anguish is not to be found by minimizing the tragic character of human destiny. To him who has never passed through the depths of spiritual distress there can never come a glimpse of the heights to which a human person can aspire. Through his search for some enduring meaning in his life, his soul must be tempered by the frustration of his ideal purposes in a deep and vital contact with the refining fire of inner conflict, struggle, and suffering. A mind which is conscious of what Unamuno called the "tragic sense of life" not only feels condemned by the ideal of the sort of person he feels he ought to be, but he is also sensitive to the intolerance, hatred, injustice, and prejudice that thwart the lives of others. The spiritual frustration with which we are concerned here can be considered to be one important aspect of the problem of evil.⁴

The problem of evil is two-fold. Reflective persons desire:
(1) an explanation of how such frustration of value can be

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permitted in a world controlled by a God who is vitally interested in the conservation and increase of value throughout the universe; (2) a practical attitude for meeting the tragic experiences of life so that one might emerge from them with greater spiritual maturity.

The problem of explaining evil: It can hardly be denied that much of the evil in the universe can be blamed upon the immoral actions, irrational choices, and thoughtlessness of human persons who disregard their acknowledged obligations. To this cause, however, it is unreasonable to ascribe such natural evils as physical suffering, disease, and inherited insanity which are not due to human carelessness, as well as earthquakes, tornadoes, and what Brightman has pointed out as the cruel, irrational waste and apparently aimless futility in much of the evolutionary development of life. Now if one does not believe in the existence of God, the problem of explaining cosmic evil is dissolved. Nature is simply indifferent to the effects of its processes upon human destiny and possesses no character of goodness or evil upon which aspersions can be cast. If one does believe in the existence of a God with a good purpose, however, some such explanation as the following must be justified:

- (a) What appears to be evil is recognized as disguised good when one fully understands God's long run purpose and is thus freed from the distortions of human ignorance.

(This reduction of evil to good offers no convincing argument against the possibility of the reduction of good to evil, i.e., what appears to be good is actually the illusion of the realization of values produced by an all-powerful, all-wise, and all-evil Being whose diabolical purpose is to torment and persecute a deluded humanity.)

- (b) An all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful God has pro-

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duced evil in the world in order to punish man for his inherently sinful and depraved nature.

(This traditional theological doctrine presupposes a questionable conception of human nature apart from the acceptance of which the doctrine is irrelevant. An extended subsequent discussion of this view will show that it precludes a fruitful solution in terms of the self-realization of ideal-values.)

- (c) God has produced evil in order to discipline man so that man will develop his own initiative and responsibility.

(While the initiative and responsibility that are necessary ingredients of spiritual maturity cannot be realized by one who has not endured the suffering and tragedies of life, it seems rather far-fetched to argue that God would cause all the human misery in the world for this purpose. Furthermore, this explanation does not account for all the frustration of value in the pre-human waste in the evolutionary development of life.)

- (d) Both goodness and evil are undeniable factors in the universe and must be accounted for in a rational conception of God and his alleged power, wisdom, and goodness.

(Since a metaphysical explanation of these factors in terms of the conception of God whose will is limited in power is offered later in this study, the implications of this theistic hypothesis can not be dealt with adequately until after we have considered the evidence for and against belief in God's existence. Throughout the immediately subsequent discussion of the practical attitude toward the frustration of value, however, we shall assume that the latter is just as much a real fact of experience as is the realization of value.)

The problem of the practical attitude for meeting the trag-

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ic experiences of life: Before a person can cultivate a practical attitude by which he might transform spiritual frustration into spiritual maturity he must analyze the nature and causes of his spiritual frustration.

In Christian theology the nature and causes of this spiritual frustration have most commonly been analyzed in terms of a human nature that is depraved and inherently sinful. Although many such expositions are too irrational and dogmatic to be worth considering in a philosophical inquiry, a most thorough and scholarly treatment of the orthodox Christian view of the nature of sin and salvation is to be found in Niebuhr's *The Nature and Destiny of Man*. Although Niebuhr himself does not accept the myths of the creation, fall, and atonement that are embodied in the Christian drama of salvation as literal facts, he scorches the "easy conscience" of sophisticated modern man who fails to see that the underlying issue is just as important today as it ever was:

The fact that man can transcend himself in infinite regression and cannot find the end of life except in God is the mark of his creativity and uniqueness; closely related to this capacity is his inclination to transmute his partial and finite self and his partial and finite values into the infinite good. Therein lies his sin.⁵

Niebuhr finds the reason for man's sin in his insecurity and involvement in natural contingency, which he seeks to overcome by a will-to-power and pride that exceeds the limits of his human creatureliness. The internal precondition of sin and the internal description of the state of temptation result in man's anxiety, which characterizes his finiteness and freedom. Only faith in God can eliminate that anxiety which leads to the sin of pride. In discussing man's responsibility for sin Niebuhr analyzes temptation and the inevitability of sin as follows:

The full complexity of the psychological facts which

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validate the doctrine of original sin must be analyzed, first in terms of the relation of temptation to the inevitability of sin. Such an analysis may make it plain why man sins inevitably, yet without escaping the responsibility of his sin. The temptation to sin lies, as previously observed, in the human situation itself. This situation is that man as spirit transcends the temporal and natural process in which he is involved and also transcends himself. Thus his freedom is the basis of his creativity but it is also his temptation. Since he is involved in the contingencies and necessities of the natural process on the one hand and since, on the other, he stands outside of them and foresees their caprices and perils, he is anxious. In his anxiety he seeks to transmute his finiteness into infinity, his weakness into strength, his dependence into independence. He seeks in other words to escape finiteness and weakness by a quantitative rather than a qualitative development of his life. The quantitative antithesis of finiteness is infinity. The qualitative possibility of human life is its obedient subjection to the will of God. This possibility is expressed in the words of Jesus: "He that loseth his life for my sake shall find it."⁶

Accordingly, sin is not the result of any particular temptation, but, rather, is an inevitable presupposition of all human life. Nevertheless, "the fact of responsibility is attested by the feeling of remorse or repentance which follows the sinful action."⁷ Since man is inevitably sinful in his self-glorification, he is free only when he recognizes the source of his guilt and acknowledges his complete dependence upon God.

If, on the one hand, Niebuhr is right in his claim that the spiritual crisis of modern man is the result of his anxiety for self-glorification, which leads inevitably to the sin of pride, the abject humility of self-negation and faith in God's absolute sovereignty would seem to be the only effective way

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that man can save his soul. If, on the other hand, one cannot accept Niebuhr's assumption that man is characterized by an innate depravity, even though the doctrine be stripped of its threats of fire and brimstone, then one may acknowledge the possibility that some other way of salvation might be more adequate for delivering modern man's tormented soul from the anguish of inner conflict and stagnation. On either assumption there is an undesirable condition of human nature that must be transformed. It is in the conception of the specific problem which must be solved that the difference is to be found.

Since we believe that modern man needs salvation from inner frustration rather than from an innate depravity, we consider Niebuhr's solution inadequate for restoring the minds of those experiencing such a crisis. Whereas Niebuhr claims that man's anxiety to realize his own spiritual possibilities is the source of his sin, we intend to show that it is the key to his salvation from a meaningless life. Man's sin, we believe, is not an inherent characteristic; but, rather, it is an awareness of self-condemnation when he willfully fails to act or think in accordance with his self-acknowledged ideal of spiritual growth.⁸

Although doctrinal theology has a necessary function in religious life, we do not believe that its methods of special pleading for a particular religious tradition is now adequate for dealing with the spiritual crisis which we have been describing. Since the theologian's interests are confined to the limited data and the absolute doctrines of a specific historical faith, he is not at liberty to question the adequacy of basic postulates upon which his "systematic exposition and rational justification of the intellectual content of religion" depends.⁹ We are not questioning the intellectual honesty of the theologian.

Instead of the special pleading for an "only" way of salvation which doctrinal theology by its very nature must express

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in terms of limited beliefs of a particular religious tradition, we shall use the philosophical method of free inquiry which will permit a more objective detachment as well as a more inclusive search for possible sources of ideal value realizations. Religion is not minimized thereby; rather, it simply becomes one among other human activities that may contribute to man's insight into an enduring meaning for his life.

There is one sense in which we shall present a special pleading for our view of the nature and destiny of man. Our position, nevertheless, will not be that of the theologian, since all our premises will be open to criticism. Furthermore, we shall draw much from many religious, aesthetic, ethical, and philosophical traditions, rather than from any authoritatively established body of doctrines.

Although man's selfish and immoral will causes much frustration of ideal values and is responsible for some of the mental distress that sensitive persons experience, it is not the only root of the problem of evil with which we are faced. A clear conscience does not guarantee salvation from the spiritual despair that possesses the lost soul of modern man. When Jesus prayed, "Father forgive them; for they know not what they do," he cleansed his soul of any sinful desire for revenge against those who nailed him to the cross. Thus he manifested the essential spirit of an enlightened good will when he preferred understanding, tolerance, justice, and love to intolerance, injustice, and hatred. When, however, he cried out, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" his experience would not substantiate such Pollyannaic optimism as Emerson expressed in his dictum that "for a good man misery is superficial," or Browning's "God's in His heaven; all's right with the world."

A more realistic insight into modern man's search for a soul is portrayed by Rodin in his statue, "The Soul and the Body," where the frustration of spiritual growth is symbolized by a grotesque and fantastic creature. The lower parts

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of this centaur-like being are similar to those of a horse that is rearing up in fright. From the shoulders up to the tips of the outstretched hands the appearance is human. On the upturned face there is graven the dire anguish of a troubled soul—a soul that is "exceedingly sorrowful, even unto death." Perhaps Rodin is also crying out through this sculptured figure: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me? Why hast Thou given me just enough intelligence to wonder about the meaning of my destiny? As a mere beast I would suffer pain but never the despair of impossible aspirations. Then death and extinction would not matter; but when my bestial nature fetters my spark of divinity, disillusionment plagues my soul. As a mere beast I would grope blindly to annihilation, but I would never be tortured by the question, 'Why?' As a biological organism I could be content with each passing emotional experience, but as a soul partially divine I must discover a way out of this spiritual stagnation by realizing some enduring meaning for my thought and conduct. Yet the more I emerge upon higher planes of life, the more inaccessible my ideal of spiritual growth becomes. That I am ever falling short of my acknowledged ideal, fills my mind with anguish. Why? Why? Why?"

There is a very real sense in which modern man's search for a soul is a quest for a way of salvation, even though it does not involve many of the religious doctrines that are usually associated with the traditional conceptions. Underlying these particular differences between specific views of how redemption is possible, however, there are two universal aspects of the human situation which also characterize the spiritual crisis with which we are concerned: (i) an undesirable condition of human nature that must be changed; and (ii) an adequate way by which this transformation can be accomplished, whether the agent be man's own will, God's will, or a cooperative enterprise which requires both.¹⁰

When it is viewed in the light of this working hypothesis,

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modern man's problem of spiritual stagnation corresponds to the sinful nature of man which the Christian view of redemption presupposes and to the fettered soul which Buddha sought to release. If modern man did not feel that human life should have a supreme purpose to which all other aims are subordinate, he would not be tortured as he is. Since he does feel that there should be such an ideal for his thought and conduct and that somehow he is failing to realize it, he is beset by the fear that his life is meaningless. He can be saved from this bondage only by being saved for some greater purpose than he has yet discovered. It should clearly be recognized, therefore, that, in spite of similarity between the problems which all views of redemption presuppose, the adequacy of a particular way of salvation depends upon its applicability to the specific condition of human nature which it must transform. Just as the Christian's solution is inapplicable to the Buddhist's problem, so is the Buddhist's solution inapplicable to the Christian's problem. Any way of salvation, therefore, must be judged internally with a view to the particular type of alteration that is required.

In our subsequent claims that the Christian conception of salvation is not adequate for modern man, it should be clear from what we have said above, we are not denying the importance of the Christian solution of the problem with which it deals. If man is utterly depraved, as it assumes, it may very well be the true way of redemption. What we are denying, however, is that it is applicable to the problem of modern man for whom the condition of inherited sin is insignificant in comparison with the mental anguish that his spiritual frustration elicits.¹¹

Whitehead has declared that it is the task of theology to furnish man with an understanding of "how life includes a mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow."¹² Although we agree with Whitehead that such a quality of mind is what modern man needs, we have already shown why we do not

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believe that the "special pleading" of theology is the method which is adequate for discovering an enduring satisfaction that can transform spiritual frustration into spiritual maturity. Free critical inquiry is required. Consequently, our quest for a way of salvation through spiritual growth will not be confined to religious experience alone, but rather it will explore such other realms of the spirit as are disclosed by man's creative imagination, his moral endeavors, both personal and social, and his metaphysical insight into the cosmic status of his ideal-value realizations in the universe as a whole.¹³

¹ Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, 276-278. Cf. MMS, 267 and *Psychology and Religion*, 95.

In his *Normative Psychology of Religion*, 167-168, Wieman claims that the present spiritual crisis is similar to the spiritual crisis in the period during which Christianity arose.

In his *Paths of Life*, 3-10, Morris describes the "agony of man." Its humanistic solution may not be adequate, but its analysis of modern man's problem and its historical insights are penetrating.

The popularity of Liebman's *Peace of Mind* and Lecomte du Nouy's *Human Destiny* bears testimony to the widespread need for spiritual guidance that is felt by many sincere and enlightened persons today. References will be made to these important books in subsequent discussions.

² The present writer heard this conversation between two soldiers who came to him for personal counseling, while he was stationed in the Middle East. The soldiers were on leave from the Italian Campaign. The ideas they expressed are accurately reported here, although it has been necessary to "clean up" some of the colorful language for a publication such as this. We present it here merely to show the problems involved, not as an argument. We might state parenthetically that we agree with Joe that it is not the army itself but the society which gave the army the dirty job to do that is the culprit, if such there be. The names used are fictitious.

³ Krutch, *Modern Temper*, 8-9.

⁴ Among the competent treatments of the general problem of evil, Hocking's classification of evils is especially instructive: "(1) Evils of our physical situation: The resistance of nature, necessity of work, poverty; defects of our bodily machine, liability to breakdown, inadequacy, collapse, age. (2) Evils of finitude: Ignorance, limited foresight, limited power; limited time. (3) Evils of mischance: Pain and other physical suffering; failure, defeat, disappointment, futility; loss of health, position, reputation; loss of friends, bereavement; loss of sanity. (4) Evils of social history: Injustice, hatred, the ravages of prejudice and cruelty, war, frustration in the attempt to do good, loss of hope; preponderance of indifference, venality, material ambition in the environment; historical triumph of force, greed, and cunning. (5) Evils of our cosmic situation and of thought: The muteness of the universe, silence of God; the law of increase of suffering with increase of sensitivity and of sympathy; the curse of tedium and of commonplaceness. (6) Moral evil: Vice and crime in general, my own share in the general moral status, and my own

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defect of duty." (*Preface to Philosophy*, 487.) See also Tsanoff, *The Nature of Evil*.

⁵ *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, 122. Cf. NDM, 178-179, 182-183, and 202. Despite the similarity of this view with Barth's conception of sin, Niebuhr recognizes relative moral judgments which Barth does not. (See NDM, 220.)

⁶ NDM, 251. Cf. NDM, 254.

⁷ NDM, 255. Cf. NDM, 258, 260, 263.

⁸ Although it will become increasingly evident that the present writer recognizes the profundity of many of Jesus' own spiritual insights, this conception of sin presupposes to a great degree the Greek conception of human nature which the doctrinal religion *about* Jesus has usually opposed. Whereas the Greeks emphasized man's own creative capacity for self-realization through the cultivation of human virtues and reason, most orthodox Christians have considered the education and discipline of these natural impulses dangerous, since they glorify man rather than God. Hence, Augustine condemned the Greek virtues of a rational life as "splendid vices": "Though it may seem laudable that the soul govern the body, and reason the vicious impulses, yet the soul and reason itself cannot by any means, unless it serve God, as God himself has prescribed it, govern them in the right way. For what kind of a lord of the body and of the vices can a mind be, which, being ignorant of the true God and not subject to his governance, is prostituted and corrupted by the demons polluted with all the vices? And the virtues themselves, if they bear no relation to God, are in truth vices rather than virtues; for although they are regarded by many as truly moral when they are desired as ends in themselves and not for the sake of something else, they are, nevertheless, inflated and arrogant (*inflatae ac superbiae*), and therefore not to be viewed as virtues but as vices." (*De Civitate Dei*, xix., 25.)

⁹ Knudson, *The Doctrine of God*, 19. The theologian himself admits that the method of theology is "special pleading": "Theology, in view of its ecclesiastical associations, has its own special province. It concentrates attention upon the teaching of the Bible and the church, seeking to interpret and commend it to the modern mind, in a way that philosophy of religion does not. It thus has its own peculiar approach to the religious problem. It comes to it from within the Christian Church. This fact gives to it a content and a character that are more or less distinctly its own." (Knudson, *DOG*, 173-174.) Although Macintosh in *Theology as an Empirical Science and Problems of Religious Knowledge* expresses the closest approximation to free inquiry in theological writings, even he does not subject the basic doctrines of Christianity to critical investigation. See Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, 22-26 for definitions which distinguish natural from revealed theology.

¹⁰ An analysis of the data which substantiates this working hypothesis will be found in the Appendix entitled "The Historical Quest for Salvation." The question of which of the agents mentioned can transform the undesirable condition of modern man, can not be answered until our investigation is completed.

¹¹ Liebman has frankly summarized as follows what he understands to be the conception of human nature that is implied by the doctrine of salvation advocated by most Western religions: "Atone, you miserable human worm! Smite yourself with the rod of self-punishment. Lacerate your guilty soul with the knout of Conscience, else ye be not worthy of the sight of God." (*Peace of Mind*, 24.)

Although our treatment of the problem of spiritual frustration will not be the same as that of Liebman, we share his conviction that "self-understanding

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rather than self-condemnation is the way to inner peace and mature conscience." (PM, 33.)

¹² *Adventures of Ideas*, 221.

¹³ Liebman believes that "it is in the mighty confluence of dynamic psychology and prophetic religion that modern man is most likely to find peace of mind." (PM, 20.) Liebman does not mean to imply that religion can be reduced to psychological techniques: "A wise religion is indispensable for peace of mind because it blesses us with inner gifts beyond the bestowal of any science: a sense of our purpose in the world, a feeling of relatedness to God, the shared warmth of group fellowship, and the subordination of our little egos to great moral and spiritual ends. Religion at its best, is the announcer of the supreme ideals by which men must live and through which our finite species finds its ultimate significance." (PM, 12-13.) Nevertheless, Liebman contends with justification that "religion needs help if it is to make these ideals incarnate in human life." (PM, 13.) Among his profound and inspiring chapters we find his discussion of "grief's slow wisdom" to be the best example of the type of religious problem for which psychotherapy can furnish valuable aid. We agree that "modern psychology, through its startling new insights into the subtleties and complexities of the human mind, should help religion to modify its views. Untenable interpretations of human nature should be eliminated: morbid traits and attitudes which have been the major obstacles along the road to the good life should be removed." (PM, 201.) We also agree that "in any kind of society certain universal psychological reactions will manifest themselves, certain emotional constants, as it were, will make their appearance, and men and women will have to learn then as now, how to manage their psychic needs and conflicts with a greater artistry." (PM, xii) Furthermore, it can hardly be denied that "this process, called sublimation, is the profoundest spiritualizing factor in man's life." (PM, 28.) Despite our obvious admiration of Liebman's wisdom and our appreciation of the significant contribution he has made toward the formulation of reasonable and fruitful religious approach to life's deeper problems, we believe that he has minimized the metaphysical insights that may be attained through a speculative interpretation of man's ethical, aesthetic, and religious experience. We agree with Liebman, speaking for both religion and psychiatry, when he emphasizes that man will "master fear through faith—faith in the worthwhileness of life and the trustworthiness of God; faith in the meaning of our pain and our striving, the confidence that God will not cast us aside but will use each one of us as a piece of priceless mosaic in the design of His universe." (PM, 104.) But we seriously doubt that "modern man in search of a soul" will be possessed by such a faith unless it is rationally justified by a coherent world view constructed by scientific and philosophical thought. Liebman would not agree with us, however: "No, intellectualism does not always confer peace of mind. Goethe's Faust—in many ways the archetype of troubled modern man—possessed a hard-earned mastery of science, philosophy, and mathematics, yet we know of the sorry bargain that this tormented hero made with the powers of evil in his search for contentment." (PM, 7.) It will be left for the reader to decide for himself whether or not the *enduring satisfaction* of spiritual growth can be realized without the "intellectualism" of objective reflective inquiry.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCRATIC WAY OF SPIRITUAL GROWTH

IN ACCORDANCE with the critical method of philosophical investigation, we propose the working hypothesis that *modern man can find his soul*, if "a way of salvation" can be reconceived in terms of his own spiritual growth. We shall find many sources of insight—religious, ethical, aesthetic, and intellectual—that can be interpreted by this principle of self-realization; but there probably is no better source in which the clues for the solution of modern man's problem can be discovered than in the teachings of Socrates.

When a perplexed Athenian youth brought his personal problems to Socrates, that sage advised: "Know thyself." The Sophist had taught the young men that all truth and value are relative, perishing with the emotions of the present moment. There is no enduring satisfaction that makes life worth the effort. To this futility Socrates replied that an "unexamined life is not worth living"; but that a self-examination may reveal enduring values which make life meaningful. A rational person can discover and develop his latent potentialities for spiritual growth. Thus Socrates sought to sublimate the frustrated emotions of his disillusioned pupils by linking their thought, conduct, and imagination with ideals of goodness, truth, and beauty that are eternal.

When Socrates recommended a way of salvation from a meaningless life through the purposive realization of ideal values, he clearly emphasized that a rational insight into the meaning of spiritual growth presupposes a thorough self-examination of the emotions and purposes that constitute hu-

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man nature: "Know thyself." If we are to explore the possibility that the Socratic wisdom may help modern man, our first step must be to analyze the given data from which his self-knowledge might be derived, i. e., his experience of values.

Whatever may be one's final judgment as to the objective meaning of values in the universe as a whole, there can be no question as to whether or not value experiences are facts. All persons experience values whenever they satisfy felt needs or desires. In addition to the biological modes of behavior through which men universally satisfy physical appetites in response to the stimuli of their space-time environment, some persons seek to satisfy spiritual appetites in their conduct through the realization of aims which they themselves have selected in response to their own creative imagination or speculative thought. Since the latter type of experience is the result of deliberate criticism and choice of ends to be realized, they have been designated as ideal values. Each of us at some time or another has probably experienced such a unique aspiration for excellence as motivates an awareness of moral loyalty to one's fellows, a yearning for beauty and sublimity, an intellectual curiosity for no practical ends, and a desire for consecration to something sacred without regard to reward or punishment.

Although we are not discussing the issue of whether or not these value intuitions have any objective referents at this point, we do consider it necessary to guard against the common fallacy in which it is assumed that the admitted conflicts of value intuitions and frustrations of ideal aspirations preclude the possibility that they could have any objective meaning. This assumption would logically require the parallel assumption that errors of sense-perception or biological maladjustments imply that there is no space-time environment. These implications of experience can be judged only by a rational interpretation such as we shall present later in

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this study. Socrates' suggestion that a human person might be able to organize his thought and conduct around an ideal of personality is important enough to deserve a thorough investigation. What we require is a psychological method of self-examination which can deal with man's thoughts, his aspirations, and his devotion to ideals, even though a subsequent philosophical investigation may show that his value-intuitions are subjective illusions.

Jung's analysis of human personality furnishes such a starting point for verifying the Socratic hypothesis that man may resolve his frustrations and find enduring satisfaction, if he will organize and integrate his passing emotional experiences into the growth of a definite quality of mind. Now this sounds rather abstract; but in the process of verifying this hypothesis we shall suggest concrete attitudes by the cultivation and satisfaction of which such self-realization may be possible.

A. Jung's Analysis of the Psychological Motivation of Ideal Value Experience.

According to Jung, self-consciousness emerges from the unconscious, to which it is organically related:

The conscious mind is based upon, and results from, an unconscious psyche which is prior to consciousness and continues to function together with, or despite consciousness.¹

It is beyond the scope of this study to consider the evidence which Jung has accumulated through many years of observation and thought about his theory as it applies to psychopathic cases. That aspect of it which is relevant here pertains to his account of the purposive integration of ideal value-experiences. Through this conscious process normal persons sublimate by the "prospective aim" such otherwise unconsci-

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ous tendencies as the sexuality and the will-to-power which characterize, to some degree, all human thought and conduct:

The way of successive assimilation reaches far beyond the operative results that concern the doctor. It leads in the end to that distant goal (which may have been the first urge of life), the bringing into reality of the whole human being—that is individuation.²

In this process an ideal of personality becomes an "autonomous complex" which "affects the life of the personality through the emotions." Such purposive imagination of possibilities of future growth is thus an indispensable constituent of a satisfactory and inwardly adjusted life. An epitome of this theory as it is expressed through Jung's works is suggested here as follows.³

The unconscious tendency of sexuality influences consciousness in such mental attitudes as an appreciation of fineness of beauty, the unselfishness of social responsibility and self-sacrifice, the creative expression and re-creative activities of the imagination, as well as in the more physical compulsions with their degrees of personal love.⁴

The will-to-power is a virile protest from a sense of an inferiority of the bodily organs or of an inadequate capacity to meet situations. The psychic accompaniment is a compensatory effort. The power to which an individual wills is not necessarily an external domination. Usually, it involves the inner satisfaction of overcoming the unbearable feeling of inferiority which seems to depend upon such mastery. The motive lies in the effort itself.⁵

The prospective aim is the individual's desire for a greater personality. Herein the field of choice is given in the conscious awareness of sexual and will-to-power motives arising from the unconscious. These are consciously directed and sublimated by the self-determination of a creative synthesis toward an ideal of psychic growth and moral autonomy:

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Fidelity to the law of one's being is a trust in this law, a loyal perseverance and trustful hope; in short, such an attitude as a religious man should have to God. And now it becomes apparent what a dilemma heavily weighted with consequences emerges from behind our problem: personality can never develop itself unless the individual chooses his own way consciously and with conscious moral decision. Not only the causal motive, the need, but a conscious, moral decision must lend its strength to the process of the development of personality. If the first, that is, need, is lacking, then the so-called development would be missing, that is, the conscious decision, then the development will come to rest in a stupefying, unconscious automatism. But a man can make a moral choice of his own way only when he holds it to be the best.⁶

Unless the prospective aim toward a greater personality is consciously acknowledged as a law for one's own thought and conduct, the meaning of one's life in unintelligible:

In so far as a man is untrue to his own law and does not rise to personality he has failed of the meaning of his life. Fortunately, in her kindness and patience, Nature has never put the fatal question as to the meaning of their lives into the mouths of most people. And where no one asks, no one needs to answer.⁷

This is precisely the fatal question which modern man is asking and to which our hypothesis of spiritual growth as a way of salvation intends to give an answer. Even though a rational person knows that "personality as a complete realization of the fullness of our being is an unattainable ideal,"⁸ nevertheless, he will purposively organize his emotional desires and egoistic compulsions in order to sublimate them into the "prospective aim" of self-realization. The degree to which a person is free to choose the determinants of his psy-

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chic destiny is relative, therefore, to the purposive control he exercises over the complex aggregate of emotional energies which emerge from his subconsciousness.

B. Toward a Functional Synthesis through Spiritual Growth.

Although Jung's psychological analysis suggests the possibility that man might be able to realize a quality of mind through the purposive integration of his emotional experiences which would sublimate his spiritual frustrations, Jung does not claim that modern man can "find his soul" through psychological tricks or mental gymnastics. Psychiatry is not an adequate substitute for religion or a way of salvation that requires belief in the objectivity of the realities to which the mental processes furnish clues. We are not seeking for some magic formula or secret panacea for all human ills through the application of psychological techniques. Nevertheless, Jung's observations furnish us with valuable data for the self-examination which the Socratic way of spiritual growth requires; for this self-creative process is an exemplification of the "prospective aim."

Throughout our subsequent discussions we shall designate the quality of mind by which modern man might be saved from a meaningless life as an *enduring satisfaction*. In order to realize this consummatory stage of spiritual growth modern man must cultivate and satiate the insistent craving of such spiritual appetites as aesthetic appreciation, an enlightened good will, speculative venture, and a consecration to a sacred cause. Although these creative syntheses of emotion and purpose are not mere "psychological recipes," it is instructive to note that the cultivation of a creative imagination requires a sublimation of sexuality, the cultivation of an enlightened good will requires a sublimation of a will-to-power, the cultivation of a consecration to an intrinsically sacred cause requires a sublimation of a prospective aim, and the

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cultivation of speculative venture requires a sublimation of sublimations into a psycho-synthesis which a metaphysical interpretation of spiritual growth furnishes as the counterpart of a psycho-analysis. These preliminary statements will become more intelligible as our study progresses. Some philosophers may fear that this attempt to apply the Socratic wisdom to the problem of modern man will lead to an obscure mysticism, such as that which characterizes oriental speculation but which is not becoming the scientific objectivity of western thought. We assure them that this is not our aim, and remind them that an objective philosophical inquiry cannot ignore any important data of human experience. Obscurantism results not from a metaphysical interpretation of man's experience nor from his purposive realization of ideal values but rather from an inadequate method of explanation.

We began this study by pointing out that the spiritual crisis of modern man is symbolized by Faust's unresponsiveness to the Easter bells. Now we wish to emphasize that Faust did not terminate his search for salvation just because his old beliefs were no longer acceptable to him. In the same way, modern man must continue to seek for the sources in human experience from which the outworn beliefs have arisen; for he is not freed from spiritual bondage simply by casting out "the crude hypotheses of our ignorant ancestors" (Montague) or by ignoring "the rattling of ancient moral chains" (Hocking). After he has liberated his mind from the fetters of blind adherence to traditional dogmas, modern man must discover anew in the well-springs of his own ideal-value experiences those meaningful feelings and purposes from which a more adequate way of salvation from inner frustration might be reconceived in terms of spiritual growth.

Since life for modern man is meaningless when it is purposeless, the discovery of a rational purpose is the chief concern of this attempt to formulate a satisfactory philosophy of life which can serve as a design for living. He who would

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follow the Socratic principle of self-examination must investigate the possibility of realizing a greater personality through the purposive self-creation of spiritual growth in which he may find the enduring satisfaction of a noble discontent. This is the quality of mind which Faust discovered when he declared "He alone deserves liberty and life who has to conquer them daily." The aim of spiritual growth is the pursuit of an ideal so great that a person never can fully attain it, but which a person will always pursue nevertheless, since to do otherwise is beneath his spiritual dignity.

In the chapters which follow we shall seek to apply the Socratic principle by suggesting to "modern man in search of a soul" how he might organize and guide his thought, conduct, and imagination in accordance with an ideal of spiritual growth through the cultivation of such spiritual appetites as (i) an appreciation of the beautiful and the sublime, (ii) an enlightened good will, (iii) intellectual curiosity, and (iv) a consecration to some cause that transcends one's own petty aims. A brief description of what we mean by these spiritual appetites is offered here as a preview of the detailed discussions:

(i) *An appreciation of the beautiful and the sublime:*

Man as a mere biological organism might live without the enjoyment of art; but man as a developing personality requires some degree of satisfaction in his desire to appreciate the beautiful and the sublime. As Longinus has well said: "Sublimity is the true ring of the noble mind." The satisfaction which great art affords is not identical with the intensity, the thrill, or the ecstasy of mere pleasurable feeling. Such pure enjoyment of art for its own sake is legitimate; but it is upon the quality of profound feeling and the meaning of the state of mind it elicits that the real significance of beauty and sublimity depends. Apart from

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such cultivation of emotional sensitivity to fineness and harmony, there could be no spiritual growth.

(ii) *An enlightened good will:*

An enlightened good will is that attitude toward other persons by which a reflective person might so transform his selfish interests that he realizes what moral freedom means by sharing social responsibility. If man maintains this attitude in the face of brute force and unideal compulsion, he is sublimating his selfish will-to-power into his own spiritual growth. Force, as exhibited in his will-to-power, is not eliminated thereby; but it is given a creative rather than a destructive function. Through the satisfaction of the spiritual appetite of an enlightened good will a person can generate a transforming equilibrium of inner poise when he meets injustice with understanding, prejudice with tolerance, hatred with love, and social indifference with social responsibility. In this higher unity, which all mutual respect for personal worth should be, there is realized an ethical quality of mind that is characterized by a generosity which motivates noble action. Plato expressed the essence of this attitude when he advocated "the victory of rational persuasion over brute force," and Jesus exemplified it in his forgiving spirit while on the Cross.

(iii) *Intellectual curiosity:*

By seeking to satisfy his intellectual curiosity a reflective person can gain more than mere information. He can realize the intrinsic satisfaction of exploring all types of experience in terms of tentative hypotheses. From his logic of inquiry which requires that he cautiously test every possible explanation and consider open-mindedly all points of view he has developed the self-imposed obligation to combine toler-

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ance with the deep convictions rooted in his enlightened good will. The fact that he can never claim absolute certainty but rather only a high degree of probability for the truth of his best judgments does not stifle his passion for truth. On the contrary, such fruitful uncertainty, which does yield important partial knowledge progressively expanding, adds zest to his speculative venture toward a coherent comprehension of the meaning of life, an ideal so great that no human mind can fully achieve it. It is this spiritual adventure of thought motivated by a profound feeling of wonder aiming to answer the question "Why?" that challenges his best intellectual efforts to share with the great thinkers of all ages what Byron called "the eternal spirit of the chainless mind." Unless a person feels some sense of wonder about the universe and an absorbing concern about the ultimate meaning of his own destiny, this disinterested intellectual curiosity will seem to be a fruitless enterprise. Once these problems become burning issues, however, modern man can discover the exhilarating joy of constructing through scientific and philosophical inquiry a coherent world-view exemplifying the symmetry, harmony, and systematic order which has aesthetic as well as cognitive value. The child's restless curiosity about its physical surroundings is thereby transmuted into the insistent and enduring passion for truth which drives modern man to penetrate by his thought the veil that forever hides from the senses the underlying causal processes that produce the natural and human orders. It is this progressive clarification which disinterested intellectual curiosity furnishes that liberates the mind from subjective impulses, routine habits, and the accidental circumstances of the environment which have distorted the mind's perspective by inhibiting fear, un-

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warranted hope, undisciplined desire, and biased aversion to logical conclusions not compatible with emotional prejudices. When a mind is so unfettered that it enjoys the true enlargement of comprehending the details of its experience as integral parts of a coherent whole with which it has established a meaningful relation, there is developed an inner resourcefulness and a majestic calm which Newman has called "the delights of knowledge."

In order to satisfy his intellectual curiosity a reflective thinker must organize the hypotheses which seem adequate for explaining the facts of experience into a coherent system of beliefs (not static dogmas justifying emotional prejudices) which he is constantly expanding as he is seeking a fuller realization and more adequate explanation of life.

(iv) *Consecration to a transcendent aim:*

The "modern man in search of a soul" who is seeking to "save" himself from the inner frustration of a meaningless life by realizing the ideal purpose of spiritual growth will find that he requires some intrinsically sacred enterprise to which he can consecrate his sensitive and enlightened good will. "Not my will, but Thine be done," expresses the profound discovery that to realize spiritual maturity one must dedicate his self-creative capacities to some cause through the participation in which all his ideal value experiences progressively increase the meaning of his life.

These "spiritual appetites" correspond to the "higher intransigent values" or the "hyper-organic values" for which the other values of life are instrumental.⁹ It is now the problem of this study to show how modern man can organize his imagination, conduct, and thought in accordance with these "spir-

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itual appetites" so that the realization of spiritual growth as the ultimate intrinsic value in life produces a *noble discontent* and an *enduring satisfaction*. We shall thus explore the implications of this hypothesis: While a *noble discontent* is a quality of mind that is generated only by the cultivation of the creative imagination and an enlightened good will; an *enduring satisfaction* is a quality of mind that can be generated only through the cultivation of intellectual curiosity which (i) verifies through metaphysical speculation the objective truth of the ideal claims of the creative imagination and the enlightened good will, and (ii) discovers a divine persuasion toward eternal perfectibility, a superhuman cause to which modern man can consecrate his creative endeavors. Although the ideal of spiritual growth will be considered primarily as the norm of a personal design for living, we shall conclude this investigation by explaining the social significance of the ideal of spiritual growth as a standard for criticizing and contributing toward the progress of civilization "from brute force to rational persuasion."

¹ Carl G. Jung, *The Integration of Personality*, 13. Cf. Jung, CAP, 100, 365, 83; and MMS, 37, 110, 215. Jung's account should not be confused with those of Freud and Adler.

² Jung, MMS, 31. Cf. IP, 3.

³ Jung, *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, (CAP), 92 and MMS, 224. See CAP, 62-63, 65-66, 92-93, 98, 345; MMS, 39-40, 81, 104, 107, 31, 110, 170-177, 224, 261; PU, xlv, v, 194; TEAP, 15, 25, 32, 125-126, 141, 175, 174, 183, 184, 265, 267-268, for passages that substantiate this epitome.

⁴ See Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, 379-395, for a discussion of the relation of sexuality to the Christian way of salvation.

⁵ See Hocking, HNR, 396-397, 403-404, 405, 476, for a discussion of the relation of a will-to-power to the Christian way of salvation. See HNR, 398-401 for a comparison with Buddhism on same.

⁶ Jung, IP, 269. Hocking expresses a similar idea: "If one were to conceive this life, then, as a sort of *apprenticeship in the capacity to create*, in which one's advancement measures one's degree of attained reality, one would be closely interpreting the empirical facts in the light of an incessant striving, which may be largely subconscious. And, in particular, I am learning how to create a self." (*Thoughts on Death and Life*, 212-213. Cf. TDL, 214-216.)

Hocking maintains that Christianity "intends to state its requirement in terms of a complete transformation of the instincts." (HNR, 367. Cf. 363-

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364.) This would seem to indicate that something very much like the prospective aim was central to Jesus' teachings about an "abundant life."

⁷ IP, 301.

⁸ IP, 287.

⁹ See Brightman's "Table of Values" in *A Philosophy of Religion*, 94-100 and Urban's "Table of Values" in *Fundamentals of Ethics*, 169.

CHAPTER III

THE FUNCTION OF CREATIVE IMAGINATION IN SPIRITUAL GROWTH

IF MODERN MAN accepts Socrates' advice, "Know thyself," in a serious effort to grow spiritually, he may well profit by a self-examination of the emotions and purposes that constitute his creative imagination. The fruitfulness of this source of spiritual insight is suggested by Jung's conclusion from his thorough study of the undercurrents of psychic life which have influenced both ancient and modern men:

The artist seizes his image, and in the work of raising it from the deepest unconsciousness he brings it into relation with conscious values, thereby transforming its shape, until it can be accepted by his contemporaries according to their powers.¹

Thus in psychically assimilating the emotional crises that constitute the process of value-realizations a great artist has raised to the level of aesthetic experience the insight that a redeeming "purposiveness outreaching human ends is the life-giving secret of man."²

In order to investigate the function of the creative imagination in spiritual growth we must: (i) discover the fruitfulness of cultivating the "spiritual appetite" of aesthetic experience, i. e., the appreciation of the beautiful and the sublime; and (ii) ascertain what insights into the meaning of human emotions and purposes might be revealed through the creative expression of a great artist. We shall consider Goethe's *Faust* as a specific example.

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A. The Fruitfulness of Cultivating Aesthetic Appreciation.

Can modern man realize a *noble discontent* through cultivating his "spiritual appetite" of aesthetic appreciation? Art, according to Hocking, "must be sufficiently beyond man so that he has to stretch a little to get its full value. The business of art is to haunt a person with the inner tinglings of a nobler selfhood which is not yet in existence but is on the way to be born."³

To be sure man can survive without the enjoyment of art; but man as a developing personality requires some degree of satisfaction in his desire for the beautiful and the sublime. For, as Longinus has well said: "Sublimity is the true ring of the noble mind."⁴ That is to say, the satisfaction which great art affords is not identical with the intensity, the thrill, or the ecstasy of mere pleasurable feeling. Such pure enjoyment of art is certainly legitimate; but it is upon the quality of profound feeling and the meaning of the state of mind it elicits that the genuine significance of beauty and sublimity depends. Apart from such cultivation of emotional sensitivity to fineness and harmony, there could be no spiritual growth.

This does not mean that art should be considered merely as a moralizing influence, in the popular sense. Neither should one claim "art for art's sake." Rather, if a reflective person seeks to cultivate his creative imagination, he will discover the unique value of art in the emotional sensitivity and appreciation of the whole of life which a great artist can creatively elicit in the reflective self-consciousness of anyone who shares his imaginative purpose.

Since Havelock Ellis suggested "the art of life," it has become a trite phrase which has been glibly bandied about so often that it has retained little more than an emotive meaning. Nevertheless, we believe it suggests the insight that he who can aesthetically respond to the delicate harmony exhibited in great works of art gains a higher vision and new powers by which he is able to adjust his own inner life cre-

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atively. For as long as man's creative imagination is active, he will ever aspire to find for his life a deeper meaning and a fuller reality. In addition to temporary enjoyment and refreshment, art provides a means for disciplining and transforming one's emotional life.

The significance of art for spiritual growth is to be discovered, therefore, in an understanding of how the creative imagination of an artist purposively elicits and integrates meaningful feelings in others. When a great artist deals with human experience, he takes for his subject life's own value-realizations, its own beauty or ugliness, its own noble achievements or its own tragic frustrations. Since tragedy always involves the problem of evil, all genuine artistic treatment of it is dealing with fundamental issues of life. Such matters as guilt and punishment are irrelevant when the beholder, as well as the artist, comes to realize that deepened sense of human suffering which the eliciting of human dignity by the work of art causes one to share. This need not be a definite philosophical attitude, but, rather, it is a mode of meaningful feeling that seems to be in tune with the more profound and significant striving and ideal aims of mankind. In the development of a human mind this imaginative capacity to respond objectively to the appeal of great tragic expression is one mark of maturity as a person rather than as a mere self.

Aesthetic appreciation of tragedy is not a denial but is an affirmation of the will to live for some purpose. Tragedy may cause man to denounce the Maker of the universe, if He has no ideal aims. But tragedy strengthens man's faith in his own ability to meet the circumstances of an inexorable fate by at least controlling himself in a manner becoming his spiritual dignity. The state of mind thus elicited is not a passive renunciation; but, rather, it is a deep and vital contact with the struggle and conflict necessitated by the growth of spiritual life itself. The essence of this "tragic sense of life" is not the peace that comes from the reconciliation of the mind to

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Macbeth's conclusion that "life is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Quite to the contrary, tragedy gives to the mind a perspective by virtue of which human dignity can be maintained in spite of the calamities and adversities of external events. It enhances the Dionysian sense of life expanding and stretching forth to realize its greatest possibilities.³ Thus art should not be thought of as superimposed upon experience; for it grows out of experience as one of the highest expressions of life itself. To deny this actual connection is to emaciate aesthetic expression and to render a form meaningless and unartistic.

Aesthetic experience is such that there must be a cooperative activity in which the person who genuinely appreciates a form of art sympathetically re-creates the feeling intended by the artist. Apart from this mutual rapport between creator and appreciator, no aesthetic effect is produced. Whereas the artist's feeling moves from meaning to symbol, the beholder's feeling moves from symbol to meaning, if the communication of aesthetic value is achieved. The artistic expression which embodies the purpose of the creator elicits thereby an emotional response in the mind of him who has cultivated his creative imagination.

Since all these psychic functions, in which emotional experiences are transformed by the creative activity of the mind, involve similar processes, this teleological operation that constitutes aesthetic experience is no isolated mental activity. Rather, it is an advanced function of the creative imagination that is stimulated and sustained by the symbol which the artist has produced. It seems reasonable to say, therefore, that he who appreciates art is a potential artist, even though he may never be able to create a material symbol that embodies his feeling. Through such sympathetic re-creation a person realizes a novel organization of meaningful feelings that increases the freedom and fullness of his emotional life; for through this purposive integration of emotion by the creative

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imagination there emerges a consciousness which is sensitive to fineness and worth.

B. The Faustian Noble Discontent.

The significance of great poetic insight is due to the meaningfulness of the feelings it expresses and elicits. Although poetry appeals to the emotions, the thoughtful mood it may elicit illuminates an understanding about human values and their meaning. The psychic transformation, which the imaginative experience of deep sorrow, of delight, of profound passion, and of aspiration affords, often stimulates an inner coherence of feelings in the mind of the person who appreciates the meaning of great poetry and thus fulfills its purpose. Regardless of how coherent or enlightened the imagination may be, it is to feeling, nevertheless, that genuine poetry must appeal for a vital response.⁶ It is from this intuitive experience of meaningful feeling that philosophy must proceed, if it is to make the poet's insights intelligible through rational interpretation.

The advocates of any particular religious tradition usually claim that there is one sacred scripture through which God has revealed his purpose to man. Ancient seers, sages, and prophets are normally considered to be the channels of God's communications. This investigation proceeds upon the assumption that, if there is a God who reveals his aims to men, there is no reason to deny that God might communicate truth through any creative mind who is seeking to realize and express ideal values, even though such a mind might be that of a scientist, philosopher, or artist. Regardless of whether or not one concludes that Goethe has received a divine revelation of a redeeming way of life, one can hardly deny that in *Faust* modern man can find much inspiration and insight into the meaning of human emotions and purposes. Can modern man through the sympathetic recreation of the meaningful feelings of Faust's *noble discontent* realize the ideal purpose of spiritual growth?

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Goethe's success as an artist was due to his ability to communicate meaningful feelings through creative expression that is emotional, imaginative, and harmoniously organic. His lasting influence as a sage, capable of interpreting the meaning of human destiny, however, is derived from the fact that the Faustian quest for redemption is both the cause and the result of Goethe's own spiritual growth.

Many poets have interpreted life primarily in terms of traditional ideas—whether they were secular or religious. Goethe, however, wrote as he lived. He dealt with life romantically in terms of its own value-realizations—its own beauty or ugliness, its own noble achievements, or its own tragic frustrations. He neither blindly accepted the past nor arrogantly rejected it; but, rather, he constructively criticized traditional ideas and gleaned from them those which he found significant in his own experience. Stimulated both by his own and other's philosophical, scientific, ethical, religious, and aesthetic activities, his creative imagination vitally integrated an ever-developing wealth of conscious content. For in such sentiments and principles he found the deposited experiences of other persons who before him had had to deal with the growth of spiritual life in terms of its own reality.

It is important to note that we are not going to interpret *Faust* in terms of an abstract idea. Goethe himself warned against such a procedure in his conversations with Eckermann:

People come and ask me what idea I meant to embody in *Faust*. As if I myself knew and could inform them! A fine thing indeed to have strung so rich and varied a life as Faust's upon the slender thread of one pervading idea! It was not in my line as a poet to embody anything abstract.⁷

Instead of forcing Faust's career into an abstract formula, we shall try to discover amidst the great variety of situations

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the temper of soul which he forged out of his experiences. If a person can sympathetically re-create these meaningful feelings, he will deepen and enrich his own self-realization of a quality of mind. Then with Goethe he is seeking to achieve a new level of spiritual growth. It is to this self-creative process of salvation from a meaningless life that Goethe refers when he declares that "piety is not an end, but a means of attaining to high cultivation of the purest peace of mind."

Since the Faustian quest for salvation is antithetical to the traditional conception of redemption portrayed in Dante's *Divine Comedy*, a brief comparison of these modes of meaningful feeling may prove instructive. Believing that the key to salvation is the renunciation of earthly passions and the submission of one's will to God, Dante elicits a yearning to return to the source of spirituality through the eternal pattern of damnation and purgation that leads to the final blessedness. After the death of Beatrice, Dante forsook the ideal of a holy life which she had inspired in him. His damnation is portrayed in his guilty realization:

His steps were turn'd into deceitful ways,
Following false images of good, that make
No promise perfect.⁸

Dante seeks to establish a consistent moral attitude toward life with a view to the next life the course of which is correlated with this one in the journey of the soul. In furnishing Hell with the fulfillment of the passionate desires of earthly life, Dante reveals their unimportance and calls on man to renounce them in the "refining fire."⁹ After the soul has struggled with impulse and conscience in Purgatory so that he becomes aware of the failing strength of his own power, he surrenders himself to God and in Paradise is restored to the security of absolute faith. Emancipated from its lower passionate nature, man's soul finds peace in the Will of God:

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And in his will is our tranquility;
It is the mighty ocean, whither tends
Whatever it creates and nature makes.¹⁰

Instead of Dante's renunciation of earthly passion and submission to the will of God, Goethe advocates the romantic affirmation of perfecting this life in the striving to achieve self-salvation. For Dante it is the achievement of the goal that is significant: for Goethe it is the process of achieving, the pursuit rather than the goal, which affords modern man the satisfying consciousness of a noble discontent. Whereas Dante's "way of God-salvation" is conceived altogether from the point of view of a superhuman reference, Goethe portrays in Faust's search for a soul that the richest life is the one in which all ideal values are realized in a personal experience of coherent harmony. To overemphasize any one aspect of experience as most important would be to sell out to Mephistopheles in the declaration: "Stay moment, thou art fair." It is this life and not the next that concerns Goethe. The desire for the inclusive feeling of a full-orbed personality motivates the romanticist's pursuit of an ideal of perfectibility. Authority, tradition, and superhuman assistance are minimized in Faust's attempt to take life arrogantly as a personal experiment. When Goethe's attitude is compared with that of Dante and Eliot, God's part in Faust's salvation is seen to be more or less a mere epilogue to the self-salvation which Faust himself had to achieve.

Now the state of mind which Goethe reveals in *Faust* is not a passive complacency. We shall see that the Faustian quest for redemption can find no lasting satisfaction apart from the deep and vital contact with the essential tragedy, conflict, striving, and growth of spiritual life itself. Like the strange creature which Rodin portrays in "The Soul and the Body," Faust cries out in a passionate crisis: "Two souls, alas! within my breast abide."¹¹

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Let us briefly recall the gist of the story about the way through which Faust saved himself from this spiritual dilemma.

The cosmic character of the tale is at once evident in the prologue in heaven. Mephistopheles is suggesting to the Lord that his people are not sincere in their loyalty and devotion to him. To show Mephistopheles that he is wrong, the Lord consents that Mephistopheles should put to the test the temper of some person's soul. The Lord selects Faust as the one who will justify his faith in man's loyalty.

Mephistopheles finds Faust as a learned doctor and teacher who is disheartened by the emptiness of human knowledge and the purposelessness of a fruitless existence. Whereas once he thought that he shared eternal truth with God, Faust now believes that all his knowledge is but an illusion. He curses sense-pleasure as well as the spiritual appetites of love, hope, faith, and patience. Self-denial, he laments, is all that life holds for him.

Mephistopheles seizes upon this opportunity to bargain for Faust's soul. He promises Faust anything magic can obtain, if Faust will promise to grant Mephistopheles his soul whenever he experiences any moment so desirable that he wants it to endure. Faust consents with a denunciation of otherworldliness.

By Mephistopheles' magic Faust is afforded thrilling and fantastic adventures in both the natural and supernatural world. The most important of these events is his seduction of Gretchen. As a result of Faust's wholly selfish attitude, Gretchen's brother is murdered and her mother is poisoned. Gretchen herself is executed for destroying Faust's child, to whom she gave birth. To Faust there comes that sense of guilt which is an essential factor in his final redemption.

Time gradually heals Faust's remorseful heart, however, and his varied career takes him from the more personal world to the more social world of public affairs. By means of Mep-

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histopheles' magic, Faust great political power as the master of the treasury in virtual control of a kingdom. But power does not satisfy him. In the course of a quick succession of events, Mephistopheles' magical manipulation of forces transports Faust on to Greece. There he woos and wins the love of Helen of Troy, the symbol of beauty and culture. To them a son, Euphorion, is born. He is the personification of romanticism. But after a short period of the ecstatic joy that comes from the love of beauty and culture, Helen leaves Faust. Helen returned Faust's love, but she realized that she could bring him only momentary pleasure, not an enduring satisfaction.

Faust emerges from his despondency with a new thirst for power. He wants to battle with the natural elements. There is a shore-line that he wishes to reclaim from the ocean which challenges him. He obtains this barren shore from the Emperor as a reward for aiding the latter to quell a justified rebellion of his oppressed people. Faust is able to accomplish this by means of the magical power which Mephistopheles furnishes.

Faust then reclaims the marshy shores and builds canals by magic. As a feudal lord, not above piracy, he is surrounded by a prosperous people engaged in agriculture and commerce. Two things cause him regret, however. One is the church bell which reminds him he is not in full power of the land. The other thing is the tragic destruction of an old couple who had refused to vacate their home at Faust's command. He intended that they should have a better one, but Mephistopheles and his minions wanted the land right away and had burned the kindly old people to death. This was contrary to Faust's orders and distressed him very much. But he nevertheless realized that it was really his selfish desire for more power that was the ultimate cause of the tragedy. Though he has tried to be a benevolent ruler, he realizes that he is nevertheless a tyrant. Presently he is confronted by the four grey

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hags, Want, Care, Guilt, and Need. His magic power becomes repulsive to his awakening moral consciousness. He resolves that his real motivation and power in life should be that of a noble discontent which requires constant effort. Blinded by the hag, Care, whom he had defied, Faust nevertheless discovers an unselfish purpose that transforms his will-to-power into an unselfish endeavor. He directs the battle with the ocean in order that his people might by their ceaseless striving learn to have greater freedom and increasing opportunities for service to their fellowmen. In this activity he finds an enduring satisfaction. With the realization of an intrinsic value in life, Faust dies. The angels snatch Faust's soul from Mephistopheles; for, since Faust was possessed by the noble discontent, or the satisfaction of never being satisfied, he was worthy of redemption. A penitent, the transformed Gretchen, leads Faust's soul into the higher realm. So much for the story.

There are conflicting opinions as to just what Goethe meant to convey as the meaning of human destiny. Three views are representative.

Santayana contends:

This last ambition of Faust is as romantic as the others. He feels the prompting toward political art, as he had felt the prompting toward love or beauty. The notion of transforming things by his will, of leaving for ages his mark upon nature and upon human society fascinates him; but his passion for activity and power which some simple-minded commentators dignify with the name of altruism and of living for others, has no steady purpose or standard about it.¹²

Lewes, on the other hand, contends that Faust's motive is altruistic:

Duty is wide, sufficing, ennobling to all who strenuously work in it. In the very sweat of labor there is

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stimulus which gives energy to life; and a consciousness that our labour tends in some way to the lasting benefit of others, makes the rolling years endurable.¹³

Lewisohn maintains that Faust is not saved by his altruism so much as he is by his recognition of the necessity of daily conversion, of daily dying to be born. "He only earns himself freedom and life who must daily reconquer them."¹⁴

It is our contention that each of these interpreters of *Faust* has found a vital aspect of Goethe's meaning. Santayana, power; Lewes, duty; and Lewisohn, eternal striving. But we believe that the essence of the Faustian quest for redemption has been missed by these interpreters. As an aspect each interpretation has some truth; but as a claim to anything more than a partial explanation, each is false, we believe. For it seems to us that the essence of Faust's quest for redemption is to be found in the enduring satisfaction which he discovered in the harmonious realization of intellectual venture, aesthetic appreciation, an enlightened good will, and a creative cooperation with God. Each of these value experiences interpenetrates in Faust's concrete realization of redemption.

Although this spiritual growth is a conscious process, it involves certain subconscious tendencies which influence Faust's experience. Thus we might say that Faust's redemption is an internal process of meaningful feelings which involves a sublimation into the growth of a spiritual consciousness of three motivating tendencies emerging from his subconsciousness. Let us analyze these motives of Faust's career in terms of Jung's explanation of sexuality, a will-to-power, and a prospective aim, which we discussed in the last chapter. Then we shall attempt to interpret this spiritual process in terms of the conscious values which constitute the meaning of Faust's redemption. That our method of interpretation is applicable to Goethe's insight into human destiny, is borne out by this statement of Goethe himself:

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Anyone strongly conscious of an inner power of synthesis, has properly the right to analyze, since he uses the external details to test and verify his inner conception of the whole.¹⁵

Sexuality is exemplified in three important instances of Faust's experience. Gretchen is the object of his sensual passion as well as his more tender affection. Said Faust, "'Tis self-surrender, 'tis to feel a rapture which surely is eternal'"¹⁶ Helen is the symbol of his aesthetic appreciation and desire for beauty, culture, harmony, and the fineness of life which shuns halfheartedness. So Faust declared, "My sense, my soul, she weaveth round for ever, I cannot brook to live, save I achieve her!"¹⁷ To this "god-like rapturous passion" is born Euphorion, the Dionysian spirit of aesthetic experience. The third important instance of sexuality symbolized in *Faust* is that of "The Mothers." "And weird it is! Goddesses of you men unknown, whom we to name are none too fain."¹⁸ We shall not attempt to explain what even Goethe himself refused to do in his conversations with Eckermann. But Mephistopheles' insight that The Mothers deal with formation and transformation, "the Eternal Mind's eternal re-creation, and round them float forms of all things that be,"¹⁹ suggests to us that "The Mothers" are the sources of creative imagination. To Faust, the striver after the ideal, the world which their powers disclose is the one that is most real.

These three experiences constitute the *Leitmotiv* which gives spiritual meaning to the career of Faust, i.e., the eternal feminine. In life Faust sublimated sexuality into his responsiveness to the ideal of spiritual growth:

Like spiritual beauty grows the lovely form
More fair, melts not apart, in ether soars aloft,
And of mine inmost being draws the best away.²⁰

In death it is the eternal-womanly, or the pure and unselfish love, which is revealed to mortals in its most perfect form

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in the love of woman. It is this eternal feminine which affords his soul an entrance into a realm of further spiritual growth:

All things corruptible
Are but reflection.
Earth's insufficiency
Here finds perfection.
Here the ineffable
Wrought is with love.
The Eternal-Womanly
Draws us above.²¹

Helen inspired Faust's quest for beauty; but Gretchen led his soul to the great adventure in which was to be "his life renewed in this pure region."²² For it was with Gretchen that Faust had come to realize the meaning of guilt, sacrifice, tragedy, sorrow, and forgiveness. Without that sort of love there could have been no deep and vital contact with the struggle and growth of life at its inmost depths and its most exalted heights. Without the baptism of Gretchen's love, there could have been no redemption.

Faust's varied career is in one sense the history of his will-to-power and his final sublimation of it in his recognition of a cause greater than himself. This will-to-power motive is exemplified clearly in his use of magic throughout his quest for an enduring satisfaction. At the outset he explained that "I've turned me to magic in my need . . .

That I the mighty inmost tether
May know, that binds the world together;
All germs, all forces that lifewards struggle,
And with vain words no longer juggle.²³

It was through magic that Faust exerted his will-to-power in his capacity as Master of the Treasury. There he controlled the life of the empire in peace. War also was a welcome opportunity for him to use his magic power in the service

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of the Emperor. His reward was the marshy shore where he pitted his power against nature herself. Man did not furnish enough opposition. The ocean challenged his will to struggle with it: "Here would I battle, this I fain would bridle."²⁴ As a tyrant he controlled the very existence of the thriving agricultural and commercial society that was his to do with as he pleased.

All this outer show of power was an attempt to compensate for his inner sense of insufficiency. Back on the Pharsalian Plains during the Classical Walspurgis Night, Erichtho had declared the truth that pertained now to Faust: "Each that hath not wit his inner self to govern, all too fain would sway his neighbor's purpose to his own imperious will."²⁵ Mephistopheles had not only given him magic but also had cultivated an opportunistic attitude in Faust: "Come war, come peace, from every circumstance will essay to make his profit."²⁶ Faust followed this advice as he expressed his strength, "strength do I feel for bold endeavor." His was a romantic attitude "for great achieving ever."²⁷ Mephistopheles and the Three Mighty Men returning from a plundering expedition brought more power to Faust, and Mephistopheles declared that: "For Might is yours, and therefore Right."²⁸ Faust had shared this principle with Mephistopheles and his minions as he sought to realize Mephistopheles' prophecy; "From thy palace in its grasp Thine arm the whole wide world shall clasp."²⁹

You will recall, however, that the church bells and the hut of an old couple seemed to be the only obstacles in the way of the realization of this goal. Faust tried to convince himself that his tyrannical attitude was a benevolent one; but his growing moral consciousness could no longer be silenced when he saw the tragic consequence of his power in the destruction of the old couple. Magic became repulsive to him, for it had been the instrument of his brutal will-to-power. Then Faust cried:

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Could I but from my path all magic banish,
Bid every spell into oblivion vanish,
And stand mere man before thee, Nature!
Then

"Twere worth the while to be a man with men."³⁰

Faust longed to sublimate his will-to-power into an enlightened good will. Without this yearning to succor mankind, Faust could not have attained the salvation of his own soul.

The prospective aim is exemplified in Faust's noble discontent, his constant and ever-increasing aspiration to become a greater personality: "In onward-striding finds his bale, his bliss, he that each moment uncontented is."³¹ To this ideal he was ever true, for "loyalty ensures us personality."³² In this principle is embodied one of Goethe's most significant insights into human destiny. "It was an article of Goethe's faith that by constancy and loyalty alone in the present condition do we become worthy of the higher step of a following one, and capable of setting foot upon it."³³ This will be seen to be the most important conviction of Goethe underlying the Faustian quest for redemption. For the ideal of perfectibility that grows out of it is the sublimation of sexuality and the will-to-power into the prospective aim.

This creative urge is the spiritual essence of the Platonic *Eros*, which Faust expressed in his own words to Wagner, the pedant who could hardly understand: "And yet the yearning that Nature places in every breast, upward and onwards springs."³⁴ Consequently, Faust desires to integrate his two natures, one sensual and the other spiritual, into higher unity of consciousness. "Two souls, alas! within my breast abide."³⁵ To find their harmony in an enduring but ever growing satisfaction was the ideal which Faust demanded: "Lead me to life unknown and every changing."³⁶

All Nature encourages Faust's endeavor. He declares that it "is ever priming my soul to stern resolve and strenuous keeping, onward to strive, to highest life still climbing."³⁷ Manto

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aided Faust because "him love I whom the impossible doth lure."³⁸ Faust embodied in this prospective aim the essence of Greek aspiration: "Creatures that would be gods by high endeavor yet doomed to dwell in their own likeness ever."³⁹ It is the perfectionistic attitude of which the Nereids and Tritons sang.⁴⁰ For growth increases one's capacity for even greater growth: "Little by little growth you win and form yourself for greater feats to follow."⁴¹ All nature manifests this effort "and striving yearningly to higher regions."⁴² Even Mephistopheles recognizes the significance of a conscious purpose in life: "Who whereto thou didst aspire? Sublimely bold would be thy goal!"⁴³ Faust recognized the value of guiding all one's activity by an ideal in the pursuit of which "his mind is with lofty purpose full." It was this principle that Faust sought to inculcate in his people in order that he might leave with them a purpose in life as their spiritual heritage. They must always battle with the ocean. "For liberty, as life, alone deserveth He daily that must conquer it."⁴⁴ The important issue for the person realizing the prospective aim is the pursuit and not the goal. Without this aspiration there could be no redemption. Thus the angels sang of Faust:

Him can we save that tireless strove
Ever to Higher level.⁴⁵

Goethe portrays in Faust's realization of a noble discontent the spiritual insight that Faust is being redeemed at every instant of his spiritual growth; for he creatively cooperates with God in the quest for an ideal of perfectibility which must be ever sought by both man and God throughout eternity. Before we interpret Goethe's meaning more fully, we must substantiate by references to the poem itself the metaphysics that this principle of redemption implies.⁴⁶

The universal process is said to be constituted by individual processes in constant interaction: "Into the whole, how all

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things weave, one in another work and live."⁴⁷ Thus ultimate reality is a creative process of eternal becoming. It has never begun and will never end. Goethe represents this active and vital force as the Earth-Spirit. In creativity there is to be discovered the universal and eternal process of change and growth.⁴⁸ This creative process is as ultimate and unbegin as are the gods.⁴⁹ Nothing ever *is*; reality is always *becoming*.

The Divine Purpose integrates the interaction of all the individual processes as God directs the process of creativity:

As, with a mighty impulse sailing,
The tree shoots upward straight and tall
E'en so Almighty Love, unfailing,
Doth fashion all and cherish all.⁵⁰

In man's love God discerns "eternal growth that works and faileth not."⁵¹ And the Lord declares to Mephistopheles that "a good man, by his dim impulse driven, of the right way hath ever consciousness."⁵² But this requires that God should have faith in man as well as that man should have faith in God. For God himself is strengthened by man's spiritual growth:

Seek in higher spheres your station
Grow by gradual period,
As in ever purest fashion
Strengtheneth the face of God.⁵³

This is the God which Faust cannot affirm with his intellect, but which his feeling will not allow him to deny:

The All-embracing,
The All-sustaining,
Clasps and sustains He not
Thee, me, Himself?
Springs not the vault of Heaven above us?
Lieth not Earth firm-established 'neath our
feet?

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To cooperate with this eternal force is the essence of Faust's mysticism: "Call it Bliss! Heart! Love! God!"⁵⁴

Thus, for Goethe, in the personal creativity of concrete growth there is embodied the unity of efficient and final causation. Human personality is an achievement in a growing universe in so far as an individual constantly seeks to realize in his thought and conduct an ideal of perfectibility. It is this ideal of perfectibility which is produced by the sublimation of the sexual, will-to-power, and prospective tendencies into a rational purposive consciousness.

In an ever-growing process, such as Goethe conceives the universe to be, perfection would be an abstraction. It is not absolute knowledge but rather the pursuit of truth, not complacency and contentment but rather the enduring satisfaction of ever being dissatisfied. These attitudes characterize the Faustian quest for redemption.

It is significant to note that neither God nor Mephistopheles could wholly determine Faust's destiny. They had to take his free choice into consideration and attempt to persuade him. Mephistopheles gave him external power through magic. The Lord held out for him an ideal of perfectibility. For the realization of this ideal, there was no reward but the spiritual dignity attained through inner growth. Thus the Lord had declared to Mephistopheles:

Though now his service be as a tangled skein,
Yet will I lead him soon to perfect vision.
The gardener knows, when the young tree is green,
'Twill glad the years with blossom and fruition."

Dante could depict salvation as a return to the sources of spirituality through the various steps that led to the final blessedness according to an eternal pattern. But Goethe must lead Faust into an endless quest in which the process itself, and not any patterned perfection, was the basis for redemption. Dante requires passive renunciation; Goethe, active af-

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firmation. God's part is no more important in Faust's redemption than is Faust's own attempt to realize a coherent harmony of ideal values. To be satisfied with less would have been to have lost the wager to Mephistopheles. It is in the process of attaining these ideal values and not after death that Faust is actually redeemed. In this spiritual growth it is the sincere effort and not perfection that matters to God: "Whilst still man strives, still must he stray,"³⁶ the Lord explained to Mephistopheles. And if God provides an opportunity for redemption in this life, he probably must have such a provision in the future life to come. But if God substituted perfection for perfectibility anywhere in the eternal process, then God would be condemning man to spiritual stagnation.

Although Mephistopheles thought when Faust cried out, "Stay moment, thou art fair," that Faust had lost the wager, Mephistopheles did not fully grasp the meaning of the situation. Faust was not affirming that he had found a stagnant satisfaction such as that which they had in mind at the time of the wager. For the satisfaction which appealed to Faust as an enduring value was the discovery that no isolated moment was satisfactory, that only by a noble discontent could genuine growth in a never-ending process be realized. The angels' capture of Faust's soul is therefore justified.

In the purposive control of ideal values toward their coherent realization, it is only to such a person who has attained some degree of spiritual maturity or God-likeness that the vision of eternal perfectibility would have any appeal. The tragic peace of the noble discontent of the Divine Persuasion is exemplified in the principles of spiritual love and dignity that are operating as final causes in the transformation of personal creativity. To regulate and direct this spiritual growth is the Faustian way of salvation. For Goethe this is the process of redemption by progressive transformation.

The enduring meaning of redemption through personal creativity is not an *a priori* principle in the sense that it is

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externally imposed upon experience or that it is independent of experience. On the contrary, this quality of attainment is a self-determined attitude of mind that is contingent to the psychic adjustment of mere desires to an autonomous ideal of personality—a partial self becoming a whole self. The imperative demands of the goal of perfectibility are rooted in the self-imposed character of its acknowledgement by the person seeking redemption. A concrete spiritual growth toward this intrinsic ideal is inherently rational and valuable in the very nature of the universe. It is actualized as one instance of universal creativity in the cultivation and abiding satisfaction of certain spiritual appetites. In Faust's quest for redemption his will-to-power, sexuality, and prospective aim were transformed into a conscious realization of spiritual dignity and redemptive love. He had sought this meaning in sensuous gratification as well as in the re-creation of Greek culture. He had sought it in personal power; but he found the redemption he so craved in the dedication of his own will to some cause greater than himself. Faust learned that to alter external circumstances by magic was fruitless. Spiritual growth requires an understanding of circumstances, but even more an attitude of mind with which any circumstances can be so met that the soul rises above them.

Faust "yearned for Truth, in Error's maze embarrassed."⁵⁷ But intellectual curiosity alone was not enough to motivate him. Aesthetic appreciation was a vital factor. In Helen, symbol of beauty and culture, Faust realized that "Like spiritual beauty grows the lovely form more fair, melts not apart, in ether soars aloft, and of mine inmost being draws the best away."⁵⁸ But Helen herself warned Faust that "Fortune weds with Beauty never abidingly."⁵⁹ Spiritual growth requires that his selfish will should become an enlightened good will. "Twere worth the while to be a man with men."⁶⁰ In the service of his fellowmen his selfishness is purged by an enlightened moral consciousness of social responsibility. He felt

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cleansed of the guilt of Gretchen and the old couple victimized by his tyrannical power, when he consecrated his will to the sharing of the Divine Persuasion of eternal perfectibility. This, the Lord had declared to be the fruit of love and duty: "Eternal Growth, that works and faileth not, within Love's golden bars ever enfold you."⁶¹

Does this mean that Faust thus forfeited his freedom? Not at all! For in sharing God's loyalty to an unattainable ideal Faust has found that fullest realization of freedom. Goethe has himself explained this principle of spiritual growth:

Freedom consists not in refusing to recognize anything above us, but in respecting something which is above us; for, by respecting it, we raise ourselves to it and by our very acknowledgement make manifest that we bear within ourselves what is higher, and are worthy to be on a level with it.⁶²

It is for this reason that Faust has sought in higher spheres his station or, in other words, has sought spiritual growth, that God is able to accomplish his purpose in the world. "E'en so Almighty Love, unfailing, doth fashion all and cherish all."⁶³ Faust's quest for redemption is conceived, therefore, as an integral part of a divine plan.

It is important to note that Faust is not saved from some punishment from original sin by the propitiation of an angry or tyrannical God. On the contrary, Faust finds salvation by discovering within himself that quality of mind which is susceptible to God's persuading love. Since he attains this self-realization, he is redeemed for some higher purpose in comparison with which reward or punishment are insignificant. Thus Goethe portrays the divine love coming down from above to save the ever higher and purer soul that Faust is achieving in his noble discontent. So could the angels sing of Faust as they rescued his soul from Mephistopheles:

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Him can we save that tireless strove
Ever to higher level.⁶⁴

When a person imaginatively re-creates the realizations and the frustrations of Faust's noble discontent, he has deepened and enriched his consciousness of the meaning of spiritual growth. Thus a purposive direction is given to his own emotional appreciation of ideal values by his aesthetic response to Goethe's imaginative portrayal of human destiny. Faust's discovery of his soul through sublimating his will-to-power and will-to-romance (sexuality) into a socially creative endeavor might point to the way of salvation for which modern man is seeking. Perhaps he too can find meaning for his life by acknowledging the Faustian ideal of spiritual growth which he knows he can never fully achieve but in the pursuit of which he can realize the intrinsic dignity of the noble discontent. Despite the heavenly setting of the prologue and the angelic imagery of the closing scenes, Faust's own insistent craving to attain an ideal of perfectibility through his own efforts rather than through submission to the will of God strongly suggests that Goethe is presenting a way of self-salvation. This is even clearer in Goethe's reinterpretation of Aeschylus' *Prometheus*.

Whereas Aeschylus' Prometheus was audacious and complaining in his physical and moral agony, Goethe portrays a Titan in whom complaint and bravado are replaced by uncompromising defiance and sublime contempt for Zeus:

I reverence thee? Wherefore?
Has thou lightened the woes
Of the heavily laden?
Hast *thou* dried the tears
Of the troubled in spirit?
Who fashioned me man?
Was it not almighty Time—
And Fate eternal.

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Thy lords and mine?
Here I sit and shape
Man in my image:
A race like myself,
That will suffer and weep,
Will rejoice and enjoy,
And scorn thee,
As I!⁶⁵

In such tragic experiences as those into which Faust and Prometheus are led by their noble discontent there are to be found the highest reaches of sublimity. For, as we said before, in all great drama the meaning of tragedy lies in the fact that, although the hero's efforts meet insurmountable obstacles, he remains true to his ideal purpose. In fact, the frustrations only strengthen his enlightened good will.

Does Goethe portray in *Faust* the *enduring satisfaction* in the re-creation of which modern man might find his soul, i.e., might realize the full meaning of spiritual growth? Our conclusions at the end of our quest for the full meaning of spiritual growth will embody much that Goethe has imaginatively expressed in *Faust*; but though Goethe elicits a *noble discontent* which is a necessary ingredient in the ultimate intrinsic value realization we are seeking, he does not furnish an *enduring satisfaction*. The aesthetic imagination can furnish the creation and re-creation of meaningful feelings, but, even when they are as profound as Goethe's, they are no more than intuitive insights that may or may not be true. Dante, it will be recalled, also elicited meaningful feelings that indicated an entirely different conception of human destiny. Which is true?

These intuitive insights of the creative imagination do not contain within themselves any verification of the truth of their contradictory claims. Valuable though intuitions are as sources of data for interpretation, some adequate criterion for testing the truth of their claims must be found. Modern man

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as a reflective person requires some means of verifying at least to a high degree of probability the objective truth of the purposive realization of ideal values which elicit a *noble discontent* before he attain an *enduring satisfaction*. The intuitive insights of his creative imagination must be interpreted, therefore, by the scientific-philosophical method and criterion which we shall explain in connection with the spiritual appetite of *intellectual curiosity*. Before we undertake such a philosophical interpretation, however, we must consider the implications of an enlightened good will for the realization of a noble discontent.

¹ Jung, *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, 248.

² Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, 186-187. See MMS, 179, 180, 190-192, and 198.

³ Hocking, *Preface to Philosophy*, 58. Cf. Northrop, *Logic of Sciences and Humanities*, Chapter IX.

⁴ Longinus, OS (Loeb Library Edition), 143-145.

⁵ See Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* (*Works of Nietzsche*, tr. Falk), 278, for a brilliant description of the eternal striving of the Dionysian spirit. See Unamuno, *Tragic Sense of Life*, 201, for a different interpretation of the significance of tragedy in which assuagement and peace are held out as the state of mind which great art bestows as a revelation of eternity. Of the two views, we prefer Nietzsche's.

⁶ The result of this psychic process may not always be an idea until after further reflection. Although some art seems to serve only as a means of temporary enjoyment (which is certainly legitimate), great art elicits a meaningful mood that endures. How an "artistic idea" develops from such an emotional mood is well illustrated by Wagner's music-drama, *Nibelungen Ring*.

In the "Prologue" Wagner portrays three norns and the Earth-Goddess weaving the web of man's destiny. The norns discover a broken strand, and in their consternation they turn to the Earth-Goddess for an explanation. When they receive none, they flee into the depths of the earth. What was the meaning of the broken strand? Wagner expressed the answer in the music-dramas that followed: man may find salvation from the inexorable web of destiny by sharing the self-sacrificing love that Brunnhilde exemplified in her triumph over the "will-to-power" of which Walhala was the dramatic symbol.

The music by itself could not have conveyed such a complex idea. Since Wagner not only composed the music but was also his own poet, however, he was able to portray explicitly the human characteristics of cunning, avarice, cowardice, courage, ambition, selfish power, disobedience, suffering, nobility, compassion, sexuality, and self-sacrifice in an artistically woven structure of creative insight. Despite the philosophical implications, as Wagner himself pointed out, he appealed to the heart rather than the head, i. e., to the emotions rather than to the intellect.

⁷ Eckermann, *Conversations with Goethe*.

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⁸ *Purgatorio*, xxx, 133-135.

⁹ *Purgatorio*, xxvi, 141.

¹⁰ *Paradiso*, III, 85-87. T. S. Eliot's revival of Dante's way of God-salvation through the renunciation of the "refining fire" indicates that the meaningful feelings of one generation can be inherited and re-created by a poet who deals imaginatively with the same mystery of human destiny many centuries later. (See Eliot, *Collected Poems*, 90 and *Dante*, 40.) The Catholic temper of Eliot's attitude is expressed in his plea to the Virgin Mary in *Ash Wednesday*: "Suffer me not to be separated." (CP, 21.) Only through loyalty to such a historical tradition does Eliot see any escape from the modern solipsism of individual emotions. Accordingly, in his *Wasteland* Eliot presents in symbolic imagery the inner sterility of modern man:

What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow
Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,
You cannot say, or guess, for you know only
A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,
And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,
And the dry stone no sound of water.

(CP, 69-70. Cf. CP, 71 and 79.) Man must renounce his own puny efforts and seek redemption through God, if he is to become a vital part in the creative advance of the cosmic process. He must experience a consecration to a higher allegiance by which alone his existence is justified: "The awful darning of a moment's surrender." (CP, 89) Thus through *Ash Wednesday* Eliot seeks to evoke the meaningful feeling of renunciation in modern man:

Blessed sister, holy mother, spirit of the fountain,
spirit of the garden,
Suffer us not to mock ourselves with falsehood
Teach us to care and not to care
Teach us to sit still
Even among these rocks,
Our peace in His will
And even among these rocks
Sister, mother
And spirit of the river, spirit of the sea,
Suffer me not to be separated
And let my cry come unto Thee. (CP, 121)

¹¹ *Faust* (I), 55.

¹² *Three Philosophical Poets*, 182-183.

¹³ *Life and Works of Goethe*, 496.

¹⁴ *The Permanent Horizon*, 107.

¹⁵ *Poetry and Truth* (II), 281.

¹⁶ *Faust* (I), 153.

¹⁷ *Faust* (II), 134.

¹⁸ *Faust* (II), 75.

¹⁹ *Faust* (II), 79.

²⁰ *Faust* (II), 253.

²¹ *Faust* (II), 342.

²² *Faust* (II), 341.

²³ *Faust* (I), 26.

²⁴ *Faust* (II), 259.

²⁵ *Faust* (II), 115.

²⁶ *Faust* (II), 260.

²⁷ *Faust* (II), 258.

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- 28 *Faust* (II), 306.
- 29 *Faust* (II), 308.
- 30 *Faust* (II), 315.
- 31 *Faust* (II), 317.
- 32 *Faust* (II), 247.
- 33 Latham cites this quotation from Riemer's *Mittheilungen*, i. 139 in his notes to part II of *Faust*, 395.
- 34 *Faust* (I), 54.
- 35 *Faust* (I), 55.
- 36 *Faust* (I), 55.
- 37 *Faust* (II), 14.
- 38 *Faust* (II), 136.
- 39 *Faust* (II), 161.
- 40 *Faust* (II), 165.
- 41 *Faust* (II), 168.
- 42 *Faust* (II), 228.
- 43 *Faust* (II), 258.
- 44 *Faust* (II), 322.
- 45 *Faust* (II), 336.
- 46 Goethe himself objected to a systematic metaphysics that would stifle creative insight. (See Eckermann, CWG, 196.) Nevertheless, Goethe makes certain metaphysical assumptions in *Faust* which should be made explicit.
- 47 *Faust* (I), 28. Cf. *Faust*, 27 and 64-65.
- 48 See *Faust* (I), 28.
- 49 See *Faust* (II), 134.
- 50 *Faust* (II), 334.
- 51 *Faust* (I), 23.
- 52 *Faust* (I), 23.
- 53 *Faust* (II), 335.
- 54 *Faust* (I), 166. See Thouless, *Introduction to Psychology of Religion*, 166, for a psychological account of this attitude.
- 55 *Faust* (I), 22.
- 56 *Faust* (I), 22.
- 57 *Faust* (I), 37.
- 58 *Faust* (II), 253. Cf. 93, 134, 179, 209.
- 59 *Faust* (II), 245.
- 60 *Faust* (II), 315.
- 61 *Faust* (I), 23.
- 62 Eckermann, CWG, 164. Cf. CWG, 68.
- 63 *Faust* (II), 334.
- 64 *Faust* (II), 336. "In these lines," said Goethe to Eckermann, "there is contained the idea of Faust's salvation. In Faust himself there is an activity which becomes higher and purer to the end, and from above there is eternal love coming to his aid." (CWG, 374-375.)
- 65 This fragment can be found in Lewes, LWG, 184.

CHAPTER IV

THE FUNCTION OF AN ENLIGHTENED GOOD WILL IN SPIRITUAL GROWTH

THE SPIRITUAL appetite of an "enlightened good will" is the defining characteristic of the moral experience of a reflective person. Whereas the emotions and purposes of aesthetic experience are enjoyed by the detached creative imagination as intrinsic values for their own sake without any necessary connection with practical action; the emotions and purposes of an enlightened good will are not only inseparably connected with his practical action, but they are necessarily guided by theoretical norms or ideals standards which are derived from his more general conception of the values that embody the meaning of his life.

Whereas an animal guides its behavior only by its past instinctive and habitual actions which it remembers, a reflective person, in addition, creates standards which give purposive direction and control to his present and future conduct. It is this ideal incentive of human activity which constantly goads and haunts him in terms of what he "ought to be." Although a reflective person does not attain perfection and often falls short of his own acknowledged obligations, his ideal of what he "ought to do" serves as a measuring rod by which he can correct and improve his own conduct.

A. What Is Moral Experience?

The analysis of what we mean by the type of moral experience of which an enlightened good will is the defining characteristic will be more intelligible, if we first explain what

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we mean by experience. By experience we mean the process of a person's complex, on-going, unity of consciousness. Despite the irrational impulses and confusion of the human mind, each individual mind is a complex unity, i.e., all the complex sensations and desires of the present moment belong together in a unique way in the sense that "my" experience is mine alone and cannot be possessed by anyone else. Not only do these present states of consciousness belong together uniquely, but they also are uniquely connected with the past by memory and with the future by the anticipation of ideal purposes. Without this purposive unity of a person's total mental life, the moral responsibility and the moral development required for the realization of an enlightened good will would not be possible.¹

Moral experience is that particular process of self-consciousness which is characterized by (i) a self-determined decision (voluntary choice) of (ii) a better rather than worse course of action (value) which is motivated by (iii) a consciousness of what ought to be done (awareness of obligation). These three factors must be analyzed.

(i) *Voluntary choice.* For there to be a moral experience there must be some activity of the will in choosing from among real or supposed possibilities one course of action or another. This does not mean that the will is a "structural faculty of a soul-substance," but rather it is the experienced activity of the mind itself when it chooses with some end in view. If a person is compelled by any force other than his own will, the experience lacks the moral quality that is a necessary ingredient of an enlightened good will. When a person chooses to act voluntarily according to an ideal or norm of conduct, normally, there is, first, an inhibition of impulsive tendencies, secondly, a deliberation regarding possible courses of action, and, thirdly, a decision to select one possibility for realization. Conscious discrimination is thus essential for intelligent choice required by the moral experience of an enlightened good will.

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(ii) *Value*. The actual experience of enjoying a desired activity or object is a value experience. Mere values, i.e., those actual experiences of preferences, are experienced by everyone at all times; but the ideal values characterizing an enlightened good will are those experiences which one believes ought to be preferred after rational criticism of conflicting desires and rational choice of action in accordance with a self-imposed standard. One must have some table of instrumental and intrinsic values so that he can determine what is better and what is worse. A reflective person, furthermore, must conceive of an ultimate intrinsic value for the realization of which he organizes all his preferences.²

(iii) *Obligation*. An awareness of obligation is the characteristic factor of moral experience that distinguishes it most sharply from aesthetic experience. There are very few, if any, people who have not experienced a "sense of duty," the feeling "I ought," and the pangs of conscience when a duty is neglected or violated. Despite the universality of the experience of an awareness of obligation, it is difficult to define. It is just as difficult, as Brightman has pointed out, to define the physical notion of space; but both notions are meaningful and unique experiences. Although a definition of moral obligation, like that of space, really moves in a circle by presupposing that which is defined, we can point out or identify obligation by stating that "obligation is the unique feeling, not identical either with desire or with social prescriptions which arise when I consider that which I take to be 'the highest value for me,' or, as we ordinarily say, 'the best thing for me to do,' and which leads me to say 'I ought to do this.'"³ The awareness of obligation (which is all that we have considered thus far) does not in itself constitute the rational obligation of an enlightened good will. The awareness of "oughtness," like a sense-impression of a spatial object, is a given datum of experience which must be criticized and interpreted by reflective thought.

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B. What Are Moral Laws?

Whenever reflective persons think critically about their experiences of voluntary choice, value, and awareness of obligation, they seek to guide and purposively control their moral experiences in accordance with universal principles, i.e., standards that should be applicable to the moral experiences of all reflective persons in similar situations regardless of the time or place. He who would cultivate the attitude of an enlightened good will, therefore, must examine the facts of moral experience in order to discover what laws of obligation it implies. Not only should these standards of "what is right" be universal, but they should be capable of being organized into a coherent system of hypothetical principles that is progressive, i.e., open to criticism and development. As convinced as a reflective person may be that he has found the best possible ethical principles, he must always be willing to modify particular standards or even abandon his whole system for a better one, if his reasoning leads him to a more adequate conception. As will be explained fully in Chapter V, the most that a reflective person can claim for any of his rational standards, whether they be scientific or philosophical, is that they are highly probable, not absolutely certain. Although these standards will be referred to as "moral laws," it should be remembered that they are hypothetical principles for guiding the development of an enlightened good will.

A moral law is a universal and necessary principle to which the enlightened good will of a reflective person must conform. If such a normative standard does not apply to the obligation of the enlightened good will, no meaningful moral quality can be attached to the action involved. It should be carefully noted that "moral laws" as conceived here are universal and necessary only for reflective persons regardless of time or place. They presuppose a capacity for rational judgment that is not found in human beings who are not able

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to, or refuse to, think, any more than it is found in apes or other animals who do not guide their actions by self-imposed standards, but rather have their actions guided by instinctive tendencies and habitual behavior patterns.

Moral laws should not be confused with moral codes in which the customary conventions and beliefs have crystallized into an immutable body of commands that are based on dogmatic authority. Whereas the externally-imposed code demands that the individual must conform to the expectations of his particular society, the moral law is autonomously self-imposed by the individual himself; and he alone can judge whether or not he has fulfilled the obligations demanded by his own acknowledged ideals. A particular moral law is not a mathematical formula. It is a working hypothesis which may be modified or even replaced, if reason requires it in order to meet the new situations that emerge in the development of moral experience. In order to guide the purposive realization of an enlightened good will in accordance with the demands of the ultimate authority of reason, it is necessary that these hypothetical norms be organized into a system of ethical principles that is logically consistent, harmoniously inclusive, and comprehensively adequate for explaining all the relevant items of moral experience. What we need is a coherent scheme of ethical hypotheses that both interpret the meaning of and guide the purposive development of an enlightened good will. In other words, such a coherent system of moral laws must: (i) define the *intrinsic* quality of mind which is the highest good; and (ii) furnish a practical guide for the particular acts of a person possessed by an enlightened good will.

There is a very important difference between a "good will" and an "enlightened good will." For a reflective person good intentions are not enough. In addition, there must be some knowledge of the relations of the purposes and values involved in ethical decisions with their theoretical implications and practical consequences. The full meaning of an *enlight-*

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ened good will is more intelligible, if one first considers the conception of what constitutes a *good will*, which, as an inherent moral quality, does not require a system of norms or a concern for the particular circumstances, consequences, aims, and values involved in moral action. No one has formulated a more significant exposition of the supreme importance of a *good will* than Kant:

Nothing in the whole world can possibly be regarded as good without limitation except a good will. No doubt it is a good and desirable thing to have intelligence, wisdom, judgment, and other intellectual gifts; it is also good and desirable in many respects to possess by nature such qualities as courage, resolution, and perseverance; but all these gifts of nature may be in the highest degree pernicious and hurtful, if the will which directs them, or what is called *character*, is not itself good. The same thing applies to *gifts* of fortune. Power, wealth, honor, even good health, and that general well-being and contentment with one's lot which we call *happiness*, give rise to pride and not infrequently to insolence, if a man's will is not good; nor can a reflective and impartial spectator ever look with satisfaction upon the unbroken prosperity of a man who is destitute of the ornament of a pure and good will. A good will would, therefore, seem to be the indispensable condition without which no one is even worthy to be happy.⁴

Kant's conception of the supremacy of the good will is inseparably connected with his basic principle of the categorical imperative which demands unquestionable obedience to the moral law. The rational character of this absolute obligation to act according to the moral law is derived from its universality and necessity. Not only is "duty" a manifestation of reason just as much as "nature," but "duty," according

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to Kant, is really more important in the light of its more direct relevance to human life. It should be noted that this moral *a priori* is not established by appeal to intuition; rather it is an indispensable objective presupposition of the moral consciousness. In this formal character of the categorical imperative lies its rationality, as well as its exemplification of purpose; for the moral relations it requires are not those of experience itself but rather the moral relations that experience implies. To comprehend this implication is to discover meaning, and to discover meaning requires a rational process motivated by purpose. In this sense, the speculative reason is subjective and the practical reason is objective:

For, whereas, so far as nature is concerned, experience supplies the rules and is the source of truth, in the respect of the moral laws it is, alas, the mother of illusion! Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what *ought to be done* from what *is done*, or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is circumscribed.³

How could the ideal possibility-to-be-realized, which seems to be the only source that Kant allows for the moral reason, have any meaning apart from a teleological factor integrating rational consciousness according to an ideal of personality? We contend that, upon the basis of Kant's reasoning, there is no objective meaning without purpose. But let us test this principle of interpreting Kant's pure practical reason by reference to his explanation of the categorical imperative.

Kant insists that, although man's sensible nature is determined by the empirical laws of necessity, the supersensible nature of rational beings is derived from the autonomy of the pure practical reason. He expresses this fundamental principle in his notion of freedom:

Inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, it is

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the *keystone* of the whole system of pure reason, even the speculative, and all the other concepts (those of God and immortality) which, as being mere ideas, remain in it unsupported, now attach themselves to this concept, and by it obtain consistency, and objective reality; that is to say, their *possibility* is *proved* by the fact that freedom actually exists, for this idea is revealed by the moral law.⁶

In order to reconcile the causality as mechanism with the causality as freedom, Kant contends that man as a thinking subject is to himself in internal intuition only phenomenal, and as a free moral subject is a being in himself. Beyond the notions of desire and pleasure Kant sees no reason to use psychological notions, since the objective necessity of the moral law is true "only because it holds for everyone that has reason and will."⁷ In other words, even though "we must be *able to will* that a maxim of our action should be a universal law,"⁸ it is in the "consciousness of the moral law, or, what is the same thing, of freedom,"⁹ that there is an objective meaning of the categorical imperative for the individual will.

In the voluntary conduct exemplifying the purpose to obey the moral law, the two realms of empirical choice and transcendent freedom are united by the pure practical reason. "There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: *Act only on the maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.*"¹⁰

In view of the relation of purpose to the categorical imperative in Kant's thought, we contend that the teleological principle exemplified in the function of the pure practical reason is self-control or the autonomous determination of moral conduct according to a rational ideal. By virtue of this purpose in his life, man can rise above the inclinations of the sensibility. Duty is the power which elevates man into the realm of self-consciousness that is "derived from the indispensable condition of the only worth which men can give themselves."¹¹

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This is the rational self-control of ideal purpose, since autonomy is basis of the dignity and worth of human personality.¹² Kant's loyalty to the moral law, which the categorical imperative requires, implies, therefore, that the object to which man's pure practical reason refers is a universal ideal of personality. Even though Kant would seem to have recognized ends and values in his recognition of the primary worth of personality, the importance of values and consequences is merely a derivative notion or implication of the choices of a good will acting consistently according to the moral law.

How can a reflective person go beyond the "good will" to an "enlightened good will"? By formulating a system of laws which accounts for the volitional activity of the will, to which Kant confined his thinking, and the value content and purposes, which he neglected. Without a system of moral laws the complexities of a changing moral experience and the consequences of moral decisions are not given full consideration. Although the "categorical imperative" may serve as a negative guide, it does not furnish a normative standard for the creative growth which enlightens a good will. Kant has made an important contribution to ethical thought by his insistent claim that, if ethical principles are in any sense objective, the moral quality of an act must be derived from something more than mere pleasure, utility, or expediency, i.e., from some ultimate intrinsic ideal. His deficiency lies in his failure to continue his investigations to the point where he would make this necessary reference to purpose explicit as the integrating principle of a system of moral laws.

The most significant attempt to push the Kantian principle of the objectivity of moral law to its logical conclusion in a coherent system of moral laws has been made by Brightman. A reflective person who organizes his volitional activity, values, and awareness of obligation in accordance with some such system of normative principles or moral laws as follows, will in our opinion realize an enlightened good will:

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1. The Logical Law: *All persons ought to will logically; i.e., each person ought to will to be free from self-contradiction and to be consistent in his intentions. A moral person does not both will and not will the same ends; this property of a moral person is called his formal rightness.*
2. The Law of Autonomy: *All persons ought to recognize themselves as obligated to choose in accordance with the ideals which they acknowledge. Or: Self-imposed ideals are imperative.*
3. The Axiological Law: *All persons ought to choose values which are self-consistent, harmonious, and coherent, not values which are contradictory or incoherent with one another.*
4. The Law of Consequences: *All persons ought to consider and, on the whole, approve the foreseeable consequences of each of their choices. Stated otherwise: Choose with a view to the long run, not merely to the present act. (In the fuller statement, the phrase 'on the whole' is necessary, for some bad consequences may follow good choices, although the predominant tendency of the consequences may be good.)*
5. The Law of the Best Possible: *All persons ought to will the best possible values in every situation; hence, if possible, to improve every situation.*
6. The Law of Specification: *All persons ought, in any given situation, to develop the value or values specifically relevant to that situation.*
7. The Law of the Most Inclusive End: *All persons ought to choose a coherent life in which the widest possible range of value is realized.*
8. The Law of Ideal Control: *All persons ought to control their empirical values by (unified) ideal values (in accordance with a life plan).*

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9. The Law of Individualism: *Each person ought to realize in his own experience the maximum value of which he is capable in harmony with moral law.*
10. The Law of Altruism: *Each person ought to respect all other persons as ends in themselves, and, as far as possible, to co-operate with others in the production and enjoyment of shared values.*
11. The Law of the Ideal of Personality: *All persons ought to judge and guide all of their acts by their ideal conception (in harmony with the other Laws) of what the whole personality ought to become both individually and socially.*¹³

No amount of discussion here would be an adequate substitute for a first-hand study of Brightman's book, *Moral Laws*. Certain salient points should be stressed, however, in order to show their direct bearing upon the cultivation of an enlightened good will. Even if a critic should believe that these particular laws are not consistent with each other or that they need modification or expansion in order to meet the needs of moral experience adequately, the critic would have to formulate a more consistent and adequate system of moral laws. In any attempt to provide normative principles for guiding the development of an enlightened good will the following features could not be neglected.

Whereas a "good will" might be motivated by the sincere intentions of an emotional or uncritical conscience which merely reflect the strong feelings of that person's social environment, e.g., his church, school, family, community, custom; an enlightened good will is motivated by the mature judgments of a critical and reflective conscience which is achieved by a person's critical examination of all his moral decisions in the light of the whole system of moral laws that he has imposed upon himself as obligatory. Good intentions are not enough. Thoughtful consideration of the consequences of choices is necessary.

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The only strictly intrinsic value for an enlightened good will is the harmonious realization of all the ideal-values which are necessary for a rational person's fullest self-realization, e.g., a coherent system of aesthetic, character, religious, and intellectual preferences. Happiness is a by-product of this self-realization, and mere physical survival would be meaningless for a reflective person unless it could be instrumental to the realization of this more ultimate intrinsic purpose.

Although the emphasis upon self-realization in the "Law of Individualism" and the social responsibility in the "Law of Altruism" might on the surface seem to be contradictory, they are not only compatible, but they mutually require each other in the development of an enlightened good will. Unless a person has realized ideal values in his own life, he does not have the ability to appreciate the worth and dignity of other persons, and does not have anything worthwhile to share with them. Unless a person transcends his own selfish, petty interests by seeking to help others, he can not realize the maximum of ideal-values of which he is capable. "A man gains his soul, by losing it."¹⁴

The Ideal of Personality which sums up the entire system of moral laws renders a two-fold service to an enlightened good will. It serves as a goal and plan of action for the person who acknowledges and self-imposes the Ideal as obligatory for all his creative efforts. It furnishes a norm by which the individual can criticize his actions in particular situations: Does this contemplated action add or detract from the realization of the Ideal? The "Law of the Ideal of Personality" does not demand that every person should conform to a set universal pattern so that all people should lead the same sort of life. Whatever particular course one's life should take, the self-imposed system of moral laws demand as the fundamental obligation of an enlightened good will that a reflective person ought purposively to organize and direct his realizations of ideal-values according to a rational design for living.

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Modern man in search of a soul needs to understand the facts of moral experience in terms of a coherent scheme of hypotheses which: (i) serves as norms for guiding the purposive development of his enlightened good will, and (ii) interprets the meaning of an enlightened good will as a creative function of spiritual growth. We believe that Brightman's system of moral laws furnishes modern man ethical norms in accordance with which an enlightened good will elicits a *noble discontent*. In order to realize an *enduring satisfaction*, however, it is necessary for a person to verify through reflective thought that a system of moral laws, which coherently explains moral experience of the human order, is just as objectively true as a system of natural laws, which coherently explains the sense experience of the natural order. *Intellectual curiosity* is required to interpret the meaning of the moral experience of an *enlightened good will* just as it must interpret the meaning of the aesthetic experience of the *creative imagination*.

In this reflective process of inquiry into the truth about both the natural and the moral orders of reality, a person's intellectual curiosity (i) observes all the relevant facts, (ii) formulates explanatory hypotheses in accordance with an adequate criterion. Such moral data as voluntary choice, values, and an awareness of obligation can not be observed by the senses or quantitatively measured as are chemical elements or electrical forces. Moral laws as explanatory hypotheses cannot be tested like the causal laws of science in crucial experiments under controlled laboratory conditions. Such artificial situations would eliminate the possibility of any meaning for the enlightened good will which requires the experimental context of one's actual experience. Despite these apparent obstacles to the discovery of objective truth about the meaning of moral experience, a reflective person must find some adequate method and criterion of philosophical inquiry, if the insistent demands of his *intellectual curiosity* are to be

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met. This will be the problem of Chapter VIII where we shall attempt to ascertain the objective meaning of moral experience in a metaphysical interpretation of reality.

We now emphasize the social implications of the personal attitude of an enlightened good will. An enlightened good will is that personal attitude toward other individuals by which one so transforms his selfish interests that he realizes genuine freedom through assuming social responsibility. Such a transforming attitude generates an equilibrium of spiritual poise when a rational person meets injustice with understanding, prejudice with tolerance, hatred with sympathy, and social indifference with unselfish responsibility. This ethical quality of disciplined emotions is the highest unity of mind with mind that all mutual respect for personal worth should be.

C. Is Humanism Sufficient?

Conceived thus as an ideal in the realization of which one's personal life becomes a part of a larger social whole, the spiritual appetite of an enlightened good will might seem to be sufficient as an ultimate intrinsic value for which aesthetic, religious, and intellectual values are merely instrumental. Dewey has come to this humanistic conviction. Appealing to liberal minds to re-direct their interests and energies from speculative thought and supernatural channels into cooperative human endeavor, Dewey concludes his short but brilliant book, *A Common Faith*, with a noble social ideal:

The ideal ends to which we attach our faith are not shadowy and wavering. They assume concrete form in our understanding of our relations to one another and the values contained in these relations. We who now live are parts of a humanity that extends into the remote past, a humanity that has interacted with nature. The things we most prize in civilization are not of ourselves. They exist by the grace of the doings

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and the sufferings of the continuous human community of which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying, and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a religious faith that it shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant.¹⁵

When modern man's feelings respond to the appeal of Dewey's Promethean courage, he is possessed by the noble discontent of an enlightened good will. This can not be experienced by sanctimonious people who ignore their social responsibilities because they are complacent in their blind, selfish faith in God's sovereign power to dispense rewards and punishments. Thus Dewey emphasizes that it is only through cooperation with each other that men can find salvation from despair or defiance in their realization of ideal values:

The sense of the dignity of human nature is as religious as is the sense of awe and reverence when it rests upon a sense of human nature as a cooperating part of a larger whole. Natural piety is not of necessity either a fatalistic acquiescence in natural happenings or a romantic idealization of the world. It may rest upon a just sense of nature as the whole of which we are parts, while it also recognizes that we are parts that are marked by intelligence and purpose, having the capacity to strive by their aid to bring conditions into greater consonance with what is humanly desirable. Such piety is an inherent constituent of a just perspective of life.¹⁶

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Although Dewey's conception of socially creative endeavor exemplifies the Faustian noble discontent, it does not offer a rational justification for the objective status of ideal values which the realization of an *enduring satisfaction* demands. For the ideal possibilities of man's spiritual growth are nothing more than constructions of his imagination:

The idea of a whole, whether of the whole personal being or of the world, is an imaginative, not a literal, idea. . . . The self is always directed toward something beyond itself and so its own unification depends upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that imaginative totality we call the universe.¹⁷

Dewey recognizes implicitly the three essential characteristics of a way of salvation which our historical analysis disclosed: (i) the realization of value; (ii) the frustration of value; and (iii) the internal adjustment of man's will to some superhuman purpose. His Promethean attitude of an enlightened good will meets the first two requirements; but his impassioned plea for the consecration of man's social efforts to "ideal possibilities unified through imaginative realization and projection" can hardly be considered as a rational justification for a belief in the objective reality of spiritual growth.¹⁸

It may be true that this imaginative construction of a reality for ideal purposes to "climb on" is all that man can discover as the superhuman reference for his noble aspirations. If this be true, however, then modern man's search for an *enduring satisfaction* which is deeper than his tragic frustrations is a bootless quest. The humanistic philosophies, like the creative insights of the great poets, elicit a noble discontent that enriches man's spiritual growth. In fact, modern man could find no salvation without cultivating his creative imagination and enlightened good will. But they are not suf-

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ficient. Can speculative thought furnish a sound basis for believing that an enlightened good will is an objective fact which makes such a difference in the universe that by realizing it modern man will have found a significant meaning for his life?¹⁹

¹ The psychological and metaphysical justification for this conception of experience will be discussed at length in Chapter VI.

² In the development of ethical theories there have been various conceptions of what is the ultimate intrinsic value: (i) Formalism has appealed to the inherent rightness or wrongness of each individual act; (ii) Hedonism has appealed to happiness; (iii) Naturalistic Perfectionism has appealed to the biological survival and development of the physiological organism; and (iv) Idealistic Perfectionism appeals to the self-realization of "hyper-organic values." (See Urban, *Fundamentals of Ethics*, 51-134. Cf. Tzanoff, *Ethics*, 47-122 for similar discussions.)

For tables of values see Urban, FE, 169 and Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, 94-100.

³ Brightman, *Moral Laws*, 65. This entire analysis of the nature of moral experience is derived with some modifications from Brightman's view expressed in this book, to which further references will be made: "Therefore the three foundation pillars of ethics are value, obligation, and law; and law is the most essential of the three, if ethics is to be a science. If we summarize these three in the formulae: 'I evaluate,' 'I ought,' 'I universalize,' we bring out the basic fact that the foundations of ethics are actual personal experiences." (*Moral Laws*, 14.)

⁴ Kant, "The Metaphysic of Morality," in *The Philosophy of Kant* (selected and translated by John Watson), page 225.

⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (tr. Smith), 319.

⁶ *Theory of Ethics* (tr. Abbot), 88.

⁷ TE, 126.

⁸ *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics*, 49.

⁹ TE, 135.

¹⁰ FPM, 46.

¹¹ TE, 180.

¹² "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." (FPM, 56.)

¹³ *Moral Laws*, 98, 106, 125, 142, 156, 171, 183, 194, 204, 223, 242, respectively. All bracketed insertions have been approved by Brightman or suggested by him for clarification. A most scholarly critical account of the ethical theories of Kantian Formalism, Hedonism, and Biological Perfectionism, and a thorough justification for the Idealistic Perfectionism underlying Brightman's system can be found in Urban, *Fundamentals of Ethics* referred to previously. An excellent briefer and less technical discussion of these issues is offered by Blanshard, *Preface to Philosophy*, 103-195.

¹⁴ See Footnote 10 of the Appendix for Jesus' expression of this principle.

¹⁵ Dewey, *A Common Faith*, 87.

¹⁶ ACF, 25-26.

¹⁷ ACF, 18-19.

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¹⁸ ACF, 50. Compare conclusions of the Appendix.

¹⁹ We shall return to a study of social problems in the concluding chapter of this study, when we shall consider the implications of an ideal of spiritual growth for democracy.

CHAPTER V

THE FUNCTION OF INTELLECTUAL CURIOSITY IN SPIRITUAL GROWTH

THE SPIRITUAL APPETITE of *intellectual curiosity* is the attitude of a reflective thinker who is possessed by a compelling passion for truth rather than for static dogmas which justify emotional prejudices. When a rational person cultivates this critical yet tolerant state of mind, his mental processes are motivated by an insistent craving to observe experience, to explain experience by working hypotheses, and to organize these causal principles into a coherent system of beliefs which he is constantly expanding and modifying as he seeks a fuller realization and a more adequate explanation of life.

A brilliant conception of the function of intellectual curiosity in spiritual growth is to be found in Einstein's description of "the lure of the mysterious" which elicits speculative venture to understand ultimate reality:

The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all true art and science. He to whom this emotion is a stranger, who can no longer pause to wonder and stand rapt in awe, is as good as dead: his eyes are closed. This insight into the mystery of life, coupled though it be with fear, has also given rise to religion. To know that what is impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting itself as the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty which our dull faculties can comprehend only in their most primitive forms—this knowledge, this feeling, is at the center of true religiousness. In this sense, and in this

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sense only, I belong in the ranks of devoutly religious men. It is enough for me to contemplate the mystery of conscious life perpetuating itself through all eternity, to reflect upon the marvelous structure of the universe which we can dimly perceive, and to try humbly to comprehend even an infinitesimal part of the intelligence manifested in nature.¹

A. Reason and Revelation.

It seems to be a common characteristic of the religious genius that he feels no obligation to verify his intuitive insights into human destiny. Buddha eschewed metaphysical systems of the Vedanta as unnecessary in view of his special enlightenment. Jesus was not interested in any rational verification of the contents of God's revelation which he claimed was especially communicated through him. Each seer brought to mankind a new way of life which required that every follower should readjust his entire thought and conduct according to an inner principle in order to realize a spiritual quality of mind. Yet neither offered his disciples any basis for testing the objective truth of his claim.²

Even if the miracles ascribed to the founders of the great religions were historical facts, they would testify only to the unusual capacity of the men who performed them—not to the truth of their spiritual insights. Since these men do not agree as to what is the true way of salvation, and since each performed magical feats, the latter could hardly constitute objective proof of their conflicting views. The acceptance of religious beliefs by the followers of each founder depends, therefore, upon whether or not they share with the Master his conviction that he has had a special revelation. Later, when these disciples arbitrarily decide what shall be the truth about the divinity of the founder of the sect, authority becomes the criterion of truth to which all others must appeal.³

The importance of the Socratic way of spiritual growth for

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modern man lies in the fact that Socrates' spiritual insights into the meaning of human destiny are open to verification in one's own experience and have been justified to a high degree of probability by speculative thought.⁴ Since Plato's philosophy is an attempt to interpret the objective truth of Socrates' claims about spiritual growth, a brief consideration of Plato's cosmology may be instructive for showing what we mean by a rational justification of intuitively experienced value-realizations. As far as the problem of knowledge is concerned, these intuitive insights are like revelation-claims in that all are data to be interpreted and tested for their objective meaning and truth. The advantage of the Socratic tradition over the religious traditions is that the former was begun with a view to free critical inquiry, whereas the latter has forbidden it. This does not mean, however, that nothing worthwhile will be derived from the spiritual insights of such seers as Jesus and Buddha, if these, too, are seen to be coherent with a rational conception of human destiny. It will be recalled that we imposed the same requirements on Goethe's imaginative insights. To Plato we turn, therefore, in search of a mode of inquiry into the meaning of life which may lead modern man to realize an *enduring satisfaction*.

Socrates had taught Plato that in order to discover the meaning of life, you must "know thyself" through cultivating spiritual appetites for the Eternal Ideals of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth. Since these can not be known through the bodily appetites, they must be discovered by thought and realized in virtuous conduct. Hence, "knowledge is virtue."

In order to justify rationally his Master's intuitive insights, Plato faced the problem of constructing a picture of the universe in which there was: (i) a permanent realm of Being wherein man's thought could discover the Eternal Ideals of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth; and (ii) a changing realm of Becoming such as man discovers his temporal world to be through his senses. In his *Myth of the Cave* (Rep. vii) Plato,

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the poet, portrays man's initial bondage to the shadowy world of physical things revealed by his senses, and his possible liberation through appropriating the ultimately real world of ideals revealed by his speculative thought. Since Plato was a philosopher, as well as a poet, he felt compelled to answer the question, "Why?" i. e., to show what creative factors caused man to be an inhabitant of both a changing sense-world and a permanent thought-world. This explanation is furnished in his *Timaeus*.

God was the causal agent who brought about the changing, temporal world of Becoming; but God was not the only creative factor. His power was limited by two other creative factors which also were uncreated themselves but which had a part in the creation of the temporal world. One was the Eternal Realm of Ideals (Goodness, Beauty, and Truth) that served as the Pattern of Perfection which God aimed to imitate in the creative process. The other was the primordial material stuff or chaotic physical motions (the Receptacle) with which God must always struggle in creating an orderly world that reflects the Ideal of Perfection to which his purpose is directed.

As one of the products of this complex creative process, man emerged with two natures. Man's lower nature links him with the passing material world which his senses reveal and to which he responds in his physical appetites for bodily pleasure:

It is not endowed by its original constitution with a natural capacity for discerning or reflecting upon any of its own experiences. Wherefore, it lives indeed and it is not other than a living creature, but it remains stationary and rooted down owing to its being deprived of the power of self-movement.⁵

Man's higher nature links him with the permanent ideal world which his reason reveals and to which he responds by

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his spiritual appetites to share God's purpose in perfecting this world through the realization of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth in his own soul. This is the "intellectual delight which is caused by imitations of the divine harmony manifested in mortal motions."⁶ The fact that man can share this creative purpose with God is the mark of his divinity. Just as God must struggle with the primordial material chaos, so man must struggle with his bodily appetites and transform them into spiritual appetites which, when satisfied, will give divine dignity and eternal worth to his soul. Consequently, man's spiritual growth is an integral part of the cosmic process of creation which depends to some degree upon man's own initiative and purposive activity in the realization of ideal values:

But he who has seriously devoted himself to learning and to true thoughts, and has exercised these qualities above all others must necessarily and inevitably think thoughts that are immortal and divine, if so be that he lays hold on truth, and in so far as it is possible for human nature to partake of immortality, he must fall short thereof in no degree. . . . These each one of us should follow, rectifying the revolutions within our head, which were distorted at our birth, by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, and thereby making the part that thinks like unto the object of its thought, in accordance with its original nature, and having achieved this likeness attain finally to that goal of life which is set before men by the gods as the most good both for the present and for the time to come.⁷

By sharing the divine persuasion which will be victorious over brute force, therefore, a rational person can achieve a divine quality of mind which Plato calls "blessedness": "And inasmuch as he is ever tending his divine part and duly mag-

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nifying that daemon who dwells along with him, he must be supremely blessed."⁸

Regardless of whether we shall accept all the contents of Plato's metaphysical interpretation of Socrates' intuitive insights into the meaning of human destiny, nevertheless, Plato's synoptic method of philosophical inquiry exhibits the basic principle of rational justification upon which belief in the way of spiritual growth depends. Whereas the great historical religions have appealed to the criteria of merely intuitive certainty or absolute authority in order to justify their beliefs about salvation, the Socratic-Platonic tradition requires that, if a man is to find an *enduring satisfaction*, he must have objective reasons for believing that his subjective realization of ideal values participates in the total meaning of the creative process which is ultimate reality. It is only when man's speculative thought reveals that his conduct exemplifies the universal and necessary principles characterizing the cosmic order as a whole that he attains "blessedness."

Perhaps the closest analogy to this view in the history of philosophy is to be found in Spinoza's "intellectual love of God." In sharing with God the love by which he loves himself, a mere man could to some degree participate in the highest perfection. When his thought and conduct could be so rationally comprehended as necessarily proceeding from God, then they could be realized *sub specie aeternitatis*:

From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind, that is to say, the highest joy, attended moreover with the idea of one's self, and consequently attended with the idea of God as its cause . . . and this is what I call the intellectual love of God.⁹

Thus man can free himself from his confused perceptions and from the disturbing passions which hold him in bondage by his intellectual insight into ultimate reality.¹⁰

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B. The Need for Speculative Venture.

In our search for a soul for modern man we have found that he can become conscious of a noble discontent through the cultivation of his creative imagination and his enlightened good will. Goethe's *Faust* was discussed as a valuable source of inspiration for this attitude toward life. For a while it seemed as if modern man could discover salvation from the inner sterility which plagues his life merely by acknowledging an ideal of spiritual growth which he would ever seek to realize, even though he knew he could never achieve it. There can be no doubt that an awareness of the intrinsic dignity of one's soul can be elicited by such an insistent craving to realize an ideal of perfectibility. When we analyzed this Promethean spirit of Humanism, however, we found that a noble discontent alone can not satisfy the mind in the face of the tragic frustrations of ideal purposes; for it offers only imaginative constructions to substantiate man's belief that the spiritual growth to which he aspires has an objective reality.

We suggest, therefore, that if modern man is to find an *enduring satisfaction*, he must cultivate a spiritual appetite for intellectual curiosity leading to speculative venture, in addition to a creative imagination and an enlightened good will. This critical attitude of detachment requires that he should explore all of his experiences in terms of tentative hypotheses. Thereby he learns the necessity of cautiously testing all possible points of view with an open mind that can embody conviction and tolerance. Even though absolute truth is unattainable so that a high degree of probability is all that he can claim for his approved hypotheses, his intellectual curiosity is not in the least stifled. On the contrary, the very uncertainty of his quest for truth, regardless of its consequences for his personal desires and prejudices, will add zest to his speculative venture; for it challenges him to share with the great thinkers of all ages what Byron called "the eternal spirit of the chainless mind."

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For our problem the important question is whether modern man can discover through speculative venture that his ideal purpose is just as essential as the tragic frustration of ideal values in the very nature of the universe. We believe that he can cultivate a quality of mind which will redeem him from a meaningless life, if he can know that his spiritual growth is an objective reality in a creative process for which his ideal purpose has a significant role. To become possessed by this metaphysical insight is to coordinate one's emotional experience so that there emerges in the mind of a rational person an *enduring satisfaction*. Since a noble discontent is motivated by the Faustian conviction that life derives its worth from the pursuit of an unattainable ideal rather than from the achievement of any final goal, it might seem that the idea of an *enduring satisfaction* is irreconcilable with such a state of mind as is characterized by constant dissatisfaction. Yet we intend to show that they are not only reconcilable, but that an *enduring satisfaction* would not emerge into reflective consciousness, if it were not for this very pursuit of an unattainable ideal in antecedent mental processes.¹¹

Man's intellectual curiosity drives him to some type of speculative philosophy. Unless one feels a sense of wonder about the universe, about the meaning of his destiny, about the best way of life by which he can enrich his own experience and that of society, philosophy will seem to be a fruitless enterprise. To "modern man in search of a soul," for whom these problems should be burning issues, philosophy is an indispensable guide for his spiritual growth. It matters not that philosophy offers no satisfaction of physical appetites growing out of physical needs, for it will afford an *enduring satisfaction* of the spiritual appetites growing out of the more fundamental needs that motivate the thought, feeling, and conduct of intelligent persons. For such a person to refuse to think reflectively about philosophical problems is to deny himself a rich spiritual heritage.

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Philosophy is an attempt to formulate systematically a rational interpretation of one's total experience which provides a coherent meaning for the tested insights of science and the meaningful feelings of religion and art. In order to satisfy his intellectual curiosity man has constructed out of the details of his experience a systematic picture of the universe, i. e., a total world view. It is only when the human mind has some comprehensive conception of its total environment as a unified whole, that its particular items of information have meaningful connections. In its attempt to construct a systematic conception of the universe philosophy draws much from science, religion, and art. Our subsequent discussions will be more intelligible, if we briefly define these relationships.

Science observes particular natural events, attempts to explain the relations between these facts by causal hypotheses, and seeks to verify these causal laws to a high degree of probability by mathematical deductions and crucial experimental testing under controlled laboratory conditions. Although the objective reality of the physical world does not depend upon man's scientific thought about it, scientific thinking has formulated natural laws as principles of order in terms of which he can understand, explain, and predict natural events. The natural order defined in terms of causal laws, therefore, is constructed by the purposive activity of scientific thought. Through science, therefore, man's inquiring mind has formulated a picture of the natural order as a unified system of mechanical causality, i. e., a "mesh-work" of physical events in a space-time matrix in which each event is the result of all other past events in the universe and, in its turn, contributes to the production of all future events.¹²

Religion begins with specific beliefs about the Divine Order and interprets the natural order and the human order in terms that must necessarily conform to its initial assumptions about the nature of God. Science and religion need not

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conflict over the issue of belief in God. Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton and many other scientists from their time down to and including the present day have not only believed in God, but they have considered the uniform processes of the natural order to be the wisely-planned channels through which God works out his design in nature and purpose in human life. Science and religion do conflict on an essential issue, however, when religion dogmatically seeks to set aside natural law in favor of supernatural intervention or when pseudo-scientists dogmatically extend abstract mechanical concepts beyond their warranted limited usefulness in explaining the natural order into the spheres of the human and the divine orders.

The significance of art lies: (i) in the intrinsic enjoyment of an aesthetic experience of beauty or sublimity for its own sake; and (ii) in the meaningfulness of the feelings which the aesthetic object expresses and elicits. Although the first function is very important, it is with the second function that speculative philosophy is concerned when it investigates the possibility that in the creative expression of the artist there may be an intuitive insight into the meaning of human destiny. Although art appeals to the emotions, the thoughtful mood it may elicit illuminates the understanding between human values and their meaning. The psychic transformation which the imaginative experience of deep sorrow, of delight, of profound passion, and of aspiration affords, often stimulates an inner coherence of feelings in the mind of the person who appreciates the purpose of the artist. Regardless of how coherent or enlightened the creative imagination may be, it is to the feeling, nevertheless, that genuine art must appeal for a vital response. Philosophy must proceed from this created and re-created intuitive experience of meaningful feelings, if it is to include the artist's insights in an intelligible world-view.

• Speculative philosophy ventures to formulate a coherent

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picture of the total universe which explains the details that are experienced as parts of the systematic whole that is rationally conceived as the structure of all-that-there-is:

We are taking religion and science as typical sources of material for our world-view. But there are many others. The mind of man has a speculative bent, and all his activities, arts and politics furnish suggestions about the nature of the whole he lives in. It is this abundance of rumor about the world and the diversity of report which give philosophy its final task, that of *bringing coherence into the total view*. The especial responsibility of philosophy is to bring *the care for literal truth, sound evidence, and accurate thinking* into the larger aspects of the world, so that science and philosophy together may constitute a single body of reasoned truth.¹³

This rational, coherent, and systematic interpretation of one's total experience within a comprehensive framework is not a set of static dogmas, but, rather, the mind which constructs a world-view is constantly expanding its perspective as it seeks a fuller realization and a more adequate explanation of life.

Philosophy shares with religion (i) an interest in man's value experiences and (ii) an interest in the whole of the universe, i. e., the divine order and the human order, as well as the natural order to which scientific interest is confined. In his efforts to find some meaningful relation between his own life and the universe and some wisdom regarding human conduct, man has approached the problem emotionally and practically in his religion; but he has approached the problem intellectually, i. e., in terms of explanatory hypotheses, in his philosophy. Philosophy conflicts with religion only when the claims of religion are justified by an appeal to dogmatic authority.

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Philosophy shares with science the logic of the hypothetical-deductive method of inquiry, i. e., observation, formulation of explanatory hypotheses, and verification in accordance with an adequate criterion. Both science and philosophy must make certain assumptions which are presupposed for the hypothetical-deductive method of inquiry: (i) There is an objective reality to which subjective ideas refer. (ii) The objective reality is orderly. (iii) The objective reality is knowable to some degree, even though a high degree of probability rather than absolute certainty is all that can be claimed for the explanatory hypotheses. (iv) All explanations require the universal and necessary category of causality.

In the subsequent discussions of scientific and philosophical inquiry the different conceptions of causality employed by science and philosophy will be explained in detail. In this preliminary comparison only the basic difference need be emphasized. Whereas scientific hypotheses are attempts to answer the question "How?" i. e., to describe the causal relations between events within the space-time natural order; speculative philosophy attempts to answer the question "Why?" i. e., to explain the creative factors in the total process of reality which produce not only the natural order but also the human order, as well as the divine order, if it is necessary to conceive the latter in order to explain the natural and human orders.

Despite the "division of labor" between science and speculative philosophy, they share the same attitude toward truth in their cooperative enterprise. A philosophical attitude is not static or dogmatic, but rather it is a critical and open state of mind which possesses a person who is always seeking a more adequate rational explanation for his experiences. Since experience changes with each passing moment, new experiments in the "laboratory" of life and new hypotheses for adequately guiding and explaining the development of experiences must be explored. Thus the defining characteristic of a philosophical attitude is intellectual growth.¹⁴

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If "modern man in search of a soul" is to find some significant meaning for his life his intellectual curiosity will not be satisfied with mere isolated bits of information. He needs some comprehensive concept of the total universe in which his knowledge about the natural order, the human order, and the divine order are coherently integrated into an organic whole. Without such a speculative interpretation natural facts are unrelated and the human purposes exhibited in the creative imagination and an enlightened good will have no meaningful connections with an objective purposive process in ultimate reality. One's personal experiences of fact and value have meaning, therefore, only when they are explained in terms of a coherent system of hypotheses which constitute the structure of the all-inclusive framework of one's metaphysical world-view.

Before we can construct a metaphysical world-view that might define the cosmological status of spiritual growth, however, we must inspect the method and criterion of reflective thinking which are required by the logic of scientific-philosophical inquiry.¹⁵

¹ *Preface to Philosophy: Book of Readings*, pp. 169-170.

² Our selection of Jesus and Buddha as examples does not imply, of course, that there have been no other important religious geniuses.

³ Even though Scholasticism was an intricate system of rational thought about Christian belief, the major premises of its syllogisms were taken from the revealed doctrines of the Bible. Free critical inquiry was not permitted, since religious beliefs were truths of faith, rather than truths of reason. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* in which it is his chief aim to show the rationality of the universe as a revelation of God. The earlier Mahayana form of Buddhism appealed solely to the authority of Buddha's "enlightenment." Although Hinayana Buddhism resorted to metaphysical thought, even though Buddha did not, there was no free critical inquiry into the basic doctrines here either.

⁴ See Chapter II of this study. This claim does not rule out the possibility of divine revelation. In fact, if one accepts Brightman's dynamic theory of revelation, it is possible that Socrates' insights are just as much divinely inspired as those of Jesus, Buddha, or any other founder of a great religious tradition: "In contrast with the dogmatic view . . . is the teleological or dynamic theory of revelation. According to this view, which is in some form accepted by most 'liberal' or modernistic theists, the essence of revelation is not the communication of infallible truths; instead it is the guidance of human lives to higher levels by divine power. To be more exact, it means the

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belief that, although God does not impart dogmatic eternal truths to men's minds in some supernatural way, yet the divine purpose so acts on human history that men are given impulses which lead them to move toward God. Those who hold this theory think in terms of spiritual stimulus and response, and so of divine-human cooperation, rather than in terms of divinely revealed creeds. It is clear why this view is called dynamic. It is not that there is no 'dynamic power' in dogmatism; there undoubtedly is. But the dynamic view makes revelation an experience of the power and active purpose of God rather than an experience of God's knowledge. According to the teleologists (or 'dynamists,' as we may call them), knowledge must always be built up and tested by reason on the basis of data of experience. Experience, on this view, includes many factors which are revelatory in the sense of being purposed by God in order to lead men to higher values; yet all of these factors must be interpreted by reason, and the interpretation is human thinking, not divine dogma." (Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, 176)

⁵ *Timaeus*, 77BC. Cf. *Timaeus*, 42AB, 47E-48A.

⁶ *Tim.*, 80B. Cf. *Tim.*, 75E, 48A, 42E, 42AD, and 47C.

⁷ *Tim.*, 90CD.

⁸ *Tim.*, 90C. See *Phaedrus*, 246 for Plato's "Myth of the Charioteer," in which he portrays the spiritual crisis which a soul experiences in attempting to free itself from its material bondage. Discussing the problem of salvation from rebirth in a cycle of probationary reincarnation (analogous to the Karma of Indian thought), Plato describes a way of spiritual growth as follows: "But the soul of him who has never seen the truth will not pass into human form, for men ought to have intelligence, as they say, 'secundum speciem,' proceeding from many particulars of sense to one conception of reason; and this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw when in company with God, when looking down from above upon that which we now call beings and upward toward the true being. And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to these things in which God abides, and beholding which he is what he is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect." (*Phaedrus*, 249A)

⁹ Spinoza, *Ethic*, Prop. xxxii.

¹⁰ In contemporary philosophy a similar idea is embodied in Whitehead's conception of "Peace," and Hocking's notion of a "prophetic consciousness."

Whitehead: "The Peace that is here meant is not the negative conception of anaesthesia. It is a positive feeling which crowns the 'life of motion' of the soul. It is hard to find and difficult to speak of. It is not a hope for the future, nor is it an interest in present details. *It is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, un verbalized and yet momentous in its coordination of values.* Its first effect is the removal of the stress of acquisitive feeling arising from the soul's preoccupation with itself. Thus Peace carries with it a surpassing of personality. There is an inversion of relative values. It is primarily a trust in the efficacy of Beauty. It is a sense that fineness of achievement is as it were a key unlocking treasures that the narrow nature of things would keep remote. There is thus involved a grasp of infinitude, an appeal beyond boundaries. Its emotional effect is the subsidence of turbulence which inhibits. More accurately, it preserves the springs of energy, and at the same time masters them for the avoidance of paralyzing distractions. The trust in the self-justification of Beauty introduces faith,

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where reason fails to reveal the details." (Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, 367-368. Cf. AI, 368-369 and 377-378.)

Hocking: "By the prophetic consciousness I do not mean a knowledge that something is to happen in the future, accomplished by forces beyond myself: I mean that this act of mine which I now utter is to succeed and hold its place in history. It is an assurance of the future and of all time as determined by my own individual will, embodied in my present action. It is a power which knows itself to be such, and justly measures its own scope. I do not say that as yet an assurance like this is possible; still less that it has ever been attained: I say only that it is necessary for happiness—that without it this region of historical fact must stand condemned as outside the sphere of either justice or reality." (*The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, 303. Cf. MGHE, 195, 198, 512; TDL, 229, 231; LRWF, 7.)

¹¹ Whereas a *noble discontent* embodies attachment to desires, an *enduring satisfaction* embodies detachment from temporary desires. The need for such a correlation of attachment and detachment in modern man's life-view has been emphasized by Hocking in *Thoughts on Death and Life* as the "principle of duality." More recently Morris, in his *Paths of Life* "in search of a faith by which the thoughtful person can direct his life in today's world," advocates this attitude of detachment-attachment in the "Maitreyan type of personality" who is a synthesis of the "buddhistic," "dionysian," and "promethean" temperaments that have dominated previous cultures. The basic difference between the "path of life" suggested by Morris and the way of spiritual growth which we shall explain in that the former is humanistic and anti-metaphysical, whereas our notion of an *enduring satisfaction* is meaning-less apart from metaphysical thought.

¹² Substantiation for this description of the aim of science is to be found in the following passages:

"To obtain even a partial solution the scientist must collect the unordered facts available and make them understandable by creative thought." (Einstein, *The Evolution of Physics*, 5.)

"The essential feature of physical explanation is evidently the transition from nature to the realm of constructs and the reverse." (Margenau, "Methodology of Modern Physics," *Philosophy of Science*, (II) (1935), 58.)

A detailed discussion of the methodology of science and the meaning of "natural laws" will be found in Chapter VI, Section B.

¹³ Hocking, *Preface to Philosophy: Textbook*, 420.

¹⁴ A philosophical attitude is identical in spirit to the scientific attitude. The essence of this *scientific attitude* has been expressed admirably by John Dewey in "Unity of Science as a Social Problem," *Foundations of the Unity of Science*, in the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Vol. I, Number 1, p. 31.:

"In short, the scientific attitude as here conceived is a quality that is manifested in any walk of life. What, then, is it? On its negative side, it is freedom from control by routine, prejudice, dogma, unexamined tradition, sheer self-interest. Positively it is the will to inquire, to examine, to discriminate, to draw conclusion only on the basis of evidence after taking pains to gather all available evidence. It is the intention to reach beliefs, and to test those that are entertained, on the basis of observed fact, recognizing also that the facts are without meaning save as they point to ideas. It is, in turn, the experimental attitude which recognizes that while ideas are necessary

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to deal with facts, yet they are working hypotheses to be tested by the consequences they produce."

¹⁵ Our claim that reason demands a conceptual integration of hypotheses about natural facts and human values is substantiated by Max Planck in his *Philosophy of Physics*: "It might thus be inferred that science ceases to play a part as soon as ethical problems arise. Yet such an inference would be wrong. We saw above that in dealing with the structure of science, and in discussing its most suitable arrangement, a reciprocal interconnection between epistemological judgments and judgments of value was found to arise, and that no science can be wholly disentangled from the personality of the scientist. Modern physics has given us a clear indication pointing in the same direction. It has taught us that the nature of any system cannot be discovered by dividing it into its component parts and studying each part by itself, since such a method often implies the loss of important properties of the system. We must keep our attention fixed on the whole and on the interconnection between the parts. The same is true of our intellectual life. It is impossible to make a clear cut between science, religion, and art. The whole is never equal simply to the sum of its various parts." (33-34)

CHAPTER VI

THE METHOD AND CRITERION OF REFLECTIVE THINKING

A. What is Reflective Thinking?

REFLECTIVE THINKING is the purposive activity in which the mind is engaged when it concentrates upon the solution of a problem. This aim of the reflective thinker regulates the investigation of all the relevant facts in their real relations, and integrates the temporal sequence of ideas (chain of successive units) in the conscious, ongoing process in which present ideas grow out of past ideas and anticipate future ideas. Certain facts are observed and the observer is uncertain why they act as they do. Consequently, a problem arises. In order to solve this specific problem a reflective thinker formulates an hypothesis that may explain the observed facts thereby solving the problem. Then by careful searching and inquiry he must determine whether or not the hypothesis explains the facts and the facts support the hypothesis.¹

The process of reflective thinking which is controlled by purpose is constituted by the *constructive activity of the mind*, i. e., a judgment which interprets the sense and value experiences of self-consciousness so that reality has a meaning which can be expressed in terms of ideas. (In common usage the conclusion produced by this interpreting activity is sometimes referred to as a judgment.) The external expression in speech or writing of the product of an act of judging is denoted by the word, *proposition*, which is composed of *percepts* and *concepts*. An examination of the processes of perception and conception indicates further evidence for our claim that reflection is a purposive constructive activity.

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In perception the mind directly apprehends "this" or "that" distinct individual thing which has its own place in space and time. Although physical objects seem to thrust themselves on the mind which perceives them, the judging activity of the mind itself is involved in the remembering and discriminating of attention, as well as in the selecting and arranging involved in the coordination of the many sense elements which are the component parts of a single perceptual object. Accordingly, perceptual knowledge from the observation of physical objects does not just pass automatically into the mind through the senses of touching, seeing, hearing, tasting, or smelling; for the mind must combine sense-impressions and interpret them.

In conception the mind entertains an idea or general meaning which is not confined to any one particular sense-object, but which as a construction of thinking applies to a number of individual things. Although we inherit the meanings of words when we learn a language, we should note that words are but shorthand expressions of concepts that must be worked out by the mind through a series of judgments in the progressive development of the constant process of thinking from partial and incomplete knowledge to a more complete and coherent knowledge.

In making a judgment the mind performs a two-fold function, analysis and synthesis, in order to construct the system of explanatory hypotheses that constitutes reliable knowledge. In its analytic function the mind discriminates, differentiates, distinguishes, and breaks down perceived objects into their smallest constituent parts. In its synthetic function the mind brings together the constituent parts of an object into functional relations with each other and with other objects, i. e., an interconnected organic unity. This applies just as much to everyday practical judgments about the nature of physical objects as it does to theoretical metaphysical judgments about the universe as a whole. In the proposition,

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"This desk is heavy," we cannot think simply about the subject without relating it to the predicate. In other words, we cannot think "this desk" without thinking something about it, if the proposition as stated is to have an intelligible meaning beyond the mere eliciting of the image of "this desk." What we understand by "heaviness" must be also taken into consideration. Although the words making up the subject and those making up the predicate can be used separately and independently, they cannot be left so separated in the synthetic activity of thinking which is the total judgment. In the metaphysical judgment, "The universe is an unbegun and unending process of temporal events," the same synthetic activity of judging is required, even though the mind could reach this conclusion only after a long series of judgments by which a coherent system of explanatory hypotheses had been constructed.

When Descartes declared that "it were far better never to think of investigating truth at all, than to do so without a method," he emphasized the fact that reflective thinking requires a logical method. A claim to truth has no meaning for a reflective thinker unless he can understand the logical method of investigation in accordance with which the conclusions have been reached and the criterion by which these beliefs have been verified.

Logic may be defined as the normative science which investigates the process of thinking and furnishes a method and criterion for arriving at truth. Whereas psychology investigates the contents of the mind in order to understand what actually goes on in a person's consciousness and subconsciousness and to describe these mental processes in the same quantitative terms as are used by the exact sciences for describing physical objects in the natural order; logic is interested in finding out what knowledge mental processes furnish about an objective reality to which they refer and in finding out which of rival beliefs about objective reality is true.²

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In the construction of a world-view in order to satisfy one's intellectual curiosity scientific and philosophical inquiries are regulated by the same hypothetical-deductive principles of reflective thinking:

- (i) Observation and classification of all the relevant facts of experience, i. e., sense data or value data or both depending upon the type of inquiry.
- (ii) Causal explanation of the observed facts in terms of a system of hypotheses.
- (iii) Verification of the hypothetical claim to truth in accordance with an adequate criterion:
 - (a) Deduction of the implications of the hypotheses by formal logic, symbolic logic, or mathematics.
 - (b) Experimental testing of the implications of the hypotheses under controlled laboratory conditions, when possible.
 - (c) Conceptual integration of an hypothesis into a coherent system of descriptive generalizations that are logically consistent and adequate for explaining experience.³

B. The Hypothetical-Deductive Method of Scientific Inquiry.

Man's intellectual curiosity has driven him from magic and supernaturalism to scientific inquiry into the natural explanation of the causal relations between observed facts without an appeal to the operations of unknowable forces which can not be publicly verified. As we indicated previously, the natural order defined in terms of causal laws is constructed by the purposive activity of scientific thought. Through science, therefore, man's inquiring mind has formulated a picture of the natural order as a unified system of efficient causality, i. e., a "meshwork" of physical events in a space-time matrix in which each event is the result of all other past events in the universe and, in its turn, contributes to the production of all future events.⁴

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Earlier in this chapter we outlined what we believe to be the hypothetical-deductive principle of *all* reflective thinking which regulate the scientific and philosophical inquiries through which one may construct a world-view in order to satisfy his intellectual curiosity. In the subsequent section of this chapter we shall show how these principles are employed by the synoptic method of speculative philosophy. Our present problem, however, is to indicate and explain how scientific investigations of the natural order employ these principles in the following procedures: (1) observation of the perceived facts (including classification); (2) formulation of causal hypotheses to explain the observed facts; (3) verification of the explanatory hypotheses by (a) mathematical deduction of the implications of the hypotheses, and (b) experimental testing of these hypothetical implications under controlled laboratory conditions which can be repeated anywhere and anytime; and (4) formulation of coherent systems of integrating descriptive generalizations, i. e., "natural laws." We shall now discuss them in detail in order to show the implications of scientific method for all reflective thinking.

1. Observation of Perceived Facts.

Scientific inquiry begins with an analysis of the physical events in the natural space-time world. All the facts that are relevant to the particular problem involved must be carefully examined or diagnosed regardless of whether the observing is through a microscope, a telescope, or sense-perception without the aid of refined mechanical instruments. Sound observation requires that the range of facts under investigation be comprehensive enough to include not only the directly pertinent facts but also such qualifying information that might arise during the process of examination to substantiate what has already been observed or to suggest other facts as yet undiscovered by the observer. Keen senses are important, but particular facts they perceive are useless unless a sufficient

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connection between the apparently isolated facts is recognized by the observer. No less important than accurate instruments is the proper mental attitude of the observer; for he must not only have the capacity for guiding his present investigations by information he remembers from previous observations, but he must be possessed by such a detached intellectual curiosity that his diagnosis of the perceived facts is not distorted by preconceived ideas, emotional prejudice, or personal desire.⁵

Observation is the fundamental procedure with which scientific inquiry begins and with which it ends; but, contrary to popular belief, the facts do not speak for themselves. Some degree of hypothetical interpretation is involved even in sense-perception:

The defining characteristic of perception is the occurrence of a sense datum and its interpretation as the aspect of an objective thing. Perception thus involves the hypothesis there exists an object to which given aspects are referred. The hypothesis that various common things exist is continually being confirmed by the reproduction of perceptions of them. I repeatedly have perceptions which are described as responses to a desk with relatively stable properties. Different types of perception are found to be correlated; thus, upon sight of my desk I expect to touch it. The truth of a perception is confirmed or disconfirmed by testing the predictions derivable from it. The development of the concept of an object is completed by the hypothesis of the identity of the perceptible objects of a society of observers. Thus the concept of objective thing is social; science is tested by social procedure. The scientific criterion of objectivity ultimately rests upon the possibility of occurrence of predicted perceptions to a society of observers.⁶

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In addition to the qualitative descriptions furnished by ordinary perceptions (e. g., "The apple is red," or "This man is taller than that man.") in terms of predicates, quantitative representations requiring procedures for assigning numbers to measurable properties are furnished by science (e. g., instead of describing a rod as long or short, science records that it is so many meters long). Counting, measurement of length, measurement of time, and measurement of weight are employed to make observations intelligible. Observation through the inference of efficient causality based upon the assumption of radiation is required for the study of such micro-physical entities as electrons, protons, neutrons, etc., which by hypothesis are considered to be the causes of macro-physical perceptual objects: "In this field, principles become constructive instruments of interpretation, and so observation is more subject to the uncertainties of hypotheses than in perception of common things."⁷

Far from "speaking for themselves" the many observable facts could not be perceived in any intelligible order apart from the use of an hypothesis as a principle of relevance to systematize perceptual observations through such procedures as: (i) *classification*, i. e., the grouping of facts that have generally significant similarities in accordance with a correlating idea, not chance resemblance; (ii) *definition*, i. e., a concise or compressed classification which is recorded as a formula to assist the investigator in explaining his observations and to assist subsequent investigations of his own or of others; (iii) *correlation of events* as a basis for prediction; (iv) *successive approximation* of causal laws; and (v) *successive definition* of causal laws which change with the development of science.⁸

2. Formulation of a System of Hypotheses to Explain the Observed Facts.

Science not only must use hypotheses in order to determine

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which facts are relevant to a particular investigation, but science could discover no order or causal connection among the observed facts unless the mind constructs a system of hypothetical principles which explains the past causes of present effects and predicts future effects of present causes. An hypothesis is a theory, or a supposition, or an inspired guess, or a working idea which a scientific investigator proposes as a possible explanation of the observed facts or a solution of a problem.

Observed facts will yield no meaning unless they are viewed with some such tentative principle of interpretation in mind:

Nature, it has been said, gives no reply to a general inquiry—she must be interrogated by questions which already contain the answer she is to give; in other words, the observer can only observe that which he is led by the hypothesis to look for; the experimenter can only obtain the result which his experiment is designed to obtain.⁹

Chance observations have significance as discoveries only when they affirm or deny some presumption in the mind of the investigator or are linked to a system of ideas. Observation of fact and formulation of hypotheses go hand in hand mutually supporting and modifying each other. In order to have a fruitful meaning an hypothesis must predict certain facts or must lead to certain consequences as a program for further investigation, or else it will be barren and not capable of proof or disproof.

Scientific knowledge, whether it be an isolated explanation of the cause of some particular fact or the total conceptual framework of natural laws by which all physical events are conceived in terms of an interconnected space-time continuum, never loses its hypothetical character. In his discussion of the organization of scientific thought, Whitehead

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points out that science can claim no more than a high degree of probability for its causal laws by which it hypothetically explains the relations between natural events:

— Success is never absolute, and progress in the right direction is the result of a slow, gradual process of continual comparison of ideas with facts. The criterion of success is that we should be able to formulate empirical laws, that is, statements of relation, connecting the various parts of the universe thus conceived, laws with the property that we can interpret the events of our lives as being our fragmentary knowledge of this conceived interrelated whole.¹⁰

When the scientist formulates one hypothesis or a system of hypotheses in order to explain the meaning of natural events, he presupposes *the category of efficient causality* as a universal and necessary principle without which objective knowledge about the natural world would be impossible. The "law of causality" cannot be proved to be true, since verification requires scientific experimentation that is meaningless unless it proceeds upon the assumption that the "law of causality" is true. It is, therefore, a necessary methodological postulate of all scientific inquiry that "nothing happens without a sufficient cause" or that "for every effect there is a cause, and from every cause there follows some effect."

To claim that the "law of causality" is not an absolutely demonstrated reality is not to claim that it is necessarily an unreality. For such a basic assumption the question of demonstration is irrelevant, just as it is for the Aristotelian "Laws of Thought." No one can prove or disprove the "Law of Identity," the "Law of Non-Contradiction," or the "Law of Excluded Middle," since convincing arguments for or against them would necessarily presuppose the basic postulate which the "Laws of Thought" express, namely, "all thinking must be consistent." Just as any reflective thinker must have a

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rational faith in the "Laws of Thought," if he is to believe in the possibility of intelligible communication, the scientific investigator must accept the "Law of Causalty," if he is to believe that there is an objective order of reality which can be investigated and known progressively in terms of an expanding, coherent system of hypotheses.¹¹

. According to the Newtonian or Classical theory in physics the "law of efficient causality" meant: "The effects of all physical causes can be directly and accurately predicted, and whatsoever can be predicted with certainty is causally determined." Not only is the principle of causality postulated, but since the problem of scientific investigation is formulated exclusively in terms of prediction, the total context of the natural order as a unified causal system of interacting parts is established by definition as a mathematical ideal in which, as Newton claimed, "every particle attracts every other particle." Although the intensity of an electric or gravitational force is influenced by the ratio of the distance, it always has some effect.

Actual scientific investigations must deal with abstractions from this mathematically conceived unitary scheme of causality. Consider, for example, the doctor who must diagnose the one underlying cause of various symptoms. When he formulates an hypothesis to explain the unknown cause of observed effects, he must select from all possible symptoms only those which are relevant to the working idea or supposed cause which he has in mind. Laboratory testing either justifies his abstractions from the total cause and effect relations or indicates that he must explore some other single path which he selects from the intricate labyrinth of the infinite causal system.

There has persisted in scientific thought the underlying assumption that all natural events taken as a whole constitute a unified system of mechanical causality. This conceptual framework "is not a set of parallel chains but a spreading

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meshwork" (Hocking) of physical events in a spatial and temporal matrix in which each event is the predetermined result of all other past events in the universe and, in its turn, contributes to the production of all future events. It should not be forgotten that the prediction of all possible natural events in terms of an all-comprehensive formula is a mathematical ideal, not an actual achievement.

The reduction of the explanation of all natural events to the interaction between particles of matter by the kinetic theory is a hypothetical interpretation of the natural order which assumes that the category of mechanical causality is the universal and necessary principle of objective reference:

In mechanics the future path of a moving body can be predicted and its past disclosed if its present condition and the forces acting upon it are known. Thus, for example, the future paths of all planets can be foreseen. The active forces are Newton's gravitational forces depending on the distance alone. The great results of classical mechanics suggest that the mechanical view can be consistently applied to all branches of physics, that all phenomena can be explained by the action of forces representing either attraction or repulsion, depending only upon distance and acting between unchangeable particles.

In the kinetic theory of matter we see how this view, arising from the mechanical problems, embraces the phenomena of heat and how it leads to a successful picture of the structure of matter.¹²

Classical physics assumed that throughout all the changing process of the objective world itself there is a rigid causal determination which produces the uniformity of nature, and that this mechanical scheme of the interaction of particles can be accurately known through scientific predictions which ascertain the simultaneous location and momentum of the

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particles. Heisenberg, in his *The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory*, questions whether this is possible in his emphasis upon the "principle of uncertainty" and Eddington in *The Nature of the Physical World* pushes this point even further to claim that "an association of exact position with exact momentum can never be discovered by us *because there is no such thing in Nature.*" Thus the "principle of uncertainty," in the predicting of effects, has been interpreted by some physicists to mean an indeterminacy in the actual causal processes of the natural events themselves.

We agree with Werkmeister that Eddington's inference that quantum mechanics has eliminated the need for the category of causality is unwarranted, even though Eddington is correct when he points out that the simultaneous determination of the location and momentum of particles cannot be ascertained. The zeal of the mechanist exceeds his knowledge, nevertheless, when he assumes that direct predictions can be made accurately about all future events:

To sum it all up we may say that if we interpret the "principle of causality" to mean that "whatsoever can be predicted with certainty is causally determined," then we must abandon it; but in this sense the principle was never really "in force." And if we take the "principle of causality" to mean that "nothing happens without a sufficient cause," then quantum mechanics has not denied it in the least.¹³

The new physics based on Planck's quantum theory and Einstein's theory of relativity seriously questions the universality and necessity of *mechanical* causality. In his discussion of "the decline of the mechanical view" Einstein points out the inadequacy of the corpuscular theory of light to explain electric and optical phenomena, the advantages of inner consistency and simplicity which the theory of relativity has over Newton's mechanical concepts of space and time, and the

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greater adequacy of quantum physics with its probable laws pertaining to congregations of events as wholes over the mechanical view which described atomic events in space and time.¹⁴

Despite the fact that many scientists and philosophers to-day agree with Millikan that "the childish mechanical conceptions of the 19th century are now grotesquely inadequate," scientific inquiry must still appeal to the category of efficient causality as a principle of interpretation in order to make its hypothetical generalizations from observations intelligible:

The law of causality is neither true nor false, but is rather a heuristic principle, a guidepost — although probably the most important guidepost we possess — which enables us to find our way through the colorful jumble of events, and which points out the direction in which scientific investigation must proceed in order to come to fruitful results.¹⁵

Scientific inquiry does not stop with the inductive generalizations from experience. The causal hypotheses which have been formulated in order to explain the observed facts require verification in accordance with an adequate criterion, if reliable scientific knowledge is to be attained.

3. Scientific Verification of Explanatory Hypotheses.

In the construction of a world-view the scientific verification of explanatory hypotheses, which are intended to define the natural order, is not as simple as it is often conceived to be. To the question: "How can I know that my scientific hypothesis is true?" the common answer would be: "Test it in the laboratory." Careful examination reveals, however, that many hypotheses cannot be dealt with directly under the controlled conditions of a laboratory experiment. Fundamental causal laws have been derived from thought as well as observation. Consequently, there is required a criterion of verifica-

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tion which takes into account the speculative thinking, mathematical reasoning, and presuppositions of the category of causality that are involved along with laboratory observations.¹⁶

In order to verify the truth of a scientific hypothesis it is necessary: (a) to elaborate by mathematical or syllogistic deductions the implications of the hypothesis;¹⁷ (b) to test these implications or predicted consequences under controlled laboratory conditions that could be reproduced with the same results at any time and place (crucial experiment); (c) to integrate conceptually the particular hypothesis into a coherent system of causal hypotheses so that the hypothetical claim is consistent with the other hypotheses in the scheme and adequate for explaining all the relevant facts to which it pertains; (d) to determine whether the accepted coherent scheme of causal hypotheses itself is adequate as a descriptive generalization for explaining all of the facts relevant to the natural order. If any particular hypothesis contradicts the other hypotheses in the system but has unearthed new facts hitherto not accounted for by the accepted system, the whole system of explanatory hypotheses must be revised. Without this provision progress in scientific inquiry would be impossible.

Let us state the formulation of the complex criterion of scientific truth in other words: If the hypothesis is true, certain deducible implications should be available for discovery. Should these implications be ascertained by laboratory experimentation under controlled conditions, then the hypothesis has been proven to a high degree of probability. Should such laboratory experiments fail to discover the predicted implications, then the hypothesis as formulated must be modified or abandoned and a more adequate hypothesis must be thought out.¹⁸

After the investigator has supposed that he has "hit upon" an hypothesis which explains the cause of all the observed facts which are relevant to the problem with which he is con-

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cerned, he deduces the implications of this working idea by mathematical reasoning. He then compares the necessary consequences of his hypothesis with the facts by a crucial experiment under controlled laboratory conditions. If the laboratory results support his hypothesis, his explanation is verified as true to a high degree of probability. If the laboratory results do not support the hypothesis, his explanation has been shown to be untrue; but even failures may be instructive for further investigation. Scientific experimentation is an exploration of the relation of cause and effect which tests its hypotheses or tentative opinions in terms of the following symbolic analysis: "If this fact *a* is really the cause of this event *b*, then we must try to see if whenever *a* occurs *b* inevitably also occurs, and whenever *a* is absent, *b* fails to occur."¹⁹

When the scientist claims that he has verified his hypotheses by a crucial experiment, i. e., a laboratory test that could be performed with the same results at any time or in any place provided that the same controlled conditions prevailed, he assumes that nature operates in an orderly manner so that events occur in uniform and invariable causal sequences. Apart from this belief in a harmonious pattern of events the scientist's appeal to the category of causality would be meaningless.²⁰

4. What Are Natural Laws?

Through this rational progress from particular instances (observed facts) to verified generalizations (coherent system of explanatory hypotheses) the scientist arrives at generic categories, i. e., causal principles which are the structure of the conceptual framework that is known as the natural order. Not only must a particular hypothesis explain the cause of a particular observed fact; but each hypothesis must fit consistently into a comprehensive scheme of hypotheses that is adequate for making possible the understanding, prediction, and control of events. When a causal generalization meets these requirements of coherence and thereby renders an intelligible

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integration of the causal relations between certain types of events, it is designated as a "law of nature."²¹

Although the objective reality of the physical world (whatever it may be) does not depend on man's thoughts about it, man can have no coherent knowledge by which he can understand, explain, or predict natural events unless he constructs by "creative thought" natural laws as structural principles of the natural order:

Science is not just a collection of laws, a catalogue of unrelated facts. It is a creation of the human mind, with its freely invented ideas and concepts. Physical theories try to form a picture of reality and to establish its connection with the wide world of sense impressions. Thus the only justification for our mental structures is whether and in what way our theories form such a link.²²

Since natural laws are descriptive generalizations, they cannot be proved or disproved by any one crucial experiment, but rather they are retained or abandoned in accordance with their adequacy or inadequacy as fundamental conceptions of order.²³

Natural laws are popularly conceived as absolute and necessary regulations with which *Nature*, conceived as causal agent, governs all physical occurrences in space and time. It should be recognized that this is not the conception of modern science which conceives the laws of nature as average modes of procedure:

Now these simplest things are those widespread habits of nature that dominate the whole stretch of the universe within our remotest, vaguest observation. None of these Laws of Nature gives the slightest evidence of necessity. They are the *modes of procedure* [italics mine] which within the scale of our observations do in fact prevail. I mean, the fact that the number of

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spatial dimensions is three, the spatial laws of geometry, the ultimate formulae for physical occurrences. There is no necessity in any of these ways of behaviour. They exist as average, regulative conditions because the majority of actualities are swaying each other to modes of interconnection exemplifying these laws. New modes of self-expression may be gaining ground. We cannot tell. But, to judge by all analogy, after a sufficient span of existence our present laws will fade into unimportance. New interests will dominate. In our present sense of the term, our spatio-physical epoch will pass into the background of the past, which conditions all things dimly and without evident effect on the decision of prominent relations.²⁴

Knowledge that satisfies one's intellectual curiosity, no less than the technological need for predicting natural events, requires an adequate conception of natural laws which indicate some degree of regular recurrence or persistent uniformity in the all-pervading patterns of the objective succession of events we assume the universe to be. According to Whitehead, there are four representative conceptions of natural laws.

The doctrine of imposed law means that there is a behavior pattern that is imposed on particular events which requires that they enter into relationships with other particular events. Since, on this view, each of the ultimate constituent units of reality is only externally related to each of the other similar units, you can neither understand them by examining the law of their causal relations nor formulate a law by a generalization derived from observation of their actions. This concept of nature requires the postulate that God imposes the laws which correlate the behavior patterns of the individual realities. Newton based his scientific thought on this doctrine.

The doctrine of law as mere description means that the scientist has a direct acquaintance with a persistent pattern in the succession of natural things that can be distinctly ob-

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served. Thus the positivist seeks to avoid the complications of theism and metaphysics.

The doctrine of law as conventional interpretation means a speculative elaboration of a system of ideas or abstract mathematical relations of implications without any necessary correlation with the observable facts.

Whitehead believes that the only adequate conception of natural laws is *the doctrine of law as immanent*:

By the doctrine of Law as immanent it is meant that the order of nature expresses the characters of the real things which jointly compose the existences to be found in nature. When we understand the essences of these things, we thereby know their mutual relations to each other. Thus, according as there are common elements in their various characters, there will necessarily be corresponding identities in their mutual relations. In other words, some partial identity of pattern in the mutual relations of these things. These identities of pattern in the mutual relations are the Laws of Nature. Conversely, a Law is explanatory of some community in character pervading the things which constitute Nature. It is evident that the doctrine involves the negation of 'absolute being.' It presupposes the essential interdependence of things. . . .

(1) It follows that scientists are seeking for explanations and not merely for simplified descriptions of their observations.

(2) In the second place the exact conformation of nature to any law is not to be expected. . . .

(3) Thirdly, since the laws of nature depend upon the individual characters of the things constituting nature, as the things change, then correspondingly the laws will change. . . .

(4) Fourthly, a reason can now be produced why we should put some limited trust in induction. . . .

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(5) Fifthly, the doctrine of Immanent Law is untenable unless we can construct a plausible metaphysical doctrine according to which the characters of the relevant things in nature are the outcome of their interconnections, and their interconnections are the outcome of their characters. This involves some doctrine of Internal Relations.

(6) Finally, the doctrine of Immanence is through and through a rationalistic doctrine. It is explanatory of the possibility of understanding nature.²⁵

Whitehead has reconceived the doctrines of the laws of nature in terms of mutual immanence, i. e., the reciprocal interaction between all the particular events in the universe, in order to construct a philosophy of nature which can include the results of the recent scientific investigations that have led to relativity and the quantum theory. The new physics today requires the doctrine of natural law as immanent; but science is not methodologically equipped to consider its full implications to the extent that it might ascertain whether this ultimate conception of the natural order is true or false. Only a metaphysical cosmology is capable of sufficient generalization to determine whether the implications of the theory of immanent law meet the tests of the criterion of coherence, i. e., (i) consistency, and (ii) adequacy.²⁶

C. The Synoptic Method of Speculative Philosophy.

Speculative philosophy is the attempt to explain a person's sense and value experience in terms of a coherent system of causal hypotheses which interpret human experience as an integral part of the interconnected totality of the universe as a whole, i. e., the human order, the natural order, and the divine order.²⁷

The chief aim of this section is to show that the hypothetical-deductive logic which characterizes scientific inquiry also defines the synoptic method of speculative philosophy. Such

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an explanation will be more intelligible, however, if we first investigate the "meaning of meaning" which is presupposed by speculative philosophy.

1. The "Meaning of Meaning" Presupposed by Speculative Philosophy.

Ever since Descartes advised philosophers that "it were far better never to think of investigating truth at all, than to do so without a method," most modern thinkers have explicitly stated the principles of their methodology according to which their conclusions have been developed.

Many have neglected, however, to state clearly their initial presuppositions about their conception of the "meaning of meaning" on the basis of which they have assumed that only a certain method is applicable for interpreting experience. Unfortunately, it is often just these implicit assumptions that prejudice the alleged invalidity of opposing arguments which are based upon another conception of the "meaning of meaning." Consequently, we believe that the sporting thing to do is to make such initial postulates explicit before undertaking a metaphysical investigation. This procedure not only facilitates internal criticism; but it also throws light on the relative fruitfulness of alternative methodologies.

The synoptic method implicitly presupposes the Hegelian principle that the meaning of a particular hypothesis can be understood only in terms of what it leads to in the comprehension of a more inclusive insight.²⁸

Although analysis produces real knowledge, the latter is incomplete and should be used as a stepping stone toward the progressively expanding insight into the meaning of the whole truth, i. e., a coherent interpretation of all the relevant facts of experience in terms of a system of hypothetical principles that are (i) logically consistent, (ii) harmoniously inclusive, and (iii) adequate for explaining all the concrete particular events as exemplifications of the generic operations of the universe as a whole.

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A speculative philosopher using the synoptic method is required by the criterion of coherence to formulate a comprehensive system of metaphysical hypotheses that explains what his experience means as an integral part of an organic Cosmic Whole, which is "All-That-There-Is." In assuming that he will discover the objective meaning of reality in a scheme of coherent generalizations, the speculative philosopher describes the interaction of his own mind with those other factors in objective reality which transcend his experience but which none the less produce the content of his self-consciousness. It is only when he formulates a system of hypotheses to explain his experience, therefore, that a philosopher is able to interpret his experience as referring to a reality beyond his own self-consciousness. Otherwise, he has no rational justification for his "animal faith" (Santayana) that reality includes anything more than his own experience. Other minds, universal qualities, mathematical relations, and physical things are objective referents for him only if they are required by reason as causes of his value-intuitions and sense-impressions. A speculative philosopher can observe these sense and value data by introspective analysis of experience; but he can only infer the nature of the objective reality which produced them. This does not mean that the external world depends upon such a cognitive process of the mind for its reality; but it does mean that no knowledge of the universe transcending self-consciousness is possible apart from the reflective thinking through which a mind constructs a picture of all-that-there-is in which his experience is an intelligible factor.

It might be objected that to postulate all these trans-subjective factors (other minds, possibly God, physical things, universals, mathematical-logical relations) which constitute an unbegun and unending temporal process of teleological causality, is to presuppose a metaphysical system rather than to construct a world-view. This would be a valid objection, if we claimed that this system of metaphysical factors were anything

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more than tentative hypotheses. But this is all we claim for them prior to a synoptic verification of their adequacy to explain our experience. Should they fail to do this, we shall abandon them, and seek another system of causal hypotheses, which, in turn, must meet the same tests of coherence. This requirement of the hypothetical-deductive logic is the same for speculative philosophy as it is for scientific inquiry.²⁹

Despite our great indebtedness to Kant for his emphasis upon the "constructive activity of thought,"³⁰ nevertheless we reject his initial methodological division of labor between the theoretical reason and the practical reason. It predetermines that the theoretical reason should deal exclusively with sense-data, and the practical reason should deal exclusively with value-data, e. g., moral experience.³¹ This dichotomy of the function of reason is inconsistent with our unitary conception of the knowing process in which sense-data and value-data are explained by the same mode of thought. Our synoptic method of inquiry requires that the purposive activity which synthetically constructs the spatio-temporal world from sense-data and the purposive activity which synthetically constructs an objective referent for value-data—apparently separate functions of reason—are but partial aspects of the same self-identical process of causal explanation. It is this purposive operation that must discover through a coherent interpretation of the given data an incomplete but none the less real revelation of ultimate reality itself.

Logical positivists have seriously challenged this conception of the "meaning of meaning" in terms of a "venture into ontology." They claim that metaphysical speculation in accordance with the synoptic method and the criterion of coherence should be "replaced by sign analysis and unified science."³² It should be clear from our discussions thus far and from those which follow throughout the present study that we share the logical positivist's enthusiasm for a unified body of scientific knowledge. Much can be gained, furthermore, toward the clarifi-

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cation of linguistic ambiguities and the improvement of the communication of ideas by the development of sign analysis. What we fail to understand, however, is why this commendable program must predicate the elimination of speculative inquiry.

We shall now attempt to show that when the logical positivist claims that metaphysical explanations are nonsense, since speculative philosophers do not limit "meaning" to the "this" and "now" of a given sense-experience in terms of formal analysis of language, he has not demonstrated the "impossibility of metaphysics" by cogent reasons. All that he has done is to demonstrate the necessary implications of his initial assumption about the "meaning of meaning" which precludes the possibility of metaphysical knowledge.³³

The basic issue involved in our search for a satisfactory philosophy of spiritual growth is raised by Ayer's contention that value experiences have no objective meaning which can be interpreted as real knowledge:

The fact that people have religious experiences is interesting from the psychological point of view, but it does not in any way imply that there is such a thing as religious knowledge, any more than our having moral experiences implies that there is such a thing as moral knowledge. The theist, like the moralist, may believe that his experiences are cognitive experiences, but, unless he can formulate his 'knowledge' in propositions that are empirically verifiable, we may be sure that he is deceiving himself. It follows that those philosophers who fill their books with assertions that they intuitively 'know' this or that moral or religious 'truth' are merely providing material for the psychoanalyst. *For no act of intuition can be said to reveal a truth about any matter of fact unless it issues in verifiable propositions.* And all such propositions are to be incorporated in the system of empirical propositions which constitutes science.³⁴

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We agree with Ayer that when the intuitionist claims that he possesses an absolute esoteric insight, which he insists must be taken at face value, he has not adequately verified his belief as reliable knowledge. Although intuitions may be sources of insight they are only data which must be interpreted by reason in order to determine their truth.³⁵

We disagree with Ayer, however, when he claims that the only way a religious or moral intuition can be tested for truth is through the formal analysis of sense-experience:

The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express—that is, if he knows what observations which lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.³⁶

By confining the meaning of "truth" to "the consistent systematization of linguistic propositions" Ayer has eliminated by definition the possibility that objective truth about spiritual reality might be discovered through a speculative interpretation of value intuition in terms of a coherent system of metaphysical categories. It should be clearly recognized, however, that he has not demonstrated the inadequacy of such a metaphysical interpretation: he has simply precluded it by his definition of what is meaningful.³⁷

Although Carnap is interested in more than "the consistent systematization of linguistic propositions," his reduction of the emotional content and the purposive activity of self-consciousness to the "thing-language" still precludes the possibility of anything but a positivistic explanation in terms of the mechanical causality of behaviorism: "If for any psychological term we know either a physiological or behavioristic method of determination, then, that term is reducible to those

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terms of the thing-language."³⁸ This requires that such conscious processes as are involved in the experience of an enlightened good will, intellectual curiosity, or any other ideal value realizations have meaning only when they are interpreted according to the formula which describes the response of a physiological organism to its environment.

Thus as far as the logical positivist is concerned the explanation of value-intuitions is turned over to the behaviorist who begins his scientific experiments on the assumption that self-consciousness does not exist, and then concludes that his investigation has demonstrated a stimulus-response pattern which eliminates the illusion that man experiences consciousness. Although this satisfies his desire for a mechanical explanation of human behavior, it excludes the facts of memory (beyond the physiological processes of cerebration which do not account for recognition), emotional inheritances from the subconsciousness, reflection, anticipation of the future (whether it is conceptual, volitional, or imaginative), and the synthesis of these irreducible elements into the purposive realization of ideal values that characterizes reflective thought and conduct. Neither the formal analysis of the logical positivist nor the factual explanation of the behaviorist is methodologically applicable for discovering the meaning of self-consciousness as a complex whole.³⁹

If one agrees with the logical positivists that philosophy is merely a department of logic "that is concerned with the formal consequences of empirical facts," few, if any, problems are created by the arbitrary assumption that "logic is grounded on semiotic; metaphysics is replaced by sign analysis and unified science; and axiology becomes the scientific study of values and judgment of values."⁴⁰ This view presupposes, however, the exclusive validity of verification in terms of syntactical analysis (philosophy) and experimental prediction in physicalistic language (science). On the basis of this assump-

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tion the interests of a reflective person must be confined entirely to semantics and scientific prediction.

Symbolic logic is an important cultural pursuit which will contribute a great deal to the correction of loose thinking and expression. This hardly justifies, however, the appeal to symbolic logic which the logical positivists make so dogmatically in order to justify their extravagant claims for the philosophical fruitfulness of their methodology and their own peculiar conception of "the meaning of meaning." By what right can the mere interests of this one group of thinkers be considered as objective reasons for condemning as insignificant nonsense the claims of other thinkers such as speculative philosophers whose interest in truth is not so narrowly confined? About interests, as about tastes, there is probably no disputing; but to eliminate even the possibility of any metaphysical knowledge simply because it presupposes another conception of the "meaning of meaning," is to make an arbitrary selection of interests the final court of appeal.

We have shown that the synoptic method of speculative philosophy has been formulated by reflective persons who have been motivated by their intellectual curiosity to interpret their sense and value experiences in the metaphysical terms of a coherent system of explanatory hypotheses. We see no reason for abandoning our speculative inquiry simply for the reason that our interests are not identical with the narrow interests of the logical positivists nor because our interests go beyond the confines which they have arbitrarily set up as the limits of philosophical concern. Without denying the importance of formal analysis and scientific predictions within their fields, we maintain that these methods are not applicable to the empirical data for an adequate interpretation of value experience and for the formulation of a satisfactory world-view.⁴¹ Now it is our responsibility to show how the synoptic method functions as a "venture into ontology," in accordance with the hypothetical-deductive logic of inquiry.

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2. The Hypothetical-Deductive Logic of the Synoptic Method.

The hypothetical-deductive logic which characterizes the scientific method of inquiry similarly defines the procedures of the synoptic method employed by speculative philosophy. In his search for a world-view which gives meaning to human experience the reflective thinker is driven by his intellectual curiosity beyond his construction of the "natural order" to a more comprehensive picture of the total universe which includes the "human order" as well as the "natural order" within an integrated whole.

Although speculative philosophy shares with religion the interest in the total picture of the universe, the reflective thinker using the synoptic method does not begin with the "divine order" as a dogmatic assumption from which the conceptions of the "natural order" and the "human order" are deduced. The intellectual integrity of the speculative philosopher requires him to maintain the same respect for fact and reason that characterizes the scientist. Metaphysical inquiry is, therefore, an extension of the purposive function of reason exhibited in scientific investigation to a wider range of experience and its meaning. We shall now analyze in detail the synoptic method which proceeds like the scientific method step by step through the same stages of the hypothetical-deductive logic:

- a. Introspective observation of the experienced facts of self-consciousness.
- b. Formulation of a system of hypotheses which explains those causal factors beyond self-consciousness that produce the value-intuitions and the sense-impressions which are discovered within consciousness by introspective observation.
- c. Verification of the truth of the explanatory system of hypotheses in accordance with the criterion of coherence.⁴²

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a. Introspective Observation of the Experienced Facts of Self-Consciousness.

A synoptic interpretation of human experience begins with an analytic observation of all the facts that are relevant to the problem with which it is concerned. Although Darwin, for instance, began his scientific inquiry with observation, the data that were relevant to his problem of explaining the relationship between biological forms of life were public physical processes. In view of the fact that we are interested in the problem of the meaning of man's ideal value-experiences for spiritual growth, the data which are relevant for our inquiry are the emotional and purposive processes of self-consciousness. Since these experienced facts are not accessible through the objective observation with quantitative measurements that the exact sciences use, our observation must be introspective.⁴³

A person's immediate, first-hand experiences are limited to his own conscious processes or states of consciousness which through introspective analysis produce a "consciousness of states." (The relation of this empirical datum to the external factors in the objective world that produce it will be analyzed later.) If you doubt this, attempt to state what is going on in your neighbor's mind. What emotions, purposes, sensations, feelings, thoughts, desires, satisfactions, etc., is he experiencing at this moment? He would have no better success in having a direct experience of what you are experiencing. An analysis of one's own self-consciousness reveals a somewhat passive content of sense-impressions (e. g., an awareness of roundness and redness) and value-intuitions (e. g., a desire for excelling or an awareness of moral obligation, i. e., a sense of "oughtness"), as well as memory images of the past, purposive choices in the present, purposive anticipation of the future, and an awareness of all these processes of emotion, sensation, purpose, and thinking as organized into an organic, complex, unified whole (Gestalt).⁴⁴

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By experience we mean, therefore, the processes of a person's complex ongoing unity of consciousness. Despite the irrational impulses and confusion of the human mind, each individual mind is a complex unity, i. e., all the complex sensations and desires of the present moment belong together in a unique way in the sense that "my" experience is mine alone and cannot be possessed by anyone else. Not only do these present states of consciousness belong together uniquely, but they are uniquely connected with the past by memory and with the future by the anticipation of ideal purposes. Without this purposive integration, personality could not develop and self-knowledge would be unintelligible.⁴⁵

An introspective analysis of a present moment of self-awareness discovers (i) a given content of sense-impressions and value-intuitions, and (ii) a given purposive activity. In a normal mind there is an ongoing process of experiencing a unity of these irreducible elements when the purposive activity transforms the chaotic emotions and vague sensations gradually into an organic whole of value-realizations, sense-perceptions, and, in some cases, conscious discrimination. A reductive analysis such as that preferred by behaviorism, which ignores this given functional organization of self-consciousness into an organic synthesis, sacrifices the facts for a dogmatic theory of interpretation.⁴⁶

A present moment of self-awareness is meaningless apart from its functional relations to its actual past moments and its possible future moments which must be taken into account, if the given data are to be intelligible factors within the temporal process of experience. Such functional relating is experienced in memory of the past and anticipation of the future through which the narrower unity of an immediate self-awareness is connected with the wider and more complex unity of self-consciousness. Our interpretation of self-knowledge must provide for the continuity of past, present, and future experience by discovering the factor which coordinates

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the constant succession of ongoing states of awareness so that there arises an organic consciousness of states, i. e., reflective self-consciousness. A structural analysis of the mere contents of consciousness can never catch this functional activity in its net. Nevertheless, it must be taken into account even though the pseudo-scientific sanctity of exclusive analysis must be challenged. Only a synthetic view of the purposive activity through which a mere self becomes a reflective person can account for empirical continuity in the growth of self-consciousness.

Dewey would object to our definition of experience: "Because of the influence of psychological epistemology of a subjective, private type, 'experience' has been limited to conscious states and processes."⁴⁷ This objection, we believe, arises largely out of a different definition of terms and a misconception of what we mean by the causal relationship of the given purposive activity and the given emotional or sense content, which taken together constitute self-conscious experience.

In the subsequent discussions of what constitutes reality it will be evident that we agree with Dewey that the natural order of physical things and the human order of other minds are metaphysically prior to one's own conscious complex unity of temporal experience. But we shall designate these objective processes as "existence" rather than as "experience" in Dewey's terminology. At this point, however, we are concerned with the epistemological process of knowing rather than the metaphysical process of becoming.

Although our claim that experience is unintelligible apart from the mind's own purposive activity would be condemned by Dewey as too "private," we insist just as strongly as Dewey does, that the sense and emotional content of conscious experience is "begotten" by the social, biological, and subconscious processes which constitute the "existential environment" of a person's "owned experience."⁴⁸

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Since we are interested in the problem of spiritual growth, the emotional and purposive processes that are involved in the realization of an enlightened good will constitute the field of relevant data for our interpretation. Probably no one would deny that such an ideal value-experience occurs in self-consciousness, when, for instance, a person prefers understanding to prejudice, tolerance to intolerance, sympathy to hatred, unselfishness to selfishness, social responsibility to social indifference, forgiveness to revenge, or respect for the intrinsic worth of persons to exploitation of them as a means. The issue on which there is a great divergence of opinion, however, arises when an attempt is made to interpret what these ideal value-experiences mean.

Just as in the process of knowing the natural world of external objects it is necessary to interpret sense-impressions by thought, so also in the process of knowing one's own self it is necessary to correlate value-intuitions and rational interpretation. Otherwise, there would be the danger of substituting religious fervor, moral anguish, aesthetic ecstasy, social enthusiasm, scientific dogmatism, or fanciful speculation for the coherent interpretation of ideal value experiences upon which an adequate conception of human personality depends. Unless empirical observation and rational explanation are so integrated, one intuition has just as good a claim to truth as any other. There would be no way to test conflicting claims. In such a situation reason would be abandoned. Thus all available intuitions must be considered as possible *sources* of insight; but conscious discrimination that meets all the requirements of consistent and adequate inquiry in the terms of a criterion of coherence is alone sovereign in testing the evidence for its objective truth.

This analysis of the empirical organization of the data which a philosopher observes introspectively has revealed the necessity for an adequate method and criterion in accordance with which the content of consciousness might be interpreted

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rationally. In other words, the purposive activity of conscious discrimination and the objective content of value and sense intuitions, which have been discovered in self-consciousness, must be explained in terms of a system of causal hypotheses, if they are to have any meaning. Apart from such rational interpretation the objective truth of self-knowledge cannot be attained.

b. Formulation of a System of Explanatory Hypotheses.

A speculative philosopher who is led by the hypothetical-deductive logic to the second stage of synoptic inquiry must formulate a system of hypotheses which explains those causal factors beyond self-consciousness that produce the value-intuitions and sense-impressions which are discovered within self-consciousness by introspective observation. Then there arises the basic problem of any theory of knowledge: How do ideas refer to reality?

We are assuming that physical things, other minds, God, logical-mathematical relations, and whatever else there may be in the universe in addition to the self-consciousness of the inquiring person are hypothetical entities in the existence of which a person can believe *only if* these tentative suppositions can be shown to be the cause of the observed or experienced sense-impressions and value-intuitions.⁴⁹ This assumption, which is justified by our conception of "the meaning of meaning" discussed previously, does not solve the problem before us, but it does bring out the implications with which we must deal. If ideas in my mind are not identical with the objective realities to which they seem to refer: (a) how can the claim that the objects are real be justified; (b) how can the objects be known. In short, how it is possible to establish a knowing relation between the actual entity of one's own present moment of self-consciousness and these hypothetical entities which seem to lie beyond it and influence it?

The essential difficulty that confronts the speculative at-

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tempt to answer this question is emphasized by Hume. In his *Treatise upon Human Nature*, Hume came to the conclusion that all thinking about reality must begin with each person's own experience. It should be evident from our discussion of the introspective observation of the experienced facts of self-consciousness that on this point we are in complete agreement with Hume. The problem arises, however, at the next step in the procedure of inquiry. Hume contends that when one analyzes his mental processes into its basic elements, he can discover nothing else but a stream of impressions. Not only is there no self-identity within the mind itself, but there is no evidence for any external connection of the mind with its external environment or for any objective connection between the natural events which are said to be causally related to each other. Thus he concluded that the mind is nothing more than a process of sensations, and he doubted that the mind could attain any reliable knowledge about itself or the external world beyond the experienced impressions:

All my hopes vanish when I come to explain our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connection among them; there would be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of the sceptic, and confess that the difficulty is too hard for my understanding.⁵⁰

The speculative philosopher attempts to succeed where Hume failed by formulating a coherent system of causal hypotheses to explain his own experience so that he can affirm with rational justification an objective reality beyond his own self-consciousness. It should be remembered that this does not mean that the existence of the external world is created by the human mind; but it does mean that no knowledge of the universe beyond one's own self-consciousness can

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be attained apart from the purposive activity of speculative thinking in terms of causal categories by which the mind constructs a picture of "all-that-there-is," i.e., a total causal process in which his own experience is both a product and a producing agent.

In order that his ideas might refer beyond subjective experiences to objective reality, the speculative philosopher must formulate a major category (with whatever subordinate categories are required) as a *principle of objective reference*. Lacking such a fundamental law any hypothetical system of objective entities is unintelligible, and the mind is confined to its own conscious states. As Brightman has pointed out, "Categories are the structural principles of a coherent system:

A category is a law essential to the being of a system to which it refers. Categories, then, may be classified into two groups; first, those that are true of the universe, as a whole; secondly those that are valid of some lesser system of objects (as the world of space and time). The first group is called metaphysical. The goal of philosophy may be described as the discovery of the truly metaphysical categories. Whether some, or even all, of the phenomenal categories (space, time, motion, cause, number, quality) are also metaphysical is a problem. We know that they are true of a part of the universe; are they also true of the whole? Our answer to this question will also show whether we are to be materialists, agnostics, idealists, realists, theists, atheists, or what not in philosophical outlook.

The theory of categories goes back, like so much else, to Aristotle. The following categories were mentioned by him at one time or another: substance, quality, relation, place, time, action, passion or passivity, position, condition.

The most famous table is the one used by Immanuel

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Kant, subdivided into four sections as follows: Quantity (unity, plurality, totality), Quality (reality, negation, limitation), Relation (inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, community or reciprocity), Modality (possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency). This list is artificially constructed.

For the purposes of comparison with the older lists, one more recent table is given herewith: time, number, space, motion, quantity, being, quality, identity, causality, necessity ('much more doubtful category than the preceding ones'), possibility (also 'doubtful'), and purpose (which Bowne regards as highest).

It is easy to see that if we could tell precisely what the categories are and could define them, we should have found the clue to the riddle of the universe. The systematic interpretation of the categories belongs to metaphysics.³¹

In attempting to formulate an adequate system of categories for explaining the meaning of spiritual growth, we shall depart from the customary practice of classifying categories as: (i) metaphysical, i. e., "those that are true of the universe as a whole"; and (ii) phenomenal, i. e., "those that are valid of some lesser system of objects (as the world of space and time)." Such a classification might suggest that the "natural order" investigated by the exact sciences is not as "really real" as the more ultimate "divine order" and "human order." Our conception of the "meaning of meaning" requires us to assume that in the total organic process of "all-that-there-is" no one type of reality has any privileged ontological status. What we must find, therefore, is one fundamental category that integrates the systematic interrelations between the particular realities and renders intelligible all the observable or experienced facts of the "natural order" and the "human order" which demand explanation. This one

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category would be the "defining characteristic" of ultimate reality, and if any further qualifying modes are required, they are to be considered as derivatives of this basic "descriptive generalization."

What are the possibilities in selecting some type of "causality" as our basic category? This is the Platonic notion emphasized by Locke, and re-emphasized in our own day by Whitehead, that "being is power." In other words, to be real an entity must be a product and a producer in the causal process of the universe, i. e., it must be an active agent. To find the causal implication of a particular happening in the total context of which it is an integral part is to explain what it means. To understand any event a person must recognize how it operates within a system of interacting events.²²

This preliminary indication of what is meant by causality is not sufficient justification for the claim that it is adequate as the ultimate category in terms of which we can conceptually construct the meaning of the objective universe. Further critical analysis of Hume's position will aid us in clarifying the epistemological issues involved in the use of the category of causality as a principle of explanation. Hume recognized that scientists and philosophers alike had sought to establish the objective reality of the external world by showing the necessary connection between events in terms of their relations of cause and effect. Hume claimed, however, that this apparent causal connection was not a necessary operation in reality, but was a subjective idea of regularity which arises in self-consciousness through the "association of ideas" that is entrenched by habit and custom.

Hume may have been right in his hypothetical assumption *that* the objective world has no meaning for the human mind; but such an assumption is fruitless, since it stifles all scientific and philosophical inquiry. Consequently, we choose to proceed upon the hypothetical assumption *that* the objective world

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does have a meaning for the human mind, since neither of these initial assumptions can be verified at the outset. We still have on our hands the problem of showing *what* is the meaning of the objective world for the human mind. Hume's analysis of the issues involved is of immeasurable value in revealing the following blind alleys which we should avoid: (i) absolute certainty based on "clarity and distinctness" is unattainable; (ii) substance is an inadequate category; (iii) mechanical causality is an inadequate category.⁵³

If we inherit from Descartes and Spinoza the mathematical standards of absolutely certain, clear, and distinct demonstration as our criterion of what constitutes the ultimate category or principle of objective reference, Hume's analysis reveals the futility of our efforts. If, however, the fundamental category for which we are searching is only a highly probable principle of interpretation from which we can derive a coherent system of explanatory hypotheses, our less pretentious objective is not necessarily unattainable.

i. Is Substance Adequate as an Ultimate Category?

Many minds in search of a conception of the total universe which unifies the apparent plurality of its parts have attempted to establish the objective connection of particular actualities by integrating them in terms of progressively expanding conceptual *classes of reality*. We have already indicated how the classification of the observable data is necessary as a useful methodological device for scientific inquiry.⁵⁴ We agree with Hume, nevertheless, that when this classification of "kinds of reality" leads to the postulate that the ultimate explanation of the universe must be found in the category of an ultimate unknowable Substance, such a conceptual construction of what the objective universe means to a human mind is artificial.

When Spinoza formulated a metaphysical description of the whole of reality in terms of speculative generalizations, he

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postulated the category of substance as his ultimate principle of explanation:

By substance, I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, that, the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.⁵⁵

According to this doctrine, self-consciousness is but an appearance of a substratum-soul which itself cannot be experienced. Even the soul is not an ultimate reality, however, since it is but a modal manifestation of a transcendent Absolute Substance that cannot be known. All things and minds are determined by God, i. e., the Absolute Substance which includes within itself all-that-there-is.

Although we agree with Spinoza that some conception of the whole of reality is a necessary presupposition for an explanation of any part of it, we reject his static conception of an ultimate Being, since experience is no intelligible aspect of it. Instead, we conceive ultimate reality as an unbegun and unending temporal process of Becoming in which the emotional content and purposive activity of self-consciousness disclose the generic causal operations of ultimate reality itself. Since self-consciousness is an integral part of the organic process of the whole of reality, mental experiences, like natural events, cannot be explained apart from their causal involvement in the creative advance of a growing universe. Whereas Spinoza appealed to the ultimate category of substance, we shall appeal to the ultimate category of causality.⁵⁶

ii. Is Mechanical Causality Adequate as an Ultimate Category?

The question arises as to how mechanical causality should be conceived so that it does explain the universal and necessary interrelations of particular events within an organic whole. Was Hume correct when he claimed that the *mechanical causality* of Newton and Descartes was inadequate as a

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fundamental principle of objective reference? We have pointed out previously in our discussion of scientific method that "the law of causality" which means that "nothing happens without a sufficient cause" is a universal and necessary category without which the experimentations, mathematical deductions, and predictions leading to scientific generalizations about the "natural order" as a "meshwork" of interacting events would be impossible. We also found that this category of causality is no longer conceived mechanically by contemporary science based on relativity and the quantum theory.⁵⁷

Even though the "natural order" can no longer be conceived by science as a machine, is it possible that apparent mechanisms in the "human order" furnish clues that might lead to a comprehensive conception of the universe as a whole in terms of the category of mechanical causality? The outstanding attempt to establish this claim has been made by the behaviorists who explain self-consciousness away as a by-product or mere consequent of antecedent physical forces in terms of an analysis of the response of man's physical organism to the stimulus of his environment:

The interest of the behaviorist in man's doings is more than the interest of the spectator—he wants to control man's reactions as physical scientists want to control and manipulate other natural phenomena. It is the business of behavioristic psychology to be able to predict and to control human activity. To do this it must gather scientific data by experimental methods.

Only then can the trained behaviorist predict, given the stimulus, what reaction will take place; or, given the reaction state what the situation or stimulus is that has caused the reaction.⁵⁸

Although this behavioristic formula is an excellent mechanical principle of interpretation for experimental psychology

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within the limited though important field of analyzing the structure and function of the physiological organism with emphasis upon the glandular and nervous system, it is not adequate as a category for interpreting reflective self-consciousness. Such mental processes as selection, memory, hesitation before alternatives, deliberate effort, an awareness of obligation, anticipation of the future realization of ideal values, voluntary choice, creative expression as well as re-creative appreciation, and reflective thought itself may be symbolized by the mechanical patterns describing the physiological reactions of a bodily organism as it adjusts itself to its environment; but this reduction of given facts to theoretical physical functions confuses genuine causal explanation with the fallacy of "explaining away." It is only by his initial presumption that "the subject matter of human psychology is the behavior of the human being" and that "consciousness is neither a definite nor usable concept" since the "belief in the existence of consciousness goes back to the ancient days of superstition and magic" that Watson can conclude:

Personality is the sum of the activities that can be discovered by actual observation of behavior over enough time to give reliable information. In other words, personality is but the end product of our habit systems. Our procedure in studying personality is the making and plotting of a cross-section of the activity stream.³⁹

Watson has not actually explained reflective self-consciousness. But, rather, he arbitrarily excludes those contents of experience that do not fit into his theoretical formula by his initial definition. He then claims without rational evidence that he has demonstrated that all non-physiological processes are not real functions of the mind. His hypothesis of mechanical causality simply is not applicable to a reflective person's experience of intellectual, aesthetic, ethical, and relig-

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ious values. It cannot account for the fact of purposive activity which points to some degree of internal or relative self-determination, i. e., final causality. Taking this purposive activity of human experience as a clue to the solution of our problem, we shall now seek to interpret the meaning of reality in terms of the ultimate category of teleological causality.

iii. Is Teleological Causality Adequate as an Ultimate Category?

We have committed ourselves to the assumption that we can know the meaning of any aspect of human experience only when we can explain its causal relationship to the most comprehensive possible context of which such empirical processes are an integral part. In our search for an ultimate category by which we might interpret this relationship of one's "first-person experience" to "all-that-there-is" we have found:

(i) the substance-attribute category is inadequate, since it renders this relation of the experienced part to the conceived whole unintelligible; and (ii) the category of mechanical causality is useful within limited fields, but it is inadequate as a descriptive generalization about the whole of reality, since it cannot explain the purposive activity of human experience without distorting the facts. Consequently, we are adopting the category of teleological causality as the ultimate principle for describing the widest possible environment of "first-person experience" as the total creative process of the universe, i. e., a teleological whole which is constituted by the causal interaction of temporal events.

In order to explain the meaning of the referents of self-consciousness, we shall conceive the ontologically indivisible organic process of reality as divided into three aspects for purposes of interpretation: (i) *subsistence*, which includes the abstract, universal sense-qualities, logical-mathematical relations, value possibilities, and complexes of these, such as a potential space-time continuum or a potential ideal of person-

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ality; (ii) *existence*, which includes all physical things, other minds, and social relations; and (iii) *experience*, which includes the processes of memory and emotional inheritances from both the conscious and subconscious, past thinking, sense-perception, value-realization in the present, and conceptual anticipation of the future, all of which taken together constitute the complex unity of self-consciousness.

Although we agree with Kant that knowledge about the objective universe can be obtained only by a constructive process of thought about the data of one's own self-consciousness according to fundamental and generic categories, we differ from him in one respect. Whereas Kant interpreted reality in terms of abstract logical principles of self-consciousness, we shall interpret self-consciousness in terms of concrete ontological principles that, if true, are exemplified in every aspect of reality.⁶⁰

Although ultimate reality exists independently of any mind's thought about it, any knowledge about the objective universe depends upon the constructive thinking of a mind whose ideas refer to that independent reality. The purposive activity of the mind organizes its own sense and value content according to categorial principles which make knowledge about the natural order, human order, and divine order intelligible. Instead of using categorial principles of the mind which make experience articulate (Kant), we shall attempt to formulate categorial principles of existence in accordance with which all types of existence, including the mind's first-person experience, have an objective meaning in the total process of the universe which is ultimate reality. *If spiritual growth is an objective aspect of reality, it must be shown to exemplify these categorial modes of existence which characterize whatever is ultimately real.* Despite the fact that the self-conscious processes with which knowledge begins are the product of metaphysical factors in the universe beyond the mental states themselves, any knowledge about these subjective processes,

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or about the objective processes which caused them, depends upon the purposive activity of the mind, which constructs a conception of the total universe in terms of generic categories that are exemplified in any particular processes that are ontologically real.⁶¹

Accordingly, we shall attempt to explain the operations of the total creative process of Becoming according to the ultimate category of teleological causality. This means that the organic process as a whole determines the development of self-consciousness in terms of three generic operational modes of teleological causality that are exemplified in whatever physical events of the natural order or mental events of the human order that can be said to be real: (i) subsistential interaction; (ii) existential interaction; and (iii) experiential intra-action. If we claim that a particular occurrence is a "really real" aspect of the ultimate teleological process, we must justify our claim by showing how these generic operations characterize the particular creative process which produces that actuality.

In our world-view constructed upon the structural framework of this categorial system of teleological causality the natural order, the logical-mathematical order, the divine order, and the human order will be interpreted as aspects of an unbegun and unending creative process of temporal duration. In this complex organic process of all-that-there-is teleological causality is concretely exemplified in God's integration of abstract possibilities and qualities into relevant order and connection, and the relatively self-determined purposes of each individual actuality in its self-causation. Apart from these specific causal agencies, the universal process of teleological causality would be a mere abstraction. In the creative process of the growing universe the emergence of novelty is characterized by the self-causation of purposively organizing events.

The realm of subsistence as a systematic hierarchy of logical-mathematical relations, sense and value possibilities, as well

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as complexes of these potentialities, would be chaotic and unrelated to the realm of existence, if it were not for the integrating activity of God who organizes these abstractions and correlates them with the particular relevant processes in the total temporal process of becoming in which these potentialities are actualized.

The realm of actuality is also a systematic hierarchy. It is a plurality of interacting existents ranging from God to electro-magnetic fields which reciprocally contribute to the constitution of each other. The actual world consists of the growth of these individual processes within a complex whole. Throughout this temporal process of becoming each actuality is the product of two existential modes of causal interaction. These are in addition to the subsistential interaction of potentiality and actuality for which God is responsible.

The first existential mode of causal interaction expresses the given objectivity of the world. Through it any particular existent is efficiently constituted by its mutual relations of reciprocal immanence with other relevant existents. Such causal interactions furnish the actual data that are appropriated as the objective content for subjective activity.

The second existential mode of causal interaction is that of the efficient and final activity of an experient's internal growth. We may distinguish this private process within the experience of an individual actuality from its public relations with other actualities by designating the internal causal activity as "experiential intra-action." In this self-realization the many objective data, which are furnished subsistentially by God's integrating activity and existentially by the mutual interaction between actualities, are integrated into a self-creative synthesis by a concrete individual. In this causal growth of self-realization (whether in a molecule or in a man) the integration and re-integration of feelings involve both physical connection with other changing existents (things and persons) and mental connection with other permanent

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subsistents (universal sense and value qualities). Concrete permanence, as contrasted with the abstract permanence of the potential subsistents, is discovered in the enduring self-identity of the individual actualities which is achieved through the present teleological organization of its internal temporal states, both inherited from the past and anticipated in the future, into an organic whole.⁶²

Now it might be objected that we have dogmatically formulated a categorial system of teleological causality which predetermines our metaphysical conclusions about spiritual growth. This objection would be justified, if we claimed that our descriptive generalizations were anything more than tentative hypotheses by which we shall attempt to explain what experience means. But we do not claim that they are anything more than a system of hypotheses which we have yet to justify. If the generic principles of *subsistent interaction*, *existential interaction*, and *experiential intra-action* should turn out to be incompatible, or if their scope should be inadequate for explaining all instances of the natural and the human order, or if they should be inapplicable to experience, then we are intellectually obligated to modify or reject the category of teleological causality and construct another system of hypotheses.

Up to this point in our investigation we have attempted to show how a reflective thinker might employ the hypothetical-deductive logic of the synoptic method in (a) an empirical organization of the introspectively observed data of self-consciousness, and (b) a rational explanation of these facts in terms of a system of hypotheses, i. e., a categorial scheme of generic principles derived from a fundamental category of teleological causality. But how does the speculative philosopher decide which is the more true of two rival systems of hypotheses? By what standard does he judge his progress or lack of it in his conceptual construction of the meaning of the objective universe?

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Throughout the process of reflective thinking in terms of the hypothetical-deductive logic of scientific and synoptic inquiry there has been an implicit assumption that for ideas to be true, they must be: (i) *consistent* with each other, and (ii) organized into a system of hypotheses that is *adequate* for explaining all aspect of experience which are relevant to the problem under investigation. The criterion of *coherence* which embodies these requirements of *consistency* and *adequacy* is, therefore, an outgrowth of the cognitive process of reflection itself. In the pattern of inquiry "ideas are operational in that they instigate and direct further operations of observation; they are proposals and plans for acting upon existing conditions to bring new facts to light and to organize all the selected facts into a coherent whole."⁶³ It remains for us to make our criterion of truth explicit.

c. Coherence as the Criterion for Verifying the Truth of the Explanatory System of Hypotheses, i. e., the Generic Principles of the Ultimate Category of Teleological Causality.

An interpretation is coherent when the system of hypotheses which the mind constructs is logically consistent, inclusive of all the relevant data, and adequate for explaining all types of experience in terms of harmonious generalizations. This means that, if an hypothesis is true, it must fulfill these four demands of reason: (i) the hypothesis must not be self-contradictory; (ii) the hypothesis must be derived from observations of experience that are relevant to the particular problem it intends to solve; (iii) the hypothesis must be a harmonious part of a comprehensive system of rational generalizations that adequately explains what the observed facts mean with reference to the organic interrelations of the whole universe; and (iv) the hypothesis must be fruitful, i. e., lead to further discoveries of truth.

Throughout our discussion of the explanatory system of generic principles that are implied by the ultimate category

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of teleological causality we have indicated that these subordinate categories are *universal and necessary*. Now that we have defined the meaning of the criterion of coherence we are in a position to explain our use of terms usually associated with *a priori* reasoning, and we hasten to do so in order to make clear that we are not assuming that a final demonstration of the absolutely certain *Truth* of any system of ideas is possible. Universality and necessity are conceived here only as terms that pertain to the deductive implications with which formal logic and mathematics are concerned.⁶⁴

When we claim that such generic principles or subordinate categories as (i) subsistential interaction, (ii) existential interaction, and (iii) experiential intra-action are universal and necessary, we mean that, *if the ultimate category of teleological causality is true, then these causal processes must operate in the production of every actuality in the universe*. Should these descriptive generalizations fail to explain the causal processes of the natural order or the human order, the ultimate category of teleological causality will be inadequate and therefore not true. As long as a coherent system of generic principles renders natural existence and human experience intelligible, teleological causality as an interpretive principle of objective reference which describes the total creative process of Becoming must be accepted as *true to a high degree of probability*. Since we have accepted the intellectual respectability of the hypothetical-deductive logic of inquiry, we must respect the limitation it imposes.⁶⁵

Even though scientific inquiry implicitly presupposes a contextual whole of uniform operations when the enquirer experimentally verifies consequences predicted by the hypothesis that he proposes to explain observed facts, a scientist may claim that his interpretation is an acceptable part of scientific knowledge, if it is substantiated only by empirical evidence. A philosopher who uses the synoptic method, however, must coherently verify the consequences predicted by his explan-

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atory hypothesis by an explicit reference to the meaning of the whole of reality.

Perhaps we should further elucidate our contention that, like scientific knowledge, the speculative knowledge to which synoptic inquiry leads is based on an appeal to a high degree of probability. To be an acceptable explanation an hypothesis must be highly probable; but no interpretation can be proved as absolute truth. Thus it is not to absolute certainty or perfect clarity of his first principles nor to dogmatic tautological statements that a metaphysician can refer for justification of his beliefs. He can claim no final formulation of definitive truth, but, rather, an approximate success in the progressive clarification of immediate experience. It is in the speculative process of expanding coherence that the verification of rational explanations should be sought. This purposive process of knowing is sustained by the investigator's faith in the knowability of the ultimate reality which his thought can never fully comprehend. Apart from this venture upon working hypotheses, neither the empirical organization of the observable evidence nor the systematic interpretation of these data of first-person experience would be possible.

The criterion of coherence can be internally criticized upon the point that a completely coherent explanation is always an unattainable ideal. Consequently, it does not offer absolute certainty in the correctness of particular judgments, and does not render any final verdict as to the truth about particular experiences. The opponents of coherence claim, therefore, that objective knowledge is impossible, if this criterion is adopted as the final court of appeal.

We acknowledge the ideal character of coherence; but we maintain that it alone shows how rational progress is yet possible. Coherence does not claim to invalidate the correctness of scientific judgments, for instance, if such conclusions are the results of sound experiments under proper laboratory conditions. A scientific judgment is true as one

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aspect of a larger interpretation, or as one circle within a larger circle of truth. Since this scientific conclusion has such a systematic relation to a coherent interpretation as a wider frame of reference, it must be tested consistently as new data are discovered or new methods are perfected. In short, this wider relation of coherence prevents the dogmatic assumption that any judgment, scientific or otherwise, is final.

Coherence thus imposes upon any thinker the constant responsibility to test further his tentative hypotheses, even though it may not be emotionally satisfying to do so. The uncertainty that a criterion of coherence involves, however, is not the fruitless type which the sceptic emphasizes. Rather it is the fruitful uncertainty that is necessary for the pursuit of an ideal of truth which is so great that no mind can ever fully reach it. We agree with Dewey that the "quest for certainty" is a fruitless enterprise.⁶⁶

Since any coherent system of categorial principles is subject to correction and expansion, an exhaustive and definitive explanation of human experience is probably an unattainable ideal. A reflective thinker possessed by intellectual curiosity will seek to realize it none the less; for some reliable knowledge, about the "natural order" and the "human order" can be achieved through scientific and synoptic inquiry. The very impossibility of completely constructing a perfect world-view that discloses the objective meaning of ultimate reality gives zest and vitality to his speculative venture.

Our discussion of the hypothetical-deductive method of scientific inquiry lead us to the conception of *natural law as immanent*, i. e., each particular natural event contributes to the actualization of every other natural event which, when taken together as an interacting causal system, constitute the creative temporal process that is the "natural order." In Chapter VII we shall examine the new cosmology, now "under re-construction," through which the reader must "travel at his own risk." We shall present the theories about natural

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events in terms of immanent law and the ultimate category of teleological causality. Like all roads upon which men are still working, even this road that aims to lead toward truth has rough spots and detours.

When we refer to the causal agency of a superhuman purpose in order to explain the actualization of the space-time continuum and the evolutionary development of life, some students of religion may be disappointed by our failure to justify belief about God's existence in terms of the specific traditional arguments.⁶⁷ Although some aspects of the teleological, cosmological, and epistemological arguments are involved in our discussion of God's role as a regulator in the creative development of a growing universe, no one argument or mere combination of these arguments would be sufficient for establishing his existence. Our reason for adopting the hypothesis that God is a reality lies in our inability to explain the natural order in terms of a coherent system of hypotheses without reference to his purposive activity as an indispensable causal principle. If we discover a more consistent and more adequate system of hypotheses which does not require belief in a superhuman purpose, we shall abandon the hypothesis that God is real. As long as we are convinced that the metaphysical world-view which we shall present in the next two chapters is more highly probable than any other we know about, we have no alternative but to accept belief in God with "natural piety."

Although we shall elaborate in detail what we mean by God in our discussions of his relations to the natural order and the human order, we suggest this preliminary definition which might be borne in mind and checked against our interpretation of experience in terms of teleological causality: God is a superhuman mind who has sufficient power and wisdom to integrate all the universal potentialities of the creative process despite his struggle with uncreative factors. His goodness is exemplified in his eternal loyalty to his purpose of conserv-

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ing and increasing ideal values in the unbegun and unending creative process.

In Chapter VIII we shall attempt to discover the metaphysical meaning of the "human order" by exploring the possibility that a person's spiritual growth exemplifies the same generic principles of teleological causality as are exhibited in the development of natural events.

¹ Dewey defines reflective thinking as the "active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends." (*How We Think*, 9) (Read HWT, Chapter I.)

In the *Introduction to Reflective Thinking*, Columbia Associates, reflective thinking is distinguished from such other types of mental activity as that producing fanciful images, random impressions, mere association, aesthetic appreciation, or the emotional congruity involved in spinning a yarn: "When thought, however, is bent on solving a problem, on finding out the meaning of a perplexing situation, or reaching a conclusion which is trustworthy, it is to be distinguished from other types of mental activity and should be called reflection." (2) (Read IRT, Chapter I.)

We agree with Dewey and the Columbia Associates that although the word "think" has a legitimate use to indicate a degree of uncertainty ("I am not absolutely certain, but I *think* I saw him.") or to question veracity ("Is that story true or did you just *think* it up?"), these usages should not be confused with the meaning of reflective thinking indicated above.

Excellent explanations of what reflective thinking means are to be found also in Edman, *Human Traits*, Chapter III, XIV; and Larrabee, *Reliable Knowledge*, Chapters I-XII.

² It should be noted that we are not limiting the principles of logic to "formal logic" as the study of the general conditions of valid inferences in the formulation of the abstract relations of propositions regardless of the factual or material truth. This type of deductive reasoning is expressed in the syllogism which shows how ideas may be so combined that the implications of given assumptions lead to conclusions that are valid because they are consistent. We are chiefly concerned here with the *logic of inquiry* which is the study of the actual process of reflective thinking in which facts are observed, causal explanations of the observed facts are sought in terms of a system of hypotheses, and this claim to truth is verified according to an adequate criterion. As one aspect of this logic of inquiry, the deductive elaboration of the implications of a working hypothesis will be shown to be very important. We are simply pointing out that it is not the whole of logic.

For Dewey's discussions of this conception of the function of logic, read *How We Think*, Chapter Five, "Thinking as a Formal and as an Actual Occurrence," pages 71-78, and *Logic, The Theory of Inquiry*, Chapter V, "The Needed Reform of Logic," pages 81-98.

Read also Creighton and Smart, *An Introductory Logic*, Chapters I and XX for discussions of logical principles cited in this section.

³ Dewey defines the two limits of every unit of reflective thinking as a pre-reflective confused situation out of which a problem arises and a post-reflec-

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tive resolved situation wherein the original doubt is dispelled and from which mastery, satisfaction, and enjoyment are derived. He outlines five phases of essential functions of reflective thought within these limits: "In between, as states of thinking, are (1) *suggestions*, in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution; (2) an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity that has been *felt* (directly experienced) into a *problem* to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought; (3) the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis, to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material; (4) the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition (*reasoning*, in the sense in which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and (5) testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action." (HWT, 107)

Our analysis of the steps of reflective thinking indicated above agrees with the meaning of Dewey's analysis. We have reformulated the structural principles expressing this similar meaning, however, for these reasons. Dewey's description is adequate when the operations of thinking are purposively directed toward a practical decision or solution of a problem; but when the operations of thinking are purposively directed toward the type of causal explanation sought by scientific and philosophical contemplation, i. e., the formulation of a world-view, we believe that our analysis is more suitable. It will be our responsibility to show how both science and philosophy employ these principles as the logical basis for their respective procedures in explaining the natural, human, and divine orders. We have found, furthermore, that this more "contemplative" rather than "decisive" emphasis in describing reflection is more applicable to the interpretation of human value experience.

In connection with the first aspect of verification (iii, above), it should be noted that the deductive reasoning of mathematics, symbolic logic, and formal logic in the elaboration of the implications of explanatory hypotheses, deals only with the validity of inferences in the consistent formulation of abstract relations regardless of the factual or material truth. For an instructive explanation of the relation of Aristotelian Logic and the mathematical method of deductive reasoning used by scientific verification and prediction, see "The Mathematical Method," by C. V. Newsom in *The Pentagon* (Bulletin of the national honorary mathematics fraternity, Kappa Mu Epsilon), Spring 1947. See also Richardson, *The Fundamentals of Mathematics*, Chapter I for a clear exposition of postulational thinking in mathematics and formal logic. Werkmeister, *A Philosophy of Science*, Chapter II, brings out the essential features of the relation of mathematics and physics from the time of the emergence of the scientific movement. That mathematics has been indispensable for the development of scientific inquiry, is shown by Whitehead's discussion of "Mathematics as an Element in the History of Thought," in *Science and the Modern World*, Chapter II. In *Principia Mathematica*, Whitehead and Russell undermine the assumption that arithmetical propositions are self-evident and necessary truths about nature by showing that number theories can be replaced by verbal definitions. It is from this "revolution" that symbolic or mathematical logic has stemmed. (This will be discussed later in connection with logical positivism.) (See Werkmeister, *The Basis and Structure of Knowledge*, Part III.)

A good concise account of the deductive elaboration of the relation of implication in mathematical reasoning is offered in *An Introduction to Reflective Thinking*, Columbia Associates, 97-98: "We are concerned here with the relations that subsist between two or more propositions, not with those obtaining among facts; and more especially with that type of relation which holds be-

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tween two propositions when from the truth of the first we can infer the truth of the second. We can express this relation in several ways. We can say that one proposition is 'implied' by another, or we can say that the second 'follows necessarily' from the first. It is significant that the truth of the *relationship* in no wise depends upon the truth of the first *proposition*. It makes no difference whether John has a sister Helen or not; we know that *if* he has a sister Helen, *then* she has a brother John.

"This relation of 'if . . . then . . . ' is called the relation of *implication*, and the elaboration of hypotheses consists in the discovery of the various propositions which are implied by the original suggestion. This whole process of following the network of relations which bind truths together is called 'deduction'; whenever we can deduce one proposition from another we know that a relation of implication obtains between them. This relation of implication has been defined as that which holds between two propositions when the denial of the second is inconsistent with the truth of the first."

It will be evident from the subsequent discussions that a philosophical interpretation of value experience cannot meet the requirement of experimental testing of the implications of its hypotheses under controlled laboratory conditions. For example, the factors of voluntary choice, preferences for the better rather than the worse, and the awareness of obligation, which constitute the data of moral experience, cannot be observed through a microscope or measured quantitatively as are biological structures, chemical elements, or electrical forces. The hypothetical principles that they formulated to explain introspectively observed moral experience must be verified, nevertheless, by the criterion of coherence and their applicability as guides for the development of character.

Some degree of corroboration with our point of view in this regard is to be found in Northrop's *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*: "It is the aim of this analysis of the problem to guide one to the relevant facts necessary to clearly understand it. Hence, the rule governing the method of analysis used in the first state of inquiry is that *the problematic situation must be reduced to the relevant factual situation*. In other words, the initial question, which, as it stands, cannot be answered—otherwise there would be no problem—whether it be a question of value or a question of fact, must, by means of the analysis, be translated over into a more specific question which can be answered by means of the determination of certain facts to which the analysis of the problem guides one." (34) In our subsequent discussion of "The Introspective Observation of the Experienced Facts of Self-Consciousness" we shall emphasize this point when we distinguish between "private" and "public" observation. We would agree with Northrop when he claims that "it is the problem which designates the method, not the method which designates the problem," (20) if he means that a particular method must not preclude relevant data (as, for example, in the case of behaviorism). But we believe that Northrop means more than this when he claims that each of the social sciences and humanities "has its unique method or its unique sequence of methods, for scientific verification." (viii) Unfortunately, there is not sufficient space here to discuss Northrop's theory to the extent that its importance warrants. Our discussion of the hypothetical-deductive method of scientific and philosophical inquiry should make it clear, however, that we cannot accept Northrop's atomistic logic. Instead, we shall follow the organic logic of the synoptic method and the criterion of coherence which integrates judgments about the natural and human orders in terms of generic categories. Northrop indicates his formulation of the stages of the procedures of the exact sciences on LSH, 28; and he offers instructive analyses of the logical principles fol-

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lowed by scientific inquiry in Chapters III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XI, and XII.

⁴ The general character of the problem and the subject matter has been described by Lenzen as follows: "The problem of empirical science is the acquisition and systematization of knowledge concerning the things and phenomena experienced in observation. . . . The initial objects of science are the things experienced in perception, and their utmost general characters are positions in space and time. The systematic and ultimately quantitative investigations of the space-time order may be called generalized physics. Thus one arrives at the doctrine of physicalism, which asserts that the concepts of empirical science are reducible to those which express the properties of the spatio-temporal things." (*Procedures of Empirical Science*, from *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Volumes I and II: *Foundations of the Unity of Science*, Vol. I, Number 5, pages 1 and 3.)

Werkmeister offers an excellent explanation of scientific method, concepts, laws, and principles in his *The Basis and Structure of Knowledge*, 261-419. See Werkmeister's *A Philosophy of Science*, Chapter II for an instructive historical account of the development of the hypothetical-deductive method of scientific inquiry.

⁵ These essential characteristics of sound observation are well illustrated in *An Introduction to Reflective Thinking*, Columbia Associates, Chapter II, where the medical diagnosis of a patient suffering from typhoid fever by a modern doctor is compared to the observations of ancient Egyptian doctors. Three principal tests of observation are indicated on IRT, 28: (i) Agreement of competent investigators. (ii) Agreement and congruity of observations with each other. (iii) Usefulness of observations in assisting in the solution of a problem.

⁶ Lenzen, PES, 4-5.

⁷ Lenzen, PES, 26.

⁸ See Lenzen, PES, 31-46, IRT, 28-33, Edman, *Human Traits*, 397-398, and Larrabee, *Reliable Knowledge*, Chapter VIII. Cf. Werkmeister, BSK, 266-273.

⁹ Lankaster, *The Advancement of Science*.

See IRT, Chapter III, pp. 35-61 for an instructive comparison of the "geocentric" hypothesis of Ptolemy and the "heliocentric" hypothesis of Copernicus.

See Werkmeister, *A Philosophy of Science*, "The Method of Science," pages 37-38 for a clarification of the ambiguity of Newton's remark, "I frame no hypotheses."

¹⁰ *Aims of Education*, pp. 156-157. The following quotations bear out Whitehead's claim. "There are no eternal theories in science. It always happens that some of the facts predicted by a theory are disproved by experiment. Every theory has its period of gradual development and triumph, after which it may experience a rapid decline. The rise and fall of the substance theory of heat, already discussed here, is one of the many possible examples. Others, more profound and important, will be discussed later. Nearly every great advance in science arises from a crisis in the old theory, through an endeavor to find a way out of the difficulties created. We must examine old ideas, old theories, although they belong to the past, for this is the only way to understand the importance of the new ones and the extent of their validity." (Einstein and Infeld, *Evolution of Physics*, 77-78.) "Science forces us to create new ideas, new theories. Their aim is to break down the wall of contradictions which frequently blocks the way of scientific progress. All the essential ideas

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in science were born in a dramatic conflict between reality and our attempts at understanding. Here again is a problem for the solution of which new principles are needed." (EP, 280.)

¹¹ We believe that this is implied in the following statement by Einstein: "It is really our whole system of guesses which is to be either proved or disproved by experiment. No one of the assumptions can be isolated for separate testing. In the case of the planets moving around the sun it is found that the system of mechanics works splendidly. Nevertheless we can well imagine that another system, based on different assumptions, might work just as well.

"Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. In our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears its ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of a mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility or the meaning of such a comparison. But he certainly believes that, as his knowledge increases, his picture of reality will become simpler and simpler and will explain a wider and wider range of his sensuous impressions. He may also believe in the existence of the ideal limit of knowledge and that it is approached by the human mind. He may call this ideal limit the objective truth." (Einstein and Infeld, *Evolution of Physics*, 33.)

¹² Einstein and Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics*, 67. Read *An Introduction to Reflective Thinking*, Columbia Associates, Chapter VI, "The Function of Explanation in Physics" for an instructive comparison of the scholastic theory of the nature of physical objects in terms of unique substances and the kinetic theory of matter in terms of this ideal of mechanical causality. "The aim, then, of the kinetic theory is to give a mathematical account in terms of the mechanical action of the molecules of which matter is composed, of all the non-chemical and non-electrical properties of things. It endeavors to reduce all objects to the fundamental elements of matter and energy, and to interpret the various changes that they undergo in terms of the laws of motion, of mechanics, of geometry, and of arithmetic. Hence it is the attempt to find one simple explanation for all these properties which are not chemical or electrical." (128) Cf. Hocking, *Preface to Philosophy*, 432-435. For an excellent account of the "rise of the mechanical view" from the philosophical atomism of Democritus to modern physics, read Einstein, *The Evolution of Physics*, 3-67.

¹³ Werkmeister, *A Philosophy of Science*, 277.

¹⁴ See Einstein, *Evolution of Physics*, 126, 259-260, and 313: "Physics really began with the invention of mass, force, and an inertial system. These concepts are all free inventions. They led to the formulation of the mechanical point of view. For the physicist of the early nineteenth century, the reality of our outer world consisted of particles with simple forces acting between them and depending only on the distance. He tried to retain as long as possible his belief that he would succeed in explaining all events in nature by these fundamental concepts of reality. The difficulties connected with the deflection of the magnetic needle, the difficulties connected with the structure of the ether, induced us to create a more subtle reality. The important invention of the electromagnetic field appears. A courageous scientific imagination

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was needed to realize fully that not the behaviour of bodies, but the behaviour of something between them, that is, the field, may be essential for ordering and understanding events.

"Later developments both destroyed old concepts and created new ones. Absolute time and the inertial co-ordinate system were abandoned by the relativity theory. The background for all events was no longer the one-dimensional time and the three-dimensional space continuum, but the four-dimensional time-space continuum, another free invention, with new transformation properties. The inertial co-ordinate system is equally suited for the description of events in nature.

"The quantum theory again created new and essential features of our reality. Discontinuity replaced continuity. Instead of laws governing individuals, probability laws appeared.

"The reality created by modern physics is, indeed, far removed from the reality of the early days. But the aim of every physical theory still remains the same.

"With the help of physical theories we try to find our way through the maze of observed facts, to order and understand the world of our sense impressions. We want the observed facts to follow logically from our concept of reality. Without the belief that it is possible to grasp the reality with our theoretical constructions, without the belief in the inner harmony of our world, there could be no science. This belief is and always will remain the fundamental motive for all scientific creation. Throughout all our efforts, in every dramatic struggle between old and new views, we recognize the eternal longing for understanding, the ever-firm belief in the harmony of our world, continually strengthened by the increasing obstacles to comprehension." (Einstein, *Evolution of Physics*, 311-313. Cf. *Evolution of Physics*, 163, 235, 259-260.)

¹⁵ Max Planck, *Der Kausalbegriff in der Physik*, 26. Millikan's statement quoted above from *Evolution in Science and Religion*, 27, is supported by Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, 99, and Bridgman, *Logic of Modern Physics*, 46-47, 50, 117.

¹⁶ Einstein's statement in this connection is instructive: "Galileo's conclusion, the correct one, was formulated a generation later by Newton as the *law of inertia*. It is usually the first thing about physics which we learn by heart at school, and some of us may remember it: 'Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon.' We have seen that this law of inertia cannot be derived directly from experiment, but only by speculative thinking consistent with observation. The idealized experiment can never be actually performed, although it leads to a profound understanding of real experiments." (EP, 8-9.)

¹⁷ See footnote 3 of this chapter for discussion of "deduction in mathematical reasoning and formal logic."

¹⁸ See Lariabee, *Reliable Knowledge*, Chapters VII, VIII, and IX, for an excellent detailed account of "clarifying the hypothesis" through semantics, classification, definition, and causal analysis.

¹⁹ See *An Introduction to Reflective Thinking*, Columbia Associates, pages 77-87 for a comparison of this symbolic analysis with the five methods or canons by which John Stuart Mill extensively analyzed the methodology of scientific experimentation. See IRT, pages 66-76 for an account of Pasteur's discovery of causal relations in biology which illustrates this method by which

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science experimentally tests its hypotheses. (Cf. Larrabee, RK, Chapters X, XI, and XII.)

²⁰ Einstein, EP, 225-226: "But our final aim is always a better understanding of reality. Links are added to the chain of logic connecting theory and observation. To clear the way leading from theory to experiment of unnecessary and artificial assumptions, to embrace an ever-wider region of facts, we must make the chain longer and longer. The simpler and more fundamental our assumptions become, the more intricate is our mathematical tool of reasoning; the way from theory to observation becomes longer, more subtle, and more complicated. Although it sounds paradoxical, we could say: Modern physics is simpler than the old physics and seems, therefore, more difficult and intricate. The simpler our picture of the external world and the more facts it embraces, the stronger it reflects in our minds the harmony of the universe."

²¹ Darwin's explanation of the relationship between the many species of biological organisms by his supposition that the species gradually becomes modified in its development from the simple to the more complex has become a natural law of Evolution. No crucial experiment can prove conclusively that it is true or false. This generalization is accepted as true to a high degree of probability, however, because without it most of the experimentally discovered cumulative evidence in paleontology, comparative anatomy, artificial breeding, and blood tests, would be unexplained. (Cf. Werkmeister, APS, 489-502.)

²² Einstein, EP, 310. Einstein explains his position further: "To obtain even a partial solution the scientist must collect the unordered facts available and make them coherent and understandable by creative thought.

"It is our aim, in the following pages, to describe in broad outline, that work of physicists which corresponds to the pure thinking of the investigator. We shall be chiefly concerned with the role of thoughts and ideas in the adventurous search for knowledge of the physical world." (Einstein, EP, p. 5.)

Margenau, "Methodology of Modern Physics," *Philosophy of Science*, (II) 1935, 58, expresses the same idea: "The essential features of a physical explanation is evidently the transition from nature to the realm of constructs and the reverse."

²³ "Fundamental ideas play the most essential role in forming a physical theory. Books on physics are full of complicated mathematical formulae. But thought and ideas, not formulae, are the beginning of every physical theory. The ideas must later take the mathematical form of a quantitative theory, to make possible the comparison with experiment." (Einstein, EP, 291.)

²⁴ Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, 211-212.

²⁵ Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, 142-144. And in *Modes of Thought*, 226-227, Whitehead says: "The only intelligible doctrine of causation is founded on the doctrine of immanence. Each occasion presupposes the antecedent world as active in its own nature. This is the reason why events have a determinate status relatively to each other. Also it is the reason why the qualitative energies of the past are combined into a pattern of qualitative energies in each present occasion. This is the doctrine of causation. It is the reason why it belongs to the essence of each occasion that it is *where* it is. It is the reason for the transference of character from occasion to occasion. It is the reason for the relative stability of laws of nature, some laws for a wider environment, some laws for a narrower environment. It is the reason why—as we have already noted—in our direct apprehension of the world around us we find that curious habit of claiming a two-fold unity with the observed data. We are in the world and the world is in us. Our immediate

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occasion is in the society of occasions forming the soul, and our soul is our present occasion. The body is ours, and we are an activity within our body. This fact of observation, vague but imperative, is the foundation of the connectivity of the world, and of the transmission of its type of order."

²⁶ Compare Whitehead's above statement, "The doctrine of Immanent Law is untenable unless we can construct a plausible metaphysical doctrine according to which the characters of the relevant things in nature are the outcome of the interconnections, and their interconnections are the outcome of their characters," to the following statement by Einstein from *Evolution of Physics*, 55:

"The results of scientific research very often force a change in the philosophical view of problems which extend far beyond the restricted domain of science itself. What is the aim of science? What is demanded of a theory which attempts to describe nature? These questions, although exceeding the bounds of physics, are intimately related to it, since science forms the material from which they arise. Philosophical generalizations must be founded on scientific results. Once formed and widely accepted, however, they very often influence the further development of scientific thought by indicating one of the many possible lines of procedure. Successful revolt against the accepted view in unexpected and completely different developments, becoming a source of new philosophical aspects. These remarks necessarily sound vague and pointless until illustrated by examples quoted from the history of physics.

"We shall here try to describe the first philosophical ideas on the aim of science. These ideas greatly influence the development of physics until nearly a hundred years ago, when their discarding was forced by new evidence, new facts and theories, which in their turn formed a new background for science.

"In the whole history of science from Greek philosophy to modern physics there have been constant attempts to reduce the apparent complexity of natural phenomena to some simple fundamental ideas and relations. This is the underlying principle of all natural philosophy." See Planck, *Philosophy of Physics*, 27-35.

²⁷ Whitehead's definition of Speculative Philosophy in his *Process and Reality* is illuminating: "Speculative Philosophy is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted. By this notion of 'interpretation' I mean that everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme. Thus the philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and, in respect to its interpretation, applicable and adequate. Here 'applicable' means that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and 'adequate' means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation." (4)

The subsistent order of logical-mathematical relations should also be mentioned as a part of the "whole of the universe," but we have deferred explicit reference to it until later when we can explain it fully.

²⁸ According to what Hegel called the *dialectic of consciousness*, man's thought about what is truly real must: (i) analyze his own consciousness (Sein); (ii) synthetically relate his own self-consciousness to the context of its environment (Wesen); and (iii) synoptically grasp the meaning of his self-consciousness as an integral part of the organic Whole of Becoming which is Ultimate Reality (Begriff).

²⁹ The following quotations indicate the conception of the "meaning of meaning" which is presupposed by the synoptic method that appeals to the criterion of coherence for verification of its claims:

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i. Criticizing the book, *The Meaning of Meaning* by Ogden and Richards, Werkmeister claims that "without this venture into ontology the problem of communication, and therefore of meaning, cannot be solved completely." ("The Meaning of Meaning Re-Examined," *Phil. Rev.*, 47 [1938], 266.) Werkmeister further defines his position as follows: "(1) Meanings are found only in experimental context involving (a) a mind which (b) interprets a sign as designating (c) some specific referent. (2) Meanings are not identical with the emotive or evocative use of words, nor with the images so frequently associated with words. (3) Meanings are determinable within our own first-person experience, (a) as mediate experience; and (b) as derivative meanings which are related to the elementary relations. Whatever is not related to our first-person experience can have no meaning for us. (4) Combinations of words have meaning only (a) if they do not violate rules of grammar; (b) if they are free from logical contradictions; and (c) if they do not mix up the spheres of relevancy." (264.) (Cf. Ogden and Richards, *MM*, 53 and 57.) See Werkmeister, *BSK*, Part I, "Language and Meaning" for an extended account.

ii. Cunningham recognizes the need for this methodological presupposition: "All our reasoning, so far at least as it proceeds through the medium of referential meaning-situation aims at the clarification of points of view centering around what is occasionally in reference; and this clarification is achieved by exploration of the significance of reference, that is, the contextual relationship of the referential meaning-situation, as it is progressively specified through penetration into the penumbral nature of what is in reference." ("Meaning, Reference, and Significance," *Phil. Rev.*, 47 [1938], 175.)

iii. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, 416: "The meaning of any experience lies in the way it is taken; that is, in the hypothesis which explains it, giving it coherence and value."

iv. With value-experiences especially in mind, Hocking states in *Thoughts on Death and Life*, 158: "In the one direction, meaning ascends from the parts to the whole: life has meaning if it contains a goodly number of these satisfactory spots—their worth colors the frame in which they are set. In the other direction, meaning descends from the whole to the parts: human life has a meaning if (and only if) there is a total meaning in the world in which it can participate." (Cf. Hocking, *Preface to Philosophy*, 413-416 and 498-500.)

v. Whitehead: "The endeavor to make our utmost approximation to analysis of meaning is human philosophy. . . . Everything which in any sense is something thereby expresses its dependence upon those ultimate principles whereby there are a variety of existences and of types of existences in the connected universe. . . . We enjoy the detail as a weapon for the further discrimination of the penumbral totality. In our experience there is always the dim background from which we derive and to which we return. We are not enjoying a limited doll's house of clear and distinct things, secluded from all ambiguity. In the darkness beyond there ever looms the vague mass which is the universe begetting us." (Whitehead, *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, "The Analysis of Meaning," 122-123.)

³⁰ The speculative philosopher not only presupposes the Hegelian principle that the meaning of human experience can be intelligible only by reference to the whole universe; but he also assumes the Kantian principle that the objective reality has meaning for the human understanding by virtue of the "constructive activity of thought." Although ultimate reality exists independently of the mind's thought about it, any knowledge about the objective

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universe requires the constructive thinking of a mind whose ideas refer to that independent reality. This purposive activity of the mind organizes the contents of self-consciousness according to universal and necessary categories of causality which make experience intelligible. "Thus the order and regularity in the appearance which we entitle *nature*, we ourselves introduce." (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A126. Cf. CPR, A114, B263, B816, B132-B133.)

³¹ "Now if reason is to be a factor in these sciences, something in them must be known *a priori*, and this knowledge may be related to its object in one or other of two ways, either as merely *determining* it and its concept (which must be supplied from elsewhere) or as also *making it actual*. The former is *theoretical*, the latter *practical* knowledge of reason. In both, that part in which reason determines its object completely *a priori*, namely, the *pure* part—however much or little this part may contain—must be first and separately dealt with, in case it be confounded with what comes from other sources." (Kant, CPR, Bx. Translated by N. K. Smith.)

³² Morris, "Scientific Empiricism," *Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Vol. I, No. 1, 71. Note that "Scientific Empiricism" is another name for "Logical Positivism."

In "Unified Science as Encyclopedic Integration," *Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, V. I, No. 1, 20-21, Neurath sets forth the program of the Logical Positivists to substitute for metaphysical speculation an analysis of scientific statements and the organization of such formal analysis in terms of an encyclopedia of axioms.

Read *Dictionary of Philosophy* (edited by Runes), pages 285-286 and pages 288-289 for a summary account of the movement of "Scientific Empiricism" and for a definition of "Semiotic: Theory of Signs," with which Logical Positivists are chiefly concerned.

³³ See Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, "The Elimination of Metaphysics," 15-39; Ayer, "Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics," *Mind*, 43 (1934), 345; and Houn, *Erkenntnis*, 1 (1930-31) 97.

³⁴ Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, 183. Italics mine.

³⁵ Our position in this matter can be shown best by summarizing our critical estimate of Emerson's "Transcendentalism." Assuming that beneath the bodily senses there is the organic whole of self-consciousness which is the intellect or mind, Emerson claimed that the objectivity of the referents of spiritual aspirations is verified by absolute intuitions: "This view which admonishes me where the sources of wisdom and power lie, and points to virtue as 'the golden key which opens the palace of eternity,' carries upon its face the highest certificate of truth, because it animates me to create my own world through the purification of my soul." (*Nature*, part vii.) Instead of using the logic of inquiry by which a thinker observes facts and attempts to explain them in terms of an adequate hypothesis, Emerson claims that his beliefs are justified by "that view which is most desirable to the mind." (*Ibid*, part i) He explicitly rejects the appeal to a coherent system of hypotheses as the criterion for testing the truth of his beliefs or the objective meaning of his intuitions: "In your metaphysics you have denied personality to the Deity, yet when the devout motions of the soul come, yield to them heart and life, though they should clothe God with shape and color. Leave your theory as Joseph his coat in the hands of the harlot and flee. A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen, and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has nothing to do." (*Self-Reliance*) Refusing to recognize the frustration of value as well as the realization of value, Emerson declared: "I know against all appearance

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that the universe can receive no detriment, that there is a remedy for every wrong, and a satisfaction for every goal."

Emerson's conclusions are worthless from the point of view of speculative philosophy which requires a coherent interpretation of both the realization and the frustration of values as experiences that must be explained in terms of metaphysical hypotheses. In the last quotation Emerson should have substituted the word "desire" for the word "know." Some of the beliefs which Emerson has claimed to be true may be verified on rational grounds; but his appeal to "desireable intuitions" certainly does not warrant the speculative philosopher's acceptance of them. A fuller discussion of the relation of intuition and reason will be offered later in connection with the "Organization of the Data of Self-Knowledge." We have insisted previously that the intuitive claims of the poets and religious geniuses must be tested by reason.

³⁶ Ayer, LTL, 19-20.

³⁷ Although Ayer recognizes the given fact of self-consciousness, when he maintains that "it is only by the occurrence of certain sense-contents that the existence of any material thing can be verified" (LTL, 54), his own verification consists simply of stating the tautological fact that sensations have been experienced and that under similar conditions they can be predicted and reproduced.

³⁸ Carnap, "Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science," *Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Vol. I, No. 1, 57.

³⁹ These analysts could profit by recalling Goethe's words: "Anyone strongly conscious of an inner power of synthesis, has properly the right to analyze, since he uses the external details to test and verify his inner conception of the whole." (PT [ii], 281.)

⁴⁰ These quoted statements are found in Ayer, LTL, 62 and Morris, *Scientific Empiricism*, 71.

⁴¹ In *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 437-438, Russell points out that since the logical positivist appeals to universals, e. g., mathematical and logical relations, "complete metaphysical agnosticism is not compatible with the maintenance of linguistic propositions." Cf. Russell, *Human Knowledge*, 445-447.

⁴² The differences between scientific and philosophical inquiry on the stages of observation and verification will be pointed out subsequently in the detailed discussion.

⁴³ As James Ward has said: "We must start where alone reflection and experience can arise at the level of self-consciousness." (*Realm of Ends*, 51-52.)

This does not imply that all human experience is essentially reflective. No metaphysical theories are yet involved. The sole appeal is to the empirical minimum unity of self-awareness, i. e., first-person experience, with which any philosophical interpretation of self-knowledge must begin. (See the previous discussion of Jung's psychological analysis of unconscious processes from which the emotional and purposive data of self-consciousness emerge.)

Read Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, Chapter VI for an exposition of self-psychology; and Werkmeister, *A Philosophy of Science*, Chapter IV, for an account of the meaning and significance of "first-person experience." (See also Ward, *Psychological Principles*.) Read Russell, *Human Knowledge*, Chapter VI, for a defense of "introspection" as a valid method.


⁴⁴ It should be noted that a person is not conscious of these contents and functions of self-experience at all times; but this discussion pertains to such a time as when attention is being deliberately directed to them. Except when

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the mind is engaged in introspective analysis, th mind is anything but such a "trim and tidy" process. (See Whitehead, *Function of Reason*, 62-63.)

The following statement by Köhler brings out the meaning of "wholeness": "In *Gestalt* psychology we distinguish three major traits which are conspicuous in all cases of specific organization or gestalt. Phenomenally the world is neither an indifferent mosaic nor an indifferent continuum. It exhibits definite segregated units or contexts in all degrees of complexity, articulation and clearness. Secondly such units show properties belonging to them as contexts or systems. Again the parts of such units or contexts exhibit dependent properties in the sense that, given the place of a part in the context, its dependent properties are determined by this position." (Köhler, *The Place of Value in a World of Facts*, 84-85.)

45 Study following Diagram of Self-Consciousness:



Each of these individual processes interpenetrates with all others and together they constitute the total process of Self-Consciousness, i.e., an organic complex unity.

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⁴⁶ The need for introspective observation of value data is emphasized by Köhler's *Gestalt* theory which requires that an adequate interpretation of experience must account for the interaction of objective content and subjective activity within a total context. (See Köhler, *The Place of Value in a World of Facts*, 84-85, 100.) Accordingly, he maintains: "We are aware of definite and very completely organized contexts. There are not separately: a self, an interest, and many things in the field, but, surrounded by many other items a self-interested-in-one-definite-thing." (PVWF, 75.) Thus Köhler attacks positivism: "It may be that Positivism once meant a laudable tendency to admit only concepts whose meaning could be traced to definite experiences. Long since, however, Positivism has become a doctrine in which only such experiences are freely admitted as belonging in a particular class, the class of 'mere facts.' In other words, Positivism knows now what the constitution of the world must be; it represents in this sense a dogmatic attitude." (PVWF, 340.) The exclusive appeal to a stimulus-response formula illustrates this one-sidedness of positivism. Value-intuitions must also be recognized as given data. (In addition to the title of his book, *The Place of Value in a World of Facts*, note also pp. 345-347, 370, 339, 386-387.) Not only does Köhler attack Perry's biological conception of value (63-64) and any exclusively biological definition of experience (69); but he also opposes all atomistic psychologies when he claims: "The mental life at its best exhibits a consistency, a coherence, and a hierarchy of values." (411)

⁴⁷ *Logic*, 37. Accordingly, Dewey defines experience in terms of the whole world of physical events and persons. (See Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 28.) This would mean that experience, whether it is conscious or not, endures throughout passing events by virtue of its biological functions and the social structure of the universe as a whole rather than by virtue of any unique autonomy of self-consciousness. (See Dewey, *Logic*, 42 and 199.)

⁴⁸ Clarification of our claim will be found later in the discussions of "the category of causality" (this Chapter) and "the external relations of self-consciousness" (Chapter VIII.)

We believe that the following quotations from Köhler indicate that our insistence that experience should be defined in terms of the purposive organization of an objectively "begotten" sense and value content into an integrated complex whole, is consistent with the *Gestalt* principle of "subjective requiredness": (i) "There is a definite context, comprising definite items in the field which are experienced as belonging to the context. There is secondly the vector which characterizes this context as a system property of it; striving does not occur by itself. There is, thirdly, the goal quality and often 'tertiary qualities' in the object which are due to its place in the context." (PVWF, 85.) (ii) "It is not the subjective aspect of requiredness in human striving and interests which make requiredness compatible with facts. Instead it is the observation that certain facts do not only happen or exist, but issuing as vectors in parts of contexts, extend toward others with a quality of acceptance or rejection. That in many examples such vectors issue from the self is a relatively minor point." (PVWF, 100. Cf. PVWF, 328.)

⁴⁹ Brightman has aptly designated the factors of self-consciousness as the "situation experienced" and the complex of hypothetical entities which are postulated to be its cause as the "situation believed-in." (*A Philosophy of Religion*, 347.) See Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 67-93 for an excellent discussion of the epistemological problems involved.

⁵⁰ Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, (ii), 317. Further exposition and criticism of Hume's position will be offered subsequently.

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⁵¹ Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 93-95. Brightman refers here to Bowne's *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 66-116.

⁵² The famous systematic treatment of the meaning of causality is to be found in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 1013a-1013b: "Cause means (1) that from which (as immanent material) a thing comes into being; e. g., the bronze of the statue and the silver of the saucer. This is what I call material cause.

"(2) The form or pattern into which the material is shaped; e. g., the bronze into the statue, or the silver into the saucer. This is the formal cause. [The acorn growing into an oak tree, or a boy growing into a man, are further examples which Aristotle gives of formal cause.]

"(3) That from which the change or the freedom from change first begins; e. g., the sculptor as the cause of the statue and the father as the cause of the child, and in general the maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing. This is the efficient cause.

"(4) The end, i. e., that for the sake of which a thing is; e. g., health is the cause of walking. For why does one walk? We say, that one may be healthy," and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause. The same is true of all the means that intervene before the end, when something else has put the process in motion (as, e. g., thinning or purging or drugs or instruments intervene before health is reached); for all these are for the sake of the end, though they differ from one another in that some are instruments and others are actions. This is what I call the final cause.

"These, then, are practically all the senses in which causes are spoken of, and since they are spoken of in several senses, it follows that there are several causes of the same thing, and in no accidental sense, e. g., both the art of the sculpture and the bronze are causes of the statue; not, however, in the same way, but the one as material cause (the bronze) and the other as efficient cause (the sculptor). And things can be causes of one another; e. g., exercise, of good condition; and the latter, of exercise; not, however, in the same way, but the one (good condition) as the final cause and the other (exercise) as efficient cause." (*The Works of Aristotle*, Vol. VIII, trans. by Smith and Ross.) (Quoted in *Preface to Philosophy: Book of Reading*, 439-440.)

⁵³ It should be noted that when we proceed upon the scientific and philosophical minimum *that* the objective world has meaning for the human mind, we are not claiming as does Hocking that this assumption is a "certitude." (See *Preface to Philosophy*, 498-499.)

Although the following principles must be presupposed by science and philosophy in order to find any meaningful relation between the human mind and the objective universe, they are not certainties but necessary presuppositions:

1. Both assume that there is an objective reality to which subjective ideas refer.
2. Both assume that the objective reality is orderly.
3. Both assume that the objective orders of reality can be known to some degree by reason (observation, formulation of explanatory hypotheses, and verification according to an adequate criterion).
4. Both assume that "causality" is the ultimate category of explanation.
5. Both employ the criterion of coherence to justify their ultimate principles; but where science can verify some of its hypotheses by crucial laboratory experiments under controlled conditions, philosophy cannot test value experiences, choices, or moral obligations, etc., in laboratories.

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6. Both science and philosophy presuppose that absolute truth is an unattainable ideal and that the most that can be expected is to verify a coherent system of explanatory hypotheses to a high degree of probability.

⁵⁴ See previous discussion of scientific observation.

⁵⁵ Spinoza, *ETH*, 1. Translated by Sterling and White.

⁵⁶ When the logical positivist claims that all metaphysical speculation is "devoted to the production of nonsense" (Ayer, *LTL*, 17 ff), he seems to overlook the possibility of a synoptic interpretation of reality which does not make experience an unintelligible part of the whole.

⁵⁷ These scientific theories will be discussed in Chapter VII, "Toward a Reconstruction of the Natural Order."

⁵⁸ Watson, *Behaviorism*, 11. In his *Fundamentals of Objective Psychology*, Dashiell states Watson's point of view more specifically: "We shall proceed to ask what are the stimulus-response units of actions involved in emotional conduct, in remembering, in perceiving, in paying attention, and so forth. Our questions should always be: What are the stimuli? What precisely are the responses?"

⁵⁹ *Behaviorism*, 2 and 274. See Weiss, *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior* for a thorough interpretation in terms of mechanical causality.

⁶⁰ Kant maintains that unless categories derived from a logical analysis of the judgment are applied to sense data, there could be no self-experience to which all the real things must be related, if they are to be known. (See Kant, *CPR*, B95-101, B106, B126, A97, A168, A113-116, A125-126, B132, B133, B111.)

⁶¹ Whitehead has recognized that Kant was the first to emphasize explicitly the "constructive activity of thought": "We have now come to Kant, the great philosopher who first, fully and explicitly, introduced into philosophy the conception of an act of experience as a constructive functioning, transforming subjectivity into objectivity, or objectivity into subjectivity; the order is immaterial in comparison with the general idea." (*Process and Reality*, 229.) Cf. Einstein's view of "creative thought . . . in the adventurous search for knowledge of the physical world" in section 4 of this Chapter, "What Are Natural Laws?" (Cf. footnote 30 of this Chapter.)

Despite Whitehead's acceptance of this basic Kantian principle, Whitehead reconceives Kant's "subject-object" structure of experience into "object-subject" in order to emphasize that reflective self-consciousness emerges from a prior and independently existing organic process: "For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world a 'superject' rather than a 'subject.'" (PR, 136. Cf. PR, 45, 229, 231, 234, 236, 252, 443, and *Adventures of Ideas*, 225-226.)

⁶² See Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 27-54 for the "categorical scheme" of an organismic cosmology from which our "system of teleological causality" has been derived with some modifications. Note especially Whitehead's ultimate category of "creativity" and its subordinate modes of "ingression of eternal objects," "prehensions," and "concrescence."

⁶³ Dewey, *Logic, The Theory of Inquiry*, 112-113. Although Hegel, of course, worked out most explicitly the logic of coherence, there is an interesting anticipation of this criterion in the methodology of Leibniz: In the sphere of pure thought, e. g., mathematics, the criteria are the principle of identity and non-contradiction—which corresponds to formal consistency; in the sphere of experience any interpretation must meet the requirement of suf-

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ficient reason—which corresponds to the causal explanation in terms of an *adequate* system of categories. We reject Leibniz's assumption that these principles of reasoning are innate in the mind, although we agree that they are essential requirements for reflective thinking. (See *Monadology*, par. 31-36.)

⁶⁴ Compare footnote 3 of this Chapter.

⁶⁵ The reader will recall from our previous discussion that scientific inquiry must meet these same requirements of the hypothetical-deductive logic in the experimental verification of the implications predicted as consequences of an explanatory hypothesis. Consider, for example, the logic of the experimental verification of Darwin's hypothesis of evolution for explaining the relationship between biological species: If evolution is true, certain deducible implications should be available for discovery. Should these implications be discovered by experimental research in comparative anatomy, genetics, embryology, paleontology, etc., then the hypothesis of evolution has been verified as true to a high degree of probability. Should experimentation fail to discover these implications, the theory of evolution must be abandoned and a more adequate theory must be thought out. Scientists accept the hypothesis of evolution as reliable knowledge, since it serves as a principle of interpretation which renders the relevant data intelligible; but they recognize that it is subject to abandonment, modification, or correction.

⁶⁶ For detailed expositions of the meaning of coherence as a criterion of truth, the following books are recommended in the order of their intelligibility for a beginning student of philosophy: Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 58-66; Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought* (II), Chapters XXVI, XXVII; and Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 4-10. (It should be noted that we are concerned here only with "coherence as a criterion of truth." On this Brightman and Blanshard agree. But Blanshard defines the "nature of truth as coherence," whereas Brightman defines the "nature of truth as correspondence." Our hypothetical-deductive method requires us to accept Brightman's view in which "truth" is applicable only to the system of explanatory hypotheses which always refer to ultimate reality, but are never completely identical with it. In later discussions it will be shown that Whitehead's "descriptive generalizations" presuppose this definition of truth.

In adopting the criterion of coherence as a standard of verification we are rejecting the unreflective criteria by which people often attempt to justify their beliefs. The most common of these are the appeals to instinct, custom, universal agreement, practical consequences, sensation, intuition, feeling, and dogmatic authority. For excellent expositions and criticisms of these uncritical standards, read Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, Chapter II; Dewey, *How We Think*, Chapter II; Montague, *Ways of Knowing*, Part I; and Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought* (II), Chapter XXV. Blanshard, *TNT* (II), 237-258, also offers an excellent criticism of the "reflective criterion" of the appeal to "self-evidence" upon which mathematical rationalism is based. We agree that the formal consistency of the abstract implications of *a priori* assumptions is not sufficient as a criterion of truth. In making this claim we are not denying the requirement of the consistency of valid implications or the indispensable function of mathematics in the development of thought. (Cf. footnote 3 of this Chapter.) For an excellent epistemological discussion concerning "Truth and the World About Us," read Werkmeister, *BSK*, Chapters III and IV.

⁶⁷ The traditional arguments for God might be summarized as follows:

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(i) *Cosmological*: Apart from the hypothesis that there is a God the unity and interacting harmony of the physical universe is unintelligible.

(ii) *Teleological*: The evidences of purpose in the biological, mental, and social processes of evolution are unintelligible apart from the hypothesis that there is a Purposer, i. e., a creative force which guides and regulates the evolutionary development of life.

(iii) *Epistemological*: The possibility of man's knowing the world requires that the world must be "mindlike" and that God be the author of both nature and human minds. (One aspect of the older "ontological argument")

(iv) *Anthropological*: Man's capacity for intelligence and for realizing ideals point to a God who exemplifies this rationality and goodness to the *utmost* degree.

(v) *Religious experience*: The belief that man shares a communion and fellowship with God "makes a significant difference in living."

(vi) *Objectivity of values*: Despite the frustrations of value in the world, the realizations of value point to the reality of a world as it ought to be, i. e., a human order of ideal values existing in the acts and purposes of a more-than-human Person. (Another aspect of the "ontological argument," the perfect idea of God requires a real God as its perfect cause.)

For a fuller statement and unusually clear exposition of these points see Harkness, *Conflicts in Religious Thought*, Chapter VI. Cf. Bertocci, *The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought*.)

CHAPTER VII

TOWARD A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NATURAL ORDER

IF THE IMMANENTAL conception of natural law is true, the cosmological world-view of mechanistic atomism must be replaced by an organismic cosmology that explains each natural event as an integral participant in the total operation of a creative process which is the ultimate reality of the universe.¹

The results of contemporary scientific inquiry must be correlated and their logical implications organized into descriptive generalizations that provide a coherent picture of the natural order. A reconception of the doctrine of matter, the notions of space and time, and the evolutionary view of life in terms of a more coherent system of hypotheses is required by a cosmological reconstruction of "those ultimate principles whereby there are a variety of existences and types of existences in the connected universe."²

A. A Reconception of the Doctrine of Matter.

An unreflective person soon loses his patience with the scientist and the philosopher who find such great difficulties in defining the nature of matter. Matter, according to the advocate of "common sense," is simply and obviously the objectively real, permanent stuff of which all physical things are composed. Anything that can be seen, heard, touched, smelled, or tasted is constituted by material substance. Usually he considers matter to be an all-inclusive substance which underlies particular things and is even more ultimately real than the things which exemplify it.

Materialistic philosophers, who appealed to the category

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of mechanical causality which science postulated from the time of Democritus up through the 19th century, conceived of matter as mass-particles in motion which produced the entire natural order. Democritus, bringing to a head the cosmological speculations of his predecessors, conceived of everything in the universe as composed of infinitely small material particles or atoms which are indivisible, invisible, and qualitatively alike. These minute homogeneous bodies with shape, size, and extension are all qualitatively similar, although they exhibit quantitative differences in size, shape, and motion. Their eternal motion through empty space is simply an inherent characteristic of each atom. Not only all physical things but also all human minds were said to be composed of combinations of atoms.

Different kinds of combinations accounted for the apparent differences between physical things. Only the smoother and more round atoms constituted minds. Atomism as a metaphysical system has undergone some modification since Democritus, but it still claims that the ultimate constituents of the universe are material entities with an inherent mechanical motion, and the function of purposive activity in mental processes is an illusion created by an incomplete examination of the physical causes involved.³

Modern scientific research, to the dismay of the exponents of "common sense," has so reconceived matter that it is no longer considered as a universal substance. While the constitution of "matter" is explored with the precise instruments of physical and chemical analysis, physics has speculatively constructed "matter" in terms of Maxwell's "electromagnetic fields" without "material actors" but with laws that are expressed in mathematical equations. Atomic bodies have been replaced by mathematical points. Although "atomic research" with all of its theoretical and practical importance has become a subject of public concern, it should be noted that the contemporary scientists, who are splitting atoms into protons,

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electrons, neutrons, and postrons, and whatever other constituents may be discovered, are dealing with "energy," not the "atomic matter" of the old materialism. What actually constitutes the ultimate reality of the natural order is still a problem.⁴

The quantum theory of Max Planck elaborated in the matrix mechanics of Heisenberg, the wave mechanics of Schrödinger, and the transformation theory of Jordan and Dirac, has created a new conception of physical reality quite different from that of the 19th century physicists who conceived the reality of the world in terms of "particles with simple forces acting between them and depending only on the distance." In order to justify the appeal to the category of mechanical causality, it was necessary to invent "concepts of mass, force, and an inertial system." A far more subtle construction of physical reality was needed to explain "the deflection of the magnetic needle" and "the structure of the ether." In the formulation of the notion of the electromagnetic field, these problems were more adequately solved; but the scientific explanation of events was shifted from the "behavior of bodies" to "the behavior of something between them, i.e., the field." Whereas the atomic theory dealt with the laws of continuity governing individual units, the quantum theory deals with mathematical laws of probability that account for discontinuity.⁵ As a result of the wide acceptance of the quantum theory the conception of bits of matter which constitute or support the physical things in the universe has been supplanted in modern physics by the conception of a field of force, i.e., a constant energetic activity manifested in wholes. The relation within these patterned configurations of quanta of energy are expressed in mathematical formulae. It is the atomic conception of matter as a "detached, self-contained local existence with a static network of spatial relations" which Whitehead condemns as "simple location."⁶

Newton's *law of gravitation* was considered adequate for

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explaining the stresses, mass, and motion of material bodies as long as they could be conceived as detached ultimate constituents of nature, externally related in terms of "imposed natural laws." The modern scientific notion of quanta "energy, activity, and the vibratory differentiations of space-time whereby any local agitation shakes the whole universe," requires the conception of "natural law as immanent;" for only this descriptive generalization explains how natural events are what they are because of their interaction with all other natural events. This "complex of the more stable interrelations between the real facts of the real universe" is the natural order with which modern science is concerned.⁷

B. A Reconception of the Nature of Space and Time.

Whitehead's notion of *natural law as immanent* requires that the classical views of absolute space and time be reconceived in terms of a "time-space continuum" in which (i) temporal duration is the defining characteristic of ultimate reality, i.e., total creative process of a growing universe, and (ii) spatial extension, i.e., the dimension of width, depth, and height, is a conceptual relation between perceived objects constructed by the particular mind to which the spatial perspectives are relative.⁸ Such an involved statement requires elaboration and substantiation.

The person possessed by "common sense," who probably still resents the rough treatment accorded his view of matter by reflective thought, feels that space and time are facts about which there can be no such complicated questions as were raised about matter. Take space for example. Can there be any doubt that space is an infinite void which not only extends in all directions but also includes all physical things from the smallest to the largest? Although it can be divided into infinitely small parts, space in his view, is an unlimited and all-inclusive six-sided container that would exist even if there were no bodies in it. "Try to question that!"

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our "common sense" friend challenges the scientist and the philosopher. The person possessed more by "intellectual curiosity" than by "common sense" accepts this challenge, but finds the problems confronting him to be very difficult indeed.

It is not difficult to locate that aspect of space which a person experiences as his "here" relative to the "theres" that constitute the "heres" of the other people and physical things. It seems impossible, however, to conceive of the relationship of a "first-person here" to the other human and non-human "heres" and to the total framework of space, which, if they have any meaning, must constitute the natural order. The reader will recall from the discussion of the scientific category of causality that the natural order is conceived as a "seamless meshwork of interacting events" which does not provide for the individual center of reference which a "first-person here" requires. An attempt to treat space as a physical substance meets no better success, since it has no constituent properties that can be analyzed. Of only this one thing we can be reasonably sure; perceptual experience of particular physical objects is impossible apart from the three dimensions of spatial relations, i. e., height, width, and depth.

Whatever comfort the "common-sense" person may derive from this establishment of "perceptual space" as a necessary foundation for the structure of sense experience, the reflective thinker finds that his intellectual curiosity is not so easily satisfied. These perceived relations between particular objects are unintelligible apart from some conception of a total framework of all possible extensive relations. It is this ideal or conceptual space that mathematics constructs in terms of its non-sensuous symbols. Here again, however, serious problems emerge. What is the most adequate mathematical construction of the concept of space? How is the concept of space related to the concept of time?

Whereas spatial extension is experienced in sense perception as tri-dimensional, temporal succession is experienced, both

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perceptually and conceptually, as uni-dimensional, i. e., before and after. Sensations and ideas always follow each other in the conscious, ongoing process of experience in which a present moment is linked to the past by the recall of the memory and to the future by the anticipation of the imagination. Just as perceptual space requires a concept of the totality of all extensive possibilities, the private experiences of temporal succession, as well as the public "clock-time," take on an intelligible meaning only if they refer to an unbegun and unending passage of events which characterize ultimate reality as a process of duration. References to the historical treatments of these problems will aid our inquiry.

Newton conceived both space and time to be absolute and infinite entities to which all "sensible measures" of space and time are relative. Space is an all-inclusive container or receptacle that exists in an eternal "now" unmoved and uninfluenced by all the physical objects that have been placed in it by God to give it substance:

Absolute space, in its own nature, without regard to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some moveable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which our senses determine by its position to bodies; and which is vulgarly taken for immovable space; such is the dimension of a subterraneous, an aerial, or a celestial space, determined by its position in respect of the earth. Absolute and relative space, are the same in figure and magnitude; but they do not always remain numerically the same. For if the earth, for instance, moves, a space of our air, which relatively and in respect of the earth remains always the same, will at the same time be one of the absolute space into which the air passes; at another time it will be another part of the same, and so absolutely understood, it will be perpetually mutable.⁹

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Flowing evenly and continuously throughout all eternity absolute and infinite Time is the immovable total context to which all motions must refer. Absolute Time is "sui generis" as to its own absolute motion. It does not depend upon the particular motions placed in it by God. Rather, it imparts an order of succession to the motions of relative times:

Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without regard to anything external, and by another name is called duration; relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external measure of the duration by means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time . . . All motions may be accelerated and retarded, but the true, or equable progress of absolute time is liable to no change. The duration or perseverance of the existence of things remains the same, whether the motions are swift or slow, or none at all; and therefore it ought to be distinguished from what are only sensible measures thereof. ¹⁰

Newton clearly recognizes that he is dealing with conceptual rather than perceptual space and time; but he correctly emphasizes that such mathematical postulates were necessary assumptions, if absolute motion is to be intelligible. Newton goes further than this, however, when he claims that Space and Time are metaphysical entities. ¹¹

Leibniz reconceived Newton's doctrine of the nature of absolute space and time as metaphysical *entities* in terms of metaphysically real orders of co-existence and succession resulting from the relations between things without which space and time would not exist. Although Leibniz's view of time will be shown later to be inadequate, his relational interpretation of space points toward the conception that is implied by the doctrine of Immanent Law:

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As for me, I have more than once stated that I held *space* to be something purely relative, like *time*; space being an order of co-existences as time is an order of successions. For space denotes in terms of possibility an order of things which exist at the same time; in so far as they exist together, and is not concerned with their particular ways of existing: and when we see several things together we perceive this order of things among themselves. ¹²

Kant rejected both Newton's conception of absolute space and time as objective entities and Leibniz's relational interpretation. He reconceived space and time as universal and necessary forms in the mind which must be presupposed for any perceptual experience. Neither does Kant consider space and time to be innate ideas, nor does he claim that space and time determine the nature of ultimate reality, whatever it may be. He simply contends that space and time are *a priori* forms of sense intuitions, i. e., the subjective conditions within the mind to which appearances must conform, if that mind is to have any experience of the objective order.

As a form of the mind's representation of the natural order, space is a pure form of the sensibility which is never found as an empirical process but which is presupposed by empirical processes:

The representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of outer appearance. On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible at all only through that representation. Space is a necessary *a priori* representation, which necessarily underlies all outer intuitions . . . It is an *a priori* representation, which necessarily underlies outer appearances. ¹³

Just as space is the intuitive form for apprehending external relations, time is the intuitive form for apprehending

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internal relations within the mind. Unless the mind presupposes time as the necessary representation underlying all sense-intuitions, consciousness of simultaneity or succession is impossible. Kant's claim that time is the universal condition of the possibility of appearances requires further analysis.

Time is not a concept derived from empirical processes; but "time is, therefore, given *a priori*. In it alone is actuality of appearances possible at all. Appearances may, one and all, vanish, but time (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot itself be removed."¹⁴

When Kant claims that time is a pure form of the sensible intuition in which successive times are really aspects of one united representation given in the mind, he raises but does not solve the problem of correlating time as an order of objective appearances and time as an inner mental state. Are objects in time by virtue of the fact that my representations of them are experienced by me in time? It seems that Kant does not recognize consistently the objective aspect of time that would allow external simultaneity. Inner succession seems to be all that he provides for. Is the answer to be found in terms of temporal causation? Kant does correlate temporality and motion; but he also limits temporality as the subjective condition which makes sense intuitions possible, and he denies that time is self-existent, or that it is an objective subsistent: "Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state."¹⁵

Inadequacies of Kant's account of space and time will become evident as the discussion progresses. Two important contributions toward an adequate interpretation of the spatial-temporal order have been made by Kant, however, which should be recognized: (i) The constructive activity of the mind must be taken into consideration in order to understand spatial relations. (ii) Space cannot be conceived apart from some concept of Time. The full significance of these points will soon be brought out.

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Scientific thought about space and time for the past three hundred years has culminated in Einstein's "theory of relativity," which discards the Newtonian notion of Absolute Space and interprets space in terms of the internal relations of the physical universe. Previous investigators had been puzzled by the observable fact that two rays of light took the same time to reach a given point, even though their sources were at different distances. In order to explain this observation Einstein found it necessary to reinterpret Newton's "laws of gravitation." This required a reconception of space and time. Instead of assuming absolute spatial distances, Einstein explored the possibility that whatever magnitude light has, it must be determined in terms of the system of reference to which measurement is relative. The three dimensional space conceived by Newton as an all-inclusive container is reconceived by Einstein as a relative order of relations which is unintelligible apart from the fourth dimension of temporal succession.¹⁶

Minkowski maintained that "space by itself and time by itself are reduced to mere shadows, and only a kind of a union of the two retains its independence." Lorentz in his transformation equation had shown that neither spatial distances nor time intervals are constant. In his "special theory of relativity," therefore, Einstein replaced the classical notions of "absolute simultaneity" and "absolute extension" with the notion of a "time-space continuum" as the defining characteristic of the natural order.¹⁷

Since spatiality, temporality, and specific gravitational fields are relative to the system of reference which is arbitrarily selected by the scientist in order to obtain physical measurements, only the theoretical constructions of mathematical formulae establish the objective time-space order.¹⁸

Einstein recognizes that the conceptual construction by Maxwell of the "electromagnetic field" governing electrical and optical phenomena is "the most important invention since

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Newton's time." Accordingly, the physical events of the natural order can be described in terms of the "field in the space between the charges and the particles" rather in Newton's charges and particles. Einstein explains in the following passage the relation of his special and general theories of relativity to the field concept:

A new concept appears in physics, the most important invention since Newton's time: the field. It needed great scientific imagination to realize that it is not the charges nor the particles which is essential for the description of physical phenomena. The field concept proves most successful and leads to the formulation of Maxwell's equations describing the structure of the electromagnetic field and governing the electric as well as the optical phenomena.

The theory of relativity arises from the field problems. The contradictions and inconsistencies of the old theories force us to ascribe new properties to the time-space continuum, to the scene of all events in our physical world.

The relativity theory develops in two steps. The first step leads to what is known as the special theory of relativity, applied only to inertial co-ordinate systems, that is, to systems in which the law of inertia, as formulated by Newton, is valid. The special theory of relativity is based on two fundamental assumptions: physical laws are the same in all co-ordinate systems moving uniformly, relative to each other; the velocity of light always has the same value. From these assumptions, fully confirmed by experiment, the properties of moving rods and clocks, their changes in length and rhythm depending on velocity, are deduced. The theory of relativity changes the laws of mechanics. The old laws are invalid if the velocity of the moving particle ap-

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proaches that of light. The new laws for a moving body as reformulated by the relativity theory are splendidly confirmed by experiment. A further consequence of the (special) theory of relativity is the connection between mass and energy. Mass is energy and energy has mass. The two conservation laws of mass and energy are combined by the relativity theory into one, the conservation law of mass-energy.

The general theory of relativity gives a still deeper analysis of the time-space continuum. The validity of the theory is no longer restricted to inertial co-ordinate systems. The theory attacks the problem of gravitation and formulates new structure laws for the gravitational field. It forces us to analyze the role played by geometry in the description of the physical world. It regards the fact that gravitational and inertial mass are equal, as essential and not merely accidental, as in classical mechanics. The experimental consequences of the general relativity theory differ only slightly from those of classical mechanics. They stand the test of experiment well wherever comparison is possible. But the strength of the theory lies in its inner consistency and the simplicity of its fundamental assumptions.

The theory of relativity stresses the importance of the field concept in physics. But we have not yet succeeded in formulating a pure field physics. For the present we must still assume the existence of both: field and matter.¹⁹

We have discussed the views of Newton, Leibniz, Kant, and Einstein regarding the nature of space and time in order to bring out the issues that are involved in Whitehead's reconception according to which temporal duration is the defining characteristic of the total creative process of a growing universe, and spatial extension is a conceptual relation between

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perceived objects that is constructed by the particular mind to which the spatial perspective is relative.²⁰

Whitehead claims that the full meaning of the conception of a space-time continuum is unintelligible apart from a metaphysical interpretation of the causal operations which constitute the ultimate process of reality. In order to have an adequate theory of measurement, Einstein requires only physical conditions to determine the metrical structure of space. Whitehead contends, nevertheless, that constant and general uniformities must be exhibited by these physical conditions, and since physics is not methodologically equipped to deal with these generic causal principles, metaphysics is necessary.²¹

Whitehead's conception of the space-time continuum is the logical implication of his view of *Law as Immanent*, according to which the natural order is an organic system of spatial relations between objects and temporal relations between events:

The physical thing is a certain coordination of spaces and times and of conditions in those spaces at those times, this coordination illustrating one exemplification of a certain general rule, expressible in terms of mathematical relations. Here we have returned to a fundamental Platonic doctrine.²²

In order to understand Whitehead's metaphysical conception of the space-time continuum we must analyze his notion of (i) perceptual space, (ii) conceptual space, (iii) experienced time, and (iv) conceptual duration. His notions of "contemporary independence" and the "grouping of occasions" will then be considered as implications of his concept of the space-time continuum.

It will be recalled from our historical survey that whereas Newton conceived space as an objective entity and Leibniz conceived space as an objective relation, Kant claimed that space is a subjective form in the mind without which there

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could be no perceptual experience in the cognitive process by which the mind constructs its picture of the natural order. Although Whitehead considers Kant's explanation of space as the necessary condition of experience to be a mere tautology, Whitehead does agree with Kant that the conception of the natural order of spatial relations depends upon the activity of the mind in the process of perception. When Whitehead claims that "in the act of experience we perceive a whole formed of related differentiated parts," he is combining aspects of the Leibnizian and Kantian notion in his explanation of perceptual space as a relational construct:

We note again that the relational theory of space from another point of view brings us back to the idea of the fundamental space-entities as being logical constructs from the relations between things. The difference is, that this paragraph is written from a more developed point of view, as it implicitly assumes the things in space, and conceives space as an expression of certain of their relations. Combining this paragraph with what has gone before, we see that the suggested procedure is first to define "things" in terms of the data of experience and then to define space in terms of the relations between things.

I emphasize the point that our only exact data as to the physical world are our sensible perceptions. We must not slip into the fallacy of assuming that we are comparing a given world with given perceptions of it. The physical world is, in some general sense of the term, a deduced concept.

Our problem is, in fact, to fit the world to our perceptions, and not our perceptions to the world.²³

Since we shall show presently that subjectively constructed space cannot be conceived apart from the objective process of time, we should understand what is meant by experienced

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temporality. Although spatial relations are involved in perceptual experience, temporal relations constitute the structure of all experience, whether it be perceptual or conceptual. When ideas are entertained in the mind they always have referents in the past and future. In fact, a person's self-identity itself is meaningless without the temporal linkage of the present to the past through memory and the temporal linkage of the present to the future through anticipation:

But in conceiving our personal identity we are apt to emphasize rather the soul than the body. Then one individual is that coordinated stream of personal experiences, which is my thread of life or your thread of life. It is that succession of self-realization, each occasion with its direct memory of its past and with its anticipation of the future. That claim to enduring self-identity is our self-assertion of personal identity.²⁴

These subjective experiences of spatial and temporal relations have objective meaning in Whitehead's cosmology when they are conceived in terms of the "extensive continuum" which undergirds the unbegun and unending creative process of duration that is the total universe:

This extensive continuum is one relational complex in which all potential objectifications find their niche. It underlies the whole world, past, present, and future. This extensive continuum expresses the solidarity of all possible standpoints throughout the whole process of the world All actual entities are related according to the determinations of this continuum It is the reality of what is potential, in its character of a real component of what is actual.²⁵

This systematic scheme of the relations of space-time embodies two kinds of potentiality: (i) abstract potentiality, and (ii) concrete potentiality.²⁶ These must be analyzed in detail.

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Abstract potentiality: The spatial dimensions that characterize particular physical things subsist as universal possibilities before they are actualized in the temporal existence of the natural order. Just as "2 x 2 equals 4" subsists as a universal mathematical possibility before it is exemplified in actual numerical relations, so deepness, wideness, and highness subsist as universal possibilities before they are exhibited as the spatial dimensions of depth, width, and height which provide the geometrical perspective for a particular perceptual experience. Similarly, loudness, roundness, squareness, farness, nearness, redness, and other universal sense qualities are real as subsistents, even though they may not be actual as existents. Whitehead designates these universal subsistents which provide the general potentiality of the natural order as "eternal objects": "Any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world is called an 'eternal object.'"²⁷

Whitehead claims that it is necessary to formulate the hypothesis that there is a God in order to explain how the subsisting abstract potentialities of spatial dimensions (as well as the other universal sense qualities, value possibilities, mathematical-logical relations, etc.) become exemplified in the natural order of temporal events. Only the mind of God would have sufficient range to include the comprehensive relations of these infinitely numerous subsistent qualities within his range of influence. God thus envisages not only the systematic hierarchy of "eternal objects," but he also correlates them with the temporal process of becoming. Accordingly, God's relation to the "eternal objects" is threefold: (i) He embodies all of these subsistent qualities within his "primordial nature." (ii) He integrates the infinite number of potential abstract forms into those orders that are relevant to particular concrete types of actuality. (iii) He links these relevant orders of potentiality with the temporal process so that spatial dimensions are actualized in the perceptual per-

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spective of the minds who construct the relations between the physical objects that exemplify these universal qualities. Consequently, the "ingression of eternal objects" into the particular temporal actualities of nature depends upon God as the regulative agency in the creative advance of the growing universe.²⁸

In order to understand what Whitehead means by the "extensive continuum" it is necessary but not sufficient merely to analyze the relation of the abstract potentiality of subsistence to the actuality of temporal existence. We must consider the *concrete potentiality* (Whitehead's 'real' potentiality) which defines the space-time order of nature that is relative to the perceptual perspective of such an actuality as a person's self-consciousness:

Thus the continuum is present in each actual entity, and each actual entity pervades the continuum. This conclusion can be stated otherwise. Extension apart from its spatialization and temporalization, is that general scheme of relationships providing the capacity that many objects can be welded into the real unity of one experience. Thus, an act of experience has an objective scheme of extensive order by reason of the double fact that its own perspective standpoint has extensive content, and that the other actual entities are objectified with the retention of their extensive relationships. These extensive relationships are more fundamental than their more special spatial and temporal relationships. Extension is the most general scheme of real potentiality, providing the background for all other organic relations. The potential scheme does not determine its own atomization by actual entities. It is divisible: but its real division by actual entities depends upon more particular characteristics of the actual entities constituting the antecedent environment. In respect to time, this atomization takes the special form of the 'epochal

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theory of time.' In respect to space, it means that every actual entity in the temporal world is to be credited with a spatial volume for its perspective standpoint.²⁹

Whitehead agrees with Newton that "the contemporary world is consciously prehended as a continuum of extensive relations" in so far as it is presented to sense perception. Newton inferred from the perceptual perspective presented immediately to self-consciousness that the natural order was a static system of mechanical interaction between particles of matter in which every event was determined by all the other events in the universe. Whitehead infers from the perceptual perspective of self-consciousness that the continuity of nature which imparts solidarity to the world characterizes the potential reality of the extensive continuum. This constitutes the past experience of perceptual consciousness, but "so far as physical relations are concerned, contemporary events (including the present moment of self-consciousness) happen in causal independence of each other."³⁰

In the temporal process of becoming (which includes all existence) all past potential moments of concrete present actualities interact according to immanent law, with the result that the past moments constitute a continuous extensive natural order as "solid" as Newton conceived it. The past moment of a particular actuality interacts with the past moments of all the other actualities with which it has relevant mutual relations of reciprocal immanence. The present moments of contemporaneous events, however, *are not bound together* by Newton's "static material medium pervading space" which would necessarily imply that each natural event shares the same actual world with all other natural events. According to Whitehead, no two natural events in the ongoing temporal process, when actualized in their present moments, share the same geometrical perspectives:

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In this way, by reason of the principle of contemporary independence, the contemporary world is objectified for us under the aspect of passive potentiality. The very sense-data by which its parts are differentiated are supplied by antecedent states or our own bodies, and so is their distribution in contemporary space. Our direct perception of the contemporary world is thus reduced to extension, defining (i) our own geometrical perspectives, and (ii) possibilities of mutual perspectives for other contemporary entities *inter se*, and (iii) possibilities of division. These possibilities of division constitute the external world a continuum. For a continuum is divisible; so far as the contemporary world is divided by actual entities, it is not a continuum, but is atomic. Thus the contemporary world is perceived with its potentiality for extensive division, and not in its actual atomic division.

The contemporary world as perceived by the senses is the datum for contemporary actuality, and is therefore continuous—divisible but not divided. The contemporary world is in fact divided and atomic, being a multiplicity of definite actual entities. These contemporary actual entities are divided from each other, and are not themselves divisible into other contemporary actual entities.³¹

It follows from this definition of concrete potentiality that the organic community of internally related events which constitutes the solidarity of the world provides the past condition for the present growth of an individual actuality. All such past conditions of present perspectives are coordinate parts in the relational complex of the space-time continuum.

Within such concrete potentiality there is embodied the continuity of internal relations which characterizes the immediate past; but within the present process of concrete growth, which has creatively synthesized such objectified data into an

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individual actuality, there is causal independence of the mutual immanence that the organic continuum embodies:

It cannot be too clearly understood that some chief notions of European thought were framed under the influence of a misapprehension, only partially corrected by the scientific progress of the last century. This mistake consists in the confusion of mere potentiality with actuality. Continuity concerns what is potential; whereas actuality is incurably atomic.

This misapprehension is promoted by the neglect of the principle that, so far as physical relations are concerned, contemporary events happen in *causal independence* of each other.³²

Accordingly, Whitehead points out that mutual immanence dominates the interacting prehensions of antecedent bodily states. Only by way of these physical functions in the immediate past can other existents causally influence the present process of an individual experient.³³

Whitehead's doctrine of perception illustrates this point. In it the extensive world is given in the past mode of causal efficacy. But in order that the external world might be perceived, the mode of causal efficacy must be analyzed in the present mode of presentational immediacy. The symbolic reference which synthesizes these past and present modes is not directly related to the external world; for it deals with the awareness of the immediate past and the bodily functions with which the external world is directly related.³⁴

It follows from this explanation that contemporary selves are not directly related to each other in the mode of efficient causation:

It is the definition of contemporary events that they happen in causal independence of each other. Thus two contemporary occasions are such that neither belongs to the past of the other. The two occasions are

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not in any direct relation of efficient causation. The vast causal independence of contemporary occasions is the preservative of the elbow-room within the Universe Nature does provide a field for independent activities. The understanding of the Universe requires that we conceive in their proper relations to each other the various roles, of efficient causation, of teleological self-creation, and of contemporary independence.³⁵

In this explanation of contemporary independence Whitehead has sought to preserve the continuity and the homogeneity of past environmental relations constituting the concrete potentiality from which each natural event has emerged as well as the distinctness and self-identical integrity of each particular actuality in the present moment of its internal temporal process of development. The organic interconnection of the past moments of particular natural events, which is implied in the conception of natural law as immanent, does not preclude a diversity of perspectives in the present.³⁶

The extensive spatial world is constituted by the becoming of individual experience; but this integrating process is not itself extensive or continuous. Thus spatial extension is the creative product of the concrete temporal growth of an individual actuality which is characterized by a becoming of continuity rather than a continuity of becoming. "In others words, extensiveness becomes, but 'becoming' is not itself extensive."³⁷ Whereas the extensive spatial continuity of natural order is defined by Whitehead in terms of "prehensions," the temporal process through which the individual character of a natural event is actualized is defined in terms of "con-crescence."

Although God's purpose is the integrating agency which provides relevant ordering and connection in the causal process through which *abstract potentiality* becomes actualized; the relatively self-determined purpose of each individual ac-

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tuality provides the final causality by which it contributes to its own internal growth out of the *concrete potentiality* furnished "efficiently" by the "solid" external world. In this self-realization the many objective data, which are furnished subsistentially by the exhibition of universal possibilities, (ingression of eternal objects) and existentially by the interaction with other temporal actualities (mutual immanence of prehensions) are integrated into a self-creative synthesis by a concrete individual (concrecence). In this causal growth, which characterizes a molecule or human nature, the integration and re-integration of feelings involve both physical connection with other changing existents (things and persons) and mental connection with permanent subsistents (universal qualities). Concrete permanence (in addition to the abstract permanence of the "eternal objects") is discovered, however, in the enduring identity of an individual. This is achieved through the teleological organization of its internal temporal states of feeling, both inherited from the past and anticipated for the future into an organic whole.³⁸

In the temporal process of "concrecence" the actuality that emerges from potentiality is not a reflection of an underlying substratum. The natural event is a partial but none the less real revelation of the total unbegun and unending temporal process of duration which is ultimate reality. In substituting the organic category of teleological causality (creativity) for the ultimate category of an ultimate static substance with changing phenomenal qualities, Whitehead must assume the responsibility for explaining how there can be an enduring self-identity throughout the constant becoming of the temporal process.

Whitehead explains that, although particular entities (such as the energetic activity of an electronic event) "perpetually perish," an enduring natural object as an individual existent is a *society* of such perishing events organized in accordance with an integrating characteristic which defines such an indi-

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vidual actuality. Each of these events is interlocked with other events, and each society with other societies of subordinate events. Consequently, the unity of a particular individual is genetically divisible in the sense that a compound is divisible into cells. This complex unity is unique, nevertheless, since its social type of order is a teleological achievement.³⁹

Each event taken by itself would have but a negligible temporal duration, since the occasions are "perpetually perishing"; but when these "atomic" instances are *grouped together into wholes*, i. e., "quanta of energy in an electromagnetic field," in accordance with characteristic objective relations, then that *social organization* provides an organic unity in the genetic complex process of temporal passage.⁴⁰ Physical relations, geometrical relations of measurement, and the four dimensions of the spatio-temporal continuum are derived from a concept of such a social organization of natural events in process:

Thus our cosmic epoch is to be conceived primarily as a society of electromagnetic occasions, including electronic and protonic occasions, and only occasionally—for the sake of brevity in the statement—as a society of electrons and protons. There is the same distinction between thinking of an army either as a class of men, or a class of regiments. . . . This doctrine, that order is a social product, appears in modern science as the statistical theory of the laws of nature, and in the emphasis on genetic relation.⁴¹

Throughout the spatio-temporal world the order of nature, as conceived in terms of the quantum and relativity theories, is constituted, therefore, by a hierarchy of such nexuses, and the "growth of a complex structured society exemplifies the general purpose pervading nature."⁴²

Despite the methodological division of reality into realms

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of subsistence and existence in order to explain the space-time continuum, Whitehead conceives the natural order, the divine order, and the human order to be integral parts of the total organic process of the creative advance, which is ultimately characterized by the temporal conformation of events as the essential principle of causation.⁴³

C. A Reconciliation of the Evolutionary Development of Life.

As long as scientific cosmologies were dominated by the mechanical atomism that was planted by Democritus and bloomed to its fullest in the nineteenth century, the relation of the human order to the physical things constituting the natural order of space and time was explained in one of two ways. The materialists, on the one hand, explained both physical and mental life in terms of the organization of material atoms with the result that there was no break in the "continuity of nature." It was claimed, for instance, that the mental life of man was mechanically predetermined by his past inheritance and his present environment in the same terms that explained his physiological organism. The idealists, on the other hand, accepted the mechanical explanation of the natural order of physical things; but they rescued human mentality by divorcing it from the "lesser phenomenal reality" with which science was concerned. The interactions of human minds with each other and the Divine Mind possessed a pre-eminent status as the key to the ultimate reality of the universe.

Whitehead's polemic against the "bifurcation of nature" heralds the two-fold aim of this contemporary cosmologist which denies the positions of both the materialist and the idealist. Against the latter Whitehead maintains that "the energetic activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life," and against the former he maintains that "we have now the task of defining natural facts, so as

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to understand how mental occurrences are operative in conditioning the subsequent course of nature."⁴⁴

Classifications for methodological purposes of scientific inquiry must sharply distinguish between the subject matter to which the respective causal laws of chemistry, physics, geology, astronomy, and biology refer. An adequate cosmological world-view which correlates the conclusions of contemporary science in accordance with a conception of natural law as immanent, however, must portray nature as an all-inclusive, "seamless" organic whole:

A rough division can be made of six types of occurrences in nature. The first type is human existence, body and mind. The second type includes all sorts of animal life, insects, the vertebrates, and other genera. In fact all the various types of animal life other than human. The third type includes all vegetable life. The fourth type consists of the single living cells. The fifth type consists of all large scale inorganic aggregates, on a scale comparable to the size of animal bodies or larger. The sixth type is composed of the happenings on an infinitesimal scale, disclosed by the minute analysis of modern physics. . . . The different modes of natural existence shade off into each other. There is the animal life with its central direction of a society of cells, there is the vegetable life with its organized republic of cells, there is the cell life with its organized republic of molecules, there is the large-scale inorganic society of molecules with its passive acceptance of necessities derived from spatial relations, there is the infra-molecular activity which has lost all trace of the passivity of inorganic nature on a larger scale.⁴⁵

It follows from this conception of the continuity and homogeneity of the natural order that the same generic causal operations which are exemplified in the emergence of the actual-

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ity of an electromagnetic field of energy out of the potentiality of the "extensive continuum" are similarly exemplified in the emergence of the actuality of such other types of existents as biological life and reflective self-consciousness. These generic categories of reality, which are universal and necessary derivations from the ultimate category of teleological causality, characterize the creative advance of the total growing universe which produces the particular actualities, if teleological causality is true. It will be recalled that these categories are: (i) the "ingression of eternal objects" from subsistence into existence; (ii) "prehensions" by which each existent actuality interacts with and contributes to the constitution of all other existents; and (iii) "conconcurrence" by which the external prehensive relations between the past of a particular actuality and the past of other actualities are unified and purposively integrated in the internal temporal development of each particular actuality:

Now as a first approximation the notion of life implies a certain absoluteness of self-enjoyment. This must mean a certain immediate individuality, which is a complex process of appropriating into a unity of existence the many data presented as relevant by the physical processes of nature. Life implies the absolute, individual self-enjoyment arising out of this process of appropriation. I have, in my recent writings, used the word "prehension" to express this process of appropriation. Also I have termed each individual act of immediate self-enjoyment an "occasion of experience." I hold that these unities of existence, these occasions of experience, are the really real things which in their collective unity compose the evolving universe, ever plunging into the creative advance.⁴⁶

According to the category of mechanical causality, it will be recalled, electromagnetic fields, biological functions, and

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mental processes are equally predetermined by their past inheritance and present environment. In this machine-world matter, life, and mind are qualitatively constituted by the same physical-chemical mass-particles in motion throughout space. The differences among matter, life, and mind are to be found, therefore, only in the quantitative degree of complexity exhibited in their particular structures. This reduction of organic life to the inorganic categories of physics and chemistry attempts to explain away the emergent qualities of adaptability, development, assimilation, sensitivity, and reproduction which characterize living organisms.

In his organismic conception of the development of life, which Whitehead holds to be more adequate than the mechanical theory, he does not minimize the causal efficacy of a reflective person's emotional inheritance through his physiological organism. In fact, Whitehead emphasizes that this influence from past bodily states, along with the interaction of the mind with other minds and physical things constituting its environment, contribute the elements of efficient causality, without which no mind would emerge in the creative process. But efficient causality is not necessarily mechanical causality, even though they both pertain to the causal effect of the past on the present.⁴⁷

Whereas mechanical causality is conceived as a total explanation that requires no reference beyond itself, the efficient causality of a mind's inheritance and environment is ineffective in bringing about emergence from the past potentiality to present actuality, unless that mind itself exerts a self-creative effort in his temporal growth:

This concept of self-enjoyment does not exhaust that aspect of process here termed "life." Process for its intelligibility involves the notion of a creative activity belonging to the very essence of each occasion. It is the process of eliciting into actual being factors in the universe which antecedently to that process exist only

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in the mode of unrealized potentialities. The process of self-creation is the transformation of the potential into the actual, and the fact of such transformation includes the immediacy of self-enjoyment.⁴⁸

Whereas an animal guides its behavior only by its past instinctive and habitual experience which it remembers, reflective persons create standards which give purposive direction and control to his present and future experiences. The key to man's creative possibilities lies in his power of decision which is his unique capacity to inhibit natural impulses long enough to deliberate about and choose from alternative courses of action according to self-imposed ideals:

But even yet we have not exhausted the notion of creation which is essential to the understanding of nature. We must add yet another character to our description of life. This missing characteristic is "aim." By this term "aim" is meant the exclusion of the boundless wealth of alternative potentiality, and the inclusion of that definite factor of novelty which constitutes the selected way of entertaining those data in that process of unification. The aim is at that complex of feeling which is the enjoyment of those data in that way. "That way of enjoyment" is selected from the boundless wealth of alternatives. It has been aimed at for actualization in that process.

Thus the characteristics of life are absolute self-enjoyment, creative activity, aim. Here "aim" evidently involves the entertainment of the purely ideal so as to be directive of the creative process. Also the enjoyment belongs to the process and is not a characteristic of any static result. The aim is at the enjoyment belonging to the process.⁴⁹

Whitehead claims that the teleological causality, by which he explains the emergence of actuality from potentiality in

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the growth of all natural events, is discovered empirically in the introspective observation of the growth of human self-consciousness: "In fact we are directly conscious of our purpose as directive of our actions."³⁰ Self-examination thus reveals that reflective persons share with unreflective persons and other animals the efficient causal motivation of instinctive tendencies of habit and emotions; but that a reflective person who is self-creative can anticipate the future and purposively control and transform his inherited pattern of natural impulses in accordance with his own ideals which constitute the goal of self-realization:

I find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, enjoyments, hopes, fears, regrets, valuations of alternatives, decisions—all of them subjective reactions to the environment as active in my nature. My unity—which is Descartes' 'I am'—is my process of shaping this welter of material into a consistent pattern of feelings. The individual enjoyment is what I am in my role of a natural activity, as I shape the activities of the environment into a new creation, which is myself at this moment; and yet, as being myself, it is a continuation of the antecedent world. If we stress the role of my immediate pattern of active enjoyment, this process is self-creation. If we stress the role of the conceptual anticipation of the future whose existence is a necessity in the nature of the present; this process is the teleological aim at some ideal in the future. This aim, however, is not really beyond the present process. For the aim at the future is an enjoyment in the present. It thus effectively conditions the immediate self-creation of the new creature.³¹

Further discussion of the reconception of the evolutionary development of life implied by Whitehead's doctrine of natural law as immanent will be more intelligible, if first we

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consider (i) Darwin's conception of "biological evolution," (ii) Bergson's conception of "creative evolution," and (iii) Morgan's conception of "emergent evolution."⁵²

Few, if any, scientists or philosophers today deny that Darwin has formulated to a high degree of probability reliable knowledge about the nature of the relationship between the many species of biological organisms in his general hypothesis that all plants and animals, including man, have evolved from a common ancestral stock. Any naturalist who observes the geographical distribution of animals all over the earth, the peculiar relations of fossils, and the changes that are possible through the artificial breeding of animals, would in all likelihood agree with Darwin that these facts suggest that they "could only be explained on the supposition that species gradually become modified" in their development from the simple to the complex.⁵³

Not only Darwin's own experiments and observations but also those of subsequent investigators have accumulated evidence in paleontology, comparative anatomy, genetics, embryology, and blood tests that is intelligible only if it is assumed that evolution is true as a principle of interpretation.

In reconceiving the evolutionary conception of life in order to account for man's ideal value experiences (with which Darwin himself was not concerned) some philosophers have questioned the adequacy of Darwin's subordinate hypothesis of "natural selection." According to Darwin those species that exist are those that have been able to survive the struggle for existence because of their capacity to adapt themselves to their environment, i. e., there are "chance variations" in structure and function which are decisive in the struggle for existence:

Whether we look to the allied forms of life which have changed during successive ages, or to those who have changed after having migrated into distant quarters, in both cases they are connected by the same

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bond of ordinary generation; in both cases the laws of variation have been the same, and modifications have been accumulated by the same means of natural selection.⁵⁴

Since Darwin offered his scientific theory simply to explain the relationship between biological species, he cannot be expected to deal with philosophical issues. Some philosophers, however, have taken the Darwinian hypothesis of "natural selection" as the key to a materialistic world-view which pre-determines that mental processes as well as biological functions can be explained only as mechanisms.⁵⁵

Even if "natural selection" does explain how weak forms of life are eliminated and the fit *survive*, this Darwinian hypothesis does not answer the more basic question of what causes these biological forms of life to *arrive* at a particular stage of the evolutionary process.⁵⁶ The scientific principle of natural selection is inadequate as a philosophical generalization, since it does not answer these further questions: How did life begin in the first place? Why do variations occur? Why do the species change into one another? How does consciousness originate?

Although de Vries' substitution of mutations for "chance variations," and Weismann's substitution of the "germ cell" for the "body cell" have refined Darwin's principle of interpretation as the result of subsequent experimentation, the primordial impulse of life, upon which "natural selection" allegedly acts, is still unexplained. When an organism possesses genes in the plasm of the germs which have mutations that allow favorable adaptations to the environment, such an organism is said to survive by virtue of "natural selection." But what causes the changes which, when sufficiently accumulated, give rise to new varieties and new species? If the Darwinian answers "natural selection," has he not attributed to the blind sifting operation of nature the very purposive

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regulation of the development of life which he has sought to eliminate?

Bergson valiantly attempted to answer these vital questions in his theory of "creative evolution" which defined ultimate reality as "a ceaseless upspringing of something new." The *élan vital*, i. e., the vital impulse of the expanding development of life, is neither the mechanical adaptation to accidental circumstances nor the fulfillment of a predetermined cosmic purpose. The unbegun and unending process of temporal duration is a self-motivating process sufficient unto itself.³⁷

Subsequent discussions will reveal that we do not approve of Bergson's neglect of final causality. We recognize, nevertheless, that Bergson made a most significant contribution to contemporary thought, when he insisted that evolution is essentially a creative process, including matter, life, and mind, which cannot be reduced to or completely identified with any of its apparent mechanisms. Although Bergson rejects radical finalism as much as he does radical mechanism, since "both doctrines are reluctant to see in the course of things generally or even simply in the development of life, an unforeseeable creation of form," he also recognizes that his own theory of "creative evolution" does "necessarily partake of finalism to a certain extent."³⁸

While Morgan in his theory of "emergent evolution" avoids the "radical finalism" of cosmic or divine predeterminism, he nevertheless provides an explanation of the development of reality which is based on teleological causality. For this reason we find his theory more adequate as an alternative to mechanism than Bergson's theory.³⁹

Morgan explains the development of the total process of reality in terms of a pyramidal structure of ascending emergent levels of atom, molecule, crystal, life, mind, and reflective thought:

Emergent evolution works upward from matter, through life, to consciousness which attains in man its

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highest reflective or supra-reflective level. It accepts the "more" at each ascending stage as that which is given, and accepts it to the full. The most subtle appreciation of the artist or of the poet, the highest aspiration of the saint, are no less accepted than the blossoms of the water-lily, the crystalline fabric of a snowflake, or the minute structure of the atom.

Emergent evolution urges that the "more" of any given stage, even at the highest, involves the "less" of the stages which were precedent to it and continue to coexist with it. It does *not* interpret higher in terms of the lower only; for that would imply denial of the emergence of those new modes of natural relatedness which characterize the higher and make it what it is. Nor does it interpret the lower in terms of the higher. If it be said that I have myself urged that how things go depends on the level of relatedness at which events run their course, this means the full recognition of the kind of effective relatedness which obtains at the level in question. It does *not* mean, for naturalistic treatment, dependence on kinds of relatedness *not as yet emergent*. If physical changes be explained in terms of life; or physiological changes be explained in terms of unreflective consciousness; or this in terms of guidance by reflective consciousness; when there is no sufficient evidence that these respectively higher kinds of relatedness have yet emerged; *then* the interpretation is not consistent with the tenets of emergent evolution; it is not in accordance with generalized description under causation.⁶⁰

Instead of appealing to the "natural selection" of Darwin or to the "*elan vital*" of Bergson, Morgan claims that the ultimate causal motivation of the evolutionary process is a "Nisus." Morgan designates this creative and regulative agen-

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cy which both pushes each actuality as a driving force from lower levels and draws it upwards from higher levels as God:

Emergent evolution, from bottom to top, is ultimately dependent on an acknowledged directive Activity. . . We acknowledge God as above and beyond. But unless we also intuitively enjoy His Activity within us, feeling that we are in a measure one with Him in Substance, we can have no immediate knowledge of Causality or of God as the Source of our existence and of emergent evolution. . . In such credal terms I believe in a physical world at the base of an evolutionary pyramid and involved at all higher levels; I believe that throughout the pyramid there are correlated attributes and that there is one emergent process of psycho-physical evolution; and I believe that this process is a spatio-temporal manifestation of immanent Activity, the ultimate Source of those phenomena which are interpreted under evolutionary naturalism.⁶¹

It should be noted that Morgan's hypothesis of the productive causality of the Divine purpose does not exclude the occurrence of novelty, as Bergson had feared in his rejection of teleology as an ultimate category:

But the orderly sequence, historically viewed, appears to be present from time to time, something genuinely new. Under what I here call emergent evolution stress is laid on this incoming of the new. Salient examples are afforded in the advent of life, in the advent of reflective thought. But in the physical world emergence is no less exemplified in the advent of each new kind of atom, and each new kind of molecule. It is beyond the wit of man to number the instances of emergence. But if nothing new emerges—if there be only regrouping of pre-existing events and *nothing more*—then there is no emergent evolution.⁶²

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Far from precluding any self-determination of a particular human mind, the effectiveness of the Divine Nisus in bringing about the emergence of mind, i. e., "the coming into being of a kind of relatedness which at preceeding stages of evolutionary progress had as such no being at all," depends upon the purposive activity of that mind itself: "In an organism within which consciousness is emerging a new course of events depends upon its presence. In a person in whom reflective thought is emergent, behaviour is sustained at a higher level."⁶³

Morgan challenges the Darwinian hypothesis of "natural selection" acting on "chance variations" which implied that all mental processes, like all other forms of life, are the product of such previous causal factors that constitute the mind's heredity and environment. The external determination of man's physical organism by heredity and environment is not denied; but Morgan claims that the mental development of a rational person is internally determined to a significant degree by his own purposive realization of ideal values:

In social and personal progress guidance becomes more and more the expression of human purpose. It is guidance in the light of deliberate and thoughtful reverence, with widening range of outlook. It is guidance toward personal joy in right conduct. More than that; it is the sympathetic rejoicing in the joy of others which characterize love and good will. Above all it is guidance in so acting as to promote evolution and to combat dissolution. For regress there is. Our aim should be to fight it in all its forms. Here we have mind at its highest and best in social life.⁶⁴

Whereas an animal or an unreflective person must adapt himself to his environment, a reflective person by transforming himself and reshaping his environment shares with the Divine Nisus in the process of creating the world.⁶⁵

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The relevance of this theory of "emergent evolution" to Whitehead's conception of natural law as immanent is most evident when we consider his explanation of self-creation in terms of the purposive integration of emotions inherited from the past in accordance with ideals anticipated in the future:

The world is self-creative; and the actual entity as self-creating creature passes into its immortal function of part-creator of the transcendent world. In its self-creation the actual entity is guided by its ideal of itself as individual satisfaction and as transcendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is the 'subjective aim' by reason of which the actual entity is a determinate process.⁶⁶

This reconception of the evolutionary development of life in terms of the purposively integrated development of matter, life, and mind, requires the hypothesis that the emergence of any actuality whatsoever, whether it be an electromagnetic field, a biological organism, or a reflective person, depends upon two causal factors: (i) the efficient causality of the total creative process of temporal events that taken together as an organic whole constitute the "antecedent world" out of which the actuality emerges; and (ii) the final causality of the self-creative activity of the individual actuality itself which produces a new organization of reality in the ongoing process. Although this two-fold operation of efficient and final causality characterizes all the emergent levels to some degree, if the theory of "emergent evolution" is true, we are especially interested here in that particular level where a reflective person seems to emerge from the unreflective self that appears to be determined greatly, if not completely, by heredity and environment.⁶⁷

The efficient causality of the "antecedent world" has been described by Whitehead as follows:

The only intelligible doctrine of causation is founded on the doctrine of immanence. Each occasion presup-

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poses the antecedent world as active in its own nature. This is the reason why events have a determinate status relatively to each other. Also it is the reason why the qualitative energies of the past are combined into a pattern of qualitative energies in each present occasion. This is the doctrine of causation. It is the reason why it belongs to the essence of each occasion that it is *where* it is. It is the reason for the transference of character from occasion to occasion. It is the reason for the relative stability of the laws of nature, some laws for a wider environment, some laws for a narrower environment. It is the reason why — as we have already noted — in our direct apprehension of the world around us we find that curious habit of claiming a two-fold unity with the observed data. We are in the world and the world is in us. Our immediate occasion is in the society of occasions forming the soul, and our soul is in our present occasion. The body is ours, and we are an activity within our body. This fact of observation, vague but imperative, is the foundation of the connexity of the world, and of the transmission of its types of order.⁶⁸

We shall explore the possibilities of the final causality of purposive self-creation in our subsequent discussions of spiritual growth. Even though all human beings are integrally connected with their antecedent worlds which provide their heredity and environment, some human minds exhibit purposive activities that seem to mold their own personal development with some degree of self-determination when they guide their thought, imagination, and conduct according to self-imposed ideals. The empirical result is that they are different from what they would have been had their behavior continued to exemplify *only* the efficient causality provided by environmental influences and inherited impulses. We accept with "natural piety" the belief that as long as a human

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being is unreflective, he does not develop beyond the biological level of life which is causally determined by "the whole antecedent world which conspires to beget him." Except for the incipient purposiveness exhibited in the aim for survival, self-determination is practically negligible.

Is it possible that reflective persons emerge upon a higher level of spiritual life when they internally adjust their desires to a self-imposed ideal of what they ought to become in the light of rational norms? Does mental growth result from the satisfaction of man's higher desires or spiritual appetites, just as physical growth results from the satisfaction of bodily appetites? We shall now attempt to answer these questions.

¹ Whitehead describes this in his *Modes of Thought*, 198: "This change of view, occupying four centuries, may be characterized as the transition from Space and Matter as the fundamental notions to Process conceived as a complex of activity with internal relations between its various factors. The older point of view enables us to abstract from change and to conceive of the full reality of nature at an instant, in abstraction from any temporal duration and characterized as to its inter-relations solely by the instantaneous distribution of matter in space." Cf. our previous discussion of the meaning of Law as Immanent in Chapter VI, B, 4, "What Are Natural Laws?"

² Whitehead, *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, 122.

This cosmological situation is analogous to that which prevailed in science at the time of the "Copernican revolution." Ptolemy's geo-centric explanation of the relation of astronomical bodies was internally *consistent* as a mathematical deduction of the implications of the fundamental postulate that the earth is stationary, but it had proved to be *inadequate* to explain and predict actual observations, although it had been applicable within limits. The helio-centric theory of Copernicus was internally *consistent* as a mathematical deduction from the fundamental postulate that the earth was in motion, and it has proved to be *more adequate* in explaining and predicting factual observations. Similar to the geo-centric theory, mechanism is internally *consistent* as a logical deduction from the fundamental postulate that reality is a system of material entities, but it has proved to be *inadequate* to explain value experiences and predict certain physical occurrences, although it has been adequate within certain limits. We are attempting to find out whether or not the organismic cosmology, like the Copernican theory, is not only consistent but is also more adequate. (Cf. MT, 208.)

³ See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, for the best account of the presophistic cosmologies which culminated in the Atomism of Democritus. For brief, but instructive accounts of the development of materialism, read Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, 236-238 for the emergence of the scientific movement; pages 386-388 for the English and the French Materialism during the 18th century; pages 492-493 for the German Materialism of the 19th cen-

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tury; pages 505-511 for the "Positivism" of Mach. Similar accounts are to be found in other historical manuals. For an extended account, read Lange, *History of Materialism*.

For an excellent analysis, read "What is Materialism?" by Hook, *The Development of American Philosophy* (ed. Muelder and Sears), pages 523-528. It is interesting to note that according to Hook, a proponent of materialism, "no matter what philosophers have said, they could not have meant that only material things exist!" (524) Certainly we have understood Hobbes, for instance, to mean seriously that all mental and physical things are reducible to matter in motion. Furthermore, the contemporary behaviorists are in earnest about their reduction of all mental processes to the materialistic formula of environmental stimulus and physiological response. At least, we shall take them to mean what they say in our subsequent dealing with their views.

4 Werkmeister's analysis of this problem is instructive: "This is not the place to trace in detail how Dirac's equations successfully meet every crucial problem of quantum mechanics; but it is important for our purposes to characterize at least Dirac's "symbolic method" of deductions. Nowhere does the author of the "new quantum mechanics" define the exact nature of that which his symbols represent. The reference to the "superposition of waves" is, after all, merely incidental—an auxiliary device to render the original equation conceivable; and in this sense comparable to our illustrations of the "parallel postulates" of Lobatschewsky and Bolyai. The ψ 's and ϕ 's of Dirac's "theory" are used "in an abstract way" all the time. The algebraic axioms, the restrictive assumptions mentioned above, and the relations between equations to which the axioms and assumptions lead, furnish the entire building material of the "new quantum mechanics." And thus, a quarter of a century after the atom was resolved into protons and electrons, these particles themselves have been resolved into the unknown "sources of radiation" of Heisenberg's matrix mechanics, or into the unreal "phase waves" of de Broglie and Schroedinger, merely to be replaced ultimately by Dirac's equations. The last trace of the hard, solid, indivisible particles of the classical theories has disappeared in the obscurity of mathematical symbols. Where we used to think that we could draw a picture or construct a model of what is actually going on in the micro-regions of physical reality, we must now admit that at best we can only create in our imagination a "vehicle for calculation" which enables us to derive from one basic formula all quantitative values which are otherwise obtained by experimental methods. "To explain" no longer means to disclose the "inner workings" of reality, but rather to translate our propositions (or equations) concerning some "ideal state" which we have defined or assumed. And more than ever do we understand now Kant's contention that we comprehend only what our own mind has created. Only as they are related to our assumptions and postulates do the phenomena of the physical world take on a semblance of intelligibility. And this is true only because we understand (or think we understand) our assumptions and postulates. At no time can we say that reality "really is" as we conceive it to be in our imagination or as we define it for the explicit purpose of computing mathematically the correct values of its quantitative manifestations. The history of quantum and wave mechanics speaks without equivocation on this point." (*A Philosophy of Science*, 264-266.)

⁵ These quoted phrases are from Einstein and Infeld, *Evolution of Physics*, 310-313, in which the discussion is summarized as follows:

"Again the rich variety of facts in the realm of atomic phenomena forces

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us to invent new physical concepts. Matter has a granular structure; it is composed of elementary particles, the elementary quanta of matter. Thus, the electric charge has a granular structure and—most important from the point of view of the quantum theory—so has energy. Photons are the energy quanta of which light is composed.

Is light a wave or a shower of photons? Is a beam of electrons a shower of elementary particles or a wave? These fundamental questions are forced upon physics by experiment. In seeking to answer them we have to abandon the description of atomic events as happenings in space and time, we have to retreat still further from the old mechanical view. Quantum physics formulates laws governing crowds and not individuals. Not properties but probabilities are described, not laws disclosing the future of systems are formulated, but laws governing the changes in time of the probabilities and relating to great congregations of individuals."

See Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, Chapter VIII, for an excellent non-technical discussion of the quantum theory.

6 "The modern point of view is expressed in terms of energy, activity, and the vibratory differentiations of space-time. Any local agitation shakes the whole universe. The distant effects are minute, but they are there. The concept of matter presupposed simple location. Each bit of matter was self-contained, localized in a region with a passive, static network of spatial relations, entwined in a uniform relational system from infinity to infinity and from eternity to eternity. But in the modern concept the group of agitations which we term matter is fused into its environment. There is no possibility of a detached self-contained local existence. The environment enters into the nature of each thing. Some elements in the nature of a complete set of agitations may remain stable as those agitations are propelled through a changing environment. But such stability is only the case in a general average way." (MT, 188) Cf. *Science and the Modern World*, 71-76, and 84.

7 "For the modern view process, activity, and change, are the matter of fact. At an instant there is nothing. Each instant is only a way of grouping matters of fact. Thus, since there are no instants, conceived as simple primary entities, there is no nature at an instant. Thus all the interrelations of matters of fact must involve transition in their essence. All realization involves implication in the creative advance." (Whitehead, MT, 200.)

8 Whitehead indicates the problems involved in this reconception in MT, 191-192: "According to the Newtonian doctrine, space was the substratum for the great all-pervailing passive relationship of the natural world. It conditioned all the active relationships, but it did not necessitate them. () The new view is entirely different. The fundamental concepts are activity and process. Nature is divisible and thus extensive. But any division, including some activities and excluding others, also severs the patterns of process which extend beyond all boundaries. The mathematical formulae indicate a logical completeness about such patterns, a completeness which boundaries destroy. For example, half a wave tells only half the story. The notion of self-sufficient isolation is not exemplified in modern physics. There are no essentially self-contained activities within limited regions. These passive geometrical relationships between substrata passively occupying regions have passed out of the picture. Nature is a theatre for the inter-relations of activities. All things change, the activities and their inter-relations. To this new concept, the notion of space with its passive, systematic, geometric relationship is entirely inappropriate. The fashionable notion that the new physics

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has reduced all physical laws to the statement of geometrical relations is quite ridiculous. It has done the opposite. In the place of the Aristotelian notion of the procession of forms, it has substituted the notion of the forms of process. It has thus swept away space and matter, and has substituted the study of the internal relations within a complex state of activity. This complex state is in one sense a unity. There is the whole universe of physical action extending to the remotest star-cluster. In another sense it is divisible into parts. We can trace inter-relations within a selected group of activities, and ignore all other activities. By such an abstraction, we shall fail to explain those internal activities which are affected by changes in the external system which has been ignored. Also, in any fundamental sense, we shall fail to understand the retained activities. For these activities will depend upon a comparatively unchanging systematic environment." (Cf. AI, 241-242.)

⁹ Newton, *Principia*, 77-78.

¹⁰ Newton, *Principia*, 77.

¹¹ Werkmeister has offered a penetrating criticism of Newton's position: "But if space, as an 'entity,' extends, it evidently presupposes something in which to 'extend'; and if time, as an 'entity' flows on, it presupposes something in which to 'flow on.' That is to say, space and time presuppose themselves; and thus, no matter what names we employ or how subtle our definition may be, as long as we insist that space and time are 'entities' which exist by themselves and for themselves, we cannot avoid the infinite regression referred to above. And this regression reduces to an absurdity the very idea that space and time are 'real entities.' (APS, 65.) See APS, 53-58 for Werkmeister's refutations of Newton's arguments and APS, 60-63 for Buler's defense of Absolute Space and Absolute Time.

¹² Leibniz, *Philosophical Works*, Everyman Library Edition, 199.

¹³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (translator N. K. Smith) B38-B39. It should be noted that Kant's conception of the transcendental ideality of space does not deny the empirical reality of space. (See CPR, B44.) As a singular and pure intuition the representation of space is given as an infinite magnitude which never pertains to the "things-in-themselves" but rather to the outer appearances for the comprehension of which space is the *a priori* form. (See CPR, B39-44.)

¹⁴ Kant, CPR, B46. This temporal principle is the defining characteristic of the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding. (See CPR, B78.)

¹⁵ Kant, CPR, B49. See CPR, B46-B49 for passages in which Kant makes the claims referred to in this paragraph.

¹⁶ The following statements from *The Evolution of Physics* express this idea: "Our space is a three dimensional continuum . . . Motion of material particles must be considered. To observe and predict events in nature we must consider not only the place but also the time of physical happening." (Einstein, EP, 212-213.)

"In all mechanical experiments, no matter of what type, we have to determine positions of material points at some definite time, just as in the above experiment with a falling body. But the position must always be described with respect to something, as in the previous case to the tower and the scale. We must have what we call some *frame of reference*, a mechanical scaffold, to be able to determine the positions of bodies. In describing the positions of objects and men in a city, the streets and avenues form the frame to which we refer. So far we have not bothered to describe the frame

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when quoting the laws of mechanics because we happen to live on the earth and there is no difficulty in any particular case in fixing a frame of reference, rigidly connected with the earth. This frame, to which we refer all our observations, constructed of rigid unchangeable bodies, is called the *co-ordinate system*. Since this expression will be used very often, we shall simply write CS." (EP, 163.)

¹⁷ Einstein explains this in EP, 312: "Later developments both destroyed old concepts and created new ones. Absolute time and the inertial co-ordinate system were abandoned by the relativity theory. The background for all events was no longer the one-dimensional time and the three-dimensional space continuum, but the four dimensional time-space continuum, another free invention, with new transformation properties. The inertial co-ordinate system is equally suited for the description of events in nature. () The quantum theory again created new and essential features of our reality. Discontinuity replaced continuity. Instead of laws governing individuals, probability laws appeared. () The reality created by modern physics is, indeed, far removed from the reality of the early days. But the aim of every physical theory still remains the same."

¹⁸ The following passage is relevant here: "The ghosts of absolute motion and inertial CS can be expelled from physics and a new relativistic physics built. Our idealized experiments show how the problem of the general relativity theory is closely connected with that of gravitation and why the equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass is so essential for this connection. It is clear that the solution of the gravitational problem in the general theory of relativity must differ from the Newtonian one. The laws of gravitation must, just as all laws of nature, be formulated for all possible CS, whereas the laws of classical mechanics, as formulated by Newton, are valid only in inertial CS." (EP, 235.)

¹⁹ EP, 259-260.

²⁰ Since this summary statement will be analyzed and fully documented in the subsequent discussion, a brief quotation from Whitehead should suffice at this point: "There is no well-defined entity which is the actual world. This phrase, 'the actual world,' means the past, present, and future occasions as defined from the standpoint of some present occasion." (*Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* [ed. Brightman], 61.)

See Whitehead's *Essays in Science in Philosophy*, 332-342, for his recognition of his indebtedness to Einstein's principle and procedure, as well as his criticism of some aspects of Einstein's explanation. Cf. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, 165-186.

For a critical comparison of Einstein's and Whitehead's conception of the theory of relativity, see Northrop, "Whitehead's Philosophy of Science," *The Philosophy of Whitehead* (Library of Living Philosophers, Ed. Schilpp), 187-207.

²¹ Whitehead expressed this view to the present writer in personal conversation. See Whitehead, *Arms of Education*, 231 and 242-244 for published statements that are relevant. Despite Einstein's attempt to avoid metaphysics the following passage indicates a rationalistic faith:

"With the help of physical theories we try to find our way through the maze of observed facts, to order and understand the world of our sense impressions. We want the observed facts to follow logically from our concept of reality. Without the belief that it is possible to grasp the reality with our theoretical constructions, without the belief in the inner harmony of our world,

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there could be no science. This belief is and always will remain the fundamental motive for all scientific creation. Throughout all our efforts, in every dramatic struggle between old and new views, we recognize the eternal longing for understanding, the ever-firm belief in the harmony of our world, continually strengthened by the increasing obstacles to comprehension." (Einstein, EP, 312-313.)

Max Planck also indicates the need for "intellectual experiment which carries the mind of the investigator beyond actual measuring instruments and enables him to form hypotheses and to formulate questions which, when checked by actual experiment, enable him to perceive new laws even when there do not admit of direct measurement." (*The Philosophy of Physics*, 27-28.)

²² *Adventures of Ideas*, 202. In connection with the last sentence of this quotation, Whitehead has explained: "The space-time of modern mathematical physics, conceived in abstraction from the particular mathematical formulae which applies to the happenings in it, is almost exactly Plato's Receptacle." (AI, 192-193) Anyone interested in the influence of Plato's notion of "The Receptacle" upon Whitehead's notion of the space-time continuum should compare *Timaeus* 37E, 50AB, and 53B with *Adventures of Ideas*, 171-172, 203, 240-241, 258-259, and 380-381.

²³ Whitehead, *Aims of Education*, 247, Cf. AOE, 244-245.

²⁴ Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, 221-222.

²⁵ *Process and Reality*, 103. "The extensive continuum is that general relational element in experience whereby the actual entities experienced, and that unit experience itself, are united in the solidarity of one common world. The actual entities atomize it, and thereby make real what was antecedently merely potential. The atomization of the extensive continuum is also its temporalization; that is to say, it is the process of the becoming of actuality into what in itself is merely potential. The systematic scheme, in its completeness embracing the actual past and the potential future, is prehended in the positive experience of each actual entity. In this sense, it is Kant's 'form of intuition'; but it is derived from the actual world 'quo datum,' and thus is not 'pure' in Kant's sense of that term. It is not productive of the ordered world, but derivative from it." (PR, 112.)

²⁶ "Thus we have always to consider two meanings of potentiality: (a) the 'general' potentiality, which is the bundle of possibilities, mutually consistent or alternative, provided by the multiplicity of eternal objects, and (b) the 'real' potentiality, which is conditioned by the data provided by the actual world. General potentiality is absolute, and real potentiality is relative to some actual entity, taken as a standpoint whereby the actual world is defined." (PR, 101-102.) (Note that our terminology "abstract potentiality" refers to Whitehead's "general potentiality," and our "concrete potentiality" refers to Whitehead's "real potentiality.")

²⁷ *Process and Reality*, 70. Whitehead explains further: "The organic philosophy does not hold that the 'particular existents' are prehended apart from universals; on the contrary, it holds that they are prehended by the mediation of universals. In other words, each actuality is prehended by means of some element of its own definiteness. This is the doctrine of the 'objectification' of actual entities." (230) See PR, 65, 21, 78, 249. See Footnote 40 of Chapter VIII for a comparison of Whitehead's theory of "eternal objects" and Plato's doctrine of "Eternal Ideas."

In a later chapter it will be shown that in addition to these universal pos-

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sibilities which must subsist as the abstract potentiality out of which the sense objects of the natural order emerge in spatial perception, there are such universal possibilities as goodness, beauty, and logical relations which must subsist as the abstract potentiality out of which ideal value realizations of the human order emerge in spiritual growth. It will be our responsibility to show that an *Ideal of Personality*, in accordance with which a human self might organize his value-experience, subsists as a potential system of value qualities, i. e., "a complex eternal object."

²⁸ *Process and Reality*, 392: "Thus the endeavor to understand eternal objects in complete abstraction from the actual world results in reducing them to mere undifferentiated non-entities. This is an exemplification of the categorical principle, that the general metaphysical character of being an entity is 'to be a determinant in the becoming of actualities.' Accordingly the differentiated relevance of eternal objects to each instance of the creative process requires their conceptive realization in the primordial nature of God. He does not create eternal objects: for his nature requires them in the same degree that they require him. This is an exemplification of the coherence of the categorical types of existence. The general relationships of eternal objects to each other, relationships of diversity and of pattern, are their relationships in God's conceptual realization. Apart from this realization, there is mere isolation indistinguishable from nonentity." (See PR, 73, 374, 392, 63-64, 343-344, 377, 521, 523; SMW, 256-257; RIM, 154; and AI, 245.)

Upon first consideration it might seem strange to require the hypothesis of God in order to explain the spatial dimensions of the natural order. An examination of Newton's explanation of the natural order reveals, however, that his doctrine of Imposed Law and the absolute entities of space and time require the postulate of God. Millikan, Eddington, Jeans, and other contemporary scientists have been led by their studies to belief in God. In his work, *Space, Time, and Deity*, S. Alexander speaks of the space-time continuum as an infinite given whole which embodies both thought and sense experience. Systems of complex empirical existents are grouped and continuously connected within this space-time matrix. In the growing universe new qualities emerge and "God is the whole universe engaged in process toward the emergence of this new quality." (*Space, Time, and Deity* [II], 428-429. See STD [I], 183-184.)

²⁹ PR, 105.

³⁰ PR, 95. Whitehead again refers to Newton to clarify the basic issue which is involved in this reconception: "Newton, in his treatment of space, transforms potentiality into actual fact, that is to say, into a creature, instead of a datum for creatures. According to the philosophy of organism, the extensive space-time continuum is the fundamental aspect of the limitation laid upon abstract potentiality by the actual world. A more complete rendering of this limited, 'real' potentiality is the 'physical field.' A new creation has to arise from the actual world as much as from pure potentiality: it arises from the total universe and not solely from its mere abstract elements. It also adds to that universe. Thus every actual entity springs from that universe which there is for it. Causation is nothing else than one outcome of the principle that every actual entity has to house its actual world." (PR, 123-124.)

³¹ PR, 96. See PR, 100-101.

³² PR, 95. Whitehead notes here "This principle lies on the surface of the fundamental Einsteinian formula for the physical continuum."

³³ "The bare mathematical potentialities of the extensive continuum re-

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quire an additional content in order to assume the role of real objects for the subject. This content is supplied by the eternal objects, termed sense-data. These objects are 'given' for the experience of the subject. Their givenness does not arise from the 'decision' of the contemporary entities which are thus objectified. It arises from the functioning of the antecedent physical body of the subject; and this functioning can in its turn be analyzed as representing the influence of the more remote past, a past common alike to the subject and to its contemporary actual entities. Thus these sense-data are eternal objects playing a complex relational role; they connect the actual entities of the past with the actual entities of the contemporary world, and thereby effect objectifications of the contemporary things and of the past things." (PR, 97. See PR, 98-101.)

³⁴ See PR, 255-279; AI, 250, 278-282; *Symbolism*, 17-19; *Modes of Thought*, 219-221.

³⁵ *Adventures of Ideas*, 251. Whitehead correlates this notion with Einstein's theory of relativity: "Curiously enough, even at this early stage of metaphysical discussion, the influence of the 'relativity theory' of modern physics is important. According to the classical 'uniquely serial' view of time, two contemporary actual entities define the same actual world. Actual entities are called 'contemporary' when neither belongs to the 'given' actual world defined by the other." (PR, 102.)

³⁶ Whitehead, MT, 206: "Thus the occasion, in reference to its internal process, requires no contemporary process in order to exist. In fact this mutual interdependence in the internal process of self-adjustment is the definition of contemporaneousness." (See PR, 95-96 and 320-321.)

³⁷ PR, 53.

³⁸ It should be noted that Whitehead has rejected the substance doctrine when he explains the natural order in terms of the causal interactions within an ongoing temporal process: "The philosophy of organism is closely allied to Spinoza's scheme of thought. But it differs by the abandonment of the subject-predicate forms of thought, so far as concerns the presupposition that this form is a direct embodiment of the most ultimate characterization of fact. The result is that the 'substance quality' concept is avoided; and that morphological description is replaced by description of dynamic process. Also Spinoza's 'modes' now become the sheer actualities; so that, though analysis of them increases our understanding, it does not lead us to the discovery of any higher grade of reality. The coherence, which the system seeks to preserve, is the discovery that the process or concrescence, of any one actual entity involves the other actual entities among its components. In this way the obvious solidarity of the world receives its explanation." (PR, 10. Cf. PR, 134.) Instead of recognizing that a natural event is "a process of activity" some thinkers have been misled by their perception of contemporary spatial regions "in terms of their passive perspective relationship to the percipient and to each other" which appear to be "passive recipients of the qualities with which in sense-perception they are associated." (AI, 281-282.) (See AI, 170, 269.) Consequently, those who have inherited the doctrine of an underlying substratum with inhering properties are guilty of the following fallacies: (i) A conception of a physical event as a distinct material atom conceived apart from the organic whole of interacting events in space-time is based on "the fallacy of simple location." (ii) A conception of truth about a given experient considered apart from the temporal conformation of that experient to the past events of its own personal history is a "fallacy

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of misplaced concreteness." (iii) A conception of reality which separates perceptual facts from emotional facts or from causal facts or from purposive facts leads to a fallacious "bifurcation of nature."

39 See AJ, 227, 260-262 and PR, 334-335, 213.

40 See AJ, 239-240, 266-267 and PR, 50-51, 374-375, 288-289.

41 PR, 141-142.

42 PR, 153.

43 In his *Adventures of Ideas*, Whitehead explains: "The past has an objective existence in the present which lies in the future beyond itself Cut away the future and the present collapses, emptied of its proper content. Immediate existence requires the insertion of the future in the crannies of the present The actualities of the Universe are processes of experience, each process an individual fact. The whole Universe is the advancing assemblage of these processes." (246 and 253.)

44 MT, 214 and 232. "The doctrine that I am maintaining is that neither physical nature nor life can be understood unless we fuse them together as essential factors in the composition of 'really real' things whose inter-connections and individual characters constitute the universe." (MT, 205.)

45 Whitehead, MT, 214-215. See Schrödinger, *What Is Life?*, 47 and 68-69 for evidence that this physicist writing about biological data is also interested in working out a unified system of principles underlying the various sciences

46 Whitehead, MT, 205-206. Whitehead explains further: "As a first approximation we have conceived life as implying absolute, individual self-enjoyment of a process of appropriation. The data appropriated are provided by the antecedent functioning of the universe. Thus the occasion of experience is absolute in respect to its immediate self-enjoyment. How it deals with its data is to be understood without reference to any other concurrent occasions. Thus the occasion, in reference to its internal process, requires no contemporary process in order to exist. In fact this mutual independence in the internal process of self-adjustment is the definition of contemporaneity." (MT, 206.)

It should be noted that the claim that reality is a continuous organic whole which must be interpreted in terms of the generic principles ("ingression of eternal objects," "prehensions," and "concrescences") does not imply that the "statistical averages" which we call "natural laws" about physico-chemical processes account for all actual processes in the universe. The contention of du Nouy in *Human Destiny*, 37-38, is relevant: "The laws of chance have rendered, and will continue to render, immense services to science. It is inconceivable that we could do without them, but they only express an admirable, subjective interpretation of certain inorganic phenomena and of their evolution. They are not a true explanation of objective reality. What they cannot take into account or explain is the fact that the properties of a cell are born out of the coordination of complexity and not out of the chaotic complexity of a mixture of gases. This transmissible, hereditary, continuous coordination entirely escapes our laws of chance. () To believe that we shall ever be able to explain biological phenomena in general, and the evolution of living beings, through the use of the same calculations employed to estimate the number of houses which will burn or the pressure of a gas in a vessel, is an act of faith and not a scientific statement. Rare fluctuations do not explain qualitative facts, they only enable us to conceive that they are not impossible quantitatively. () The striking and magnificent intellectual

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trick which enables the human mind to construct a pattern practically superposable on Nature, remains a wonderful expedient which can only be applied to non-living matter. It even had to be seriously modified in order to make it apply to the realm of electromagnetic radiation (Bose-Einstein statistics) and to electronic energy (Pauli-Fermi statistics). () To study the most interesting phenomena, namely Life and eventually Man, we are, therefore, forced to call on an anti-chance, as Eddington called it; a 'Cheater' who systematically violates the laws of large numbers, the statistical laws which deny any individuality to the particles considered."

47 The implication of this mechanical world-view for an interpretation of human personality is clearly stated by Russell: "Personality is essentially a matter of organization. Certain events, grouped together by means of certain relations, form a person. The grouping is effected by means of causal laws—those connected with habit-formation, which includes memory—and the causal laws concerned depend upon the body." (*Religion and Science*, 145. Cf. previous discussions of behaviorism and the category of mechanical causality.)

48 MT, 206-207. Whitehead explains further: "Thus in conceiving the function of life in an occasion of experience, we must discriminate the actualized data presented by the antecedent world, the non-actualized potentialities which lie ready to promote their fusion into a new unity of experience, and the immediacy of self-enjoyment which belongs to the creative fusion of those data with those potentialities. This is the doctrine of the creative advance whereby it belongs to the essence of the universe, that it passes into a future. It is nonsense to conceive of nature as a static fact, even for an instant devoid of duration. There is no nature apart from transition, and there is no transition apart from temporal duration. This is the reason why the notion of an instant of time, conceived as a primary simple fact, is nonsense." (MT, 207.)

See Werkmeister, *A Philosophy of Science*, 317-322, for an excellent historical account of the "mechanism-vitalism issue." Although Driesch has not proven that "Neo-Vitalism" is adequate, he has brought out biological facts which a mechanistic theory cannot adequately explain.

49 MT, 207-208. See Werkmeister, APS, 399-424 for an instructive survey of psychological typologies including those of Hippocrates, Galen, Kretschmer, Jaensch, Dilthey, Spranger, and Jaspers. Werkmeister agrees with Stanger, Allport, and Lewin that personality is dynamic: "In the development of personality two distinct problems may be discerned. (1) The individual must maintain himself as self-identical unity in his relation to the world about him; he must adapt himself to the environment, and must withstand the disintegrating forces of his surroundings. (2) He must mediate and resolve the tensions within himself, and must thus develop an inner fortitude and freedom. The manner in which any given individual solves these two problems will determine the course of his development and therefore of his whole being, his personality." (APS, 421.) We shall deal specifically with these two problems in Chapter VIII.

50 MT, 213. Whitehead expressed this generalization as follows: "In the formation of each occasion of actuality the swing over from re-enaction to anticipation is due to the intervening touch of mentality. Whether the ideas thus introduced by the novel conceptual prehensions be old or new, they have this decisive result, that the occasion arises as an effect facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future. In between there lies the teleology of the Universe." (AI, 249.) See Whitehead, *Function of Reason*.

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⁵¹ MT, 228.

⁵² In his *Human Destiny*, du Noüy has challenged the mechanistic conception of evolution with arguments that deserve serious consideration. He contends that *perfect adaptation* is not the goal of evolution, but rather it has been a means by which the infinite number and variety of living species have developed. Among the many products of the evolutionary process man is the only strain that has survived without achieving equilibrium: "Consequently we insist that whereas adaptation blindly tries to attain an equilibrium which will bring about its end, evolution can only continue through unstable systems of organisms. It only progresses from instability to instability and would perish if it only encountered perfectly adapted, stable systems As was indicated above, this way of interpreting the transformations of living beings explains the contradictions for which the Darwinian and the Lamarckian theories have been reproached, in the case when the fittest, forced to face a change in its environment, or driven out of it as a result of some geologic or climatic convulsion, finds itself under such conditions that the characters which assured it a superiority become useless, troublesome, or even harmful. Adaptation then works to neutralize its own anterior efforts, and natural selection tends to eliminate those it had heretofore protected. () In such cases, adaptation is obviously not progressive, but protective, defensive. We hope we have made it clear that this is absolutely normal, inasmuch as the 'progressive' trend depends on evolution, not an adaption." (HD, 90 and 91.)

According to du Noüy, man's development can no more be explained entirely in terms of biological process of adaptation than can organic biological process be explained in terms of the "second law of thermodynamics" (Carnot-Clausius law) and "the calculus of probabilities" by which inorganic evolution is interpreted. (See HD, 40-46.) The total process of evolution contains subordinate processes of inorganic, organic, and mental evolution. "Just as there seems to be an intellectually impassable gap between the reversible 'evolution' of electrons and that of atoms (built of electrons); between the irreversible evolution of atoms and that of life (built of atoms); so there seems to be an intellectually impassable gap between the evolution of life and that of man, as such. Man is still an animal by his very structure, and has inherited a large number of instincts from his ancestors. Some of them are still necessary to protect the species. Nevertheless he has also brought into the world, from an unknown source, other instincts and ideas specifically human which have become overwhelmingly important although contradicting the first, and it is the development of these ideas, these new characters which constitutes the present phase of evolution. () Therefore, if the principle of evolution is to be maintained in his case, the modalities of its manifestations will be somewhat different, and that is why all evolutionary theories have been incapable so far of accounting for the behavior of man." (HD, 99.) It is with the evolution of the human mind that du Noüy is chiefly concerned: "Evolution continues in our time, no longer on the physiological or anatomical plane but on the spiritual and moral plane." (HD, 104.) This does not mean that man is unrelated to the organic and inorganic world; but it does mean that in man there lie the possibilities of psychological and moral progress: "Thus, the very foundation of the human organism is material, chemical, the same as that of the animals. It must eat, sleep, procreate. It is difficult for Man to evade this relationship, to free himself from the endocrine enslavement. By fighting against it he will affirm the difference to which he owes his human dignity, and by ceding to it

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he will abdicate the independence gained by hundreds of millions of years of evolution." (HD, 108.)

Although du Noüy's strained attempts to reconcile his scientific cosmology with that of Genesis, his predilection for Christian theology and his confirmed optimism about the "glowing future of human destiny" may seem to exceed scientific objectivity, the clearly expressed conclusions of this eminent biologist about human evolution are most provocative. If they should do nothing else, they indicate that the theory of organic evolution requires reconception.

⁵³ Darwin, *Autobiography*. In his excellent introduction and summary of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, Kellogg has explained: "Evolution means continuity, means transmutation, the origin of the new from the old; means change, continuous movement, gradatory development. It means genetic relationship, blood cousinship, an all-embracing genealogy of life." (*Evolution*, 6.)

⁵⁴ Darwin, *Origin of Species*, 317 (Modern Library Edition). Darwin explains further in his *Autobiography*: "Favorable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavorable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of a new species. Here then at last I had got a theory by which to work."

Darwin was thereby rejecting Lamarck's theory of the "inheritance of acquired characteristics," i. e., the environmental modifications of the organism are passed on from one generation to the next in a long series which finally produces a new kind of animal.

⁵⁵ Spencer, Haeckel, and Sellars may be considered as representative exponents of this general point of view.

Although Spencer did not confine his explanations to mechanistic categories when he defined life as "the continuous adjustment of internal to external conditions," and the Unknowable Reality to which he refers is not necessarily a materialistic conception, his evolutionary notion of first principles exhibits a mechanical world view of matter and motion: "An integration of matter and the concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." (*First Principles* [IV], Chapter XVII.)

Haeckel made this materialistic cosmology, based on evolution and the conservation of energy, explicit in his *Riddles of the Universe*.

In contemporary thought, Sellars attempts to account for the coming into being of novelties at different levels of the evolutionary process; but we cannot find his "natural tendency to combination" a sufficient account of the cosmic force which the evolutionary conception of life requires, when it assumes the proportions of a total world-view. (See Sellars, *The Philosophy of Physical Realism*.)

Darwin himself deals with mental process to some extent in his *The Expressions of Emotions in Animals and Men*, in which he pointed out the similarity of emotional patterns in men and animals. The pushing of the implications to the naturalistic conclusion regarding man's value experiences, however, has been the work of the Darwinians.

(Read Perry, *Philosophy of the Recent Past*, 19-80.)

⁵⁶ This point which Bowne emphasized has more recently been expressed by Werkmeister, *A Philosophy of Science*, 500: "The principle of natural selection begs the fundamental question of how different forms and structures originate."

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⁵⁷ A preliminary statement of Bergson's thesis is to be found in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*: "There is a reality that is external and yet given immediately to the mind. Common-sense is right on this point, as against the idealism and realism of the philosophers. () This reality is mobility. Not things made, but things in the making, not self-maintaining states, but only changing states, exist. Rest is nevermore than apparent, or, rather, relative. The consciousness we have of our own self in its continual flux introduces us to the interior of a reality, on the model of which we must represent other realities. All reality, therefore, is tendency, if we agree to mean by tendency an incipient change of direction." (65.)

A more developed expression of Bergson's theory from his *Creative Evolution*, is as follows: "The universe *endures*. The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new. The systems marked off by science *endure* only because they are bound up inseparably with the rest of the universe. It is true that in the universe itself two opposite movements are to be distinguished, as we shall see later on, 'descent' and 'ascent.' The first only unwinds a roll ready prepared. In principle, it might be accomplished almost instantaneously, like releasing a spring. But the ascending movement, which corresponds to an inner work of ripening or creating, *endures* essentially, and imposes its rhythm on the first, which is inseparable from it. There is no reason, therefore, why a duration, and so a form of existence like our own, should not be attributed to the systems that science isolates, provided such systems are reintegrated into the Whole. But they must be so reintegrated. The same is even more obviously true of the objects cut out by our perception. The distinct outlines which we see in an object, and which give it its individuality, are only the design of a certain kind of *influence* that we might exert on a certain point of space: it is the plan of our eventual actions that is sent back to our eyes, as though by a mirror, when we see the surfaces and edges of things. Suppress this action, and with it consequently those main directions by which perception are traced out for it in the entanglement of the real, and the individuality of the body is re-absorbed in the universal interaction which, without doubt, is reality itself." (11)

⁵⁸ Bergson, CE, 45 and 40.

⁵⁹ The subsequent discussion of Morgan's particular theory will be more intelligible if we have the benefit of Lovejoy's general definition of "emergence," which is to be found in the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* (edited by Brightman), 22, "The Meaning of 'Emergence' and Its Modes": "Emergence" then (or 'epigenesis,' which would be a more appropriate word), may be taken loosely to signify any augmentative or transmutative event, any process in which there appears effects that, in some one or more of several ways yet to be specified, fail to conform to the maxim that 'there cannot be in the consequent anything more than or different in nature from that which was in the antecedent.'"

Further discussion of the hypothesis of "emergence" in *P6IGP* is offered by Driesch, "Emergent Evolution," Cair, "Life and Matter," and Wheeler, "Emergent Evolution of the Social."

See Werkmeister, *A Philosophy of Science*, 349-351, for a survey of the biological facts which support the theory of "Epigenesis."

⁶⁰ Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, 297.

⁶¹ Morgan, EE, 141-142, 301, and 309. Morgan recognizes the similarity to

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Alexander's theory that something essentially new emerges at the distinct levels of space-time, primary qualities, matter, secondary qualities, life, mind, and deity, i. e., the next higher quality to the highest attained at any point. See Morgan, EE, 9-10. Cf. our previous reference to Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*.

⁶² Morgan, EE, 1-2.

⁶³ Morgan, EE, 17 and 113.

⁶⁴ Morgan, "Mind in Evolution," in *Creation by Evolution* (edited by Mason), 350-351.

⁶⁵ See Morgan, "Mind in Evolution," 350-351. In his *Fundamentals of Ethics*, Urban has brought out an implication of the evolutionary interpretation of life which is relevant here: "Either this turning of life and nature to ideal ends, at least in man, is an accident, a superfluous luxury, or else it contains in some way the key to a truer knowledge and understanding of the entire evolutionary process. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that evolution is the expression of some force which is not content with achieving merely survival and adaptations for its creatures, but seems rather bent on complicating itself ever more dangerously in the endeavor to evolve higher forms of life which have their own intrinsic ends." (107)

⁶⁶ Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 130.

⁶⁷ In order to demonstrate the reality of final causation in the self-creative activity of a reflective person, we shall be required to show how the ideal anticipated in the future produces a significant effect in the present process of self-consciousness. The question arises, nevertheless, whether this alleged purpose on the reflective level is entirely unique for rational persons or whether there is at least an "incipient purposiveness" exhibited in the processes or the levels of biological life and electromagnetic fields.

The behavior of a biological organism exhibits at least the aim for survival. Could this not be considered an "incipient purposiveness"?

The pattern of an electromagnetic field exhibits at least the tendency toward thermodynamical equilibrium. Could this not be considered an "incipient purposiveness"?

This recognition of what Whitehead has called a "purposiveness pervading nature" has been supported to some degree by Schrödinger in his *What Is Life?*: "What is the characteristic feature of life? When is a piece of matter said to be alive? When it goes on 'doing something,' moving, exchanging material with its environment, and so forth, and for a much longer period than we would expect an inanimate piece of matter to 'keep going' under similar circumstances. When a system that is not alive is isolated or placed in a uniform environment, all motion usually comes to a standstill very soon as a result of various kinds of friction; differences of electric or chemical potential are equalized, substances which tend to form a chemical compound do so, temperature becomes uniform by heat conduction. After that the whole system fades away into a dead, inert lump of matter. A permanent state is reached, in which no observable events occur. The physicist calls this the state of thermodynamical equilibrium, or of 'maximum entropy.' (70) Schrödinger refers to the aim involved in the "orderliness encountered in the unfolding of life" as the "order from order" principle and the aim involved in the "statistical mechanisms of electromagnetic activity" as the "order from disorder" principle. (See *What Is Life?*, 80-81. Cf. Northrop, *Logic of the Sciences and Humanities*, Chapter XII: "Causality in Field Physics in Its Bearing upon Biological Causation.")

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⁶⁸ Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, 226-227. Whitehead more specifically points out: "The body is that portion of nature with which each moment of human experience intimately co-operates. There is an inflow and outflow of factors between the bodily actuality and the human experience, so that each shares in the existence of the other. The human body provides our closest experience of the interplay of actualities in nature. (MT, 157.) (Compare previous discussions of Whitehead's notion of "prehensions" and his conception of natural law as immanent.)

CHAPTER VIII

THE METAPHYSICAL MEANING OF SPIRITUAL GROWTH

THE METAPHYSICAL meaning of spiritual growth hinges upon the following question: Can the development of a reflective person be internally or self-determined to some degree by his own creative purposes *according to rational laws*; even though his physical life is externally determined by his inheritance and environment which influence him *according to natural laws*?¹ For our synoptic method of inquiry to meet the requirements of coherence, we must explain what rational laws of the human order characterize the teleological causality of a self-conscious, relatively self-determined, and self-identical temporal process such as spiritual growth must be, if it has any metaphysical meaning. In other words, we must attempt to find out if such empirical capacities as memory of the past, ideal-value realizations in the present, and reflective anticipations of the future exhibit a purposive integration of given emotional experiences into an achieved organic whole.²

In Chapter III and IV of this study we found that when "modern man in search of a soul" cultivates and seeks to satisfy his "spiritual appetites" of aesthetic appreciation and an enlightened good will, he enriches his life by eliciting a *noble discontent*. The intuitive insights of the poets and the humanists inspire a person to realize ideal values; but they provide no *enduring satisfaction* that is deeper than the tragic frustration of ideal aspirations into which a sensitive soul is plunged. We concluded that if modern man is to find a significant meaning for his life, his reflective thought must justify his belief that

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spiritual growth is an integral part of the creative process of reality which is empirically exemplified in the ideal value realization of an enlightened good will. Chapters V, VI, and VII have furnished analyses of the function of reason and the notion of immanent law as a descriptive generalization of teleological causality which explains the "natural order." In order to understand the highest emergent level of the "human order" in terms of a descriptive generalization of teleological causality we shall now investigate the hypothesis that the objective meaning of an enlightened good will is explained by the notion of the spiritual growth of a relatively self-determined and self-identical mind as it strives to realize an ideal of personality. Our hopes for realizing an *enduring satisfaction* depend upon the success of this speculative venture.

Since we assume that self-consciousness emerges from the interacting processes of the growing universe as a whole which begets it, we must verify the objectivity of this principle of spiritual growth by showing how it is required as an integral part of the organic scheme of categories that describes the causal operations of the total creative process of ultimate reality. Let us state the expanding requirements of such a synoptic inquiry into the metaphysical references of self-consciousness in the logical form of hypothetical-deductive propositions: If an enlightened good will has objective meaning, the emotional and purposive processes of self-consciousness that are involved must be shown to be necessary functions in the growth of a relatively self-determined and self-identical person. If such self-creation is an objective reality, it must exhibit the operations of: (i) subsistential interaction, (ii) existential interaction, and (iii) experiential intra-action, which when taken together constitute the ultimate category of teleological causality. More specifically, it is our three-fold task to explain how: (i) self-consciousness is related to all the hypothetical referents which constitute its total environment; (ii) self-determination is possible in an organic process of causal interac-

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tion; and (iii) self-identity is possible in spite of the fact that experience is changing at every moment.³

A. The Complex Unity of Reflective Self-Consciousness.

A present moment of self-consciousness is a creative synthesis of emotional content, inherited from the past, and purposive activity, directed towards the future. Even though all experience does not presuppose reflective consciousness, the emotions that constitute the basis of human thought and conduct could hardly be experienced prior to the emergence of at least a minimum of self-awareness. It is with this private, given complex whole of a conscious ongoing process that self-analysis must begin. Reflective self-consciousness results from the transformation of the chaotic, vague awareness of emotions, sensations, and purposive activity into an organic whole of value-realization, sense-perception, and conscious discrimination. Although the objective emotional content is given independently of the subjective purposive activity, apart from the latter the former could have no meaning for reflective self-consciousness.⁴

The emotional inheritance (objective content of sense-perceptions or value-intuitions) is *received* from the physical organism out of which a minimum self-awareness has emerged. The purposive activity of thinking and value-realization *produces* an internal succession of mental states toward an integrated whole.⁵

1. The External Relations of Reflective Self-Consciousness.

Now our metaphysical interpretation must account for the external relation of self-consciousness to its physical organism. For a human self is integrally related to its physical organism to the extent that it derives much of its emotional content from its immediately past bodily states. The influence of the body on self-consciousness is exhibited in the latter's sense of unity with the body, a sense of the function of the bodily organs, a

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concomitant series of emotional states, and a sense of unity with the past. These mental states are a part of the concrete content that physical things contribute to self-consciousness. Emotions, hopes, fears, and inhibitions as well as sense-perceptions involving the nervous system, viscera, and disturbances in the blood, etc., constitute further evidence of the causal interaction of body and mind, and the contribution of the body to the content of self-consciousness. This is the legitimate subject matter of physiological psychology which has contributed much to an understanding of human nature.

Since the body-mind problem is one of the most difficult problems in philosophy, a brief review of the attempts to solve it should be instructive. Just as the materialists, d'Holbach and de La Mettrie, thought around rather than through this body-mind problem by reducing mental processes to physiological motion, so does behaviorism avoid the problem by eliminating consciousness in its initial definition of the data for investigation.⁶

By its very definition of mind and body as self-sufficient and independent entities whose underlying reality is not discoverable in experience, the substance theory rules out any intelligible explanation in terms of causal interaction.⁷

According to parallelism, there is one series of bodily processes and another series of mental processes; but there is no causal interaction between these parallel systems. Epiphenomenalism is the theory that the psychical series is a collateral product or a succession of the shadows of the physical series. In neither theory is there any causal connection between body and mind. We agree with Whitehead's opposition to this bifurcation:

The separations of perceptual fact from emotional fact; and of causal fact from emotional fact, and from perceptual fact, and of perceptual fact, emotional fact, and causal fact, from purposive fact; have constituted

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a complex of bifurcations, fatal to a satisfactory cosmology.⁸

In his attempt to avoid the blind alleys of materialism with its reduction of mind to body or a spiritualism which does not sufficiently account for the influence of bodily functions upon self-consciousness, Whitehead has suggested a unique theory of bi-polarity. How does Whitehead seek to avoid the bifurcations of metaphysical dualism? In the place of an interaction between body and mind, he formulates an account of the interaction between physical and mental feelings within one organic society of events, e. g., self-consciousness which is characterized by selective emphasis, contrast, and synthesis. It is by virtue of this purposive activity that physical and mental poles interact within consciousness:

Finally, we have to consider the type of structural society which gives rise to the traditional body-mind problem. For example, human mentality is partly the outcome of the human body, partly the single directive agency of the body, partly a system of cogitations which have a certain irrelevance to the physical relationships of the body. The Cartesian philosophy is based upon the seeming fact—the plain fact—of one body and one mind, which are two substances in causal association. For the philosophy of organism the problem is transformed.

Each actuality is essentially bipolar, physical and mental, and the physical inheritance is essentially accompanied by a conceptual reaction partly conformed to, and partly introductory of, a relevant novel contrast, but always introducing emphasis, valuation, and purpose. The integration of the physical and mental side into a unity of experience is a self-formation which is a process of concrescence. . . . So what needs to be explained is not dissociation of personality but unifying

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control, by reason of which we not only have unified behaviour, which can be observed by others, but also consciousness of a unified experience.⁹

Turning to Whitehead's definition of mind, one discovers that he prefers to indicate "the complex of such intellectual operations" as the "consciousness belonging to the actual occasion," since "the term mind conveys the suggestion of an independent substance." The implications of this distinction in meaning are important. Whereas Descartes, for instance, would maintain that a mind is merely qualified by its ideas, Whitehead defines the mind as "the complex of mental operations involved in the constitution of an actual entity."¹⁰

Since these "mental operations do not necessarily involve consciousness," they do not always presuppose the self-consciousness of a human person, as far as Whitehead's general cosmology is concerned. Nevertheless, it is with the advanced stage of emergent evolution, when "consciousness primarily illuminates the higher phase in which it arises," that this study is concerned. When mind is referred to in the subsequent discussion, therefore, the self-conscious type of mentality is meant; for "our own self-consciousness is direct awareness of ourselves as such persons."¹¹

On the surface it might seem that Whitehead's principle of bipolarity is similar to the double aspect theory of mind and matter, which is a modification of parallelism. According to this theory, mind and matter are but two aspects of one and the same fact. Just as a stove is both hot and metal, so analogously a human self is both material and mental; but these two aspects neither constitute the human self, which is other than they, nor do they interact with each other. For Whitehead, on the contrary, the physical and mental poles would be meaningless apart from their mutual interaction in the process of self-formation which together they constitute.¹²

The essential issue involved in Whitehead's explanation of the body-mind relation can be made more clear in the light

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of his analysis of the influence of bodily functioning upon self-consciousness:

All sense-perception is merely one outcome of the dependence of our experience upon bodily functionings. Thus if we wish to understand the relation of our personal experience to the activities of nature, the proper procedure is to examine the dependence of our personal experiences upon our personal bodies.

Let us ask about our overwhelming persuasions as to our own personal body-mind relation. In the first place, there is the claim to unity. The human individual is one fact, body and mind. This claim to unity is the fundamental fact, always presupposed, rarely explicitly formulated. I am experiencing and my body is mine. In the second place, the functioning of our body has a much wider influence than the mere production of sense-experience. We find ourselves in a healthy enjoyment of life by reason of the healthy functionings of our internal organs—heart, lungs, bowels, kidneys, etc. The emotional state arises just because they are not providing any *sensa* directly associated with themselves. Even in sight, we enjoy our vision because there is no eye-strain. Also we enjoy our general state of life, because we have no stomach-ache. I am insisting that the enjoyment of health, good or bad, is a positive feeling only casually associated with particular *sensa*. For example, you can enjoy the ease with which your eyes are functioning even when you are looking at a bad picture or a vulgar building. This direct feeling of the derivation of emotion from the body is among our fundamental experiences. There are emotions of various types—but every type of emotion is at least modified by derivation from the body. It is for physiologists to analyse in detail the modes of bodily functioning. For philosophy, the one fundamental

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fact is that the whole complexity of mental experience is either derived or modified by such functioning. Also our basic feeling is this sense of derivation, which leads to our claim for unity, body and mind.¹³

A similar account of the body-mind problem is suggested by Hocking in his definition of the self so as to include bodily functions within it:

We conclude that the self cannot be itself without its body. We must regard the body not as an appendage of the mind nor as a detachable instrument, but as an inseparable organ. The self is a system of meanings, but not of meanings without facts. The self is a hold on possibility, but not without its own actuality: it is an actual holding of possibility. The self has a certain free-play among spaces and times, but by way of will it becomes engaged in *this* space-time order as an event among events. The self is purposive, but to be purposive it must work as a cause among causes. All the categories of the body are required in the structure of the self.¹⁴

Brightman, however, defines the self in such a way that bodily functions are excluded from it:

A present complex consciousness may be called a datum self. The whole self is the whole range of present, past, and future experiences that belong with a datum self by virtue of conscious linkages.¹⁵

Accordingly, the physiological organism, including the brain and the central nervous system, are external to the self or mind, even though they furnish its nearest environment:

That brain and nervous system are environment and not mind itself is evident from the fact that most of the time the mind is not even conscious of having a

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brain and nervous system; that they are actual environment is shown by physiological psychology.¹⁶

There are several considerations which arise from the comparison of these two accounts. What can Whitehead mean by an experience that is not conscious? Even if Whitehead is granted the right to use the term "mentality" to designate operations that are not necessarily conscious for a highly reflective self, nevertheless, to be part of some self it would require at least a minimum of awareness. Consider, for example, this statement:

Mental activity is one of the modes of feeling belonging to all actual entities in some degree, but only amounting to conscious intellectuality in some actual entities. This higher grade of mental activity is the intellectual self-analysis of the entity in an earlier stage of incompleteness, effected by intellectual feelings produced in a later stage of concrescence.¹⁷

Now if self-experience does not involve enough mental activity for self-awareness at the outset of its development, how could there be the mental continuity which is required for conscious activity to achieve "the intellectual self-analysis of the entity in an earlier stage of incompleteness, effected by intellectual feelings produced in a later stage of concrescence." Physical feelings pertain to other existents, and it is difficult to see how, short of a miracle, the mental activity of selection, emphasis, contrast, and synthesis, by which Whitehead characterizes the emergence of consciousness, could subconsciously refer to relevant objects before awareness arose. Yet the mental feelings must refer to the objects furnished by the physical feelings, if there is to be a constant interplay between the physical pole and the mental pole:

In this way, potentiality passes into actuality, and extensive relations mould qualitative content and objecti-

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fications of other particulars into a coherent finite experience.¹⁸

If there can be self-experience without even a minimum of self-awareness, what is there to distinguish a given self from the physical feelings of the space-time continuum from which it has emerged? Perhaps "blind physical prehensions, physical and mental, are the ultimate bricks of the physical universe"; but for these reasons it is difficult to see how Whitehead can say of human experience that there are times when "consciousness is negligible."¹⁹

It is one thing to affirm that "emotions, hopes, fears, inhibitions, sense-perceptions arise" from bodily functions involving nerves, viscera, and disturbances in the blood; but it is quite another thing to hold, therefore, that this bodily inheritance is a part of the self-consciousness which is a human person. That such emotions, hopes, fears, inhibitions, and sense-perceptions arise as a results of bodily functions with the emergence of self-consciousness could be explained metaphysically in terms of a causal interaction between bodily selves and the conscious self which is a human person. From a psychological point of view, however, what emotion, hope, fear, inhibition, sense-perception, or value-experience is there of which some self is not at least consciously aware? How could a pre-conscious feeling exist without some degree of this awareness?

Perhaps it is possible to describe the basic elements of some instances of existence without "the three ingredients, consciousness, thought, sense-perception";²⁰ but a human individual is unintelligible unless its unique experiential unity contains at least the germs of these three ingredients. Otherwise, the data for self-knowledge are not empirically verifiable.

In those passages in which Whitehead discusses the body-mind relation, he emphasizes the intimacy of the body to the mind and the sense of unity:

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The only strictly personal society of which we have direct discriminative intuition is the society of our own personal experiences. We also have a direct, though vaguer, intuition of our derivation of experience from the antecedent functioning of our bodies, and a still vaguer intuition of our bodily derivation from external nature.²¹

Even though this be true, cannot the reply be made that it is the awareness of such intimacy or unity that is given as psychologically prior in self-experience. Thus, if intimacy is Whitehead's criterion, it certainly is not an empirical judgment that the body is a part of the self. For Whitehead's own statement, quoted above, implies that body is an inference postulated to explain the intuition of unity. How could there be an intuition without some awareness?

If, as Whitehead himself declares above, "our own personal experiences" are the only data of which "we have direct discriminative intuition," it seems to us that he still has the problem of explaining the relation of this given unity of self-awareness to the physiological organism "with which each moment of human experience intimately cooperates."²² Furthermore, he has the additional problem of explaining the interaction of the physical and mental poles within self-consciousness. We may wonder, then, if he has improved upon the account of an external interaction between body and mind by his psychological duality which merely transplants the problem to within the self.

Now when Whitehead is considering the relation of reflective self-consciousness to the body, he seems less inclined to insist that "body and soul are inescapable elements in our being, each with a full reality of our own immediate self."²³ For on this higher level of self-realization we interpret his physical pole to mean the inheritance of the objective content furnished by the body and his mental pole to mean the reaction and integration by purposive activity of this given content:

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"The process is urged onward by operation of the mental pole providing conceptual subject-matter for synthesis with the Reality."²⁴ In this process sense qualities may be exhibited in the physical inheritance which also embodies the influences of other selves, "but the final synthesis, with its production of appearance, is reserved for the occasions belonging to the personal soul."²⁵ Further substantiation for this emphasis upon the mental pole is furnished by Whitehead's statements that "their relative importance differs in different actualities," and "there is a contrast of importance as between the two poles, and that in this contrast the relative importance of either may be negligible."²⁶ Thus in reflective self-consciousness the purposive activity of the mental pole is the defining characteristic: "But the whole is coordinated so as to support a personal living society of high-grade occasions. This personal society is the man defined as a person. It is the soul of which Plato spoke."²⁷

In any case the physical pole merely conditions rather than determines the mental pole in that it furnishes only passive content to the purposive activity which is the determining factor in the unique complex unity of reflective self-consciousness:

But in conceiving our personal identity we are apt to emphasize rather the soul than the body. The one individual is that coordinated stream of personal experiences, which is my thread of life or your thread of life. It is that succession of self-realization, each occasion with its direct memory of its past and with its anticipation of the future. That claim to enduring self-identity is our self-assertion of personal identity.²⁸

Now if bodily functions were really an integral part of this "succession of self-realization," they would have to possess the capacity to persist beyond the transient moment in which they furnish some of the objective content of self-consciousness.

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This investigation intends to show, however, that only a quality of mind exhibits the teleological wholeness that can endure throughout a "coordinated stream of personal experiences."

To what conclusions about the external relations of self-consciousness are we led, then, by the consideration of these accounts of the body-mind problem?

If, on the one hand, we accept Brightman's notion of the self as a complex unity of consciousness, the body is by definition a part of the self's environment. If, on the other hand, we accept Hocking's notion of the self as an organic unity of mind and body, the body becomes a part of the self by definition. Their differences seem to lie in which facts these men think are most important. Now we hesitate to base our final judgment on either of these initial definitions, especially since both bring out empirical facts. Although we lean toward Brightman's view, we fear that by accepting it without qualification or further inquiry into its implications, we shall be indulging in the *petitio principii* for which we have condemned the behaviorist, when by his initial definition of personality in terms of a stimulus-response formula he pre-determined his conclusion that consciousness is not a usable concept.²⁹

We suggest, therefore, that on the level of unreflective self-awareness the influence of the content inherited from the subconscious and the body so dominates the purposive activity that the problem can be resolved only by definition. But that is not the whole story. Our struggle with Whitehead's theory of bipolarity has brought us to suggest this hypothesis: The incipient purpose, which is exhibited on the lower emergent level of unreflective self-awareness by a mere reaction to the content inherited from antecedent experience and given by subconscious and bodily functions, becomes *on the higher emergent level of reflective self-consciousness* a transformation of this given content by the purposive realization of ideal values.³⁰

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In the final analysis our conclusion about the most important aspect of the body-mind problem, i.e., do bodily functions pre-determine the reflective self-consciousness required for the purposive growth of a rational person, depends upon whether we can discover within reflective self-consciousness a unique self-determination and self-identity. If we cannot discover an exemplification of teleological causality in an achieved quality of mind, we see no grounds for opposing the claim of the neo-realist that personality depends upon "habit and memory" which "are both due to effects on the body, especially the brain."³¹

There is one point, however, which can be settled as a result of this discussion. The content of self-consciousness is "efficiently" caused by its immediate past, its sub-conscious, and its bodily states. It is by way of its physical organism, therefore, that self-consciousness causally interacts with its more remote external environment. May we repeat, in order to avoid misunderstanding, that our hypothesis that the body is no part of a reflective person does not imply that he does not causally interact with his natural environment. But we shall try to show that the content thus transmitted *via* the body, the sub-conscious, and antecedent experiences, is so transformed that it cannot be the defining characteristic of the internal relations of reflective self-consciousness. Whether the mind is conditioned by or determined by its environment, however it be conceived, is still the basic issue upon the solution of which hangs our verdict concerning spiritual growth.

In thus reserving our final judgment concerning the complete explanation of the body-mind relation until after we have investigated what self-determination and self-identity may mean in terms of teleological causality, we are following the principle of Hegel, to whom our synoptic method of inquiry is largely due: The most coherent meaning of any particular hypothesis can be understood only in terms of what it leads to in the growth of a more comprehensive insight.³²

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2. The Internal Relations of Reflective Self-Consciousness.

We have found that those states which characterize reflective self-consciousness are realized when the purposive activity of the self integrates the objective emotional content inherited from its environment. The first state in this process of internal succession is an awareness of the objective content thus furnished by antecedent experiences. When this is taken up into the enduring process of internal growth, the internal relations of reflective self-consciousness involve a rational purpose which so organizes these internal relations that experience culminates in the realization of ideal values. These constitute a new content which is derived from emotions and desires inherited from the self's bodily and subconscious environment but which is transformed by rational purpose. This emergent content is transmitted as a datum for a consequent repetition of this same internal succession of mental states.³³

In so far as self-experience is under consideration, the emphasis is upon the temporal conformation of states of awareness that are dominated by memory. For memory is required in order that there might be a continuity between the present and the immediate past. Normally it is also through memory that there is a continuity between a present awareness and memory of the more remote past. Consequently, in so far as a self is conscious at all it interacts with objects of its environment that are either present or remembered. This response involves in every case of self-experience internal relations of a present moment of activity to the content derived through memory of the past or inherited from bodily functions and the subconscious. For an unreflective self living on a merely biological level of existence, the internal relations of self-consciousness would be little more than a series of mere reactions to these antecedent impulses or memories that could be explained to a great extent by a stimulus-response formula. The only exception might be that recognition requires more than cerebral activity.

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When a self becomes conscious of ideal values beyond those preferences necessary for mere biological survival or transient physical pleasure, the internal relations of a reflective self-consciousness are far more complicated and require a different formula for their interpretation. It is here that the objective content derived from the self's environment is internally related to an ideal of personality, i.e., an objective content anticipated in the future that is acknowledged in the present. By virtue of this reflective organization of the internal relations of its present purposive activity to its potential future, anticipation becomes as important as memory in the temporal continuity of states of consciousness which are being realized in the light of a consciousness of states. As an aid to explaining what this emergent object of reflective consciousness means for ideal value-realization, let us first analyze the conceptual objective reference of sense-perception with which the conceptual objective reference of an ideal of personality can be compared.³⁴

A perception of physical objects requires a conceptual reference (internal relation) of a reflective self-consciousness to subsistent sense-qualities such as, for example, redness, roundness, triangularity, hardness, extensiveness, as well as mathematical and logical propositions such as, for example, two plus two equals four or A is A . These neutral entities are the abstract data of perceptual experience to which the neo-realists have been led by their analysis of physical objects into their most universal characteristics. For the critical realist, they are the logical essences, the "what" divorced from its "that." For the logical positivist, they are the tautological truths of analytic propositions. For Whitehead, they are the eternal objects.³⁵

All of these descriptions of the abstract data of perception are in one form or another modified versions of Platonic Ideas. Now we agree with the neo-realists that these abstract subsistents are necessary data for a perceptual relation between self-consciousness and physical objects. But they provide no causal

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principle of relevance by which the infinite number of subsistent possibilities might be ordered and by which the abstract identity that these potential subsistents embody might be correlated within a particular process of reflective self-consciousness that would exemplify them in so far as it universalized. Ironically enough, the neo-realist falls into this "subsisto-centric predicament" by leaning over backwards to avoid what he calls the "ego-centric predicament," i.e., "the argument that because entities are contents of consciousness they can not also transcend consciousness; it also implies that, so far as based on such subjective premises, the idealistic theory of a transcendent subjectivity is gratuitous."³⁶ It will be our problem to explain how these abstract data can be exemplified "experio-centrally" in a creative synthesis of self-consciousness according to the synoptic category of teleological self-causality.

In our discussion of Whitehead's cosmological account of a space-time continuum we explained that it is by virtue of God's integration of these relevant subsistent possibilities and his linkage of them with each existent process of self-realization that abstract identity and concrete change have been correlated in a particular self that universalizes ("prehends eternal objects"). Thus Whitehead avoids both predicaments. We shall work out the implications of this *subsistent interaction* (Whitehead's "ingression of eternal objects") when we come to consider self-determination as an exemplification of teleological causality.³⁷

The study of Whitehead's explanation of "The Extensive Continuum" led us to draw the implication that a space-time continuum could be considered a complex of "eternal objects" or universal sense-qualities, which subsists independently of perceptual experience, but which is necessarily the conceptual object to which a reflective self-consciousness refers in a perceptual experience. It is because this subsistent space-time continuum is a conceptual object of reflective self-consciousness

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that the organic interconnection of existence can be systematically conceived in terms of natural law as immanent.³⁸

The purpose of this review of the discussion about the space-time continuum has been to show what constitutes the conceptual object to which perceptual experience refers as an internal relation of reflective self-consciousness. Is there a parallel or corresponding conceptual object to which value-experience refers as an internal relation of reflective self-consciousness? This question takes us back into the main stream of our investigation of spiritual growth.

An intuition of values, we believe, requires a conceptual relation of a reflective self-consciousness to subsistent value-possibilities corresponding to the sense-qualities or neutral entities of the neo-realists. Whereas the neo-realists maintain that values do not have such an objective character, since value can be identified with subjective interest,³⁹ we maintain that such ideals as goodness and beauty, for instance, have the same subsistent objectivity as logical and mathematical relations or sense-qualities. Consequently, just as a space-time continuum is a universal potentiality to which perception and its derived scientific generalizations refer, so an ideal of personality is a subsistent complex of value-possibilities which is a universal potentiality to which ideal values refer. An important difference between the space-time continuum and an ideal of personality, with respect to the internal relations of reflective self-consciousness, is that the former involves a reference to the past whereas the latter refers to the future possibilities of self-realization. It follows from this metaphysical principle that this past reference underlies science and philosophies of nature, while the future reference underlies the objective meaning of art, ethics, and religion. We believe that there are some significant intimations of this notion in Plato and Aristotle.

Is there not an implicit presupposition that an ideal of personality is a subsistent possibility which can be actualized through self-realization in this passage from Plato's *Timaeus*:

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But he who has seriously devoted himself to learning and to true thoughts, and has exercised these qualities above all his others, must necessarily and inevitably think thoughts that are immortal and divine, if so be that he lays hold on truth, and in so far as it is possible for human nature to partake of immortality, he must fall short thereof in no degree; and inasmuch as he is for ever tending his divine part and duly magnifying that daemon who dwells along with him, he must be supremely blessed.⁴⁰

Does Plato's principle of participation provide sufficiently for a way by which a temporal self might realize the eternal ideal of personality?

When Aristotle conceived the cosmic process as the realization of the essence of Being in the phenomena of Becoming, he implied that a subsistent ideal of personality was meaningless apart from a universalizing person who actualized it. In this notion of the entelechy, therefore, Aristotle made a significant advance beyond Plato, for whom the eternal ideas (including an ideal of personality) were too independent of the temporal process of self-realization.⁴¹

It was in Aristotle's perfectionistic ethics that this metaphysical principle of the entelechy bore rich fruit. Although man's vegetative and animal souls link him with the lower levels of the animal world, he has the dynamic capacity for developing a rational soul through the function of virtuous conduct and reflective thought. The practical virtues are exemplified in a person's steadfast choice of the mean between two extremes, e. g., courage rather than cowardice or foolhardiness, temperance rather than licentiousness or insensibility, liberality rather than stinginess or prodigality, greatness of soul rather than humility or vainglory. Such moderation does not exhaust man's spiritual possibilities, however; for it is instrumental to the realization of the intrinsic enjoyment of the pure activity of the soul. In attaining the dianoetic virtue

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of wisdom for its own sake a reflective mind realizes the harmony and balance of a fully developed personality. In the contemplative life, therefore, man finds the enduring satisfaction which "belongs to the class of things precious and divine."⁴²

Thus when we turn to the history of philosophy for a clue to the objective meaning of an enlightened good will we find that whereas Plato and Aristotle emphasized the organization of one's preferences and desires, i. e., the value-content of reflective self-consciousness, Kant emphasized the obligation of one's will, i. e., the volitional activity of reflective self-consciousness. Now both of these aspects of moral experience are essential; but, if we are to discover the objective meaning of the function of an enlightened good will in spiritual growth, we must ascertain how an ideal of personality as its subsisting universal conceptual referent is actualized in each particular concrete experience of voluntary choice, obligation, and ideal values which are found in reflective self-consciousness when it is concerned with moral issues. Our synoptic method of inquiry requires us to formulate descriptive generalizations which define the pattern of the development of moral character in terms of a coherent system of hypothetical principles.

We believe that the system of "moral laws" formulated by Brightman meets this need. Not only does it correlate the volitional activity emphasized by Kant and the value-content emphasized by Plato and Aristotle into a consistent and adequate scheme of normative principles for guiding rational conduct, but it also exhibits the implications that are deducible from our hypothesis of the function of an enlightened good will in spiritual growth. Just as a system of natural laws interprets the meaning of the space-time continuum to which reflective consciousness refers in scientific generalizations from the experience of perception, Brightman's system of "moral laws" interprets the meaning of an ideal of personal-

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ity to which reflective consciousness refers in speculative generalizations from the experience of an enlightened good will.⁴³ Neither system of laws should be considered as immutable or absolutely final. Both systems may need modifications or expansion, if experience demands that the mind possessed with intellectual curiosity find a more coherent explanation of the natural order or the human order.

Our discussion of the complex unity of reflective self-consciousness has described: (i) its external relations to its space-time, bodily and subconscious existential environment which "begets" or produces the given elements of experience, and (ii) its internal relations to its subsistent conceptual goal or idea of what it might *become* in the temporal process of purposive growth, i. e., an ideal of personality. The claims that we have made in this discussion can be justified only if we can show that these conscious temporal processes exemplify the teleological causality that also characterizes every other organization of events in the universe. If the arrival of reflective self-consciousness in the evolutionary process of the universe is a novel emergent, that is to say, if a rational person is anything more than the predetermined effects of the efficient causation of the environmental factors that provide the content of his consciousness, his purposive activity must exemplify the following two "defining characteristics" of final causation: (i) relative self-determination, and (ii) self-identity.

In order to decide whether or not reflective self-consciousness is characterized by self-determination and self-identity, we shall investigate the following metaphysical hypotheses of teleological self-causality: (i) Self-determination is a creative synthesis of efficient and final causality into an organic whole. (ii) Self-identity is a creative synthesis of passing emotional experiences into the purposive growth of an enduring quality of mind.

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B. The Causality of Relative Self-Determination.

We propose the hypothesis that the relative self-determination in the realization of an ideal of personality is a creative synthesis of efficient and final causality.⁴⁴ It follows from the metaphysical categories constructed by our synoptic method that the meaning of this teleological self-causality is unintelligible, however, apart from a coherent explanation of how self-determination is relative to the influence of the other causal factors that provide subsistent possibility and elements of existent necessity in the unbegun and unending process of a growing universe.⁴⁵

By rejecting Spinoza's view of the totality of the universe in terms of an underlying substance, of which the modal manifestations are discoverable in experience, we have been led to organic pluralism. According to this view, the ultimate process of reality is characterized by the causal interaction of temporal events. In order to show that this is a more intelligible explanation of experience, we have suggested that the organic, temporal process which is reality has three aspects: (i) *subsistence*, which includes the abstract, universal sense-qualities, logico-mathematical relations, value-possibilities, and complexes of these, such as a potential space-time continuum or a potential ideal of personality; (ii) *existence*, which includes all physical things, other minds, and social relations; and (iii) *experience*, which includes the processes of memory and emotional inheritance from the past, thinking, sense-perception, value-realization in the present, and anticipation of the future that constitute the complex unity of self-consciousness.⁴⁶

Since a rational person is an integral factor of this total metaphysical process, we shall attempt to explain his self-determination by which he is causally involved in the creative advance of a growing universe according to these categorial modes of reality. Our first problem, therefore, is to explain

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the *subsistential interaction* between a potential ideal of personality and a reflective self-consciousness.

By the category of *subsistential interaction*, there is a way out of the "subsisto-centric predicament" of Plato and the neo-realists. Plato realized (even if the neo-realists do not) that the Ideas must be comprehensively related to God in order that the infinite number of value-possibilities might be included within the influence of a causal agent whose purpose could relate them to the "moving image of eternity." Thus, in accordance with the Eternal Ideas, "God constructed them (the pre-existing elements), so far as He could, to be as fair and good as possible."⁴⁷ The following passage gives further indication that in Plato's view God's purpose working under limitations integrates the cosmic process in accordance with the eternal pattern:

And, moreover, as regards the numerical proportions which govern their masses and motions and their other qualities, we must conceive that God realized these everywhere with exactness, in so far as the nature of Necessity submitted voluntarily or under persuasion, and thus ordered all in harmonious proportion.⁴⁸

The following passage, which we believe expresses the principle of subsistential interaction in Plato's view, would seem to imply that God teleologically pre-determines the growth of a human personality and thus would rule out human self-determination:

Accordingly, seeing that that Model is an eternal Living Creature, He set about making this Universe, so far as He could, of a like kind. But insasmuch as the nature of the Living Creature was eternal, this quality it was impossible to attach in its entirety to what is generated; wherefore He planned to make a movable image of Eternity, and, as He set in order the

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Heaven, of that Eternity which abides in unity He made an eternal image, moving according to number, even that which we have named Time.⁴⁹

In the organic pluralism of Whitehead and Brightman, Plato's teleological pre-determinism is modified so as to provide for human relative self-determination. In the first place, they relate the subsistent Ideas internally to God's purpose by making the Ideas subsist within God's mind. Secondly, they provide for the causal agency of a human person (as well as for physical things in Whitehead's view) whose purposive activity interacts with God's purpose in the actualizing of value-possibilities in his particular self-realization. Thus they, following Aristotle, imply that a reflective self-consciousness referring to an ideal of personality is a concrete universal. Let us briefly consider our principle of subsistent interaction in its relation to the thought of Whitehead and Brightman.

The key to Whitehead's thought in this regard is expressed in his notion of the "ingression of eternal objects":

In this sense God is the principle of concretion; namely, he is that actual entity from which temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts. That aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for conceptual feeling; and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase of feelings with its initial conceptual valuations, and with its initial physical purposes. Thus the transition of the creativity from an actual world to the correlate novel concrescence is conditioned by the relevance of God's all-embracing conceptual valuations to the particular possibilities of transmission from the actual world, and by its relevance to the various possibilities of initial subjective form available for the initial feelings. In this way there is constituted the

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conrescent subject in its primary phase with its dipolar constitution, physical and mental, indissoluble.³⁰

God thus envisages not only the systematic hierarchy of eternal objects, but he also correlates them with the process of becoming. Accordingly, his relation to the eternal objects is threefold: (i) He embodies all of these subsistent qualities within his primordial nature. (ii) He integrates the infinite number of possibilities into those orders that are relevant to particular types of actuality. (iii) He links those relevant orders of potentiality with the temporal process in such a way that novelty emerges. Consequently, the ingression of sense and value qualities into the experiences of particular actualities depends upon God as the regulative agency in the creative advance.³¹

Now, as far as Whitehead's written statements are concerned, the primordial function of God which integrates the cosmic process and persuades human persons to seek ideal values in unconscious.³² Only God's consequent nature, to which the actual world contributes, is conscious. This raises a very difficult problem, since it involves the unintelligible notion of an unconscious Purposer.³³

In Brightman's view of the relation of God's finite will to the purpose of a human self, there is no question about whether or not God's purpose is conscious:

God is personal consciousness of eternal duration; his consciousness is an eternally active will, which eternally finds and controls The Given within every moment of his eternal experience. The Given consists of the eternal, uncreated laws of reason [including logic, mathematical relations, and Platonic Ideas] and also of equally eternal and uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects (qualia), disorderly impulses and desires, such experiences as pain

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and suffering, the forms of space and time, and whatever in God is the source of surd evil. The common characteristic of all that is 'given' (in the technical sense) is, first, that it is eternal within the experience of God and hence had no other origin than God's eternal being; and, secondly, that it is not a product of will or created activity. For The Given to be in consciousness at all means that it must be process; [note Whitehead's category of process in *Process and Reality*] but unwilling, nonvoluntary consciousness is distinguishable from voluntary consciousness, both in God and in man. God's finiteness thus does not mean that he began or will end; nor does it mean he is limited by anything external to himself. Strictly we should speak of a God whose will is finite rather than a finite God; for even the finite God is absolute in the sense of being the ultimate source of all creation.⁵⁴

We believe, therefore, that, when subsistential interaction is explained according to the category of teleological causality, it seems highly probable that the purposes of God and man interact in so far as a rational person exhibits self-determination. It is not enough, however, to claim that God's purposes do not predetermine man's will. There may be other causal factors in the actual world of existential interaction which preclude self-determination.

According to our category of *existential interaction*, these divinely integrated abstract sense-qualities and value-possibilities are so actualized by the organic interplay of all the physical things and the other minds constituting the space-time environment of self-consciousness that the data given to it becomes its concrete content. We must now decide whether or not these causal influences determine the self-realization of an ideal of personality.⁵⁵

Our emphasis upon the organic community of the causal interaction between the existents that constitute the actual

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world raises a difficult problem. Will the seemingly unique autonomy of a reflective self-consciousness be reducible to a mere focus of internal relations?

Idealists such as Bradley and Bosanquet define a human individual in such a way that it loses its autonomy. For they define autonomous individuality in terms of internal relations that can be found in only the Absolute.⁵⁶ A human individual, according to those idealists, does not exemplify any rational principle for comprehending unity in diversity. Rather the idea of a finite individual leads into a maze of external relations and terms. Thus Bradley emphasizes the principles of inclusiveness and harmony as a basis of the total system that is the true Individual. Within this total system of reality human experiences are but imperfect appearances.⁵⁷

Human value-experiences, especially, require the Absolute as a basis for concrete internal unity. It should be noted, however, that the human self does make a difference for the Absolute in Bradley's view. But the recognition of this fact is far from ascribing an ontologically real or enduring individuality to the human self:

A being short of the Whole, but existing within it, is essentially related to that which is not itself. Its inmost being is, and must be infected by the eternal. Within its content there are relations which do not terminate inside. And it is clear at once that, in such a case, the ideal and the real can never be at one. But their disunion is precisely what we mean by perfection. And thus incompleteness and unrest, and unsatisfied ideality, are the lot of the finite. There is nothing which, to speak properly, is individual or perfect, except only the Absolute.⁵⁸

A more recent version of such a totalitarian absorption of the human individual is to be found in Alexander's view of the latter as a mere difference of position within the internal

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relations of the space-time continuum.⁵⁹ When Bertrand Russell defines human individuality in terms of such a relational process, he reduces human personality to causal laws and thus annihilates any unique autonomy it might seem to have:

Personality is essentially a matter of organization. Certain events, grouped together by means of certain relations, form a person. The grouping is effected by means of causal laws—those connected with habit formation, which includes memory—and the causal laws concerned depend upon the body.⁶⁰

If we are to avoid such annihilation of individual uniqueness, we must interpret the meaning of self-determination in such a way that it includes the formal factors of teleological activity and organic wholeness within self-consciousness which Bradley, Bosanquet, Alexander, and Russell omit in their exclusive emphasis upon internal relations and objective content of the universe as a whole. If we can do this, we may be able to interpret the structure of a human individual in terms of the purposive activity and the content that is given to it by the internal relations of that individual with other existents which are also internally related to each other in the total organic process. It remains to be seen if this will explain the functional relation between the center and the content of human experience. Thus if the reduction or absorption of the autonomy of a human self is to be denied, we must show that a unique unity for human personality can be preserved, even if its existential environment is an organic process of internal relations.

The problem here might be stated as follows: Can the inclusive relations of an organic process be so restricted by the purposive unification of the complex data into concrete growth of self-consciousness that the individual escapes reduction or absorption into mechanical laws, a space-time matrix, or the Absolute?

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We suggest that the unique autonomy of a human person can be preserved, if the existential interaction between the internally related environmental factors, which exemplify efficient causation, can be shown to be qualified by the experiential intra-action within reflective self-consciousness, which exemplifies final causation. Purposive activity, therefore, is the key to the unification of these public existential relations into the private objective content of self-experience.⁶¹

This creative synthesis of emotional influences contributed by other existents to the objective content of self-consciousness not only characterizes the given unity with which self-realization begins, but also such purposive integration of complex data dominates each successive instant of concrete temporal growth. At no time, therefore, does the personal growth from a *given* experiential unity toward the *achieved* organic whole of a total personality cease to interact causally with the other actualities from which it derives its objective content. Nevertheless, the determining factors in this process of self-formation is the individual person's own purposive activity. We believe that the meaning of such final causality in the purposive growth of reflective self-consciousness can best be explained in terms of the category of experiential intra-action.

According to our category of *experiential intra-action* (Whitehead's "concrescence"), a rational purpose of self-determination correlates emotional inheritance and memory with anticipation and volitional integration of value-experience in accordance with a subsistent ideal of personality. Thus, while the environmental factors constitute the organic determination of the universe as a whole and *condition* the activity of a human person, the latter's *reaction to* and *purposive integration of* these external influences upon its immediately past emotions exemplify the self-determination that synthesizes the efficient causation of God and the world with the final causality of its own personal growth.⁶²

Self-determination, therefore, is a creative synthesis of the

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past necessity provided by existential interaction and future possibility provided by subsistential interaction in a present moment of self-causation. This means that, although the present moment of teleological self-causation is autonomous, the succession of events which constitute the past and provide the data and given conditions for the present is determined by the organic complex of internal interaction throughout the universe.

Since the organic community of internally related events constitutes the solidarity of the world, the past conditions of experiential intra-action are coordinate parts in the relational complex of the space-time continuum.⁶³ We are faced with the problem of showing how a self can be internally determined by its own present purpose in a world which is characterized by the solidarity of extensive connections.

Whereas the continuity of internal relations characterizes the immediate past of a present moment of self-consciousness, within the present process of self-creation there is a causal independence of the mutual immanence which the organic continuum embodies. Accordingly, mutual immanence dominates the interacting functions of antecedent bodily states. Only by way of these physical functions in the immediate past can other existents causally influence the present process of an individual experient. It follows from this explanation, therefore, that contemporary selves are not directly related to each other in the mode of efficient causation. Thus a present state of experience has no immediate physical relation with any other present event. Rather a present actuality is directly related only to its own past or real potentiality such as is exemplified in its own physical organism.

Since only the immediate physical feelings of the past are internally related to the immediate past physical feelings of other existents, each of any two contemporary selves is always in the process of determining the course of its own future self-realization, i. e., the teleological organization of its

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own temporal states into an enduring organic whole.⁶⁴ Accordingly, if there is any activity that is not determined by external agents, it must be discovered in the relative self-determination of a present moment by which a person internally organizes his experience. To understand this principle in human experience is to understand the teleological growth into an organic whole, by virtue of which a mere self progressively develops into a fuller personality.

This hypothesis of relative self-determination within a context of organic causality saves the continuity and homogeneity of past *environmental interaction from which a self has emerged* in the present without destroying the distinctness and integrity of that self in its present moment of self-realization. For the organic interconnection of the past does not preclude a diversity of perspectives in the present. In human experience a present unique unity such as sense-perception points toward the organic continuity of spatial perspectives in the past; value-realization points toward the emergence of individual novelty in the future. The continuity pertains chiefly to the content derived from the organic interconnection of the past environment: the individuality pertains chiefly to the purposive activity of self-causation. But neither the continuity of efficient causation nor the individuality of final causality can be divorced from the other in the creative process through which a self becomes an objective reality.

A coherent interpretation of the interaction of subsistence and existence reveals, therefore, that the whole universal process conspires to influence the experiential intra-action by which an ideal of personality is purposively realized. Can a human personality be shown to be a teleological process of concrete growth through an actualization of divinely-ordered possibilities of value and through a creative synthesis of emotional influences given by the external world of existential relations? If so, would it not follow from the categorial modes of reality that a reflective self-consciousness which is charac-

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terized by the teleological causality of self-determination possesses some degree of freedom?

Although a present choice may be free, once the choice is made certain consequences are bound to follow which will become a part of the mutually determined conditions for the present choices that are yet future. For in an organic universe, freedom apart from the uniformity of possibilities of subsistence and the conditions and necessities of existence would be mere capricious spontaneity.⁶⁵ It follows from this that not only is human choice relative to the other causal factors in the creative advance, but the process of the creative advance, i.e., the universe in the making, is relative in some degree to the actions of reflective persons exercising their creative capacity of relative self-determination.

This conception of human freedom as relative self-determination should clearly be distinguished from the notion of freedom as indeterminism. According to indeterminism at a given present moment the human will unconditioned by any other factors causes certain actions to occur spontaneously without motives inherited from the past or aims anticipated for the future.⁶⁶ Our analysis of reflective self-consciousness has shown that purposive activity is meaningless apart from the motives for thought, conduct, and imagination that are derived from a table of ideal values. Motivation is no more absent on this emergent level of reflective self-consciousness than it is on the level of human nature described by the behavioristic formula of environmental stimulus and inherited response or in the biological patterns that describe tropism in lower forms of life. The crucial issue is not whether or not motives exist, but rather it is the type of motive, e. g., is it an uncontrolled impulse foisted upon the mind or is it a normative standard self-imposed after reflective thought.

Self-determinism is challenged by the advocates of mechanical determinism who claim that biological heredity and environmental influences completely determine human na-

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ture.⁶⁷ Although these causal mechanisms are useful methodological devices for investigating the external influences upon the purposive activity which organizes the emotional content of reflective self-consciousness, they do not represent sufficiently exhaustive scientific knowledge to justify the pseudo-scientific appeal to them which is often made by those who dogmatically claim that they can predict the conduct of reflective persons. Most scientists frankly recognize that their method of inquiry is not applicable to the data which are involved in dealing with the problem, and consequently they leave its treatment to philosophy.

Whenever external physical forces, divine influences, subconscious compulsions, or the functioning (as well as malfunctioning) of the physiological organism individually or collectively dominate completely the motivation of human action, it is externally determined. Whenever a mind is guided by impulse rather than a table of intrinsic values, freedom is negligible. A different kind of motivation emerges, however, in the power of decision by which a rational person inhibits his natural impulses long enough to deliberate about and choose from alternative courses of action *in accordance with reflective standards* which he has imposed upon his own thought, conduct, and imagination.

When we claim that a reflective person has this unique capacity of relative self-determination we do not mean that he has the liberty to do what he pleases. Liberty is meaningless apart from responsibility and acknowledged obligation to conform his thought and action to self-imposed ideals. Freedom must be progressively achieved and the degree that is attained by a reflective person is to be measured by the degree of responsibility he has assumed. A reflective person is never *free from* restraint, but he is *free for* some purpose such as realizing ideal values which determine his particular choices. A decision exhibits freedom, therefore, when the mind which makes it chooses according to rational laws pertaining to the

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purposive realization of ideal values rather than the psychological laws regarding the association of ideas, sensory-motor responses, instinctive impulses, subconscious compulsions, biological laws regarding the physiological functioning of the bodily organism, or whatever other laws there be regarding chemical, electromagnetic, and gravitational patterns.

The extra-mental causal factors described by these scientific generalizations other than "rational laws" probably furnish *all* the motivation for the behavior of unreflective people. We do not deny that hereditary and environment furnish to a great extent even the motivation for reflective thought and conduct, and we do not require the advocate of mechanical determinism to prove that heredity and environment directly influence autonomous decisions. We claim, nevertheless, that though these extra-mental causal factors do determine to a great extent *how* one imagines, feels, acts, and thinks, they are not the exclusive determinants of *what* one prefers as self-imposed obligations. In fulfilling these obligations the reflective person exhibits the purposive activity which characteristically defines what it means to be a relatively autonomous agent who at least participates in the complex causal process that produces his personality. A reflective person is not the sole author of the creative product which is his spiritual growth; but he is at least an indispensable collaborator. Therein lie the possibilities of relative self-determination which are his to realize.

The thesis that the natural order is a causal system of interacting space-time events is invalidated, if the principle of scientific causality is not true. But the scientific principle of causality can not be demonstrated, since any experiment which might prove it or disprove it must presuppose it.⁶⁸ Similarly, our claim that a reflective person may achieve freedom can not be proved by any crucial experiment. Yet if this teleological self-causality is not a concrete fact, our entire thesis of spiritual growth collapses. The causality of both the natural

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order and the human order must be presupposed and accepted as long as they serve as principles of interpretation which render the relevant facts intelligible. Stated otherwise, we must accept the fact that a reflective person possesses some degree of freedom, if the assumption that he is completely externally determined renders significant experiences unintelligible.

When a reflective person cultivates such spiritual appetites as intellectual curiosity, aesthetic appreciation, an enlightened good will, and consecration to some sacred cause, this purposive organization of his emotional desires empirically distinguishes his life from what it would have been had he cultivated only bodily appetites. Such a difference is unintelligible if one refuses to recognize that his self-creative efforts have had a causal effect. Even more direct concrete evidence that a reflective person possesses some freedom is exhibited in moral and intellectual experience.

The function of an enlightened good will in spiritual growth is unintelligible unless a reflective person is free to acknowledge normative standards as self-imposed obligations to choose to act as he ought rather than as his impulses might prompt him to do. Any textbook on Ethics as well as the record of any court of justice will show clearly that moral and the derivative legal responsibility of persons for their actions presupposes that they possessed some degree of freedom. Yet our ethical theories and our jurisprudence might be based upon an illusion. Can the advocate of mechanical determinism prove this by a scientific investigation of all the factors of heredity and environment that are involved? He might show that in a particular case the person involved was the pawn of heredity and environment; but he would not have necessarily eliminated all possibility that a reflective person might be free. In fact, his search for evidence to support his contention is unintelligible unless his mind is free to some degree.

We believe that reflective thinking itself is the best evidence

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for the claim that rational persons have some relative self-determination. If the conclusions of the hypothetical-deductive method of scientific and philosophical inquiry are to be accredited, it must be assumed that some freedom has been experienced by the mind which (i) observed all the relevant facts, (ii) formulated the system of hypotheses to explain the facts, and (iii) verified the coherence of his explanatory theory by (a) mathematically or logically deducing the implications of his hypotheses, and (b) testing these implications by their adequacy to explain the facts and for the facts to support the hypotheses. If logical truth is expected from such reflective inquiry, the ability of the mind to select the more highly probable hypothesis rather than the less probable hypothesis can hardly be denied.

Unless it is assumed that conscious discrimination is an effective factor in the process of inquiry, what seems to be a coherent system of causal laws is nothing but the reflection of the uncritical prejudices, capricious desires, habitual responses, vague impressions, the physiological functions, or the accidental circumstances of heredity and environment, which in some mysterious way make the decisions for which the scientist is given credit. If the scientist has no freedom of selection, his claims are no more justified than the claims of those who attempt to demonstrate the truth of their beliefs by appealing to the uncritical criteria of dogmatic authority, custom, sense-impressions, mystical intuitions, universal agreement, feeling, or practical consequences. If the inquiring mind of the reflective thinker is not free to some degree, then the intellectual enterprise of science and philosophy is "like a tale, told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Even the determinists, however, are unwilling to affirm that this is the case. Russell, for example, brilliantly defends a deterministic world-view; but he assumes that the scientific attitude of mind exemplifies sufficient self-determination to be detached and objective:

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The scientific attitude of mind involves a sweeping away of all other desires in the interest of the desire to know—it involves suppression of hopes and fears, loves and hates, and the whole subjective emotional life, until we become subdued to the material, able to see it frankly, without preconceptions, without bias, without any wish except to see it as it is, and without any belief that what it is must be determined by some relation, positive or negative, to what we should like it to be, or what we can easily imagine it to be.⁶⁹

A morally responsible person possesses freedom under rational law, i. e., he is free only when he acts in accordance with the objective normative principles which he has self-imposed as more obligatory than his impulsive desires or petty interests. So also an intellectually responsible person is free only when he has dedicated his energies to the ideal of truth in the same manner that a religious person consecrates his soul to a divine cause. Goethe claimed that this internal self-limitation by self-imposed ideals is the self-mastery through which genuine freedom is achieved:

Freedom consists not in refusing to recognize anything above us, but in respecting something which is above us; for by respecting it, we raise ourselves to it, and by our very acknowledgment make manifest that we bear within ourselves what is higher, and are worthy to be on a level with it.⁷⁰

We shall conclude this study with a discussion of the social significance of an ideal of spiritual growth. The concrete meaning of the relative self-determination of an enlightened good will should be more intelligible when it is explained in terms of the social responsibility that a reflective person is obligated to assume.

Since we do not conceive of freedom as a specific faculty or quality of a particular function of those processes involved

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in experiential intra-action, we must show how freedom is exhibited in the purposive integration of the whole of reflective self-consciousness. This notion presupposes that a rational person is characterized by self-identity. Consequently, it is our task now to justify this assumption.

C. The Purposive Realization of Self-Identity.

Self-identity is a creative synthesis of constantly passing emotional experiences into the purposive growth of an enduring quality of mind. Thus emotional impulses of a present moment of self-consciousness are organized in the light of remembered experiences, and are transmuted into ideal values with a view to the realization of personal growth anticipated in the future. Since this thoroughly temporal explanation of the growth of self-identity in terms of teleological causality is a direct challenge to the substance doctrine of the soul, a brief comparison of them is highly instructive. It is a crucial test of our category of teleological self-causality, and if we cannot meet the same problems which the substance doctrine claims to solve with a better explanation, our hypothesis is inadequate.

Now according to the substance doctrine, self-identity is embodied in a substratum soul, which is distinct from the empirical self or present conscious unity of experience. As such, the ultimate reality of the transcendent soul is divorced from given sense and value-experiences, if not entirely unknowable. Temporal consciousness is, therefore, merely a phenomenal appearance of the underlying reality. This Scholastic doctrine of a soul-substance has come down to us through two philosophical traditions. The first tradition is the rationalistic one of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz; the second is the empirical development through Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

Descartes maintained that it is possible to have clear and distinct notions of thinking substance, of corporeal substance, and of God. Spinoza accepted Descartes' definition of sub-

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stance in terms of self-causation, and pushed the principle to its logical conclusion in the notion of Absolute Substance, i.e., all that there is, which is an unknown substratum with parallel attributes. Leibnitz presents a synthesis of Descartes' quantitative pluralism and Spinoza's qualitative monism in his theory of simple active substances which are maintained by God through a pre-established harmony.⁷¹

Turning to the empirical tradition, we find that Locke inherits Descartes' dualism, but suggests further that the activity of mind characterizes mental substance in terms of the idea of power. Berkeley rejected the notion of an unknowable material substance entirely, since perceptual ideas were the key to reality, the status of mind was secure; but that of bodies remained a problem. Berkeley solved it by reducing the physical world to God's perceptual ideas. Hume accounts for the process of the mind in terms of sensations, impressions, and reflections in such a way that he rejects the entire substance doctrine for both body and mind.⁷² The most important feature of Hume's account for this discussion is his conclusion that personal identity is not discoverable, if the exclusively analytic method of associationism is used for investigating the meaning of self-consciousness:

When I turn my reflection on myself, I never can perceive this *self* without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive anything but the perceptions. It is the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self.⁷³

Can we answer Hume by showing that a synoptic method can discover self-identity without appealing to the substance doctrine of the soul which we too reject?⁷⁴ The crux of our problem is brought out by Weiss in his criticism that Whitehead's temporal view of human personality does not provide any persisting self-identity. This criticism would apply as well to our own interpretation so far as it has been developed up to this point:

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The fundamental temporal fact is not the passage of events, but the occurrence of changes in persistent substantial individuals. It is the denial of this doctrine which is characteristic of the modern approach to the problem of a temporal world. The denial assumes that to be temporal is to be a completed being at every moment of time, perishing within the passing moment because inescapably contained within the span of that moment. But to suppose that entities either have non-temporal boundaries and are thus eternal, or that they have the temporal boundaries of the present and thus perish with the passing moment, is to commit the *fallacy of essential completeness*. Though Whitehead has pressed home the point that it is a fallacy of 'simple location' to suppose that there are entities which occupy places in space or time and do not essentially refer to other regions, he has not acknowledged the fundamental fallacy of essential completeness of which his own was a specialized instance. He expresses the fallacy of simple location as having a temporal as well as a spatial application; yet he does not maintain that no things can be viewed as merely present. Instead he takes each thing to be a momentary being, containing *within itself* a reference to an external future. In view of this interpretation of time, it seems that he understands the rejection of the fallacy of simple location to entail merely the supposition that every spatio-temporal entity has an internal reference to distant regions. But if a thing is in a single moment of time and merely inwardly points beyond that moment it will vanish, as so pointing with the passage of its moment. Pointing does not enable an object to persist and Whitehead seems thus still to remain within the Cartesian tradition which identifies the temporal with the momentary.⁷⁵

Weiss' criticism reveals that he has overlooked an essential

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point in the conception of personality as a growing temporal process of self-realization.

Now the complex unity of self-consciousness is divisible into particular moments of immediate emotional experiences which do vanish (Whitehead's actual entities or Brightman's datum selves). Each of these events or moments of immediate experience, however, is interlocked with other subordinate events which constitute self-consciousness when they are purposively organized into a "personal society."⁷⁶ Apart from this organization in terms of purpose as its defining characteristic, the immediate moments of emotional experience would have but a negligible temporal endurance; for, taken by itself, each is "perpetually perishing" (Plato). When, however, these immediately passing moments of emotional experience are purposively grouped together, then it may be possible that a social organization of self-consciousness might exhibit an enduring identity in its growth toward an organic unity (Brightman's whole self) in the genetic complex process of temporal self-realization.

In rejecting the explanation of a soul-substance, we contend that the human self is a *sui generis* temporal process of experienced purpose and emotional relations which disclose a partial but none the less genuine aspect of the nature of ultimate reality. Since the momentary self is not an enduring person, we must show that it is an organic whole of teleological growth which begins with and extends the momentary self beyond a mere "unique experiential togetherness." It is within this growing unity of experience that a self develops toward an ideal of a total personality and thereby *achieves* its own personal identity throughout changing experiences. There is no going behind or beyond this given experiential unity and its teleological-growth-into-an-organic-whole in order to find some reality that is more ultimate. For no matter how complicated may be the integration and re-integration of value-realizations in the process of self-creation, the operation of self-

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causality is always that of an individual experient re-ordering itself. This means that—even though the data of the experiential content are given through a self's interaction with other existents by virtue of God's integration of relevant universal sense and value-possibilities—nevertheless, within his own experience, a chaotic fragmentary self is organizing himself into an organic whole or unified person.

Far from being an *a priori* abstraction from concrete experience, spiritual growth is, therefore, the unique quality of a self-conscious, self-determined, and self-identical purpose which adjusts mere emotional desires to an objectively discovered but self-imposed ideal of personality. Accordingly, it is this metaphysical principle of teleological self-causality that is exemplified in the spiritual growth by which modern man may achieve his "soul."

¹ This relation of the "natural order" and the "human order" has been succinctly expressed by Blanshard in his "The Nature of Man": "What is distinctive about man is that he lives on a hierarchy of levels. As a body, he obeys the laws of physics. As a body that is alive, he obeys the laws of biology. As a conscious being, he obeys the laws governing the association of ideas. He is also, though brokenly, a moral and rational being. So far as this is the case, he is governed by laws which require us to say that he does what he does because to do so is right and reasonable." (*Journal of Philosophy* (XLIII, 25, 1946, page 673.)

² Compare previous discussion of the empirical organization of self-consciousness disclosed by introspective observation.

³ See previous discussion of the categorial system of explanatory hypotheses required by the hypothetical-deductive logic of synoptic inquiry.

This attempt to determine whether or not such an ideal value experience as the realization of an enlightened good will has any objective meaning in terms of metaphysical categories does not presuppose that ethical principles are invalid, if our conclusion is negative. Moral obligation is experienced as a fact, whatever may be one's view of the universe as a whole. We are interested in what such an experience may indicate as a clue which, when interpreted, may lead to a coherent insight into the objective reality of spiritual growth.

When Westermarck in his *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas* claims that it is impossible to justify the belief that moral experience indicates anything about objective reality, he distorts the issues: "The presumed objectivity of moral judgments thus being a chimera, there can be no moral truth in the sense in which this term is generally understood. The ultimate reason for this is, that the moral concepts are based upon emotions, and that the contents of an emotion fall outside the category of truth. But it may be true or not that we have a certain emotion, it may be true or not that a given mode of conduct has a tendency to evoke in us moral indignation or moral approval. Hence a

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moral judgment is true or false according as its subject has or has not the tendency which the predicate attributes to it. If I say that it is wrong to resist evil, and yet resistance to evil has no tendency whatever to call forth in me an emotion of moral disapproval, then my judgment is false." (17-18)

We wish to point out this fallacy in his reasoning. If he applies the same logic to sense-experience, he would have to say that scientific concepts are true when they elicit pleasure and false when they elicit pain in the consciousness of the experimenter. Westermarck is right when he maintains that "emotions are outside the category of truth"; but so also are other given contents of consciousness such as sense-impressions. All these experienced data are intuitions that must be interpreted in terms of verifiable hypotheses. Westermarck may be right in his claim that an enlightened good will has no objective meaning, but before we shall agree with him we must come to this conclusion as a result of a synoptic interpretation according to a comprehensive scheme of causal categories. Perhaps we shall find that moral experience has objective meaning as a contributing factor in spiritual growth. We are not trying to solve the problem here; but we wish to avoid such falsification of the questions that must be answered.

⁴ That self-consciousness is such a unique complex unity of given experience is a fundamental principle of the organic pluralism advocated by Brightman and Whitehead.

Brightman: "Every conscious being is a complex unity, a *unitas multiplex*, to use William Stern's phrase. All of the complex data of any particular conscious being belong together in a unique way; 'my' experience is mine only and cannot be handed over to anyone else. Not only do the present data hang together uniquely, but they are also connected uniquely with past and future data by linkages of memory and of anticipation. A present complex consciousness may be called a datum self. The whole self is the whole range of present, past, and future experiences that belong with a datum self by virtue of conscious linkages." (ML, 79.)

Whitehead: "There is a togetherness of the component elements in individual experience. This 'togetherness' has that special peculiar meaning of 'togetherness in experience.' It is a togetherness of its own kind, explicable by reference to nothing else. For the purpose of this discussion it is indifferent whether we speak of a 'stream' of experience, or of an 'occasion' of experience. With the former alternative here is togetherness in the stream, and with the latter alternative there is togetherness in the occasion. In either case, there is the unique 'experiential togetherness.'" (PR, 288.)

⁵ Such an analysis for the sake of interpreting self-consciousness should not lead one to the conclusion that the unique complex unity of the self is destroyed. This is emphasized by two thinkers who otherwise disagree on many points:

Bowne: "In memory volition appears in a voluntary use of the laws of reproduction. In the constructive imagination the mind freely combines given elements. In all the constitutional forms of activity volition enters as eliciting, guiding, repressing, according to laws inherent in the nature of the soul itself." (*Introduction to Psychological Theory*, 233.)

Lewis: "Any particular experience is a whole within which that part or aspect which represents the legislative or categorial activity of mind and that which is given content, independent of the mind's interpretation, are separable only by analysis. We have no higher or more esoteric experience through which the mind discovers itself." (*Mind and the World Order*, 25-26.)

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⁶ See previous discussion of the category of mechanical causality for our rejection of behaviorism.

⁷ See previous discussion of the category of substance. In addition to this formal argument, an account of the difficulties besetting an explanation of the interaction of substances which arise from the principle of the conservation of energy, can be found in Werkmeister, APS, 369-371.

⁸ PR, 444. Cf. PR, 10. See Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 331-332 for a classic refutation of naturalism with which Whitehead's view seems in accord. Both thinkers affirm that the body is necessary for conscious perception of the continuity of existence. But this perception is an instance of causal interaction for which neither parallelism nor epiphenomenalism could account. (Cf. Ward, *Psychological Principles*, 165, and Whitehead, MT, 219-220; SME, 17-19.) The importance of this similarity between Ward and Whitehead lies in the fact that Ward's duality of "presentational continuum" and subjective activity corresponds roughly to Whitehead's physical and mental poles. (See Ward, PF, 29-30, 60ff., 74ff.; *Realm of Ends*, 10, 26. See PR, 165; P6ICP, 59.)

⁹ PR, 164-165. Cf. AI, 347, 268; MT, 168-171, 40; PR, 246, 22-25, 245, 250-251, 286, 326, 372, 399, 417, 407, 409, 370, 389.

¹⁰ PR, 328 and 130.

¹¹ PR, 130, 246, 164.

¹² See PR, 165; P6ICP, 59. Drake expresses the double-aspect theory thus: "I suggest that the mind *is* the brain; i. e., that it is that cerebral mechanism which receives impressions from the outer world and evokes adjustments of the organism. In using the term 'mind,' we are conceiving these cerebral events as they are on the inside, so to speak When we use the term 'brain,' we are looking at them from the outside, through our sense-organs." (D. Drake, "What Is a Mind?" *Mind*, XXXV [1926], 234.)

¹³ MT, 218-219.

¹⁴ *The Self, Its Body and Freedom*, 95-96.

¹⁵ Brightman, *Moral Laws*, 79.

¹⁶ *A Philosophy of Ideals*, 25.

¹⁷ PR, 88.

¹⁸ PR, 470. See AI, 347, 268; MT, 168-171, 40; PR, 246, 22-25, 245, 250-251, 286, 326, 372, 399, 417, 407, 409, 370, 389.

¹⁹ PR, 470. Cf. AI, 243.

²⁰ PR, 54.

²¹ AI, 265.

²² MT, 157.

²³ MT, 220-221.

²⁴ AI, 362. Cf. AI, 270.

²⁵ AI, 276.

²⁶ PR, 366, and P6ICP, 59.

²⁷ AI, 267.

²⁸ MT, 221-222.

²⁹ Of course, Brightman might reply that, since ultimately the body is the energizing of the divine will in his metaphysics, his solution is explicable in terms of the causal interaction of the divine mind and the human mind. Although this may preserve a metaphysical monism, we are not sure that it is a satisfactory solution of our immediate problem which should be dealt with first.

³⁰ Review previous discussion of Jung's psychological analyses of the causal

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interaction between conscious purpose and subconscious emotions which substantiates our hypothesis. Although Hocking is not responsible for the hypothesis which we are suggesting here, we believe that there is some intimation that he would agree with it in the following passage: "Though every act of a living self is a free act, there are special occasions in which freedom is realized from within in contrast to a course of behavior relatively unfree. These occasions are the acts of *reflexion*. Reflexion is an experience in which the self turns and looks at itself, makes itself an object of contemplation, and becomes more or less aware of the difference between the self as observed and the self it desires to be." (SBF, 149.)

³¹ Russell, *Religion and Science*, 142.

³² See Hegel, *Phenomenology of Mind*, 47, 214; *Logic* (I), 191, 184. Compare previous discussion of the "Meaning of Meaning," presupposed by speculative philosophy.

³³ Our analysis here is a modified version of Whitehead's account of this internal process of mental states in terms of datum, process, satisfaction, and decision. (See PR, 227-228, 232-234, 28-29, 24, 44-45, 159, 173; MT, 120-121, 224. Cf. PR, 88; MT, 229-230; AI, 248-250, 362, 363.)

³⁴ Recall Hocking's statement: "Reflexion is an experience in which the self turns and looks at itself, makes itself an object of contemplation, and becomes more or less aware of the difference between the self as observed and the self it desires to be." (SBF, 149.) If this be true, and introspection certainly seems to indicate that it is an empirical fact, the inadequacy of the following method is obvious: "We shall proceed to ask what are the stimulus-response units of action involved in emotional conduct, in remembering, in perceiving, in paying attention, and so forth. Our questions should always be: What are the exact stimuli? What precisely are the responses?" (Dashiell, *Fundamentals of Objective Psychology*, 36.)

³⁵ "The eternal objects . . . define the concepts whereby the associate mental occasion analyzes the physical occasion, thereby affecting a new synthesis which is the unity of consciousness." (Whitehead, *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* [edited by Brightman], 60-61.)

³⁶ Perry, *The New Realism*, 476.

³⁷ Compare previous discussion of the "Extensive Continuum."

³⁸ Compare previous discussion of natural law as immanent.

³⁹ See Perry, *General Theory of Value*, 139-140, for the neo-realist's "bio-centric or psycho-centric theory of value." Cf. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, 304, for the view of mind as "interest, nervous system, and contents" which this theory presupposes.

Spaulding, though a neo-realist, is an exception in that he holds to a Platonic view of the objectivity of values. (See NR, 508.)

The emergence of values is also recognized by Alexander in *Space, Time, and Deity*.

⁴⁰ 90BC. For a more complete explanation review previous discussion of Plato's cosmology in Chapter V. Since we are suggesting that Plato implicitly presupposes that an ideal of personality is a complex of eternal ideas, the following passages from Demos, *Philosophy of Plato*, are relevant: "Plato proposes the conception of the ideas as a *hypothesis* to explain certain facts of human experience—facts which we will conveniently classify under three headings: (a) production, (b) knowledge, (c) nature." (174) The Platonic forms might also be described as follows: "To sum up, mathematics, science, art, and the moral life are directed toward objects which are not empirical. Unless these

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disciplines are to be divested of all significance, their objects must be deemed to be real. In all these disciplines, the mind is moving along a path away from particulars to universals; away from the actual to the idea; away from the sensed to the conceived. The realm of forms is precisely the world aimed at, and contemplated in these disciplines." (182) Consequently, Demos goes on to show how, for Plato, these universals illustrate the standard of the really real: "We may now sum up the respects in which universals illustrate the standard of the really real. Forms are things-in-themselves; that is to say, they are not relative to anything else. They are what they are. Forms have an intrinsic content; beauty is a definite nature understood by itself. In the field of experience, the big is relative to the small; in the realm of forms, size is absolute. The forms possess selfhood in respect of their relation (a) to things, (b) to minds, (c) to other forms." (191) That point in Plato's view which Whitehead will be shown to modify is the independence and priority of the forms. Regarding this issue, Demos has an instructive comment: "The reasons for which Plato assigns an independent and prior status to universals are two; universals are eternal, and universals are norms." (178-179)

A careful consideration of the following passages from Plato's own writings about the Ideas has convinced the present writer of the accuracy and profundity of Demos' interpretation of Plato's meaning: *Timaeus*, 46DE, 50E, 51D, 52A; *Phaedrus*, 247C; *Parmenides*, 129, 130; *Phaedo*, 102, 75-103; *Republic*, 6.308, 5.476; *Meno*, 81-86; *Symposium*, 211; *Sophist*, 240; *Philebus*, 15; *Euthydemus*, 296, 301.

41 "For even if there is something good predicated in common of all things that are good, or separable and capable of existing independently, manifestly it cannot be the object of human action or attainable by man; but we are in search now of something that is so." (Aristotle, *Ethics*, Book I, Chapter III.)

42 Aristotle, *Ethics*, Book I, Chapter X.

43 Compare the previous discussions of "moral laws" and "natural laws" in Chapters IV and VI.

44 Compare footnote 50 of Chapter VI for previous reference to Aristotle's discussion of his four causes: material, formal, efficient, and final. Parenthetically, we believe that Aristotle misunderstands Plato, since Plato provides for all of these causes in his pre-existing elements uncreated by God, the Ideas, God's integrating activity, and God's aim to realize the Good, respectively. Although, as we have already pointed out, Plato did not account sufficiently for how a person might realize the eternal essences in temporal existence, he did intimate that the realization of an ideal of personality required the final causality of a human self as well as of God.

In Leibnitz, we find a more explicit reference to personality in terms of efficient and final causality: "Souls act according to the laws of final causes by appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes by motions. And the two kingdoms, of efficient and of final causes, are in harmony with one another." (*Monadology*, par. 79.) Since Leibnitz presupposed the substance doctrine, even though his monads were active, his explanation of causal interaction was inadequate. In our explanation of reflective self-consciousness according to a category of teleological causality, we propose to remedy this inadequacy by interpreting personal growth in terms of a creative synthesis of efficient and final causation.

45 Compare the previous discussion of the category of teleological causality in Chapter VI.

A similar view of the universe and its totality is held by Werkmeister: "We

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now envisage this whole co-existing world about us—and ourselves included—as resting upon, and as derived from, antecedent causes. Suddenly this whole world appears to us in a dynamic aspect of ever changing events causally linked together into one great evolutionary scheme, covering aeons in time and ranging from star dust to man in material development." (APS, 466.) Werkmeister provides for freedom along with determining factors of nature by distinguishing different levels of reality: matter, life, mind, and personality. On each of these, he holds, there are different types of determination. For instance, biological phenomena exhibit "bio-determinants." Man exhibits "determination through thought." Consequently, "freedom so understood—namely, as autonomy of the highest actually existing level of determination—is perfectly reconcilable with a general and thoroughgoing determination of nature; for such freedom nowhere interrupts the actual nexus of events but adds only further determining factors to the causal sequence—factors which give new impetus and new direction to the processes already occurring." (APS, 442.) (See APS, 438-439 for material paraphrased above.)

Our agreement and disagreement with this view will be evident in our explanation of teleological causality. Now Werkmeister rightly maintains that an exclusive predetermination by God's purpose, for instance, would rule out freedom just as much as would an exclusive mechanism. (See APS, 426-427.) But we intend to explore a possibility that he seems to have overlooked, namely, that God's purpose and human purpose might causally interact and so provide for a relative self-determination.

⁴⁶ Compare previous discussion of the ultimate category of teleological causality in Chapter VI.

We wish to re-emphasize that this division is not intended to tri-chotomize the monism of the organic process that is reality. Accordingly, we agree with Hoernle in his reason for indicating divisions of relativity as "aspects": "I prefer to treat the difference between existence and subsistence, or between particular and universal, as a difference between *aspects* of Reality rather than between modes of being or classes or objects. 'Aspect' may be a vague term, and I wish I could think of a better: but it is at least a convenient reminder (which the other terms are not) that the differences belong to a unity, and that the problem of conceiving them as differences of that unity is ever present. Similarly, a division into 'classes' seems absolute and final: 'aspects' are essentially relative." (*Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* [edited by Brightman] 268-269.)

⁴⁷ *Timaeus*, 53B. Compare previous discussion of Plato's cosmology in Chapter V.

⁴⁸ *Timaeus*, 56C.

⁴⁹ *Timaeus*, 37DE.

⁵⁰ PR, 374.

⁵¹ See PR, 75, 374, 376, 303, 63-64, 521-525; SMW, 246; *Religion in the Making*, 113-114, 118-120, for passages relevant to this paragraph.

See Chapter VII for a discussion of Whitehead's conception of the relation of God to the "natural order."

⁵² PR, 524: "This side of his nature is free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious."

⁵³ In private conversation, Whitehead informed the present writer that God's purpose is conscious by virtue of the unity of the primordial and consequent natures within God's being.

⁵⁴ *A Philosophy of Religion*, 336-337. The bracketed insertions are Bright-

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man's own footnotes at these points. Although the nature of physical things is not under discussion here, we note parenthetically that for Brightman physical things are ultimately the energizing of the Divine Will, whereas for Whitehead physical things have a theoretical autonomy in that they, like human persons, interact causally with God's purpose in the "ingression of eternal objects."

⁵⁵ This is an essential doctrine of organic pluralism. This essential interdependence of existents was expressed in Whitehead's theory of the mutual immanence or essential togetherness of things which implies that each particular happening is a factor that influences every other happening. Thus in his organic process of processes the community of the universe is accounted for by the functional interplay or internal relations between individual centers of activity: "Thus, as disclosed in the fundamental essence of our experience, the togetherness of things involves some doctrine of mutual immanence." (MT, 225. Cf. MT, 205, 226; PR, 43-45, 335.) Whitehead expressed by his term "prehension" the key to the solidarity of the world which we are indicating by "existential interaction."

Brightman explains the organic character of the actual world in terms of the interaction of experients: "The term experient is intended to designate an indefinite variety of such entities, including the lowest and simplest forms of animal and perhaps of vegetable life, the evanescent experients of certain sub-conscious processes, the developed experient of experients we call the human self or person, and the supreme experient, God. The hypothesis of experients further posits that experients are in interaction with each other and with non-experiential entities, if such there be." ("An Empirical Approach to God," *Phil. Rev.*, 2 [1937], 153.)

Although we use the term "existent" where Brightman uses "experient" to indicate the actualities of the world other than my own self-consciousness, the difference is one of terms rather than of meaning. We reserve "experient" for a particular existent, i. e., my own private self-consciousness. Nevertheless, the causal interaction of selves within an organic process of actuality is a basic principle of the metaphysics of both Brightman and Whitehead, as well as our own.

⁵⁶ See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 243-244, 263-265, and Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, 72.

⁵⁷ See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 119-120, 382, 371-372, and 374.

⁵⁸ Bradley, AR, 246. Cf. Bradley, AR, 376-377, 260.

⁵⁹ See Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, (II), 45 and 428.

⁶⁰ Russell, *Religion and Science*, 143. In his latest book, *Human Knowledge*, he modifies his position: "I conclude that while mental events and their qualities can be known without inference, physical events are known only as regards their space-time structure. The qualities that compose such events are unknown." (231)

⁶¹ Whitehead, it will be recalled, has given to this teleological process of self-creative synthesis a name which etymologically suggests the essential concrete growth of many elements together into one, *concrescence*: "'Concrescence' is the name for the process in which the universe of many things acquires an individual unity in a determinate relegation of each item of the 'many' to its subordination in the constitution of the novel 'one.'" (PR, 321. See PR, 359.)

⁶² Our category of the experiential intra-action of efficient and final causation within reflective self-consciousness is an explicit formulation of what is implied in the hypothesis of "emergent evolution."

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⁶³ See Chapter VII for previous discussion of the "space-time continuum."

⁶⁴ We believe that our explanation is implied in Whitehead's view of contemporary independence: "The mutual independence of contemporary occasions lies strictly within the sphere of their teleological self-creation. The occasions originate from a common past and their objective immortality operates within a common future. Thus indirectly, *via* the immanence of the past and the immanence of the future, the occasions are connected. But the immediate activity of self-creation is separate and private, so far as contemporaries are concerned." (AI, 252. Cf. PR, 101, 105, 95, 75; AI, 251, 255-256, 328; MT, 206.)

Review Chapter VII for previous discussion of "contemporary independence" in the "natural order."

⁶⁵ Bowne has significantly emphasized that freedom is meaningless apart from uniformity: "By freedom in our human life we mean the power of self-direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and to work for their realization. We do not mean an abstract freedom existing by itself, but this power of self-direction in living men and women. Abstract freedom is realized only as little as abstract necessity. Actual freedom is realized only as one aspect of actual life; and it must always be discussed in its concrete significance." (*Metaphysics*, 405.)

⁶⁶ The conception of freedom as indeterminism is represented today by Sartre in his "Existentialism": "Man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent that he fulfills himself; he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his acts, nothing else than his life." (*Existentialism*, 37-38.) Each choice, according to Sartre is absolutely free from the influence of causal motivation: "At heart, what existentialism shows is the connection between the absolute character of free involvement . . . and the relativeness of the cultural ensemble which may result from such a choice." (*Existentialism*, 47. See page 89 for Sartre's deprecation of the concept of causality.)

⁶⁷ Although Werkmeister is not an advocate of determinism, his exposition of this point of view is instructive: "But we are not only born to hereditary and congenital factors and conditions, we are also born into a physical and social environment which is not of our choosing; and from the very first moments of our existence this environment influences and conditions us and determines our actions. No matter how 'sovereign' the first autistic motions or utterances of the new-born baby may be, very soon his 'reflexes' become 'conditioned' and his behavior is 'regulated' by adult attendants. As the child grows up, he learns the language of his surroundings and with it he absorbs the ideas of his elders. He 'imitates' their behavior and is 'trained' into the society of which he is to become a full member later. He develops habits and attitudes in conformity with the existing folkways. He adapts himself, positively or negatively, to the world in which he lives, and this world molds and shapes his character and his whole range of attitudes and his outlook upon life.

Biological heredity and environmental influences—the two great determiners of human nature—seem to leave little room for free will; and the determinists will make the most of this fact." (APS, 428.)

⁶⁸ Compare previous discussion of the scientific principle of causality in Chapter VI.

⁶⁹ *Mysticism and Logic*, 44. In the following selection from Max Planck's *The Philosophy of Physics*, that great scientist recognizes the reality of self-determination: "We may perhaps here deal with free will. Our consciousness, which after all is the most immediate source of cognition, assures us that free will is supreme. Yet we are forced to ask whether human will is causally

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determined or not. Put in this way the question, as I have frequently tried to show, is a good example of the kind of problem which I have described as illusory, by which I mean that, taken literally, it has no exact meaning. In the present instance the apparent difficulty is due to an incomplete formulation of the question. The actual facts may be briefly stated as follows: From the standpoint of an ideal and all-comprehensive spirit, human will, like every material and spiritual event, is completely determined causally. Looked at subjectively, however, the will, in so far as it looks to the future, is not causally determined, because any cognition of the subject's will itself acts causally upon the will so that any definite cognition of a fixed causal nexus is out of the question. In other words we may say that looked at from outside (objectively) the will is causally determined, and that looked at from inside (subjectively) it is free. There is here no contradiction, any more than there was in the previous debate about the right- and left-hand side, and those who fail to agree to this overlook or forget the fact that the subject's will is never completely subordinate to its cognition and indeed always has the last word." (32-33)

⁷⁰ Eckermann, *Conversations with Goethe*, 164. Cf. CWG, 68.

⁷¹ See Descartes, *Principles*, 34; Spinoza, *Ethics*, 1; and Leibnitz, *Monadology*, paragraphs 62-63 and 79.

⁷² See Locke, *An Essay Concerning the Human Understanding*, Bk. II, XXI, 1; Berkeley, *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, 64 and 84; Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Everyman's Library Edition) I, 24.

⁷³ THN, II, 318.

⁷⁴ There is a slight intimation that identity might be defined in terms of purpose in Hume's own writing: "By producing a reference of the parts to each other, and a combination to some common end or purpose," the imagination is induced to advance a step further. (THN, I, 243.)

⁷⁵ Weiss, *Reality*, 208. Essentially the same idea is expressed by Ryan: "The functional idea, however, must be blasted out of the modern treatment of mind problems. In its place we must substitute a dualistic and dynamic philosophy of act and potency, substance and accident." (Cited by Morris, *Six Theories of Mind*, 46.)

⁷⁶ For Whitehead's discussion of this notion, see AI, 260-262, 239-240, 266-267; PR, 213, 334-335, 50-51, 374-375, 288-289. Cf. previous discussion of endurance of electromagnetic fields of the "natural order" in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER IX

THE ENDURING SATISFACTION OF SPIRITUAL GROWTH

SPIRITUAL GROWTH is not an ordinary mode of human thought and conduct. Yet, if our metaphysical hypothesis of teleological self-causality is true, the purposive realization of ideal values exemplifies objective principles on a higher level of life than human minds usually attain in their evolutionary development. Although there are many human beings who never aim at ideals higher than those attainable through bodily behavior which is motivated by uncriticized desires or merely physical appetites, a higher mode of life emerges with unique qualities when an ideal of personality is recognized and consciously acknowledged. This quality of attainment is a self-determined attitude of a self-conscious and self-identical person that requires the inner adjustment of his desires to an autonomous ideal of spiritual growth. Its imperative demands upon his will are rooted in its self-imposed character, i. e., his acknowledgement of it as a norm for his thought and conduct. It follows, therefore, that when a self purposively integrates his emotional experiences into an organic whole, he realizes a particular type of novelty that is peculiar to such rational persons. This spiritual growth is exemplified concretely in a self-create process by which a definite quality of mind is realized through the cultivation and enduring satisfaction of spiritual appetites. Let us now consider the implications of this metaphysical self-knowledge for such a consummatory stage of emergent evolution.¹

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A. The Significance of Coherent Metaphysical Insight for an Enduring Satisfaction.

We discovered previously that if modern man satisfies his spiritual appetites for aesthetic imagination and an enlightened good will, he may realize the Faustian attitude of a noble discontent. The high courage of the humanist can not compensate, however, for the fact that he offers no rational basis for believing that spiritual growth is an objective reality in the creative process of the universe. The realization of aesthetic and ethical values is very important, but it is not sufficient. Throughout the preceding chapters we have shown what we mean by speculative venture. By briefly summarizing our conclusions we shall be in a position to decide whether or not a synoptic insight into the metaphysical meaning of spiritual growth furnishes one who is possessed by a noble discontent with the *enduring satisfaction* which modern man is fervently seeking.²

The investigation of self-causality, as it is implicated in a human person's teleological integration of perishing emotional experiences into a self-conscious, relatively self-determined, and self-identical whole of organic growth, has revealed the truth of the following propositions: (i) The given experiential unity which is the minimum essential of selfhood is linked with the relevant order of abstract sense-qualities and value-possibilities by virtue of God's integrating activity (subsistent interaction). (ii) A given human experient is functionally interrelated with all the other particular actualities that interact immanently within the organic process of existence (existential interaction). (iii) Both these external subsistents and external existents become factors in the internal constitution of a given human experient by virtue of its causal integration of these complex data in the concrete temporal growth into a novel objective existent (experiential intra-action).³

Such a volitional attitude of mind has been shown to be the present prospective principle of self-causation by which an

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ideal of a total personality is imaginatively anticipated and purposively realized through the rational control of ideal value-experience. It is the final causality of self-creation by a will which is sensitive by virtue of its creative imagination, which is good by virtue of its sincere and intelligent loyalty, and which is enlightened by virtue of its speculative venture.

(i) According to the causal explanation of subsistential interaction with concrete actuality, both sense and value intuitions are given as abstract elements available for the concrete growth of a human personality. Thus we believe that we have justified our two-fold hypothesis that out of the *sensa* the human experient constructs his space-time continuum; out of the value-experience the human experient constructs his ideal of a total personality toward which his present self might grow. To the space-time continuum self-consciousness maintains physical relations of sense-perception in the mode of efficient causation: to the ideal of personality self-consciousness maintains mental relations of value-realization in the mode of final causation. The elements of both rational constructions (space-time continuum and an ideal of personality) are given as eternal forms that are relevantly integrated by God. The actualization of these sense-qualities and value-possibilities in concrete temporal growth presupposes, therefore, that the coherent construction of an ideal of personality is just as objective for reason as is a coherent construction of the space-time continuum.

If this be true, a sensitive, good, and enlightened will is an important instance of the self-creative activity through which a rational person realizes those relevant possibilities of ideal value that God has integrated and linked with existence for the concrete growth of that particular actuality. Since the causal explanation of the universe has been shown to require such an hypothesis, if it is to be coherent, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that such a mental attitude is a constitutive factor in the process of spiritual growth. Con-

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sequently, the person who is possessed by this state of mind is an active agent in the growth of ideal values throughout the total universe.

(ii) The organic character of existence has been explained in terms of the categorial mode of reciprocal immanence (existential interaction). In other words, experients are what they are by virtue of their active interrelations with the other experients whose perspectives they share. Since a sensitive, good, and enlightened will is such an immanent relation between rational persons, it is just as much a constituent of objective existence as is a physical relation between actualities in an electromagnetic field. Likewise, such a mental attitude toward other persons is just as objectively real in the concrete growth by which a person is self-created as is a physical relation toward natural objects.

(iii) The concrete growth of an individual actuality (experiential intra-action) has been shown to be a purposive unification of value-experiences. This self-causation is exemplified in both natural events and human individuals. Human self-causation has been seen to be distinguished from sub-human causality, however, by the quality of the purposes that are involved in its self-realization of ideal values.

In this process of concrete growth toward complex unity, by which a human individual is actualized, the activity of a sensitive, good, and enlightened will is thus a regulative factor. For it is the self-consistent function in the genetic process of individual growth. The reciprocal influences of human value-realizations with other persons as well as with oneself in this way are purposively integrated into that quality of mind which is enduringly satisfying.

It follows, therefore, from the meaning of the categorial modes of existence, as they are exhibited in the purposive growth of a self-conscious, self-identical, and self-determined person, that a sensitive, good, and enlightened will exemplifies the principle of final self-causation. By virtue of this fact

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such a human individual is an integral part of the organic process that constitutes the objective existence of the universe. Thus, to increase one's own spiritual stature is to be a part creator of the growing universe; for a rational person's ideal purpose really makes a difference in the creative process that is ultimate reality. When a human mind becomes possessed by the rational understanding of this metaphysical insight into the cosmic significance of his ideal purposes, then that mind becomes conscious of a feeling of an *enduring satisfaction*. Endowed with this quality of mind, modern man can realize that his spiritual growth exemplifies the universal and necessary principle of teleological causality that characterizes whatever is objectively real throughout the organic whole of the creative process.

A positivist or a pragmatist may wonder what the cosmic significance adds to the ideal purpose and why it yields an *enduring satisfaction* beyond the noble discontent that is elicited by the striving for an ideal regardless of whether or not the realization of one's aspirations has any metaphysical meaning. Just what constitutes this "something more" can be brought out by comparing our view with that of William James. James claimed that we live in a growing universe in which both man and God must struggle together in order to make a better world:

If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a real fight—as if there were something really wild in the universe which we, with all our idealities and faithfulness, are needed to redeem.⁴

James verifies the truth of this claim by an appeal to the practical feeling of satisfaction that one experiences when he acts upon this belief. He contends that man has the "right to

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believe" what he desires as long as there is no conclusive theoretical proof to the contrary.

Now we agree with James that a human person can well be defined as a "fighter for ends," and that in his purposive realization of ideal values man is cooperating with a God who is also struggling to improve a growing universe. This is the Faustian meaning of life which embodies a noble discontent. But James had no other criterion than his own courageous hopes and aspirations to justify his belief. Consequently, he furnishes no objective reasons for denying the truth of Russell's claim that the only meaning man can find for his life is:

to preserve a mind free from the tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power.⁵

In spite of their antithetical conclusions, both James and Russell portray equally noble conceptions of man's destiny. Each is inspired by his personal temperament and feeling rather than by a rational conception of spiritual growth that is verifiable in terms of a metaphysical system. Like the humanists, each appeals to the creative imagination and thus fails to furnish an adequate basis for determining the truth of conflicting intuitions.

It is our contention that speculative venture using the synoptic method and the criterion of coherence verifies to a high degree of probability that spiritual growth is an integral process within the total creative process of the universe. Consequently, we have an objective reason for accepting James's belief rather than that of Russell. It is because modern man can attain this metaphysical insight into the causal efficacy of his ideal purposes that, along with his noble discontent, he

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can realize an *enduring satisfaction*. Whereas James verified his value-claims by their practical consequences, we verified our value-claims by showing that their realization in spiritual growth exemplified metaphysical categories which characterized all that is truly real. Accordingly, although the realization of an *enduring satisfaction* does not demonstrate the objective truth of our hypothesis of spiritual growth, the quality of mind attained thereby is the product of our metaphysical thinking when its implications are applied to concrete experience. Even though we reject the positive principle of pragmatism, i. e., any belief is true which has practical consequences, nevertheless, we accept its negative principle, i. e., no belief is meaningful which has no practical consequence or, at least, some application to life. In short, a meaningful idea must make some difference in experience.

Since this synoptic insight reveals that the universe may be susceptible to the Platonic victory of persuasion over force, such a spiritually mature person as modern man could become would not be defying the ultimate power in the universe, even though he would have inherited the Promethean spirit of an enlightened good will. For he would realize that his spiritual growth is inherently rational and valuable in the very nature of the creative process as a whole. Now in what sense does the destiny of a sensitive, good, and enlightened purpose define the meaning of a self-conscious, relatively self-determined, and self-identical personality?

It has been our central thesis that the enduring self-consciousness, relative self-determination, and self-identity of a persisting human person is acquired from those emotional experiences which are perpetually passing away in the changing, ongoing, temporal process of becoming that characterizes ultimate reality. Endurance in this sense does not mean an enduring substance. Rather it should be thought of in terms of a continuity of spiritual growth. For the defining characteristic of the personal society which is a human individual has

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been shown to be a teleological quality of mind. Herein is disclosed that metaphysical reality which is thus related continuously to its own past and future and yet is emerging as an unique novelty in its present realization of an enduring satisfaction. Just as each of the meaningful feelings of a creative imagination and an enlightened good will is an integration of perishing emotional experiences into an ideal purpose, so is an enduring satisfaction the result of the teleological organization of those spiritual appetites of a noble discontent into an organic whole by speculative venture. Accordingly, the subordinate *quantitative* unities of indivisible "datum selves," which are these transient emotional experiences, have thereby become organized teleologically into a divisible *qualitative* unity-in-complexity, i. e., a self-conscious, self-determined, and self-identical personality.

If there is any sense in which a rational person might be said to transcend the temporal process of change, it is in this consummation of reflective self-consciousness through speculative venture. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that such an enduring satisfaction is a transmutation of the value-realizations of a noble discontent into a quality of mind whose spiritual growth will continue throughout all time and is thus eternal.

Analogously, the meaningful feelings that are elicited by the various movements of a great symphony are so taken up into its climax that there is felt the sublime meaning of the whole as it enhances the aesthetic effects of the movements that organically constitute it. Viewed in the light of the same aesthetic principles, the purposive realization of various ideal values embodies partial meanings of human personality in its process of self-creation. But just as the climax transmutes the effects of the various movements, so also it is the *enduring satisfaction* which gives metaphysical importance to the *noble discontent* from which it emerges. Herein there is discovered, we believe, the fullest disclosure of what it means

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for modern man in search of a soul to become a self-conscious, self-determined, and self-identical personality.

A human person who is possessed by this enduring satisfaction does not cease to grow. That would mean extinction. Rather, this novel mental self-realization of emotional peace, moral poise, and causal power exemplifies the teleological capacity by which an organic whole endures throughout the continuous temporal process of becoming constantly an even more complete person. In this quality of mind there is realized that rare completeness of a teleological whole whereby a human individual grows into an enduring person of unique metaphysical significance.⁶

B. The Significance of Religious Consecration for an Enduring Satisfaction.

The "modern man in search of a soul," who is seeking to save himself from the inner frustration of a meaningless life by realizing that ideal purpose of spiritual growth, may find that he requires some intrinsically sacred enterprise to which he might consecrate his sensitive and enlightened good will. "Not my will, but Thine be done," expresses the profound discovery that to realize spiritual maturity, one must dedicate his purposes to some cause through the participation in which all his ideal value experiences progressively increase the meaning of his life.

If a reflective person employs the method of synoptic inquiry is to realize the full meaning of the religious experience of consecration, however, the intuitive insights involved, like those of aesthetic experience, must be interpreted in terms of metaphysical principles that can be verified as a coherent system of explanatory hypotheses.⁷ Santayana would question the necessity for this speculative justification of intuitive insights.

In the aesthetic naturalism of Santayana there is a romantic attempt to find a meaning for life through an appreciative response. Incentive and perspective for living are acquired

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through contemplation. Although a person's activity may involve objective social consequences, the ultimate aim is merely a subjective satisfaction. One is saved from a life of mere vegetation to a life becoming the dignity of the human spirit when the disciplined life of reason leads to mature reflection. No creative art has achieved the perfection and expressiveness of religion in lifting men to this realm. Through the imagination religion has elicited and cultivated a refined quality of mind. Salvation, therefore, lies in the progressive realization of goodness, truth, and beauty—but the dominant emphasis should be upon the harmonization of beauty:

What successful religion really should pass into is contemplation, ideality, poetry, in the sense in which poetry includes all imaginative life. That this is what religion looks to is very clear in prayer and in the efficacy which prayer consistently can have. In rational prayer the soul may be said to accomplish three things important to its welfare: it withdraws within itself and defines its good; it accommodates itself to destiny, and it grows like the ideal it conceives.⁸

As a symbolic rendering of the experiences of life, religion holds out for man's imagination meaning and insights that satisfy the emotions that crave idealistic aspirations. Santayana denies, however, that religion contains anything more than "a symbolic rendering of that moral experience which it springs out of and which it seeks to elucidate."⁹ Despite his tribute to the sublimity of religious mythology, Santayana makes it clear that he sees in religion nothing but imaginative symbols and poetic analogies. This view of religion is a consistent implication of his metaphysics in which the mental essences which each person experiences are entirely separate from the existences of the external world. Consequently, he offers no objective status for man's experience of ideal values, though his writings are filled with beautiful descriptions of

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the inner life. Like the poets to whom he looks for the salvation of mankind, Santayana furnishes modern man a noble discontent but no *enduring satisfaction*; for, instead of a rational interpretation of the universe in which ideals have cosmic significance, he holds out only an imaginative construction. What is required is a view in which the highest values in the realm of essences should be the source of an objective transformation within personal existence — regardless of whether the chief agent is God, man, or God and man cooperating in the creative process.

Some degree of dependence upon God or the cosmic process beyond one's own self-realization is an essential characteristic of man's consciousness when he is seeking salvation. Our evolutionary reconception of the redemptive process in terms of the Socratic way of spiritual growth must take this feeling of consecration into account, even though we appeal to reason rather than to faith in absolute revelations as do the great religious traditions.¹⁰

Now if modern man can purposively organize his emotional experiences by his creative imagination, his enlightened good will, and his speculative venture, then it may be that he can conceive his spiritual growth to be an integral part of the divine quest for an eternal ideal of perfectibility. In realizing an *enduring satisfaction* he attains a cosmic perspective of even greater significance than the noble discontent of self-salvation alone could afford.

In making this claim we are not forgetting our previous observation that, if modern man is to grow spiritually, he must always be aware of the tragic character of a deep and vital contact with the struggle and suffering of life. Recall, for example, Jesus' experience on the cross. The frustration of his efforts could not stifle his ideal purpose to return divine love for human hatred as long as he had faith in his vision of God's purpose: "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do." But then his vision of the divine influence

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which sustained his enlightened good will failed: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"

When modern man contemplates the fate and despair of such a sensitive soul, he becomes aware of the essentially tragic character of spiritual growth. He may well doubt that the noble discontent which drives his enlightened good will toward an ideal of perfectibility has any meaning beyond the aesthetic vision of his own creative imagination. And when that fails, will he not find himself the pawn of those agencies of brute force which are bound to destroy his hopes for the realization of ideal values? Should modern man conclude, then, that Buddha has found the most satisfactory way of liberation from the miseries of existence by escape into Nirvana: "Oh, to be nothing, nothing, nothing"? Or will a noble discontent lead modern man to the Stoical resignation of unyielding despair with which brave men meet their fate of meaningless extinction in a hostile universe?

Modern man in search of a way of salvation for meaninglessness and spiritual stagnation may well wonder if he should not reconcile himself to the futility of any victory of the persuasion of an enlightened good will over brute force and seek only an aesthetic redemption from tragedy through the "unyielding despair" of his creative imagination. Such a way has been advocated by Schopenhauer.

According to Schopenhauer, art is the means of escaping the irrational illusion, the vain struggle, and the meaningless desires for striving of man's will. In this revelation, he believes, lies the most genuine value of poetry:

Tragedy is to be regarded, and is recognized as the summit of poetical art, both on the greatness of its effect and the difficulty of its achievement . . . The unspeakable pain, the wail of humanity, the triumph of evil, the scornful mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and the innocent, is here presented to us; and in this lies a significant hint of the

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nature of the world and of existence. It is the strife of the will with itself, which here, completely unfolded at the highest grade of its objectivity, comes into fearful prominence.¹¹

But this escape is not that of cowardly self-deception. Schopenhauer intends that we should cope with this destiny with our eyes open:

Thus the summons to turn away the will from life remains the true tendency of tragedy, the ultimate end of the intentional exhibition of the suffering of humanity, and is so accordingly even where this resigned exaltation of mind is not shown in the hero himself, but is merely excited in the spectator by the sight of great, unmerited, nay, even merited suffering.¹²

Thus Schopenhauer, like Buddha, recommends the cleansing and the deadening of the will by virtue of which "the individuality also, and with it its suffering and misery, is really abolished."¹³

Now we would agree with Schopenhauer that there is an essentially and ineradicably tragic aspect of reality and that some of the deepest insights into the frustration of ideal purposes are often rendered through the medium of great art. But whereas Schopenhauer can see only tragedy from which art offers an escape, we are suggesting that with the tragedy there possibly is a further meaning in man's thoughts and aspirations, his devotion to ideals, in short, the Faustian discontent. Even frustration of man's enlightened good will, for instance, might open up new meanings which otherwise he would not have discovered.

The root of our disagreement with Schopenhauer, however, lies in the limitation of his method for apprehending ultimate reality. Whereas he would confine the destiny of human persons to the fate which is revealed by aesthetic intuition alone,

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we have investigated the possibility that the creative advance of the universe, in accordance with which a reflective person might adjust his enlightened good will, can be apprehended adequately only by means of a more comprehensive perspective which includes the creative imagination but which goes beyond it by virtue of metaphysical thought. According to our synoptic inquiry aesthetic intuition must be integrated with moral loyalty by a rational interpretation that is derived from a wider range of value experiences than Schopenhauer recognizes.

Without minimizing the tragic character of spiritual growth, we have sought to discover an objective status for the realization of ideal purposes which gives meaning to the struggle. For a reflective person the frustrated value or the suffering undergone is not as significant as the quality of mind which a wider range of experience and a more coherent interpretation elicit so that the tragedy of a noble discontent is transformed into an *enduring satisfaction*. This is possible for a mind that has worked out a rational interpretation of ideal value experiences which justifies the belief that they refer to an objective reality beyond the mere aspirations of man's creative imagination.

In all probability, serious emotional crises can never be completely eliminated; but if a reflective person is possessed by this consciousness of the cosmic significance of his ideal purposes, his tragic experiences will not be without some meaning. He is not as much concerned about distress and suffering when his efforts are frustrated as he is concerned about the spiritual dignity with which he faces tragedy, when he knows that what he does makes a difference in the creative process of the universe as a whole. Even though he can not always control the external circumstances that obstruct his ideal purposes, the realization of this quality of mind gives him that measure of self-control which is sufficient to increase his mental stature, regardless of the course of external events.

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Through his spiritual growth he thereby controls his emotions for the sake of an ideal cause that is greater than his own selfish or petty interests. He can thus judge all his thought and conduct according to whether or not it is becoming the spiritual dignity which his synoptic insight into the cosmic meaning of ideal value-realization bestows. This tragic sense of cosmic responsibility is his spiritual heritage. Since tragedy means that a noble purpose endures, even though the obstacles frustrating its fruition may be insurmountable, success is but one result of a noble purpose. Although the consequences are important, they are not the definitive criterion of the significance of ideal aims. Rather, a coherent comprehension of metaphysical causality can be the norm by which modern man can know the ultimate meaning of his spiritual destiny.

When one achieves this cosmic perspective, he realizes that his concrete temporal growth transcends his merely momentary experiences as an aspect of eternity. This is not contrasted with the temporal; for it is an extension of temporal experience beyond the finite scope of merely human aims into the infinite duration of the divine purpose. This does not mean that the Faustian quest for self-salvation is abandoned for renunciation of his own efforts and submission to the arbitrary will of a sovereign God who completely determines man's destiny. Rather, it is an opportunity for sharing with God a common enterprise which requires God's faith in man just as much as man's faith in God. A rational person who consecrates himself to a religious cause in the light of this evolutionary reconception of the redemptive process draws much from the essential insights of the great religious traditions without ignoring the important contributions of humanism.

From our metaphysical investigation we concluded that the purposive activity of God is not arbitrary or unmotivated. Instead, his immanent purpose was shown to exemplify the same generic principles of causality by which other experients

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acted in the organic, temporal process that is ultimate reality. In the discussion of the subsistential interaction between God and the world, it was claimed that God was the agent of relevance who integrated and linked abstract potentialities with concrete existence, i. e., sense-qualities, value-possibilities, and an ideal of a total personality. According to this view, God is not a transcendent creator, since he does not produce the un-begun and unending process itself. No human organism, however, could come into being through the process of emergent evolution by virtue of its self-causation, were it not for God's integrating activity of concretion. In this cooperative process of constantly creating (as contrasted with a creation by fiat) a human self is being created at every moment of its temporal growth. Thus self-causation interacts with and derives its content from God's immanent purpose. If the organic character of teleological causality is to be exemplified adequately, however, God's "function of concretion" must be correlated with his "function of persuasion." Correspondingly, coherence requires that man's relation to God in the mode of efficient causation (concretion) should through the sharing of ideal values be supplemented by cooperation in the mode of final causation (persuasion).

In the realization of this ideal purpose, God and man, in so far as man cooperates with God by sharing his vision of eternal perfectibility, can probably conserve some ideal values out of each of the tragic frustrations which they will always encounter. What quality of mind, therefore, might characterize modern man in so far as he shares this divine persuasion toward an ideal of eternal perfectibility?

When a human individual becomes conscious of his emergence from the society of merely biological feelings, his reflective experience is constituted by an awareness of spatial experience of physical relations, temporal experience of origination from a given past, and some degree of temporal experience of self-determination toward an anticipated future. Now

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when a rational person, possessed by a noble discontent, realizes through speculative venture the meaning of a creative imagination and an enlightened good will, then that person, who thereby receives an enduring satisfaction, is susceptible to an influence from beyond the spatio-temporal relations of his own past and future. That is to say, he may become gradually aware of another creative purpose beyond his own but interacting with it. Such a superhuman reference is to a divine purposer who can unify man's emotional and intellectual aspirations. Although God transcends a human person's self-consciousness, God is immanent in the temporal process of that person's spiritual growth.

As modern man approaches spiritual maturity he will become conscious of an awareness of holiness or what is supremely sacred in sharing God's ideal purpose. It is in consecration that a reflective person experiences this challenge of an eternal striving for perfectibility. If God is to be worthy of worship, he must embody in his eternal purpose that which man finds to be the most vital spiritual attitude within himself, namely, the noble discontent which acknowledges an ideal of perfectibility that is beyond any possible realization, but which, nevertheless, demands an everlasting loyalty. Thus the noble discontent can lead to an enduring satisfaction only if modern man learns "the secret of noble patience."¹⁴

Underlying the traditional conceptions of salvation there is the belief that someday there will occur what Tennyson described as:

That far-off divine event
To which the whole creation moves.

Such a notion of perfection as a termination of divine progress is as inconceivable for speculative venture according to a category of teleological causality as would be an idea of its beginning. Not only is it remote from any experience, but it escapes attempts to imagine what it would be like. Since time

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is ultimately real, all reality is a creative process of eternal becoming in which God's purpose is the integrating factor. Even God himself could not change this ultimate fact. Although God did not create the cosmic order, he will always seek to perfect it, i. e., to achieve ever higher orders of life through persuading reflective persons to realize spiritual growth both in this existence and throughout other realms of a growing universe. That God's cause might be lost and his ideal purpose rendered futile, is a possibility which a rational person must recognize. A sincerely consecrated person, however, will participate no less in the eternal quest for a victory of ideal persuasion over brute force. To one who has experienced the struggles, tragedies, and variety of realizing ideal values, the cessation of all desires in the static complacency that the idea of perfection embodies is a pale prospect in comparison with the sublime possibilities of creative endeavor in plumbing the depths of a universe of inexhaustible perfectibility.

The vitality of a person's spiritual growth is enhanced by his faith that God is cooperating with him in an eternal purpose which is perfect in goodness, even though that divine purpose is limited in power by virtue of the temporal nature of the continuous creative process. To respond to the appeal of God's vision of such eternal persuasion is to coordinate human growth and divine purpose in a cosmic process far outreaching any merely human aims. When modern man has consecrated himself to this sacred enterprise, he can face the inevitable frustrations of life with spiritual dignity and thereby always reap some meaning from every possible tragic situation.

Unlike the traditional conceptions of salvation, this view implies that there is neither substitution of divine aid for human effort nor a divine dispensation of rewards and punishments. Nevertheless, life in this world can not be a barren and fruitless existence of the temporary moment, when it is

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so abundantly experienced that it becomes an integral part of the creative process of conserving, increasing, and perfecting moral, aesthetic, and intellectual values throughout eternity. Only to such a person as one who has first realized the meaning of the noble discontent through a creative imagination and an enlightened good will, and who has through speculative venture received an enduring satisfaction, however, would this vision of eternal perfectibility have any vital appeal. To him alone can there come that sense of a superhuman presence which the consecrated person believes to be a communion and fellowship with the living God.

This realization of an enduring satisfaction is very much akin to the concern of religious aspirations for an intuition of permanence amidst the perishing of man's temporal values. Both require a meaningful feeling that God and man are co-operating in the constant re-creation of spiritual growth. The meaning of an enduring satisfaction should not be completely identified with any particular religious way of life, however, even though some of the deepest insights it embodies have been inspired by the religious intuitions of such seers as Jesus and Buddha. Whereas the feelings which a merely religious person experiences may be the result of an intuitive faith without any further justification, the experience of an enduring satisfaction requires that modern man shall attain a metaphysical insight that rationally coordinates all of his ideal values. Perhaps it would be more accurate to characterize an enduring satisfaction as an ultimate intuitive insight which is not only the consequence of a rational process but which can be justified by a coherent interpretation of all the other aspects of spiritual growth.

This certainly is very similar to the synthesis of emotion and thought that is to be found in the more rational forms of religious experience. Yet, may we re-emphasize, religious feelings are often justified by an appeal to dogmatic certainty without any regard for coherent verification. The metaphysical

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adequacy of highly probable hypotheses formulated through synoptic inquiry is the *sine qua non* for the realization of an enduring satisfaction.

Whereas the historical notions of salvation have with few exceptions implied that man is *saved from some punishment or undesirable fate*, it is the thesis of our re-conception of the redemptive process that man is *saved for some purpose*, namely, the perfecting of ideal values. Salvation, therefore, might be said to be God's and man's attainment through ideal value-experience of a quality of mind that is susceptible to divine influences. The opportunity which salvation opens up for a person worthy of it is that of an even greater spiritual growth than that begun in this existence. The privilege that salvation confers is an even greater responsibility which can be shared in closer communion and eternal fellowship with God.

Thus we conclude that in so far as a human individual is possessed by an *enduring satisfaction* he is constantly in the process of being redeemed from the spiritual stagnation of a barren and fruitless existence. For from this quality of mind there can be derived a transforming insight into the spiritual purpose of an abundant life. To modern man in search of a soul, spiritual growth as a way of salvation offers a mental peace, a moral poise, and a consciousness of the creative power by which ideal persuasion may be victorious over brute force:

Peace, not the peace of a stagnant pool,
But of deep waters flowing,
Waves quiet and cool.
Poise, not the poise of a sheltered tree,
But of an oak, deeply rooted,
Storm-strengthened and free.
Power, not the power of a fisted might,
But of a quickened seed stretching,
Life climbing toward the light.¹⁵

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¹ Review previous discussion of emergent evolution in Chapter VII.

When we designate spiritual growth as a "consummatory stage of emergent evolution," we do not mean to imply that even highly reflective persons who purposively organize their thought, conduct, and imagination in terms of spiritual appetites have attained the culmination of the evolutionary process. We agree with du Noüy that "man, with his present brain, does not represent the end of evolution, but only an intermediary stage between the past heavily weighted down with memories of the beast, and the future, rich in higher promise." (*Human Destiny*, 225.)

While we agree that "the moral and spiritual evolution of man is only at its beginning" and "the period of physical adaptation is far from ended," we do not believe that spiritual progress is so certain for man that we can prophesy, as does du Noüy, that "in the future it (moral and spiritual evolution) is destined to dominate his activities." (*Human Destiny*, 205) We believe that spiritual growth is a possibility for individual persons and societies constituted by rational persons; but whether or not it becomes an actuality depends upon the purposive activity of such rational persons. In a growing universe, such as we conceive it, spiritual progress is not predestined anymore than is spiritual retrogression.

² Compare section, "Is Humanism Sufficient?" in Chapter IV, and section, "The Need for Speculative Venture," in Chapter V.

³ Compare previous discussion of the categories of teleological causality in Chapter VI.

⁴ James, "Is Life Worth Living?" in *The Will to Believe*, 61.

⁵ Russell, "Free Man's Worship," in *Mysticism and Logic*, 56-57.

⁶ Compare Jung's psychological analysis of human nature in Chapter II.

⁷ Compare our conclusions regarding the intuitive insights into human destiny portrayed by Goethe's *Faust* in Chapter III.

⁸ Santayana, *Reason in Religion*, 43.

⁹ RIR, 11.

¹⁰ It will be recalled from our historical analysis in the Appendix that as the third insight into the essential characteristic of the redemptive process, salvation requires an inward adjustment to some superhuman factor. The conception of the means by which this is accomplished has ranged from awareness of sin and repentance or consecration, as in Judaism and in the religion of Jesus, respectively, to the release from Karma, as in Hinduism, Janism, and Buddhism. Between these extremes, all the historical religions demand some sort of inner adjustment of man's will to a power that is not his own. Even in those cases where we found that the agency of the self was the dominant factor, there was at least the cosmic process that had to be taken into account. Possibly, Taoism and Confucianism do not make such a superhuman reference indispensable; but even they suggest this inner adjustment. In the poetry of Dante we found the meaningful feelings of renunciation of earthly passions and submission to the Will of God which similarly indicated that the redemptive process requires an influence from beyond man's own will that is received rather than man-produced as in the self-salvation of Faust. This religious insight is crystallized in Jesus' prayer in the garden of Gethsemane: "Not my will, but Thine be done."

¹¹ *World as Will and Idea* (III), 326-327.

¹² WWI (III), 215.

¹³ WWI (III), 132.

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¹⁴ Brightman, *The Finding of God*, 147: "The secret of noble patience will be found by the religious man in the sharing of the divine patience."

Cf. Hocking, *Preface to Philosophy: Textbook*, 486-487 for an excellent analysis of different attitudes toward the problem of evil.

¹⁵ Source unknown to present writer.

CHAPTER X

THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRITUAL GROWTH

A. The Function of Ideas in Social Processes.

THE DEVELOPMENT of Western Civilization is undoubtedly the product of a complex of causes. Consequently, no adequate interpretation of history should minimize the influences of the natural environment that have stemmed from man's bodily necessities and his lust for power. There is no reason to believe that they will cease to be effective in the present or the future. These compulsive agencies, however, are not the only social determinants.

The ideas of reflective persons must also be taken into account, if we are to understand the past processes that have begotten our present society and the future alternatives of chaos or civilized order which we are now in the process of begetting. These rational concepts have crystallized into social ideologies, i. e., theories of what society ought to be, which a thinker derives from his general philosophical view of the universe as a whole.¹

The complex problems of post-war social reconstruction can not be solved satisfactorily unless our objectives are coordinated and our creative efforts are guided by the foresight which only a sound social ideology can provide. Otherwise we have no organization of ideas in the light of which the urgent issues of group living can be examined with an insight into what values civilized persons ought to contribute to and derive from society. The important role of philosophy in clarifying such a cultural vision is emphasized by Whitehead:

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Mankind is now in one of its rare moods of shifting its outlook. The mere compulsion of tradition has lost its force. It is our business—philosophers, students, and practical men—to recreate and reenact a vision of the world, including those elements of reverence and order without which society lapses into riot, and penetrated through and through with unflinching rationality. Such a vision is the knowledge which Plato identified with virtue. Epochs for which, within the limits of their development, this vision has been widespread are the epochs unfading in the memory of mankind.²

The most important implication of any social ideology are its requirements concerning *by what means* and *for what end* social processes should be controlled. Our subsequent discussion of such ideological factors that influence social action will be more meaningful, if we first compare the divergent cultural analyses offered by Spengler (*Decline of the West*) and Toynbee (*A Study of History*). These provocative philosophies of history merit a thorough study by all thoughtful people. Although our treatment of these works will necessarily be brief and cursory, it will attempt to bring out the hidden presuppositions of social ideologies and to disclose the basic issues with which we should be concerned.³

Both Spengler and Toynbee assume that history should be studied with a view to discovering knowledge of the past which explains the present and furnishes a basis for predicting the future. Whereas Spengler claims that the future is predetermined by the past, Toynbee claims that the future depends to some degree upon the thought and action of human persons in the present. In our comparative analysis of these two interpretations we shall be concerned chiefly with the question: Can Western Civilization Survive? Since our answer will be hypothetical rather than categorical, further questions will require consideration. If Western Civilization is to sur-

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vive, we must find a more effective *means* and a more rational *end* for purposively controlling social processes than has yet been achieved by any people. Consequently, we shall discuss the questions: Can rational persuasion be the means of social control? Is spiritual growth the ideal end for which democratic social processes should be purposively controlled? In dealing with these issues we shall attempt to clarify the meaning of social progress and the significance of the ideological differences between a totalitarian and a democratic conception of ideal value.

B. Can Western Civilization Survive?

1. Spengler: Western Civilization Is Doomed!

Spengler maintains that every culture is like a biological organism which grows from youth into maturity and then declines gradually into old age until it meets death. For another analogy he suggests the cycle of the seasons: spring, summer, autumn, and winter. Accordingly, he has diagnosed the parallel development and decline of "contemporary" spiritual, cultural, and political epochs of the Chinese, Indian, Egyptian, Classical, Arabian, and Western civilizations:

I see, in place of that empty figment of *one* linear history which can only be kept up by shutting one's eyes to the overwhelming multitude of the facts, the drama of *a number* of mighty Cultures, each springing with primitive strength from the soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound throughout its whole life-cycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, in *its own* image; each having *its own* idea, *its own* passions, *its own* life, will and feeling, *its own* death. Here indeed are colours, lights, movements, that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the Cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks and the stone-pines, the blossoms,

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twigs and leaves—but there is no ageing “Mankind.” Each Culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression which arise, ripen, decay, and never return. There is not *one* sculpture, *one* painting, *one* mathematics, *one* physics, but many, each in its deepest essence different from the others, each limited in duration and self-contained, just as each species of plant has its peculiar blossom or fruit, its special type of growth and decline. These cultures, sublimated life-essences, grow with the same superb aimlessness as the flowers of the fields. They belong, like the plants and the animals, to the living Nature of Goethe, and not to the dead Nature of Newton. I see world-history as a picture of endless formations and transformations, of the marvelous waxing and waning of organic forms. The professional historian, on the contrary, sees it as a sort of tapeworm industriously adding on to itself one epoch after another.⁴

Thus when Spengler says that cultures are “contemporary,” he means that the stages of these periods have common traits.

Upon the basis of this analysis of the past and in view of the symptomatic lack of creativeness and appreciation of spiritual values in the present, Spengler has concluded that western civilization is fulfilling its inexorable destiny of decay:

Looked at in this way, the “Decline of the West” comprises nothing less than the problem of *Civilization*. We have before us one of the fundamental questions of all higher history. What is Civilization, understood as the organic-logical sequel, fulfillment and finale of a culture?

For every Culture has *its own* Civilization. In this work, for the first time the two words, hitherto used to express an indefinite, more or less ethical, distinction, are used in a *periodic* sense, to express a strict

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and necessary *organic succession*. The Civilization is the inevitable destiny of the Culture, and in this principle we obtain the viewpoint from which the deepest and gravest problems of historical morphology become capable of solution. Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built, petrifying world-city following mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic. They are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again.⁵

According to Spengler, western civilization has this advantage over previous world cultures, namely, that it can, at least, foresee that it is doomed for destruction:

Herein, then, I see the last great task of Western philosophy, the only one which still remains in store for the aged wisdom of the Faustian Culture, the pre-ordained issue, it seems, of our centuries of spiritual evolution. No Culture is at liberty to *choose* the path and conduct of its thought, but here for the first time a Culture can foresee the way that destiny has chosen for it.⁶

Consequently, the ultimate destiny of western culture can be understood objectively in the light of its spiritual perspective or psychic depth, even though no human effort can divert its inexorable decadence:

We are now at last in a position to approach the phenomenon of *Morale*, the intellectual interpretation of Life by itself, to ascend the height from which it is possible to survey the widest and gravest of all the fields of human thought. At the same time, we shall

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need for this survey an objectivity such as no one has as yet set himself seriously to gain. Whatever we may take *Morale* to be, it is no part of *Morale* to provide its own *analysis*; and we shall get to grips with the problem, not be considering what *should* be our acts and aims and standards, but only by diagnosing the Western feeling in the very form of the enunciation.⁷

An interpretation of the destiny of western culture is unintelligible, therefore, apart from the Faustian *Morale* it embodies:

The moral imperative as the form of morale is Faustian and only Faustian That which we call not merely activity but action is a historical conception through-and-through, saturated with directional energy. It is the proof of being, the dedication of being, in that sort of man whose ego possesses the tendency to Future, who feels the momentary present not as saturated being but as epoch, as turning-point, in a great complex of becoming—and, moreover, feels it so of both his personal life and of the life of history as a whole. Strength and distinctness of this consciousness are the marks of higher Faustian man. It is the distinction between character and attitude, between conscious becoming and simple accepted statuesque becomeness, between will and suffering in tragedy.⁸

The meaning of inexorable destiny for western culture is expressed not only in Goethe's great drama, but permeates as well the creative expression of other great artists and thinkers whose insights disclose the characteristic images and formulas of their own epoch:

What the myth of *Götterdämmerung* signified of old, the irreligious form of it, the theory of Entropy, sig-

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nifies today—*world's end as completion of an inwardly necessary evolution*

This too, the power of looking ahead to inevitable Destiny, is part of the historical capacity that is the peculiar endowment of the Faustian. The Classical died, but it died unknowing. It believed in an eternal Being and to the last it lived its days with frank satisfaction, each day spent as a gift of the gods. But we know our history. Before us there stands a last spiritual crisis that will involve all Europe and America. What its course will be, Late Hellenism tells us. The tyranny of the Reason—of which we are not conscious, for we are ourselves its apex—is in every Culture an epoch between man and old-man, and no more. Its most distinct expression is the cult of exact sciences, of dialectic, of demonstration, of causality. Of old the Ionic, and in our case the Baroque were its rising limb, and now the question is what form will the down-curve assume?⁹

When Spengler declares that western civilization is doomed to death, he does not mean that the human race faces destruction. Rather, the process will begin anew and the same cycle of spring, summer, autumn, and winter will be repeated.

2. Toynbee: Western Civilization Has a Chance!

Probably no one has criticized Spengler's predeterministic thesis more effectively than Toynbee, since he has offered an alternative interpretation which demands equal consideration. Spengler's basic fallacy, according to Toynbee, lies in his substitution of the questionable metaphor of a living organism with a life span determined by the biological laws of its nature for a law for explaining social processes that is subject to verification:

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In subjective terms, societies are the intelligible fields of historical study. In objective terms, they are the common ground between the respective fields of activity of a number of individual human beings, who are themselves living organisms but who cannot conjure up a giant in their own image out of the intersection of their own shadows and then breathe into this unsubstantial body the breath of their own life. The individual energies of all the human beings who constitute the so-called 'members' of a society are the vital forces whose operation works out the history of that society, including its time-span. To declare dogmatically that every society has a predestined time-span is as foolish as it would be to declare that every play is bound to contain just so many acts.¹⁰

When Toynbee rejects the theory of predestined cycles, he does not deny that there are recurrent patterns in the development of the various civilizations that have produced the "web of human history." Whereas Spengler's theory is analogous to the rotation of a wheel on its own axle, Toynbee's theory is best represented by the movement of the vehicle which proceeds forward as a result of the recurrent cycles of the wheel. It is possible, therefore, that as a result of the repetition of a pattern a progressive design may be developing:

Thus the detection of periodic repetitive movements in our analysis of the process of civilization does not imply that the process itself is of the same cyclic order as they are. On the contrary, if any inference can legitimately be drawn from the periodicity of these minor movements, we may rather infer that the major movement which they bear along is not recurrent but progressive. Humanity is not an Ixion bound for ever to his wheel nor a Sisyphus for ever rolling his stone to

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the summit of the same mountain and helplessly watching it roll down again.

This is a message of encouragement for us children of the Western Civilization as we drift to-day alone, with none but stricken civilizations around us. It may be that Death the Leveller will lay his icy hand on our civilization also. But we are not confronted with any *Saeva Necessitas*. The dead civilizations are not dead by fate, or 'in the course of nature,' and therefore our living civilization is not doomed inexorably in advance to 'join the majority' of its species. Though sixteen civilizations may have perished already to our knowledge, and nine others may be now at the point of death, we—the twenty-sixth—are not compelled to submit the riddle of our fate to the blind arbitrament of statistics. The divine spark of creative power is still alive in us, and, if we have the grace to kindle it into flame, then the stars in their courses cannot defeat our efforts to attain the goal of human endeavour.¹¹

It is not our aim here to analyze or evaluate the entire meaning and significance of Toynbee's brilliant inquiry. Like many other students, we eagerly anticipate his completion of the other volumes upon which he is now working. Even in its uncompleted state, however, his interpretation promises to be another "Copernican revolution." We shall confine the subsequent discussion to a brief summary of his main thesis as it pertains to the history of Western Civilization with special emphasis upon those aspects from which we can draw implications relevant to the social significance of the ideal of spiritual growth.

The intelligible unit of historical study with which Toynbee is concerned is neither any national state nor mankind as a whole. Mankind is too general a subject to be studied scientifically, and the forces discovered in nations are but partial

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actions of the more comprehensive causal operations of "a certain grouping of humanity which we have called society." According to Toynbee, there have been throughout the history of mankind twenty-one civilized societies and over six-hundred and fifty primitive societies. The Western Society (or Western Christendom) in which we are interested here is one of the only five civilized societies of the same species that are living today.¹² Western Civilization is an outgrowth or off-spring of the Hellenic Society with which it is "affiliated":

The continuity of history, to use an accepted phrase, is not a continuity such as is exemplified in the life of a single individual. It is rather a continuity made up of the lives of successive generations, our Western Society being related to the Hellenic Society in a manner comparable (to use a convenient though imperfect simile) with the relationship of a child to its parent.¹³

Each of the twenty-one civilized societies has undergone similar periodic processes of genesis, growth, breakdown, and disintegration. Before we summarize Toynbee's explanation of the causal factors involved in these dynamic processes, we note two important warranted premises of his account. (i) The social life of insects and other animals indicate that man was not the first social creature. (ii) Man's emergence from his sub-human condition of static primitive society into the dynamic human level of civilization is more significant than any advancement he has yet attained. Although Toynbee admits that he has not ascertained a "permanent and fundamental point of difference between primitive societies and civilizations," his search for it has discovered an alternating rhythm of static and dynamic situations as a universal category for interpreting the origin, rise, and decline of particular civilizations:

This alternating rhythm of static and dynamic, of movement and pause and movement, has been regard-

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ed by many observers in many different ages as something fundamental in the nature of the Universe. In their pregnant imagery the sages of the Sinic Society described these alternations in terms of Yin and Yang—Yin the static and Yang the dynamic. The nucleus of the Sinic character which stands for Yang seems to represent the unclouded sun-disk emitting its rays. In the Chinese formula Yin is always mentioned first, and within our field of vision, we can see that our breed, having reached the 'ledge' of primitive human nature 300,000 years ago, has reposed there for ninety-eight per cent of that period before entering on the Yang-activity of civilization.¹⁴

In his search for an explanation of the "genesis of civilizations," i. e., how mankind emerged from the static "integration of custom" into the dynamic process of "the differentiation of civilization," Toynbee finds the hypotheses of "superior race" and "comfortable environment" to be inadequate, since they do not account for the psychological factors involved in the response of a society to the challenge of environmental stimuli: "This unknown quantity is the reaction of the actors to the ordeal when it actually comes."¹⁵

Toynbee claims that the criterion of the growth of civilization is "in an inward self-articulation or self-determination," rather than "in the conquest of the external environment, either human or physical."¹⁶ The fact that a civilization has emerged does not necessarily imply that it will grow. One response to a challenge is not enough. A series of successive challenges is required for the differentiation through growth:

We have now completed our investigation of the process through which civilizations grow and, in the several instances which we have examined, the process seems to be one and the same. Growth is achieved when an individual or a minority of a whole society

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replies to a challenge by a response which not only answers that challenge but also exposes the respondent to a fresh challenge which demands a further response on his part. But although the process of growth may be uniform, the experience of the various parties that undergo the challenge is not the same. The variety of experience in confronting a single series of common challenges is manifest when we compare the experiences of the several different communities into which any single society is articulated. Some succumb, while others strike out a successful response through a creative movement of Withdrawal-and-Return, while others neither succumb nor succeed but manage to survive until the member which has succeeded shows them the new pathway, along which they follow tamely in the footsteps of the pioneers. Each successive challenge thus produces differentiation within the society, and the longer the series of challenges the more sharply pronounced will this differentiation become. Moreover, if the process of growth thus gives rise to differentiation within a single growing society where the challenges are the same for all, then, *a fortiori*, the same process must differentiate one growing society from another where the challenges themselves differ in character.¹⁷

The "source of action" for the creative movements which produce the growth of civilization is to be found in the minds of creative personalities:

These individuals who set going the process of growth in the societies to which they 'belong' are more than mere men. They can work what to men seem miracles because they themselves are superhuman in a literal and no metaphorical sense . . . The new specific character of these rare and superhuman souls that break

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the vicious circle of primitive human social life and resume the work of creation may be described as personality. It is through the inward development of personality that individual human beings are able to perform these creative acts, in the outward field of action, that cause the growths of human societies.¹⁸

Civilizations break down when the social unity in the society as a whole disappears as a result of the failure of the creative minority to elicit the allegiance of the majority.¹⁹ In his attempt to explain the causes of these breakdowns, Toynbee rejects the deterministic explanations in terms of factors beyond human control, as we have indicated in his criticism of Spengler. Just as control over the environment is not the cause of the growth of civilizations, so loss of command over the physical or human environment can not be cause of breakdowns. The duration of the growth of a civilization is not predetermined as Spengler contends with his metaphor of the life-span of a biological organism. A breakdown, nevertheless, is likely:

What is the weakness which exposes a growing civilization to the risk of stumbling and falling in mid-career and losing its Promethean elan? The weakness must be radical; for, although the catastrophe of a breakdown is a risk and not a certainty, the risk is evidently high.²⁰

Just as self-determination through the "creative power of inward self-articulation" must be achieved in order for the civilization to grow, so the failure to maintain self-determination is the cause of its breakdown, i. e., its cessation of growth:

In any whole consisting of parts a loss of harmony between the parts is paid for by the whole in corresponding loss of self-determination. The loss of self-determination is the ultimate criterion of breakdown, and

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it is a conclusion which should not surprise us, seeing that it is the inverse of the conclusion reached in an earlier part of this Study, that progress toward self-determination is the criterion of growth.²¹

The disintegration of a civilization usually follows its breakdown; but there may be petrification instead, e. g., Egyptaic society. The defining characteristic of disintegration is the tendency toward standardization and uniformity which is the opposite of the differentiation and diversity that characterizes the growth of civilized societies:

We have recently noted, on a superficial plane, the tendency towards a uniformity of three-and-a-half beats in the rhythm of disintegration. A much more significant symptom of uniformity is the uniform schism of a disintegrating society into three sharply divided classes and the uniform works of creation performed by each of them. We have seen dominant minorities uniformly working out philosophies and producing universal states; internal proletariats uniformly discovering 'higher religions' which aim at embodying themselves in universal churches; and external proletariats uniformly mustering war-bands which find vent in 'heroic ages.'²²

The standard pattern to which the disintegration of a civilization conforms appears to be "a schism of the body social"; but the underlying and more essential concomitant of disintegration is the "schism in the Soul" whereby the creative faculty which produced growth is replaced by alternative ways of behavior, feeling, and life:

The schism in the body social, which we have been hitherto examining, is a collective experience and therefore superficial. Its significance lies in its being the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual rift.

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A schism in the souls of human beings will be found to underlie any schism that reveals itself on the surface of the society which is the common ground of these human actor's respective fields of activity; and the several forms which this inward schism may take must now engage our attention.

Schism in the souls of members of a disintegrating society displays itself in a variety of shapes because it arises in every one of the various ways of behaviour, feeling and life which we have found to be characteristic of the action of human beings who play their part in the geneses and growths of civilizations. In the disintegration phase each of these single lines of action is apt to split into a pair of mutually antithetical and antipathetic variations or substitutes, in which the response to a challenge is polarized into two alternatives—one passive and the other active, but neither of them creative. A choice between the active and the passive option is the only freedom that is left to a soul which has lost the opportunity (though not, of course, the capacity) for creative action through being cast for a part in the tragedy of social disintegration. As the process of disintegration works itself out, the alternative choices tend to become more rigid in their limitations, more extreme in their divergence and more momentous in their consequences. That is to say, the spiritual experience of schism in the soul is a dynamic movement, not a static situation.

To begin with, there are two ways of personal behaviour which are alternative substitutes for the exercise of the creative faculty. Both of them are attempts at self-expression. The passive attempt consists in an *abandon* (ἀκρατεία) in which the soul 'lets itself go' in the belief that, by giving free rein to its own spontaneous appetites and aversions, it will be

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'living 'according to nature' and will automatically receive back from that mysterious goddess the precious gift of creativity which it has been conscious of losing. The active alternative is an effort at self-control (ἐγκράτεια) in which the soul 'takes itself in hand' and seeks to discipline its 'natural passions' in the opposite belief that nature is the bane of creativity and not its source and that to 'gain the mastery over nature' is the only way of recovering the lost creative faculty.²³

What about the destiny of Western Civilization? Is our society doomed to disintegration following a breakdown caused by the failure of self-determination which is essential for progressive growth? According to Spengler, it is inevitable that our civilization like an animal organism will meet the fate of all past societies, since it is "condemned by an inexorable destiny to die after traversing a predetermined life-curve." According to Toynbee, the future looks black but not hopeless, since our fate depends upon our response to a challenge:

Even if all other civilizations that have come into existence so far were to prove in fact to have followed this path, there is no known law of historical determinism that compels us to leap out of the intolerable frying-pan of our time of troubles into the slow and steady fire of a universal state where we shall in due course be reduced to dust and ashes. At the same time, such precedents from the histories of other civilizations and from the life-course of nature are bound to appear formidable in their sinister light of our present situation. This chapter itself was written on the eve of the outbreak of the General War of 1939-45 for readers who had already lived through the General War of 1914-18, and it was recast for re-publication on the morrow of the ending of the second of these two world

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wars within one lifetime by the invention and employment of a bomb in which a newly contrived release of atomic energy has been directed by man to the destruction of human life and works on an unprecedented scale. This swift succession of catastrophic events on a steeply mounting gradient inevitably inspires a dark doubt about our future, and this doubt threatens to undermine our faith and hope at a critical eleventh hour which calls for the utmost exertion of these saving spiritual faculties.²⁴

C. Can Rational Persuasion Be the Means of Social Control?

It follows from Toynbee's analysis of the geneses, growth, breakdown, and disintegration of civilized societies that the crucial factor which determines the destiny of our Western Civilization is whether or not we can maintain self-determination; for with it our society will continue to grow, while without it decline will set in. Naturally, therefore, we are anxious to discover *by what means* we can control our social process. Although Toynbee does not explicitly declare it, he implies, if we are not mistaken, that the successful maintenance of self-determination depends on whether or not creative persons in a growing universe can make *rational persuasion victorious over brute force*.²⁵ But why has not the principle of rational persuasion been effective in sustaining the self-determination required for progressive growth in the life of the civilizations which declined? According to Toynbee, no society has cultivated the "spiritual faculties" for responding to the challenge of rational persuasion without the compulsion of regimentation, which eventually undermines the persuasion itself:

The direct kindling of creative energy from soul to soul is no doubt the ideal way, but to rely upon it exclusively is a counsel of perfection. The problem of

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bringing the uncreative rank and file into line with the creative pioneers cannot be solved in practice, on the social scale, without bringing into play the faculty of sheer mimesis—one of the less exalted faculties of human nature, which has more in it of drill than of inspiration.²⁶

Can Christianity sustain or restore, whichever the case may be, the susceptibility to ideal persuasion upon which the growth of our society depends? Toynbee has not yet given us his final answer; but he indicates in the last paragraph of his writing to date that this is the crucial field of his further inquiry. Jesus' exhortation to "turn the other cheek" would seem to be "the counsel of perfection" upon which creative persuasion relies. But can Christianity taken by itself raise "the level of a number of ordinary human souls to the higher level that has been attained by the creator himself?" Has it not been necessary for Christianity to "resort to the device of raising some single faculty to the higher level without bothering about the whole personality" so that it has forced "a human being into a lopsided development"? Has it not been unfortunate that Christianity has minimized, if not neglected, "the Hellenic virtues which go to the making of a well-balanced personality"?²⁷

Can the progressive realization of the philosophical ideal of spiritual growth provide the susceptibility to ideal persuasion upon which the growth of our Western Civilization depends? Toynbee claims that philosophy in the past has lacked spiritual vitality:

What, then, are the weaknesses that doom philosophy to discomfiture when it enters the lists as the rival of religion? The fatal and fundamental weakness, from which all the rest derive, is a lack of spiritual vitality. This lack of *elan* lames philosophy in two ways. It diminishes its attractiveness for the masses and it dis-

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courages those who feel its attractions from throwing themselves into missionary work on its behalf. Indeed philosophy affects a preference for an intellectual *elite*, the 'fit though few,' like the high-brow poet who regards the smallness of his circulation as evidence of the excellence of his verse. In the pre-Senecan generation Horace felt no incongruity in prefacing the philosophico-patriotic appeal of his 'Roman Odes' with:

Avaunt, ye herd profane!
Silence! let no unhallow'd tongue
Disturb the sacred rites of song,
Whilst I, the High Priest of the Nine,
For youths and maids alone entwine
A new and loftier strain.

It is a far cry from this to the parable of Jesus: 'Go ye out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled.'

Thus philosophy could never emulate the strength of religion at its best; it could only imitate, and parody, the weaknesses of its inferior devotees.²⁸

The reader must decide for himself whether or not our philosophical inquiry lacks "spiritual vitality" when we search for the *enduring satisfaction* that will transform spiritual frustration into spiritual maturity upon the assumption that, since religious experience alone is not sufficient, we must explore also such other realms of the spirit as are disclosed by man's creative imagination, his moral endeavors, and his metaphysical insight into the cosmic status of his ideal-value realizations in the universe as a whole.²⁹

If the personal ideal of spiritual growth is to have social implications that are sufficiently effective so that our Western Civilization is provided with "self-determination," we must find some way of making rational persuasion the means of social control. Even if one grants that the purposive control of

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a rational person's individual life stems from the inner force of self-imposed ideals, there is no guarantee that society as a whole can be regulated according to ideal standards without the self-defeating use of regimentation, if not even more drastic external force. Does not Christianity hesitate to abandon its promises of heaven and its threats of hell?

In *The Republic* Plato enunciated the principle that the rational persuasion of *justice* must be victorious over brute force. Justice, as expressed in the objective laws of the state, is the all-comprehensive principle which is the ground for all of life's essentials and the bond of community fellowship. Thus any civilized pattern of what human relations ought to be must have as its keystone the recognition by each rational person that, regardless of his individual ambitions and capabilities, he must be persuaded by an Ideal of Justice to conceive of his personal purposes as an integral part of the larger purposes of the social community as a whole.³⁰ But even in the Republic, which was conceived as an ideal state, regimentation was considered as necessary to some extent. If the principles of Plato's social philosophy had ever been applied, the need for external force would probably have been even more necessary.³¹

It is possible that we shall be able to make rational persuasion an effective means of social control, even though all past societies, including our Hellenic "affiliate," have been unsuccessful in so maintaining the self-determination required for continued growth? Even Spengler, who claims that "no Culture is at liberty to *choose* the path and conduct of its thought," points out that "here for the first time a Culture (Western Civilization) can foresee the way that destiny has chosen for it."³² Perhaps by being forewarned we can be not only forearmed but also resourceful enough to achieve a novel transformation in our society that stems from the personal creativity of spiritual growth. Perhaps never before has the course of events been susceptible to the influence of rational

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persons. Perhaps such a time is not yet nor ever will be ripe. But we shall neither know nor succeed unless we attempt to make rational persuasion effective. Knowing that it has never been successful before and beset with apparently insurmountable obstacles, we are tempted to renounce all hope. But when one contemplates the novel emergence of life from inorganic processes and the novel emergence of mind from biological processes, the possibility of such a novel transformation by reflective persons emerging upon a higher level of social development is not inconceivable in a growing universe. It is to this victory of rational persuasion over brute force that Whitehead refers:

This bond is the growth of reverence for that power in virtue of which nature harbors ideal ends, and produce individual beings capable of conscious discrimination of such ends. This reverence is the foundation of the respect for man as man. It thereby secures that liberty of thought and action, required for the upward adventure of life on this Earth.³³

More precise definition of terms is required for an understanding of the meaning and implications of the relation of rational persuasion to brute force. No human or natural processes, individual or social, are possible without some type of force, if our appeal to causality throughout our scientific and metaphysical explanation of the natural order and the human order has been justified. On this point the advocates of mechanical determinism and teleological self-determinism agree. Self-imposed ideals are no less compulsive than are the coercive factors of heredity and environment. To attempt to eliminate force, therefore, would be futile. Brute force or violence, however, is another matter. Perhaps it can never be overcome; but the possibility that the ideal compulsion of rational persuasion may predominate over the unideal compulsion of violent destruction of human life and property

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in Western Civilization, is the challenge to which our society must effectively respond, if it is to endure. This "creative power" is the "unknown quantity" which "is the reaction of the actors to the ordeal when it actually comes."³⁴

Democracy is based upon man's faith in the creative power of rational persuasion as the means by which social processes of voluntary group cooperation can be purposively controlled through self-regimentation in accordance with ideals.³⁵ There is a very real sense in which the United States is the laboratory in which the hypotheses of the social thinkers of Western Civilization are being tested. Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (whose ideas represent our heritage from our "parent society") conceived *Justice* to be the *sine qua non* of a civilized political and economic system. Without justice they believed there could be no unity of loyalty and interest in the community as a whole. With justice as the ultimate intrinsic value of society men could work out constitutional governments based on impartial law rather than human caprice. Christianity challenged the worldly standards of class and rank with the claim that all men are of equal spiritual worth in the eyes of a heavenly Father-God. The vision of a worldly order of *freedom* and *equality*, which are the defining characteristics of *Justice*, was kept alive by such thinkers as Spinoza (*Political Treatise*), Locke (*Civil Government*), Montesquieu (*Spirit of the Laws*), Rousseau (*Social Contract*), Voltaire (*On Toleration*) and Paine (*The Rights of Man*). It was this working hypothesis which the framers of the *Constitution of the United States* re-stated in the succinct form of the *Preamble*:

We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.³⁶

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Can men organize their national community in terms of freedom and equality? Before the people of the United States had time to complete the social experiment that might furnish the answer, our problem has become far more complicated by the results of the recent war. America has been catapulted into the role of world leadership by virtue of her military, industrial, and financial power. Although we are not minimizing the importance of the present struggle for power between the United States and Russia, we claim that in the long run the survival of democracy will depend most on whether or not we develop the capacity for *tempering our power with justice* in international affairs. We are not suggesting that America can be effective in the present world crises without a military, industrial, and financial superiority. We are claiming, however, that unless we temper our power with justice, we shall have missed our opportunity for greatness, just as did the nations led by such conquerors as Alexander, Caesar, Genghis Khan, and Napoleon. Despite our growing strength, we shall fail in our attempt to establish freedom and equality throughout the world, if we do not use rational persuasion in spreading our democratic gospel. The risk of not relying on brute force alone is great; but the alternative is self-destruction of our own ideology of voluntary group cooperation.

Only through such an organization as the United Nations can America contribute its power to the cause of a civilized world order. If freedom and equality are to be realized by mankind, they must be established under international law based on justice and moral obligation rather than power politics based entirely on national self-interest.³⁷ -

The reader may very well be disappointed by the fact that we have not suggested any concrete procedure for making rational persuasion victorious over brute force. Frankly, we have no panacea, nor do we guarantee that one will be found. The scientist exploring the unknown has no guarantee that

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his experimental procedure will yield positive results. He observes, formulates hypotheses, and tests his hypotheses, nevertheless, with whatever methods and knowledge he has at his disposal. He has imposed upon his intellectual curiosity the standards of objective inquiry which are derived from and defined by his ideal of truth. He recognizes the possibility that he may not discover the truth, even if he seeks it by means of a scientific method; but he is also recognizing the certainty that unless he employs the rational means in the light of the rational end, he will obtain no knowledge. Apart from his ideal of truth and his scientific method his experiment is meaningless. Those of us who are concerned about the social experiment of democracy are in the same situation. We too are exploring the unknown. Apart from the ideal of spiritual growth, the end which requires rational persuasion as the means for purposive control, our social experiment is meaningless. A social system with any other end or means would cease to be democratic. We should recognize the possibility that we may not discover a way of realizing spiritual growth by means of rational persuasion. But there is also the possibility that decisions and actions in accordance with the ideal may lead to the discovery of how to make rational persuasion effective. And this we do know: decisions and actions which disregard the ideal end of democracy will certainly destroy the possibility of establishing democracy. The service of philosophy, therefore, should be to clarify the ends for the realization of which democratic process should be purposively controlled.³⁸

D. Is Spiritual Growth the Ideal End for which Democratic Social Processes Should Be Purposively Controlled?

The metaphysical world-view of organic pluralism which we have advocated throughout this study implies that when human thought, conduct, and imagination are purposively directed toward the realization of an ideal goal, a significant

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contribution is made toward the creative advance of a growing universe. We intend to show that the democratic ideology of *voluntary group cooperation* is derived from this metaphysical interpretation of reality.³⁹ Before we elaborate our belief that the ideal of spiritual growth furnishes an end for which democratic processes might be purposively controlled, we must consider the alternative conception of "inevitable progress" which has developed in Western Civilization.

What other ends of social processes have been advocated? The ideal of Human Progress has been the characteristic doctrine of our Modern Culture, just as the characteristic doctrine of the Hellenic Culture was Fate, and the characteristic doctrine of the Medieval Culture was Divine Providence. In his well known *The Idea of Progress*, Bury explains the meaning of this conception of the ultimate goal of all social processes:

The idea of human progress then is a theory which involves a synthesis of the past and a prophecy of the future. It is based on an interpretation of history which regards men as slowly advancing—*pedetemti progredientes*—in a definite and desirable direction, and infers that this progress will continue indefinitely. And it implies that, as the issue of the earth's great business, a condition of general happiness will ultimately be enjoyed, which will justify the whole process of civilization; for otherwise the direction would not be desirable. There is also a further implication. The process must be the necessary outcome of the psychical and social nature of man; it must not be at the mercy of any external will; otherwise there will be no guarantee of its continuance, and the idea of Progress would lapse into the idea of Providence.⁴⁰

Influenced strongly by the scientific theory of evolution many nineteenth century thinkers pinned their faith on the

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inevitability of automatic progress which denied "the illusion of finality" embodied in the Christian doctrine of an impending Judgment Day predetermined by Divine Providence. Such an "illusion of finality," according to Bury, also characterized Hegel's "unfolding of the Absolute Idea" through the dialectical development of the national state and Comte's notion of a development from theology, through metaphysics, to the scientific stage. Even though Spencer did not provide any evidence that man's knowledge of his environment will continue to increase or that man's personal or social life is morally perfectible, he substituted the dogma of automatic progress for the dogma of Divine Providence:

Whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the development of life upon its surface, in the development of Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this same evolution of the *simple into the complex*, through successive differentiations, holds throughout. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes, down to the latest results of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, is that in which Progress essentially consists. Progress is not an accident but a necessity. What we call evil and immorality must disappear. It is certain that man must become perfect The ultimate development of the ideal man is certain—as certain as any conclusion in which we place the most implicit faith; for instance, that all men will die Always toward perfection is the mighty movement—towards a complete development and a more unmixed good.⁴¹

Bury contends that the advocates of the inevitability of automatic progress have themselves been overcome by the "illusion of finality." This dogma has no empirical evidence to support it, for "the Progress of humanity belongs to the

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same order of ideas as Providence or personal immortality. . . . Like them it cannot be proved either true or false. Belief in it is an act of faith."⁴²

The dogma of automatic and inevitable progress is embodied today in the totalitarian ideology conceived by Marx and exemplified in Soviet Communism. In his interpretation of history Marx substitutes economic determination for Hegel's political determination. Like the other advocates of "necessary progress," Marx claimed that his historical research and practical prescriptions for controlling social processes were scientific. On the surface they would seem to be; but a brief analysis can show that the appearance is deceiving. When Marx sets out to *explain* the present in terms of the causal factors involved in past social processes, and to *predict* future effects from present and past causes, his aim and method seem to be those of sound scientific inquiry. When he describes the social dialectic by showing how the mode of production conditions political and other social processes so that the structure of society is transformed in its subsequent stages, his analysis seems sound. But when Marx becomes a prophet he completely abandons the attitude of a social scientist.

According to Marx's "dialectical materialism", present and past social processes must be explained in the exclusive terms of "economic determinism":

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life? () What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes in character in proportion as material production is changed?⁴³

The emphasis upon the important role played by economic

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factors is to Marx's credit. No one can deny their importance. But the exclusion of other factors in the physical and human environment is arbitrary and unreflective, even though his focus on an "only" cause does best suit his biased preconception. In addition to the evidence of the influence of ideas upon social processes, which we shall offer subsequently, consider the causal influence of the Marxian ideology itself. How can an analysis and an explanation be considered scientific, when the facts are distorted to fit the dogma, and causal hypotheses are crushed under the steamroller of the inexorable dialectic that pushes relentlessly onward toward its preconceived goal?

How does Marx predict future effects from present and past causes? He predicts a class struggle from which the communistic proletariat will emerge victorious over the capitalistic bourgeoisie:

The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. *Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.*⁴⁴

Far from being a scientific prediction on the basis of a sound hypothetical-deductive investigation, the Marxian prophecy falls in the category of eschatology. Toynbee's judgment to this effect is illuminating:

Karl Marx (1818-83) has painted in colours borrowed from the apocalyptic visions of a repudiated religious tradition, a tremendous picture of the secession of a proletariat and the ensuing class war. The immense impression which the Marxian materialist apocalypse has made upon so many millions of minds is in part due to the political militancy of the Marxian

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diagram; for, while this 'blue-print' is the kernel of a general philosophy of history, it is also a revolutionary call to arms In this place we have cited Marx for other reasons: first, because he is the classic exponent of class war for our world in our age; and, second, because his formula conforms to the traditional Zoroastrian and Jewish and Christian apocalyptic pattern in unveiling, beyond a violent climax, the vision of a gentle finale. () According to the Communist prophet's intuition of the operations of his familiar spirit, Historical Materialism or Determinism, the class war is bound to issue in a victorious proletarian revolution; but this bloody culmination of the struggle will also be the end of it; for the victory of the proletariat will be decisive and definitive and the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat,' by which the fruits of the victory are to be harvested during the post-revolutionary period, is not to be a permanent institution. A time is to come when a new society which has been classless from birth will be old enough and strong enough to dispense with the dictatorship. Indeed, in this final and permanent acme of well-being the New Society of the Marxian Millennium will be able to cast away not only the Dictatorship of the Proletariat but also every other institutional crutch, including the state itself.⁴⁵

The followers of Marx refer to "the withering away of the state" when the "existence of the laborer will be widened and enriched" in emotional strains similar to those in which Tennyson sang of the "one far-off divine event, to which the whole creation moves." Even though Lenin sings also of the "withering away of the state," he and his followers who rule Russia today consider the *dictatorship of the proletariat* the goal which defines the function of the state.⁴⁶ Since their ultimate objective is derived from an apocalyptic vision of inevitable progress rather than a coherent metaphysical world

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view, the more immediate objective of an efficient and powerful totalitarian state, in which the individual has no intrinsic worth, has been deemed an intrinsic value. It is this end which the Communists claim justifies brute force, e. g., violence, purges, fanaticism, regimentation of personal aims, and pernicious propaganda as the means for controlling social processes. Justice, freedom, equality, and the rights of individuals to realize ideal values must go by the board in order that the inexorable destiny of proletarian progress might be fulfilled.

Does the denial of such automatic progress imply that there neither has been nor ever will be any social progress? No, our claim that progress is not a *necessary and universal* characteristic of social processes does not preclude the *probability* that there has been some progress in the past and the *possibility* that there may be progress in the future.⁴⁷ Philosophers have used different criteria for judging whether or not our Western Civilization has been progressive. Hocking contends that "it is largely because the political order has never completely broken down, in spite of all the ups and downs of institutions, that the total movement of human culture has been forward."⁴⁸ Urban finds probable evidence for past social progress in the growing respect for persons as ends in themselves and in "the spiritual and ideal trends" in such institutions as property and the family. He considers as progressive all "trends in the direction of increasing and establishing the objective conditions for self-realization."⁴⁹ The technological and theoretical achievements of science are often cited as evidence of past progress.

But what about the future possibility of progress? Granting that there probably has been some progress, is there any justification for the claim that progress is guaranteed, if men use science to control natural processes in the interest of social welfare:

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Science has led men to look to the future instead of the past. The coincidence of the ideal of progress with the advance of science is not a mere coincidence. Before this advance men placed the golden age in remote antiquity. Now they face the future with a firm belief that intelligence properly used can do away with the evils once thought inevitable. To subjugate devastating disease is no longer a dream; the hope of abolishing poverty is not Utopian.³⁰

We believe that Dewey and Conklin are right in their claims that scientific endeavor is essential for social progress. This is not a reversion to the dogma of automatic progress. Necessary though it be, is science alone sufficient?

Tsanoff has wisely said, "In the progress of civilization the scale of activity spreads out in both directions: the more sublime ascent, the more abysmal fall."³¹ The peoples of the world have been shaken by the atomic bomb into the realization that science by itself alone might lead to the "abysmal fall." Technological knowledge itself must be purposively controlled according to some ideal of what human relations ought to be.³² The criterion of progress, therefore, must be extended beyond scientific achievement in theory and application to include as its defining characteristic an ideal of spiritual growth which is derived from a coherent metaphysical conception of a growing universe.³³ Progress will be realized in the future only if we establish the objective social conditions which are necessary in order that individual persons can realize an ideal of spiritual growth. We believe that we should strive to establish a democratic organization of the international community, since democracy which exemplifies the ideology of voluntary group cooperation by means of rational persuasion would provide such objective conditions. The postulate of the possibility of future progress is meaningless, therefore, apart from the purposive realization of a self-imposed ideal of spiritual growth.³⁴

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If spiritual growth is the ideal end for which social processes should be purposively controlled, a rational person who acknowledges it as an ultimate intrinsic value in his own design for living can use it as a criterion for judging whether or not a particular political-economic system is satisfactory. He can ask this question: Does this type of social organization provide the opportunities of rights and obligations which are necessary for me to cultivate and satisfy my "spiritual appetites" for intellectual curiosity, aesthetic appreciation, enlightened good will, and a consecration to some sacred cause?

Those of us who prefer democracy to a totalitarian state must do more than just take our political liberty for granted. Unless we become conscious of intrinsic values for the realization of which freedom is necessary, democracy is bound to collapse from mere neglect. Foreign aggression or infiltration is not ultimately so dangerous to the democratic way of life as is indifference toward its spiritual meaning in the minds of those people who profess to believe in it. Disregard for the ideal values of rational thought and conduct which give liberty its significance tends to destroy liberty as well as reason.

Why should we sacrifice so much to preserve freedom of thought, freedom of feeling, freedom of moral choice, and freedom of worship? We have a reason, if for our ultimate intrinsic value we acknowledge an ideal of spiritual growth that so compels reflective, aesthetic, ethical, and religious activity that we must have democratic freedom as the only satisfactory condition for the realization of these ideal values. If biological survival were our ultimate intrinsic value, a totalitarian state might well be the most effective organization of our political and economic life. Then it would not matter that truth and beauty would be distorted into propaganda or that mutual respect for the intrinsic worth of human persons and consecration to something sacred would be replaced by blind and fanatical devotion to a ruthless state. But if the re-

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alization of mere biological values does not afford an enduring satisfaction, the struggle to conserve and increase spiritual values in our thought and conduct will justify the democratic way of an abundant life. Thus spiritual growth is not only a way of personal salvation from a meaningless life, but it is also a leavening force in the social progress of civilization.

Since the founders of American democracy recognized that survival is not adequate as an ultimate intrinsic value for a progressive social order, they sought to organize a constitutional government which would provide for "liberty and the pursuit of happiness" as a further aim for life. True to his formalistic heritage from the Jewish-Christian tradition, Stoicism, and Kant, such a thinker as Paine presupposed that men are by nature free and equal. Man's civil rights grow out of natural rights."

We agree with Paine that individual rights are the key to the functioning of a democratic society, and that a just social order should provide "freedom under law." Since we conceive relative self-determination to be an achievement, we cannot agree, however, that liberty is an inborn characteristic of human nature, i. e., "some natural right pre-existing in the individual." It follows from our metaphysical interpretation of human personality that freedom is a creative function of the mind which must be progressively attained through the realization of a self-imposed ideal of spiritual growth. Happiness, furthermore, is not adequate as an ultimate intrinsic value, unless by happiness is meant the quality of mind which results from the cultivation and enduring satisfaction of spiritual appetites. The paramount question, therefore, is whether or not spiritual growth is adequate as an ideal and for guiding the development of a genuine democracy.

Democracy has been defined as "the complete recognition of the right and duty of every human being to realize and express his personality by taking his part and doing his bit in

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the life of the community."⁵⁶ Such intelligent cooperation requires an appreciation of mutual ideal values by rational persons who are united by loyalty to an ideal of justice. To be just, one must assume the obligation of granting to others the opportunity for realizing the most abundant life of which he is capable. How is this possible, if one has not himself discovered the meaning of spiritual growth? Only when a sufficient number of persons realize freedom by accepting this social responsibility of an enlightened purpose will democracy become a reality. "The essential mark of any democracy is the domination exercised over all its members by a single spiritual intention."⁵⁷

It has been the thesis of this study that a person may find a meaning for his life, if he organizes his thought, conduct, and imagination in terms of these spiritual appetites: (i) intellectual curiosity, (ii) an enlightened good will, (iii) an appreciation of the beautiful and the sublime, and (iv) a consecration to some transcendent cause. Without the controlling influence of some such ideal ends we believe that the aspiration for a democratic way of life is an empty illusion. To reflective persons who are striving to achieve a democracy, however, a philosophy of spiritual growth may provide a design for living, in the realization of which the democratic ideals of justice, freedom, and equality will become concrete realities.

¹ The following statement by Schweitzer, *The Decay and Restoration of Civilization*, emphasizes the social significance of an adequate metaphysical world-view: "The reconstruction of our age then can begin only with a reconstruction of its theory of the universe. There is hardly anything more urgent in its claim on us than this which seems in the solid thought-building of a theory which can support a civilization, and when we take from it, all of us in cooperation, ideas which can stimulate our life and work, only then can there again arise a society which can possess ideals with magnificent aims and be able to bring these into effective agreement with reality. It is from new ideas that we must build history anew. () For individuals, as for the community, life without a theory of things is a pathological disturbance of the higher capacity for self-direction." (85-86).

According to Northrop in his *Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*, the achievement of world peace depends upon the construction of an adequate

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world view: "It appears, therefore, that philosophy has three tasks with respect to the peace: (1) An analysis of the major cultures of the Western and Eastern worlds which designates the basic theoretical assumptions from which the social institutions and practices they value proceed. (2) The specification of a common, single set of assumptions possessed of the greater generality which permits the largest possible number of the resultant diverse, traditional assumptions which are logically compatible to be retained and acted upon without conflict. (3) The reconstruction of all the traditional assumptions to the extent that this is necessary, in order to bring them more in accord with the nature of things as this is revealed by contemporary as well as traditional philosophical and scientific knowledge." (305) The reader is urged to read Northrop's brilliant analysis of ideological problems in LSH, Chapters XIII-XXIV.

² *Adventures of Ideas*, 126. Flewelling has also emphasized this need for spiritual insight in his *Things That Matter Most*, 25: "There never was a time in the history of the world when there was more need for morale than now, and we shall have it to the very degree that we are moved by right concepts of what matters most. If we can rightly determine this problem of values, tomorrow may bring in the very conditions of which we dream, but it is necessary for us to have convictions. We cannot drift into a better world which is to be. We must have clear concepts of value and we must be ready to fight for them."

³ Historians increasingly seem to be recognizing the importance of philosophies of history. In his "Introduction" to *Wither Mankind*, Beard declares: "All over the world, the thinkers and the searchers who scan the horizon of the future are attempting to assess the values of civilization and speculating about its destiny. . . . So for one reason or another, the intellectuals of all nations are trying to peer into the coming days to discover whether the curve of contemporary civilization now rises majestically toward a distant zenith or in reality has already begun to sink rapidly toward a nadir near at hand." (1) See Robinson, *The New History*, for a penetrating analysis of the inadequacies of much historical study and for a revised perspective by which historical research can become a most vital part of cultural development. Cf. *An Introduction to Western Civilization*, by Hedger and others, for a very fruitful cooperative study which contributes much toward the realization of this revised historical aim.

⁴ Spengler, *Decline of the West* (I), 21-22. Cf. DW(I), 428ff. for tables.

⁵ Spengler, DW(I), 31.

⁶ Spengler, DW(I), 159.

⁷ Spengler, DW (I), 341. Spengler explains "Morale" in more detail: "In this place it is exclusively with the conscious, religio-philosophical morale—the morale which can be known and taught and followed—that we are concerned, and not with the racial rhythm of Life, the habit, Sitte, that is ἦθος, unconsciously present. The morale with which we are dealing turns upon intellectual concepts of Virtue and Vice, good and bad; the other, upon ideals in the blood such as honor, loyalty, bravery, the feeling that attributes nobility and vulgarity." (DW [I], 341.)

⁸ Spengler, DW (I), 342-343.

⁹ Spengler, DW (I), 423-424.

¹⁰ Toynbee's *A Study of History*, 248. See ASH, 247-254 for Toynbee's rejection of the following deterministic explanations of the breakdown and disintegration of civilization: (i) the universe is a "clockwork" that is "running

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down"; (ii) the quality of the individuals whose pedigrees have accumulated too long deteriorate; and (iii) human history inevitably follows the cycles indicated by the Babylonian astronomy.

These and subsequent references to Toynbee's monumental *A Study of History* are to the excellent abridgment by Somervell. Although we recommend the study of Toynbee's original six volumes, we shall use Somervell's abridgment, since it is more readily available to the reader. Toynbee's argument is more easily grasped, we believe, if the abridgment is read before the original volumes.

¹¹ Toynbee, ASH, 254. Toynbee's position here is more intelligible in the light of his explanation of the relation of individuals to society. He rejects the two stock explanations of sociology: (i) society is merely an aggregate of individual realities which exist by themselves, or to the contrary (ii) the individual does not exist by itself, but only when it is conceived as a part of the perfect and intelligible whole known as society. Instead, Toynbee claims: "What then is the right way of describing the relation between human societies and individuals? The truth seems to be that a human society is, in itself, a system of relationships between human beings who are not only individuals but are also social animals in the sense that they could not exist at all without being in this relationship to one another. A society, we may say, is a product of the relations between individuals, and these relations of theirs arise from the coincidence of their individual fields of action. This coincidence combines the individual fields into a common ground, and this common ground is what we call a society. () If this definition is accepted, an important though obvious corollary emerges from it. Society is a 'field of action' but the *source* of all actions is in the individuals composing it." (ASH, 211.)

¹² The other four civilized societies living today are: "(i) an Orthodox Christian Society in South-Eastern Europe and Russia; (ii) an Islamic Society with its focus in the arid Zone which stretches diagonally across North Africa and the Middle East from the Atlantic to the outer face of the Great Wall of China; (iii) a Hindu Society in the tropical sub-continent of India; (iv) a Far-Eastern Society in the sub-tropical and temperate regions between the arid zone and the Pacific." (ASH, 8.)

¹³ Toynbee, ASH, 11. In this "apparentation-and-affiliation" as in all such transitions from the old to the new societies there are three characteristic factors: "a universal state as the final stage of the old society; a church developed in the old society and in turn developing the new; and the chaotic intrusion of a barbarian heroic age." (ASH, 14.) Toynbee notes that the second factor is the most important and the third is the least significant. Here the old frontier became the center of the new society.

¹⁴ ASH, 51. This point taken together with the theory of emergent evolution will be shown to have important implications for our claims regarding the social significance of the ideal of spiritual growth. Anyone interested in a further discussion of the Chinese formula of "Yin and Yang" should read Flewelling, *Things That Matter Most*, 70-86.

¹⁵ ASH, 68. Several points in connection with this conclusion should be noted:

When Toynbee refers to "primitive societies" as static, he does not deny that they may have at one time been dynamic, but they are static in their last stage of "integrated custom," which is the only one with which the civilized society has any connection.

The "unknown quantity" of unprecedented effort to which Toynbee refers is discovered in the mythological expressions of societies rather than in the

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sciences of biology and geology which are so concerned with material factors that they overlook this spiritual factor.

Toynbee indicates the environmental stimuli to be (i) hard countries, (ii) new ground, (iii) blows, (iv) pressure, and (v) penalizations.

Achievement results from difficult rather than from easy conditions; but the challenge can be too severe with disastrous effects.

¹⁶ ASH, 199.

¹⁷ ASH, 241.

¹⁸ ASH, 212. Toynbee explicitly refers to Bergson's philosophy of creative personalities in *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*.

¹⁹ In an Editor's Note Somervell explains that by a breakdown Toynbee means "the termination of growth" but not disintegration. (ASH, 273-274.)

²⁰ Toynbee, ASH, 276. Toynbee analyzes the breakdown of various civilizations in terms of three alternatives: "It is evident, then, that, whenever the existing institutional structure of a society is challenged by a new social force, three alternative outcomes are possible: either a harmonious adjustment of structure to force, or a revolution (which is a delayed and discordant adjustment) or an enormity. It is also evident that each and all of these alternatives may be realized in different sections of the same society—in different national states, for example, if that is the manner in which the particular society is articulated. If harmonious adjustments predominate, the society will continue to grow; if revolutions, its growth will become increasingly hazardous; if enormities, we may diagnose a breakdown." (ASH, 281.)

²¹ ASH, 279. Toynbee has come to this hypothesis of an inner cause of self-destruction after considering a succession of hypotheses ascribing the cause to external factors which he finds inadequate: "Our inquiry into the cause of the breakdowns of civilizations has led us, so far, to a succession of negative conclusions. We found out that these breakdowns are not acts of God—at any rate in the sense that lawyers attach to that phrase; nor are they vain repetitions of senseless laws of Nature. We have also found that we cannot attribute them to a loss of command over the environment, physical or human; they are due neither to failures in industrial or artistic techniques nor to homicidal assaults from alien adversaries. In successively rejecting these untenable explanations we have not arrived at the object of our search; but the last of the fallacies we have just cited has incidentally given us a clue. In demonstrating that the broken-down civilizations have not met their death from an assassin's hand we have found no reason to dispute the allegation that they have been victims of violence, and in almost every instance we have been led, by the logical process of exhaustion, to return a verdict of suicide." (ASH, 275.)

²² ASH, 555. It should be noted that the loss of command over the environment is not the cause of disintegration: "The evidence, so far as it goes, suggests that an increasing command over environment is a concomitant of disintegration rather than of growth. Militarism, a common feature of breakdown and disintegration, is frequently effective in increasing a society's command both over other living societies and over the inanimate forces of nature." (ASH, 364.)

²³ ASH, 429.

²⁴ ASH, 553-554.

²⁵ This Platonic principle (which is emphasized in our day by Whitehead) seems to be implied in Toynbee's reference to "the nexus of cause and effect between the loss of the leading minority's faculty for creation and the loss of the faculty for attracting the majority by charm rather than by force." (ASH, 366.) Civilizations have grown by virtue of this "*elan* which carried the chal-

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lenged party through the equilibrium of a successful response into an overbalance which declared itself in the presentation of a new challenge." (ASH, 363.)

²⁶ ASH, 216. Cf. ASH, 554.

²⁷ Since we have pointed these quoted phrases toward a specific problem which we believe is implied in what Toynbee states, we may have distorted his actual meaning. To avoid misrepresentation, we quote his own passage in its entirety: "The social problem that awaits the creator when he returns from his withdrawal into a renewed communion with the mass of his fellows is the problem of raising the average of a number of ordinary human souls to the higher level that has been attained by the creator himself; and as soon as he grapples with this task he is confronted with the fact that most of the rank and file are unable to live on this higher level with all their hearts and wills and souls and strength. In this situation he may be tempted to try a short cut and resort to the device of raising some single faculty to the higher level without bothering about the whole personality. This means, *ex hypothesi*, the forcing of a human being into a lopsided development. Such results are most easily obtainable on the plane of a mechanical technique, since, of all the elements in a culture, its mechanical aptitudes are easiest to isolate and to communicate. It is not difficult to make an efficient mechanic out of a person whose soul remains in all other departments primitive and barbarous. But other faculties can be specialized and hypertrophied in the same way. Matthew Arnold's criticism, in *Culture and Anarchy* (1869), of the devout middle-class Nonconformist English Philistine in his 'Hebraizing backwater' was that he had specialized in what he wrongly believed to be the Christian Religion while neglecting the other—the 'Hellenic'—virtues which go to the making of a well-balanced personality." (ASH, 304.)

In his discussion of "palingenesis" Toynbee claims that Christianity alone "leads right onward" toward the growth of a new kind of society wherein "transference and etherialization" are realized, since Christianity provides human growth both "transfiguration and detachment." (See ASH, 530-531. For discussion of the "futurism" and "archaism" which Toynbee claims are ineffective, see ASH, 505-530.)

Provocative as it is, Toynbee's case for the transfiguring potentiality of Christianity lacks the convincing quality possessed by his other claims. Perhaps he will make it convincing in his subsequent volumes. We fail to see how such a claim could be justified, however, unless some clear distinction is made between "the religion of Jesus" and "the religion about Jesus" which has developed in the theological tradition. (This distinction has been emphasized by Bundy in *The Religion of Jesus*.)

²⁸ ASH, 481.

²⁹ Compare Chapter I, "The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man," and Chapter IX, "The Enduring Satisfaction of Spiritual Growth." We have attempted to show that detachment is necessary in order to attain a coherent metaphysical insight; but we have also claimed that when this objective knowledge is applied through the organization of one's moral, aesthetic, and religious experience in terms of self-creation and consecration that a quality of mind is realized. Would Toynbee be justified in claiming that the hypothesis of spiritual growth lacks spiritual vitality?

³⁰ An excellent selection of the important passages from Plato's *Republic* is to be found in the *Preface to Philosophy: Book of Readings*, 177-211. For a most instructive analysis of *The Republic*, read Hendel's section in the *Preface to Philosophy: Textbook*, 215-233.

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³¹ See Toynbee, ASH, 178 and 216.

³² Spengler, *Decline of the West* (I), 159.

³³ Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, 109. According to Flewelling in his *The Survival of Western Culture*, "it is the imponderables that dictate the future. Should Western culture succeed in rising to the new opportunity that faces her, should she take a step forward, it must now be toward a more spiritual interpretation of life and society. Material progress has reached its bound and end until there is a broader and deeper pioneering in the spirit. The genius of her dissatisfactions with material things, point to a nobler and ultimate survival." (298)

³⁴ Toynbee, ASH, 68. Cf. ASH, 254 and 199 (quoted previously).

³⁵ See Flewelling, *Survival of Western Culture*, 215-216.

³⁶ This essential principle of *freedom under law* has been expressed by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*: "A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all other . . . is at any rate a necessary idea." (B373)

Excellent selections from the source material of the various social thinkers cited above are to be found in the *Preface to Philosophy: Book of Readings*, 177-304. The reader is urged to study the admirable summary and analysis of "The Background of Modern Civilization: Events, Ideas, and Institutions," offered by Hendel in the *Preface to Philosophy: Textbook*, 233-294. See also Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, especially Chapter XIV.

For a brilliant and thorough clarification of the origins, the growth, and the implications of the democratic idea, read Edman's *Fountainheads of Freedom*. Not only are Edman's own insights most instructive, but his selection and presentation of relevant source material (with the collaboration of Schneider) will be found to be very enlightening.

³⁷ Our conviction that power must be tempered by justice, if democracy is to avoid self-destruction, has been strongly influenced among other things by a personal experience in the Middle East during the recent war. An Arab boy serving in the American army had been killed in North Africa. Consequently, the United States Government sent to our local commander a "purple heart" with orders to award it to the mother of the deceased Arab youth, who lived in the area where we were stationed. Since I had been doing public relations work in connection with the American Red Cross program, the Commanding Officer asked me to find the family and make the necessary arrangements. After a complicated search I found the family; but I encountered a difficult situation which we had not anticipated. The Arab officials in the village were opposed to any such bestowal of honor on a woman. According to their custom only the father was worthy of the award. We were stalemated. Those of us representing the United States not only had military orders to present the award to the mother, but we felt strongly that the Arab attitude was an unfair prejudice toward the mother. The Arabs felt just as strongly that we were motivated by an ignorance of an essential distinction between the relative dignity of the two sexes. My first meeting with the local Muctal and his council ended in an impasse; but they courteously invited me to return the following week after they had conferred with higher officials. At the second meeting they had specific orders from a higher potentate to refuse permission for honoring the mother. In order to support their position the Arabs read a long list of the properties, armed forces, and other evidences of the power of their leader from whom the decision had been received. This was our cue. We produced the form letter from the President of the United States under whose orders we

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were acting. After we recited, in part, the inventory of armed forces, territory, the financial and industrial power which he commanded, they asked for time to consult with their leaders. At the next meeting the Arabs had changed their decision, not because they feared the United States would use its power on them, but because they were convinced that the right must be on the side of our leader who was more powerful than theirs. During the interim between this meeting and the ceremony for the award, we realized that our victory in the conflict might be self-destructive for democratic principles. We needed to show that the democratic attitude is characterized by justice. Consequently, when we awarded the "purple-heart" to the mother, we awarded the lapel bar to the father; for thereby we attempted to recognize their rights to their convictions despite our disagreement. The reaction of the Arabs was mixed. Some considered our action beneath the dignity of a group who held the power but did not force our will without concession or compromise. Others could not understand our motives. Many, however, were pleased and appreciative of our gesture toward justice, and among the youth there was elicited an interest in the democratic attitude. It was not a perfect solution, but power was at least tempered by justice. This represents on a small scale the much more complicated and difficult problem of America today in formulating an international policy based on persuasion rather than mere brute force.

³⁸ Our claim is substantiated to some degree by Whitehead's view of the function of ideas in cultural processes: "The history of ideas is a history of mistakes. But through all mistakes it is also the history of the gradual purification of conduct. When there is progress in the development of favourable order, we find conduct protected from relapse into brutalization by the increasing agency of ideas consciously entertained. In this way Plato is justified in his saying, The creation of the world—that is to say, the world of civilized order—is the victory of persuasion over force." (*Adventures of Ideas*, 30-31.)

³⁹ "Voluntary group cooperation" has been defined by Brightman as "that form of social process which is directed toward the organization of society with maximum freedom for individuals in their relations to each other limited only by the necessary consequences of group existence and by social intelligence in choosing means toward social ends." In his *Lectures in Social Philosophy*, Brightman distinguishes this ideology from that of conceiving social processes as an "organic whole" (e. g., totalitarianism) and that of conceiving social processes as a "strife of individuals" (e. g., *laissez-faire* capitalism).

⁴⁰ Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, 5. The reader is urged to study Bury's analysis of the various conceptions of progress that have been developed by social thinkers and philosophers of history from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries.

When Bury ascribes belief in fate to the Greeks, and faith in Providence to the Middle Ages, he does not mean that no one today still holds to these doctrines. He is referring to the dominant intellectual view.

⁴¹ These selections from Spencer's *Illustrations of Universal Progress*, Chapter I, are quoted by Randail in *The Making of the Modern Mind*, 441.

⁴² Bury, IOP, 4. See IOP, 351-352 for Bury's discussion of the "illusion of finality."

⁴³ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, II. Although Marx admits elsewhere in his *Deutsche Ideologie*, 28, that ideas have some influence on social conditions, his general claim, and certainly that of the Marxians, is that economic factors alone determine social processes.

⁴⁴ *Communist Manifesto*, I. (Italics mine.) When Marx and Engels conclude the *Manifesto* with the call "Working men of all countries, unite," they

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would seem to be in the inconsistent position of attempting to expedite what they conceive to be inevitable.

⁴⁵ Toynebee, *ASH*, 368-369.

⁴⁶ Lenin expresses his objective in his *State and Revolution*: "The state, i. e., the proletariat organized as the ruling class—this theory of Marx is indissolubly connected with all his teaching concerning the revolutionary role of the proletariat in history. The culmination of this role is proletarian dictatorship, the political rule of the proletariat."

⁴⁷ Urban's statement in his *Fundamentals of Ethics* is instructive: "There is no empirical evidence for any principle that is universal, that includes the future as well as the past. If we believe in what is called the principle of the uniformity of nature—that everything that happens in the future will have a cause, or as we say, be governed by law—it is not because we have any empirical evidence that this will be so. It is rather because we know that, if it is not so, physical science or knowledge is impossible. The situation is in principle the same in the case of the postulate or 'law' of progress. If we believe that progress is necessary, it is only because we know that if it is not, moral effort is in the end meaningless and futile." (436)

⁴⁸ Hocking, *Preface to Philosophy: Textbook*, 38.

⁴⁹ Urban, *FE*, 427. Cf. *FE*, 427-433.

⁵⁰ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 262-263. The importance of science for social progress is similarly emphasized by Conklin in *Man: Real and Ideal*, 171: "The values rendered by science are not only material but also intellectual, social, and moral. () It has controlled disease and pestilences, relieved suffering, and prolonged life. It has destroyed horrible superstitions, such as witchcraft and demonical possession. It has enormously enlarged the experiences and the thoughts of men, and has made possible wider associations and closer cooperation among nations than were ever possible before." (Quoted in *Preface to Philosophy: Book of Readings*, 154.)

⁵¹ Tsanoff, *Ethics*, 355. Roubiczek's statement in his *The Misinterpretations of Man* is especially relevant here: "Blind belief in progress makes man the slave of material development, for the only sphere where it is possible to detect progress is in that of science and technique. Such a development could only become true progress if man were able to control and to direct it, but his spiritual and moral powers lag so far behind that the machines, which could enable him finally to conquer nature, and by subjugating him even more completely than did the powers of nature. The highest achievement of science lies in the technical perfection of war, which leaves us in no doubt that this development is being transformed into the growing triumph of madness. Progress, restricted to technical achievements, destroys whatever could really be considered as progress."

⁵² Although Hocking, as quoted above, finds the probable evidence for past progress in the preservation of the political order, he recognizes that the possibility of progress in the future depends upon the spiritual ideals of rational persons: "Civilization by the very nature of its advance, becomes dependent on the inner character of its individual members. This is beyond the reach of the laws. () The situation to which we are now brought by our own progress is that we hardly know how to reach the sources of character in ourselves. There is a real self of man which appears to be submerged under the complexities of modern sophistication so that he cannot find it." (*Preface to Philosophy: Textbook*, 38. Cf. Chapter I of this study.)

⁵³ Those who might object that scientific inquiry and technological application have nothing to do with ideal values, should read the following statement

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by Whitehead⁵⁴ which claims that science itself has been produced as a result of man's ideal value motivation: "Judgments of worth are no part of the texture of physical science, but they are part of the motive of its production. Mankind have raised the edifice of science, because they judged it worthwhile. In other words, the motives involve innumerable judgments of value. These values may be aesthetic, or moral, or utilitarian, namely, judgments as to the beauty of the structure or as to the duty of exploring the truth or as to the utility in the satisfaction of physical wants. But whatever the motives, without judgments of value there would have been no science." (*Aims of Education*, 228-229. Cf. *Modes of Thought*, 9-16, 44.)

⁵⁴ Whereas Urban in the following passage claims that the self-realization of ideal value is meaningless apart from the idea of social progress, we have attempted to show that the idea of social progress is meaningless apart from the self-realization of ideal values: "Our actual knowledge is not of such a character as to disprove the possibility of progress. The postulate of progress, in the sense of the increase and conservation of values is, however, so basic to the moral life that we are justified in making it a pillar in our philosophy of life and the world." (Urban, *FB*, 444.)

⁵⁵ Paine so declares in his *Rights of Man*: "Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or the rights of the mind, and also those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness which are not injurious to the natural rights of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection . . . A constitution is a thing *antecedent* to a government, and a government is only the creature of a constitution."

⁵⁶ Leighton, *The Individual and the Social Order*, 469.

⁵⁷ Meiklejohn, *What Does America Mean?*, 181. Meiklejohn's definition of liberty is relevant to this discussion: "Liberty is loved by us, not as a form in which we always act, but as a principle in accordance with which we know in our best moments we ought to act." (*WAM*, 231.)

APPENDIX

THE HISTORICAL QUEST FOR SALVATION

A. The Need for Constructive Criticism.

IN AN AGE obsessed with its own modernity, it is well to guard against an uncritical attitude of contempt toward our cultural traditions. Even if the historical ways of salvation do not furnish an adequate answer to the pressing question that arise today concerning the destiny of the human soul, some critical appreciation of the deeply rooted religious needs that they were intended to satisfy is indispensable for coping with this problem in the context of our own culture. The doctrines may have become outmoded; but the spiritual yearnings persist from age to age. We must neither blindly accept nor arrogantly reject our religious heritage; but, rather, through constructive criticism we should sympathetically understand it, sift its *valuable insights*, and add to it those modes of *thought and conduct* that will be worth the while of future generations to consider, when they in turn must deal with the perennial quest for salvation anew. Consequently, we offer this analysis of the historical conceptions of salvation as the necessary prolegomena to our own thought about the problem. Since the conclusions of this study will grow out of an internal criticism of solutions which have been offered previously, our reconception of a way of salvation for modern man through spiritual growth will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, as would be a radical break with the past.¹

In order to delineate the many historical views of salvation, we shall classify them as: (i) ways of God-salvation, i. e., a redemptive process in which God is the chief agent; and (ii)

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ways of self-salvation, i. e., a redemptive process in which man is the chief agent. As the discussion proceeds, it will become evident that this division is not absolute, even though it is methodologically useful.²

B. The Ways of God-Salvation.

In Judaism salvation was at first thought of as fulfillment of a national hope for the redemption of the Jewish race from political bondage; but under the influence of the eighth century prophets there arose a concern for the salvation of individual persons from their own sins against their fellow-man and against God. Longing for the day when a Messiah would appear to fulfill their destiny as a chosen people, the Jews put their complete faith in God's action. There were only two things that they themselves could do. They had to abide by the divine laws revealed to Moses, and, if these were broken, they had to repent for their sins. It is of repentance as the primary requirement for salvation that the Psalmist sings:

The Lord is nigh unto them who are of a broken heart
And saveth such as be of a contrite spirit.
Many are the afflictions of the righteous;¹
But the Lord delivereth him out of them all.³

In Zoroastrianism man's striving with God for the salvation of the world might seem to make it a way of self-salvation. Actually, however, this human activity is a mere corollary of the basic doctrine that there is but one sacred law which must be accepted and observed by all who would be saved. The acceptance and observation of the sacred law were not limited to the rites of purification but also demanded good thought and conduct. Unlike the religion of Israel, the Zoroastrian faith emphasized immortality from the very beginning:

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O ye mortals! Mark these commandments,
Which the Wise Lord has given
For happiness and for pain:
Long punishment for the evil-doer,
Bliss for the follower of truth,
Joy of salvation ever afterwards for the righteous!⁴

Absolute submission to the divine will is found in the Sikh religion. Since the supreme God is an inscrutable being, man is helpless and can be saved only by God's grace in absorbing man into Himself:

By seeking Thy protection,
The soul blendeth with the Supreme Soul.⁵

The religion of Islam requires a similar absolute faith and conformity to God's revealed will. Here, however, it is submission rather than absorption that is the key to the Moham-medan's way of salvation by God's grace:

O ye who believe! If ye fear God,
He will make good your deliverance,
And will put away your sins from you,
and will forgive you.
God is of great bounteousness.⁶

When the belief in an eternal round of rebirth determined by the deeds of previous existences arose in India, the promise of heaven for those who gave liberally to the Brahman priests and sacrificed to the Gods was not sufficient compensation. The people feared that some more effective means of escape from the law of transmigration was needed. Consequently, the masses found a way of salvation from rebirth in devotion to savior-gods. Most important of these were Shiva and Vishnu, who at crucial times became incarnate as men and saved them by compassionate grace. Although most of these religious cults had no intellectual interests, at least one leader, Ramanuja, taught that he who seeks the knowledge of Brahman and

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thinks about God as well as loves Him attains salvation from the endless cycle of rebirths by God's grace:

O Lord of prayer, we invoke Thee, Savior,
As Protector, as the Comforter Who loveth us!'

The notion of a savior-god was also dominant in the mystery religions in the lands around the Eastern Mediterranean during the Hellenistic and Roman period. Common to all these was the belief that, since only a God can be Immortal, man must become a God, if he were to save himself from the evils after death. According to the myths of Dionysus, Zagreus, Sabazios, Orpheus, Attis, Isis, Osiris, Adonis, Seraphis, and Mithras a god dies a violent death and is brought to life again. Thus man's salvation lay in re-creating the tragedy so that this same God-consciousness filled his mind when he suppressed his own consciousness in a savage orgy. The rites in these ceremonies varied from the slaughter of a living animal to eat his flesh and drink his blood to the purification of the body by bathing in blood or mud. In the more civilized Eleusinian mysteries it was believed that just as the wheat dies only to rise again, so also man by performing magical rites may renew his life. Thus through identification with a savior-god by enthusiasm or sacraments, or by both, the initiate discovered the assurance of a blessed immortality. Even though many of the Greeks were offended by the fact that one's moral character had nothing to do with salvation, the initiation into the mystery and the participation in its rites remained the essential requirements. Some progress was made, however, when, instead of the promise of earthly goods emphasized by the older Greek religions, the Orphic gospel sought to whet and satisfy a spiritual appetite for eternal life.

The immanent love of a transcendent Father-God is the basic presupposition of the Christian way of salvation. Accordingly, man's efforts do count for something in ridding himself of some natural and moral sins; but the *sine qua non* of

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Christian salvation is the redeeming activity of God's Will: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God Who worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure."⁸

Although the language of this verse would seem to minimize the loving character of God, the essential role of Jesus in the redemptive process is conceived in personal terms which express a rapprochement of God's judgment and mercy with man's trust and devotion.⁹ In order to understand the complex meaning of the Christian way of salvation, therefore, we must analyze the various conceptions of Jesus' part in the process: (i) Jesus' own belief about salvation as recorded in Matthew, Mark, and Luke; (ii) Christ's beliefs about Himself as the Saviour as recorded in the Gospel of John; (iii) Paul's belief in Christ as The Redeemer; and (iv) theological doctrines of the atonement.

(i) The chief statement by Jesus himself which expresses his belief about salvation is found in slightly varying wording in all three of the synoptic gospels. It is recorded as follows: Matthew 16: 25: "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it." Matthew 10: 39: "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." Mark 8: 35: "For whosoever would save his life; and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's shall save it." Luke 9: 24: "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake the same shall save it." Luke 17: 33: "Whosoever shall seek to gain his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it."¹⁰

Whether one accepts the more prophetic emphasis of Luke or the doctrinal forms of Matthew and Mark, our interpretation of Jesus' meaning about salvation is essentially the same, i. e., salvation is found by giving oneself so completely to the Divine Cause that one's own selfish interests become negli-

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gible in importance. Not only must one so lose his life through service and devotion to the ideal to which he has consecrated his thought and conduct, but, if necessary, he must sacrifice his life before he would forsake his divine mission. In spite of the impossibility of verifying Jesus' actual words, if there is any accuracy at all in the Biblical accounts, Jesus' own actions reveal this principle as the norm for his vision of an abundant life. The Sermon on the Mount, his two commandments of love of God and love of man, the Golden Rule, the Lord's Prayer, and his emphasis upon the spirit rather than the letter of the law express simple precepts whose contents were not original with Jesus. But it was the first time that these spiritual insights were thus uniquely selected and organized with reference to God's coming Kingdom: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness."¹¹

Picture the scene when Jesus enters the Garden of Gethsemane. He believes that he has failed in his divine mission, that his cause is nearly lost. He is experiencing a desperate crisis in which he is "exceedingly sorrowful, even unto death." In this state of mental depression and spiritual anguish he seeks communion and fellowship with God in prayer. As he prays: "Not my will, but Thine be done," Jesus' faith is renewed and he comes to realize that, in spite of the obstacles that thwart his ideal purpose, he is cooperating with his Father-God. This realization generates within his mind the revitalizing power by which he can leave Gethsemane in the direction of Calvary rather than back toward the safety of Galilee. Outwardly it proved to have been a foolhardy choice; but from the point of view of his divine mission, it gave him the opportunity to reveal the creative spiritual attitude by which all men could be saved. For as he suffered the consequences of his foolhardiness on the cross, he prayed: "Father, forgive them, they know not what they do." As he was meeting hatred, intolerance, prejudice, and unjust persecution with the forgiveness and understanding love of an enlightened

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good will, he was engraving his message upon the memory of humanity. But then there came the last tragic moment when Jesus felt that even God had deserted him: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"¹²

(ii) Christ's belief about himself as the Savior are recorded in the Gospel of John. Whereas the events we have been describing portray Jesus seeking and finding salvation through consecration and cooperation with God, John presents the Christ who is Himself the Savior of men. Not only is Christ the door of salvation (John 10: 9) and the Good Shepherd who by self-sacrifice protects the sheep (John 10: 10), but He is also the indispensable vine (John 15: 1-6). Consequently, He is Himself, "the way, the truth, and the life."¹³ For John, therefore, the redeeming power of Christ is available to those who are regenerated by a mystical knowledge. Since this principle of divine life was an intellectual mystery, it did not involve a rational process of thought, despite John's superficial use of the Greek concept of "the logos."

(iii) According to Paul's doctrine of Christ as The Redeemer, Christ's death and resurrection potentially offered salvation to all mankind; but it actually was a redeeming power only for those who realized a spiritual union with Christ by faith in Him. This required more than intellectual and moral acceptance of the Gospel, and the undefinable mystical alliance was made more concrete by the sacraments of baptism and the communion of the Lord's Supper.¹⁴

(iv) According to the theological doctrines of the atonement God made salvation from an original sin possible by sending His Son who died on the cross in order that all who believe in Him might be redeemed by His blood. Through Christ's resurrection eternal blessedness is opened up for all men. Although all Christian theologians have agreed that Christ's sacrifice is the key to man's salvation, they have differed greatly on the theory about it.¹⁵

Despite the shift of absolute authority from the Church to

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the Bible, the Protestant Reformation instigated by Luther did not essentially alter the Christian view of salvation. Whether one reads the *Summa Theologiae* of Aquinas or the *Institutio Christianae Religionis* of Calvin, the absolute sovereignty of God, the necessity of Christ's sacrifice, the impotence of man who can do nothing but have faith, are seen to be basic doctrines in the Christian view of redemption. Jonathan Edwards' *God Glorified in Man's Dependence* could just as well have been written by Augustine in the fourth century. In our own day this orthodox view is best expressed by Karl Barth in his discussion of the "word of God":

But our possessing it in faith means that we possess it as a promise. We believe we are redeemed, set free, children of God, i. e., we take up as such the promise promulgated in the Word of God in Jesus Christ, although and while we do not in the least understand it in regard to our present, or in the least see it as fulfilled and completed; we take it up, because it speaks of an act of God upon us, although and while we only see our empty hands, which we thereupon stretch out to God. We believe in our future existence, we believe in an eternal life in the midst of the valley of death. It is thus, in this futurity, that we have and possess it. The certainty with which we are aware of this possession is just the certainty of faith, and certainty of faith means concretely certainty of hope.¹⁶

Even liberal Christian theologians who advocate a rational faith agree with the exponents of a blind faith that, regardless of man's ethical, aesthetic, and intellectual accomplishments, only from a divine source can there come the means of redemption. The experiences of Paul, Augustine, and Luther are cited as proof of this belief. From the point of view of Christianity, therefore, man's spiritual efforts at self-improvement avail him no more a way of salvation than did primitive magic.¹⁷

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C. The Ways of Self-Salvation.

Whereas the authenticity of the ways of God-salvation which we have considered thus far is believed to be derived from the revelation of God himself, there have been other views about man's destiny which stemmed primarily from the spiritual insights of human enlightenment through discipline and reflective efforts. Divine influence is not necessarily eliminated in all cases; but the chief agent in the process of redemption is man himself.

Since Confucius discouraged belief in a personal God, prayer, and public worship, there may be some grounds for claiming that actually Confucianism is an ethical system rather than a religion. Nevertheless, his precepts of social propriety have guided the religious aspirations of millions of men, and his veneration of Chinese antiquity with its worship of Heaven bears testimony to the fact that he did not consider his thought to be a radical break from the religious tradition of his people.¹⁸ What is important here is that the Confucian way of salvation emphasized the efforts of the human self exclusively: "What the superior man seeks is in himself."¹⁹

In the religion of the Divine Way (Tao) advocated by Lao-tse, the doctrine of inaction (Wu-wei) would seem to suggest that the emphasis upon passivity rules out the possibility of self-salvation. Furthermore, since Tao is a transcendent principle of the universe, there may be a reference to the necessity of Divine agency in man's salvation. But some scholars contend that Taoism should be considered as a religious way of self-salvation for these reasons: (i) it taught that man must seek to incorporate the transcendent principle within himself, since no God can do it for him; and (ii) Lao-tse's own writings show clearly that salvation was an important problem for him:

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The Tao is the Sanctuary where all things find refuge,
the good man's priceless Treasure,
the Guardian and Savior of him who is not good.
It may be sought and found daily,
and can remit the sins of the guilty;
hence It is the most precious.²⁰

Philosophical Hinduism arose because speculative minds in India could not find satisfaction in the naïve beliefs about a Savior-God. Like the unphilosophical believers they, too, sought release from the bondage of rebirth; but the way of liberation was more suited to their intellectual capacities. Self-salvation thus replaced God-salvation for the more sophisticated.

According to the Upanishads, liberation from rebirth is to be attained by an intuitive insight and absorption into Brahman-Atman:

Without the Lord, the soul is bound.
By knowing God, one is released from all fetters.
The One God rules over both the perishable and the soul.
By meditation on Him, by union with Him,
By entering into His being more and more
There is finally cessation from every illusion.
By knowing God, there is a falling off of all fetters.²¹

Maltreatment of the body was merely preparatory to this realization of one's real self as free from all changes. As a further method of inducing such a transcendent consciousness, the method of Yoga was used to suppress all bodily functions.

The basic doctrine here is that Brahman is pure being, a unity which excludes all duality. So long as man believes in his separateness from Brahman, he is bound to the wheel of rebirth. Release lies in overcoming this illusion. Since Brahman and the law of rebirth are transcendent principles, it might be questioned that this is a way of self-salvation. But again we find support for our position from Moore:

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This transcendental knowledge is not a doctrine that can be learned and taken on the authority of a teacher, or reached by way of demonstration, or accepted on the ground of its self-evidence. If it is ever attained, it comes as an intuition which brings its certainty in itself. Moral excellence, ascetic exercises, reflection, contemplation carried to and beyond the limits of consciousness, are only means by which a man may put himself in a state in which this transcendent intuition is possible. Here, again, the attainment is man's own; the impassive Brahman has nothing to do with it.²²

In the philosophical explanations of this saving insight, Shankara emphasized that the works of the law and striving for moral perfection are of no avail:

How, then, is an emancipation (*Moska*) from the bonds (*Bandha*) of existence possible? Not by works: for these, good as well as bad, demand their requital; necessitate accordingly a new existence, and are the cause of the continuance of the *samsara*; not yet by (moral) purification (*Samskara*) for this can take place only in an object capable of change, whereas the *atman*, the soul, whose emancipation is concerned, is unchangeable. Emancipation therefore cannot consist in any development or in any activity, but only in the recognition of something already real, still concealed through ignorance. 'From knowledge comes emancipation.' (*Jnanan moksah*) When once the soul knows its identity with Brahman, this knowledge is emancipation. (The saying is 'that art thou,' not 'that shalt thou be.' See Shankara, iii. 3.32.) The individual soul on recognizing its identity with Brahman becomes by that concept the universal spirit. (See Shankara, i. 1.4.)²³

The knowledge that the individual soul and the phenom-

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enal world have no true existence and the Brahman-Atman has the only real identity—this unempirical knowledge is an intuition that cannot be taught. Although the mind can be prepared for it by thought, thought does not attain it. It comes to the mind as an intuition. When that mind's residue of former deeds has been exhausted, its substrata of existence is dissolved, and it is forever Brahman:

When the deeds whose fruit has not yet begun to form, and when those whose fruit is the present existence, have been destroyed by knowledge, then, at the moment of death, complete and eternal emancipation begins for the enlightened sage: 'his vital spirits do not depart, but he is Brahman, and in Brahman is he merged.'

As rivers run, and in the ocean
Renouncing name and form from vision vanish,
So names and forms the Enlightened Sage renouncing
Enters great Brahman, the all-embracing Spirit.²⁴

Challenging the absolute monism of the Vedanta philosophy is the strain of thought later incorporated into the Sankhya system which claimed that the saving knowledge is in absolute diversity rather than in identity. Here the phenomenal world is not an illusion but an objective reality, and the underlying substratum is a constant flux of nature as well as man's thoughts and feelings. In this atheistic view, the human soul, as long as it remains in ignorance, is bound to the wheel of rebirth. But when the soul realizes that it is passive and not a real participant in the eternally active and productive primary substance (Prakriti), then it is saved from transmigration. It is from this view that both Jainism and Buddhism derive many of their insights.

Jainism emphasized the ascetic self-mortification which characterized Brahmanism in seeking salvation from the Karma constituted by a man's deeds before conversion, whether those

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deeds were in this present life or in a previous one. The Three Jewels by which such salvation was achieved were: (i) right faith that the Jina had overcome the world; (ii) right knowledge of the psychological and metaphysical relation of the soul and the world which it must struggle to overcome; (iii) right living according to the teaching of the founder in order to add no more deeds to Karma, negatively, by suppressing the passions and, positively, by cultivating the virtues. Thus, like the Sankhya, the Jains believed in an enduring individual soul. Knowledge, faith, and right conduct are the true causes of final liberation.²⁵

Now Buddha agreed that salvation must be achieved by man himself and that the evil from which redemption was sought was the bondage of man not only to the ills of his present existence but also to those of an infinite series of rebirths. But he differed fundamentally from the other Great Heresies in his absolute denial of the reality of a substantial soul. Only the Karma of one existence is transmitted to another existence.

Now the central position of the Buddhist alternative to those previous views of life was this—that Gotama not only ignored the whole of the soul theory, but even held all discussion as to the ultimate soul problems with which the Vedanta and the other philosophies were chiefly concerned, as not only childish and useless, but as actually inimical to the only ideal worth striving after—the ideal of a perfect life, here and now, in this present world, in Arahatsip.²⁶

According to Buddha, there is only one sense in which a man has an identity that continues after death, namely, the identity of cause and effect. As the temporary effect of the causes of countless ages, man survives, if it can be called survival, in so far as the cause which produced him produced other such temporary effects. Consequently the salvation

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which the Buddhist seeks is not his own enjoyment in any future world. Rather, he so thinks and acts that the fruit of his deeds will be reaped by some other person who is affected by his Karma but has no conscious identity with him. It is in the present world, therefore, that he must find salvation from the delusions of individuality so that he might attain Nirvana, i. e., "the blessed state of release which comes when the chain of causation that reaches from one life to another has been broken"²⁷

Whereas the orthodox Christian doctrine holds that man is saved from sin and hell for a heavenly reward of eternal happiness, the Buddhist doctrine presupposes the law of Karma which would operate in hell and heaven, as well as in this world, and would make any such permanent condition impossible. The goal of the Buddhist way of salvation is, therefore, *Arahatship*.

He who is thoughtful, prudent and reflective,
Fervent, not forward, and earnest,
Hath destroyed his fetters; he, e'en here on earth,
May attain supreme enlightenment.²⁸

Not only is this a state of unspeakable bliss, but it is also a release from the wheel of rebirth.

It [Buddhism] holds also that the destruction of ignorance is the way of escape from the wheel of life, but the escape is not reached, and, of course, in the Buddhist system, could not be reached, in a union with God to be attained only in an after-life. The victory to be gained by the destruction of ignorance is, in Gotama's view, a victory which can be gained and enjoyed in this life, and in this life only. This is what is meant by the Buddhist ideal of *Arahatship*—the life of a man made perfect by insight, the life of a man who has travelled along the 'Noble eightfold path' and broken all the 'Fetters,' and carried out in its entirety, the Buddhist

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system of self-culture and self-control. The Christian analogue to this state of mind (which, in English books on Buddhism, is usually called Nirvana), is the advent of the Kingdom of Heaven within a man, the 'peace that passeth understanding.'²⁹

Accordingly, the way of salvation which Buddha taught presupposed the validity of what he called the Four Noble Truths:

1. This life, as well as all those linked with it in the *endless cycles of rebirth*, is characterized universally by suffering. This is intensified by those events which are distinctive of individual existence, e. g., birth, decay, disease, death, etc.
2. The cause of such universal suffering is desire or lust for life now and after death.
3. Suffering can be eliminated only by extinguishing the desires which cause it, i.e., those appetites for temporary satisfactions as well as will to live itself.
4. The Noble Path alone offers the Middle way between the extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification for saving modes of thought and conduct:
 - a. Right views that are free from superstition or delusion.
 - b. Right aspirations that are worthy of intelligent persons.
 - c. Right speech that is kindly and trustful.
 - d. Right conduct that is peaceful, honest, and pure.
 - e. Right livelihood which hurts or endangers no living thing.
 - f. Right efforts in self-training and self-control.
 - g. Right mindfulness that is active and watchful.
 - h. Right meditation on the realities of life.³⁰

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The detailed structure of Buddha's teaching is further revealed in the four stages of the Noble Path which consist of:

1. Conversion by companionship with the good, hearing of the law, enlightened reflection, or the practice of virtue.
2. The path of those who only once return to this world because he has reduced lust, hatred, delusion to a minimum and has freed himself from doubt, the delusion of self, and ritual.
3. The path of those who never will return to this world because they have destroyed all desire for themselves or wrong feeling for others.
4. The path of the Arahats, i. e., those men saved by their insight which frees them from lust for either material or immaterial existence and gives them a true perspective of life.³¹

Thus by following this Noble Path a man can by his own efforts attain Nirvana which is his salvation. Although Nirvana has been defined before in this discussion, the following insight of Rhys Davids adds further light, especially now that the Buddhist way of salvation has been described:

What then is Nirvana, which means simply going out, extinction; it being quite clear, from what has gone before, that this cannot be the extinction of a soul? *It is the extinction of that sinful, grasping condition of mind and heart, which would otherwise, according to the great mystery of Karma, be the cause of renewed individual existence.* That extinction is to be brought about by, and runs parallel with, the growth of the opposite condition of mind and heart; and it is complete when that opposite condition is reached. Nirvana is therefore the same thing as a *sinless, calm state of mind*; and if translated at all, may best, perhaps,

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be rendered 'holiness' —holiness, that is, in the Buddhist sense, *perfect peace, goodness, and wisdom*.³²

Of Buddha's followers, the Hinayana branch in southern India remained true to the orthodox teachings of their master that he was only a teacher of a way of salvation from suffering and that metaphysics is futile; but the Mahayana branch of northern India which was extended into China and Japan made a divine savior of Buddha and formulated a speculative system of theological doctrines. Instead of Buddha's polemic against the substantial reality of the soul, Mahayana Buddhism brought back a soul theory into its system of belief. Furthermore, Buddha's emphasis upon self-discipline and self-development for the realization of Arahatsip by which man found salvation was minimized by the doctrine of Bodhisattship. According to this Greater Vehicle, it was a higher ideal to be born again and again in order to bring saving insight and sublime conditions or Nirvana for generations of men yet unborn.

Some commentators have pointed to the shift from Hinayana to Mahayana Buddhism, in which Buddha the human teacher became Buddha the Divine Savior, as evidence for the contention that true religion must have a superhuman reference and object of worship. Whether this be true or not, it does not follow in either case that Buddhism abandoned the way of self-salvation. The Mahayana Buddhist did not seek deliverance from this world's evil or from the evil of rebirth by appeal to the Buddha whom they venerated. Support for this interpretation is given by G. F. Moore:

Moreover, the goal had shifted from the attainment by the individual of the character of Arahats (saint) and entrance into Nirvana, to becoming a Buddha, with all a Buddha's essential knowledge and a Buddha's mission. But through all this, the achievement was solely man's own. It was 'salvation by man's own power.'³³

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An exception to this view is to be found in the Pure Land Sects of Buddhism of Japan. According to this doctrine, men of old were capable of self-salvation; but human nature had degenerated to the point where self-salvation was not sufficient. Perhaps there were a few who might achieve redemption by their own efforts; but for the masses divine help was needed in order to be saved from the cycle of rebirth.

Such a salvation is provided by Amitabha Buddha, who ages ago vowed that he would not himself enter into the bliss of attainment unless every man who in devout faith called upon his name might be saved. Those who, putting their confidence in this vow, thus call upon Amitabha are received by him into the Western Paradise, the realm of endless light, where they progress to perfection in knowledge and character. Here, again, religion, in despair of man's ability to save himself, turns as its only hope to the grace of God—for a god in everything but the word, Amitabha is—through faith.³⁴

There were some important differences within the Pure Land Sects themselves, however. The founder of the Jodo sect, Honen, established the orthodox doctrine described above. Some of his followers in China as well as in Japan made the accumulation of merits necessary for salvation, while others claimed that the endless invocation of the name, "Hail Amida Buddha!", was sufficient. The greatest of Honen's disciples, Shinran, declared that a more spiritual attitude was required for salvation. This was an absolute trust and faith in the promises of Buddha by whose Grace alone all men could find a new birth in the Western Paradise.³⁵

Although the Greek conception of self-salvation through the rational development of virtues in a balanced life is considered elsewhere, some mention should be made at this point of the Stoics whose ideas became the religious principles for

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many in the Greek and Roman cultures. The Stoics maintained that the universe was entirely permeated by a material *Logos*, i. e., an active, purposeful Divine Intelligence, of which the human soul is an integral part. It was only becoming man's dignity, therefore, to seek virtue for its own sake by rationally organizing his life so that he was complete master over his passions and sensuous impulses. In the Divine Providence evils were distorted goods, since they served as a means for the discipline of man's character. It was this self-mastery of the inner man in spite of the outward circumstances that beset him which was the key to the Stoical way of salvation:

Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this nature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and so secures tranquility.³⁰

D. Conclusions from Historical Survey.

In the first place, this survey has substantiated our thesis that the adequacy of a way of salvation can not be judged apart from an understanding of the specific problem it must solve, i. e., the particular undesirable condition of human nature requiring a transformation. This should give credence to our claim that the spiritual distress of modern man can not be alleviated simply by offering him a way of salvation which is irrelevant to his particular needs for a purpose which would make his life meaningful. A Christian who is seeking salvation from an original sin does not consider absorption into Brahman, the ascetic self-mortification of Jainism, the Buddhist's Noble Path, the Stoic's self-mastery, or any of the other "ways" as adequate as his own. The same thing could be said of any of the other religious views we have discussed. Why, therefore, should not an orthodox Christian recognize that a person, who does not share his belief in the absolute sovereignty of God and the utter depravity of man, might find the traditional Christian way of salvation inadequate for solving his problem? As a matter of fact, modern man would

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have to reject such theological doctrines that deny man's spiritual capacities, if Jesus' *own* insights are to have any meaning for him. Furthermore, to modern man who is searching for a way of salvation from his spiritual frustration for some meaningful purpose, the problem of changing God's will by propitiation or any other means is as irrelevant as the problem of how he might be absorbed into Brahman in order to escape the wheel of rebirth.

In the second place, the reader may decide in the light of this historical analysis whether or not his own or any of the other traditional ways of salvation meet all of his own needs. We suggest that if any of these brief summaries indicate this possibility, further investigation of that view might prove fruitful. If, however, the reader's problem is still unsolved, perhaps he will be interested in deriving further insights concerning human destiny from other types of redeeming experiences than those usually considered by orthodox theologians.

In the third place, we have before us the historical data from which we can infer the essential characteristics of human nature as they have been conceived by all the great religions when they have offered man a way by which they claim he might transform the undesirable condition of his soul. In spite of the deviation of our view from that of the orthodox traditions, we insist that no adequate reconception of a way of salvation for modern man can be attained, if we do not take into account the following essential insights into human nature that pertain to this eternal problem.

The first of these essential insights is the fact that man has been seriously concerned about his experiences of ideal values. Recall, for examples, the emphasis of the Hebrew prophets upon moral virtues, the high ethical standards of Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, Taoism, Stoicism, Jesus' teaching and exemplification of righteousness and loving compassion, Abelard's and Ritschl's moral theory of the atonement, the re-

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quirement of Jainism for right living, and the Buddhistic system of elevated thought and conduct.

A second characteristic of human effort when man seeks salvation is that he must face much frustration of the ideal values he has chosen to realize. According to the prophets of most of the great religions, it will be noted, man himself is to blame, since he is guilty of moral sin in his own thought and conduct. The eighth century prophets of Judaism and Jesus especially emphasized this point. In the Orient, especially in Buddhism, however, the tragic evil in man's life was thought to be caused by something beyond man's own will over which he had no control. In spite of the efforts to gloss it over, Jesus' cry of despair on the cross (My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?) has also echoed this unpleasant fact down through twenty centuries. A Christian who will not face this basic issue is not worthy of the name.

The third insight into the essential characteristics of the redemptive process is that salvation requires an inward adjustment of the human will to some superhuman factor. The conception of the means by which this might be accomplished has been shown to range from awareness of sin and repentance (Judaism) or consecration (Jesus) to the release from Karma as in Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism. Between these extremes, all the religions we have considered demand some sort of inner adjustment of man's will to a higher power that is not his own. Even in those cases where we found that the agency of the self was the dominant factor, there was at least the idea of a cosmic process that had to be taken into account by man as he worked out his destiny in compliance with externally caused requirements (Taoism, Confucianism, and Stoicism).

In summarizing our conclusions from this historical analysis, we contend, therefore, that these factors—(i) the realization of ideal values, (ii) the frustration of ideal values both by man's own will and by a trans-human evil factor, and

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(iii) the internal adjustment of human value-realizations to a cosmic force or superhuman agency—must be accounted for and not explained away by any adequate reconception of a way of salvation for modern man in search of a soul. Instead of blindly accepting these traditional “ways of salvation” or arrogantly rejecting them, we shall adopt the attitude of constructive criticism toward these historical traditions in our attempt to suggest the possibilities of a way of spiritual growth.

¹ This distinction between evolutionary and revolutionary views has been made by Brightman with respect to conceptions of God. (See *A Philosophy of Religion*, 155.) We shall show that the same terminology can be used regarding conceptions of salvations.

² A similar basis for historical classification is expressed in the following passage from Bixler, *Religion for Free Minds*, 20-21: “Speaking generally we may say that religions in the past have divided on this basic issue. One type has accepted the liberal premise and worked on the assumption that man had something of his own to express and that religion should help him to do it. The other type has denied at the outset that in his religious life man has any dignified freedom of his own, and has made him a creature dependent upon God for his will as for all else. We may call it the difference between a religion which stresses man’s autonomy and one which stresses God’s authority.”

There are other scholars who deny that self-redemption is actually a religious way of salvation at all. Knudson, for example, contends in *The Doctrine of Redemption*, 281: “Now it is the characteristic of redemption that it comes from God. We may be saved from various evils, both natural and moral, by our own efforts and by merely human assistance, but this is not salvation in the religious sense of the term. Self-redemption is not redemption. True redemption comes from above. It consists in triumph over the world, and this manifestly lies beyond human power to attain. Man may through what he regards as his own strength improve his earthly lot, and he may to some extent discipline and cultivate his inner life. But this does not solve for him the problem of life nor does it yield him a truly redemptive experience. The latter can come to him only as he is lifted above himself and is supported by a power superior both to sin and death. In other words, it can come to him only through divine aid. Only God can save. This is the conviction of religious faith.” Although what Knudson claims is probably true of the Christian tradition, a universal application would exclude some very important attempts to realize the meaning of human destiny. Even though Brahmanism, Buddhism, and the mystery religions found that supernatural aid was required to supplement human effort (see Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, 418-420), our subsequent analysis will show that there have been religions in which the chief agent is man.

³ Psalms 34: 18-19. See Hume, *Treasure House of Living Religions*, 57.

⁴ Yasna 30.11: Iiani, *Divine Songs of Zarathustra*, 29. See Hume, TLR, 58.

⁵ Hymns of Guru Nanak, Rag Sorath: Macauliffe, *Sikh Religion*, 1.330. See Hume, TLR, 57.

⁶ Koran 8.29: Rodwell, *Koran*, 377. See Hume TLR, 56.

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⁷ Rig Veda, 2.23.7, 8; Griffith, *Rigveda*, 1.287, with "Lord of prayer" as place of the Sanscrit designation for the Deity, "Brihaspati." See Hume, TLR, 55. Although Ramanuja's doctrines were more intellectual than those of the others, they were not as philosophical as the speculative Hindus' views which we shall discuss later.

⁸ Philippians, 2: 12, 13. Review Niebuhr's analysis of the doctrine of sin from which the Christian doctrine seeks to save man.

⁹ Royce maintains that whatever have been the Christological doctrines of Christian leaders, the historical fact has been a union of Christ's followers in a divine Universal Community characterized by faith and love. (See Royce, PC, II, 425. Cf. PC, I, 49, 158, 376, 344, 364; SRI, 75, 202-203.)

¹⁰ We believe that this last passage from Luke 17: 33 best expresses Jesus' own words, since the Christocentric language and the reference to the gospel in the other passages seem patently to be doctrinal additions. (See Bundy, *Psychic Health of Jesus*, 139 for substantiation of this interpretation.)

¹¹ Matthew 6: 33. Jesus' conception of an abundant life will be seen to be very important in later discussions of spiritual growth.

¹² Further implications of this very important experience will be discussed later.

Although the report of Jesus' resurrection will be seen to be of basic importance for the Christian doctrines about him, our interpretation of his own view of salvation is confined to those historical events that ended on the cross. For us, Jesus' experience in Gethsemane is a more important revelation of his conception of salvation than that of Calvary, since even his forgiving attitude was the result of his reconsecration to his divine mission. His words on the cross merely disclosed his consequent divine quality of mind.

Although we do not know whether or not Lyman would agree with this view, the following passage substantiates it to some extent: "For the fullest portrayal of the way of transformation we must turn to Jesus. And from him we learn that this way saves men from evil by repentance and forgiveness, faith and sacrificial service. These experiences restore wholeness because they are in themselves integral. Repentance is the recovery of singleness of mind. Forgiveness, whether given or received, relaxes the tensions and breaks down the antagonisms due to past wrongs. Faith releases inward powers and allies the soul with higher forces. Sacrificial service repairs the havoc of unreason and lovelessness." (*The Meaning and Truth of Religion*, 67.)

¹³ John 14: 6. Although John 12: 25, "He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal," lacks the egocentric references, John 12: 26, "If any man serve me, let him follow me; and where I am, there shall also my servant be: if any man serve me, him will my Father honour," indicates that this section is no exception to John's thesis.

¹⁴ The belief that Jesus had a supernatural birth, suffered a violent death, was resurrected, and redeemed all who were initiated into the church and participated in the sacraments is similar to the belief underlying all the mystery religions as well as the religions of Shiva and Vishnu. There are these significant differences, however: Whereas the mystery religions sought only release from mortality, Paul sought release from sin. Furthermore, according to the Christian view, God Himself was the loving Father who wished to make possible eternal blessedness for His children by sending His Son. (See Moore, *Birth and Growth of Religion*, 175-176 and *History of Religions* (II), 128-129 for relevant discussions.) Perhaps Gnosticism with its esoteric knowledge of the mysteries of the Godhead, of the universe, and of the soul is one phase of

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Christianity which is practically the same as the mystery religions. Both sought salvation through fanciful mythology, secret rites, and the magical charm of unintelligible names. There is some affinity with the mystery religions also in the writings of the Grecian Jew who wrote the epistle to the Hebrews, where Christ is conceived as the great High Priest who by his perfect sacrifice of Himself atones for man's sins and makes perpetual intercession to God for His Grace in man's salvation. But these views were in the periphery rather than in the center of the main stream of the Christian tradition in its subsequent development.

¹⁵ The Apologists sought salvation from demons and immortality from death by faith, obedience, and knowledge of God's unity, character and will. Irenaeus agreed that only God could make possible the security of salvation. Origen, Chrysostom, and Pelagius maintained that man has some freedom in God's plan for his salvation; but Augustine emphasized God's absolute sovereignty and His will-to-pardon. Many of the early Christian fathers thought that Christ paid a ransom to Satan to release man from his power.

Among the Scholastics Anselm and Aquinas emphasized that God was satisfied by Christ's sacrifice following the outrage of man's sin because of Christ's perfection. God's honor having been preserved, He was willing to forgive and accept the repentant sinner. Whereas Socinians insisted that Christ died to assure us of God's forgiveness and furnish us an example of obedience, Grotius held that Christ died in the interest of the divine government that would save the world. The necessary satisfaction to God of Christ's sacrifice (Anselm) was reconceived by Abelard in terms of God's love which made it possible that all men could become sons of God. It was this moral theory of the atonement that was advocated later by Ritschl. The earlier emphasis upon propitiation of God was thus gradually replaced by the idea of reconciliation of man to God.

¹⁶ Barth, *The Doctrine of the Word of God*, 530. Although we share the views of the liberal theologians who revolt against this orthodox tradition which undermines the social efforts of Christianity today, we must confess that modernism is not a representative expression of Christian belief, historically speaking. Since the doctrinal basis for liberalism is not clearly defined, it is difficult to present a quotation which fairly represents the views of all of its advocates. The essential principles, however, are expressed in Channing's *Unitarian Christianity* which was written during the 19th century specifically as a polemic against the orthodox view of Puritanism:

"We believe that no dispositions infused into us without our own moral activity are of the nature of virtue, and therefore we reject the doctrine of irresistible divine influence on the human mind, moulding it into goodness as marble is hewn into a statue. Such goodness, if this word may be used, would not be the object of moral approbation, any more than the instinctive affections of inferior animals, or the constitutional amiableness of human beings. () By these remarks, we do not mean to deny the importance of God's aid or Spirit; but by his Spirit we mean a moral, illuminating, and persuasive influence, not physical, not compulsory, not involving a necessity of virtue. We object, strongly, to the idea of many Christians respecting man's impotence and God's irresistible agency on the heart, believing that they subvert our responsibility and the laws of our moral nature, that they make men machines, that they cast on God the blame of all evil deeds, that they discourage good minds, and inflate the fanatical with wild conceits of immediate and sensible inspirations." (See Muelder and Sears, *Development of American Philosophy*, 126.)

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¹⁷ See Knudson, *The Doctrine of Redemption*, 282. Macintosh's statement in *Theology as an Empirical Science*, 132 also expresses this belief: "Salvation or redemption is always, from the standpoint of experimental religion, deliverance from evil, actual or potential, through the divine agency."

¹⁸ Hocking supports this interpretation: "Confucius was reticent about religion (and still more so about metaphysics); but he was far from being without it. He conceived righteousness and its spread as a cosmic demand." (*Living Religions and a World Faith*, 70.)

¹⁹ *Analects*, 15: 20.

²⁰ *Tao Teh King* 62: 1, 4. Hume quotes this passage in TLR, with "The Supreme" in place of the technical Chinese designation "The Tao" which we have preserved here.

Moore supports our claim that Taoism is a religion: "Yet though, from the point of view of the established religion primitive Taoism was pure irreligion, it was itself a religion in a higher sense—a way by which man might attain perfect blessedness. When the universal law is the law of his being, he is one with the universe; having emptied himself, he is filled with the fullness of the transcendent Tao. There is the glow of mystic emotion in the contemplation of the Tao which shows that in his metaphysics Lao-tse found the eternal satisfactions of religion." (HR [I], 55-56.)

²¹ Svetasvatara Upanishad 1.8, 10, 11. This quoted by Hume, TLR, 55.

²² Moore, BGR, 160-161. Deussen explains man's part in this process more explicitly, as follows: "From the man who enters upon the pursuit of the higher knowledge there is demanded study of the Veda and the four requisites: distinguishing between eternal and perishable substance; renunciation of the enjoyment of reward here and hereafter; attainment of the six means; longing for emancipation. The six means are, tranquility; control of passions; renunciation; patient endurance; concentration; and faith. Besides these requisites, commonly enumerated in the instruction of the schools, two other means serve in a general way to promote knowledge: works and meditation." (*Outline of the Vedānta System of Philosophy, according to Shankara*, 41.)

²³ Deussen, OV, 39-40.

²⁴ Deussen, OV, 44-45.

²⁵ Uttara-Dhyāna Sūtra 23.33. Quoted by Hume, TLR, 56.

²⁶ Davids, *Buddhism, Its History and Literature*, 39. Davids makes clear the view of the universe which Buddha presupposes here in his other work, *A Sketch of the Life and Teaching of Gautama, the Buddha*, 88: "The whole kosmos—earth, and heavens, and hells—is always tending to renovation or destruction; is always in a course of change, a series of revolutions, or of cycles, of which the beginning and the end alike are unknowable and unknown. To this universal law of composition and dissolution, men and gods form no exception; the unity of forces which constitutes a sentient being must sooner or later be dissolved; and it is only through ignorance and delusion that such a being indulges in the dream that it is a separate and self-existent entity."

²⁷ Moore, BGR, 152.

²⁸ Iti-vuttaka 34. Quoted by Hume, TLR, 54.

²⁹ Davids, BHL, 163-164.

³⁰ We have followed Davids, BLT, 108 and BHL, 137-138 here. Moore, HR (I), 294-295 offers a slightly different translation of the Eight Fold Path, but the meaning is practically the same.

³¹ That from which man is saved has been analyzed by Buddha into the ten errors or evil states of mind which he has designated as the Fetters: (i) Delu-

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sion of self, (ii) Doubt, (iii) Dependence on works, (iv) Sensuality, (v) Hatred, (vi) Love of life on earth, (vii) Desire for life in heaven, (xiii) Pride, (ix) Self-righteousness, and (x) Ignorance. See Davids, BLT, 109-110.

³² BLT, 111-112.

³³ BGR, 155.

³⁴ Moore, BGR, 158.

³⁵ Moore, HR (I), 135-136, has a passage which is instructive here: "As a system of salvation by grace through faith, the Pure Land sects have an obvious resemblance to Christianity, which appears the more striking in contrast to what we may call the orthodox Buddhism of the Holy Way. The virtual monotheism, especially of the Shinshe; the emphasis of man's inability to achieve salvation by his own powers, his dependence on the power of another; the infinite compassion of Amida, who before innumerable ages provided this way by which even the weakest and the most ignorant and the greatest sinners may be saved; faith in Amida's gracious purpose to save all as the essence of religion; gratitude as the spring at once of piety and morality—such are the salient points of comparison. To not a few students it has seemed that a teaching so widely at variance, not only with primitive Indian Buddhism but with its later developments, and so closely akin to Christianity, (more accurately to certain types of Protestantism) not in certain isolated features but in a whole complex of fundamental ideas, can only be explained by Christian influence. The age of the Pure Land sects excludes the possibility of contact with Christianity in Japan."

³⁶ Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, VII, 28. See Chapter II for a discussion of the Socratic principle of self-knowledge and spiritual self-realization that influenced the Stoics. The Platonic and Aristotelian views are discussed in Chapter VIII.

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